REPRESENTING THE SYMPOSION : IDENTITY AND PERFORMANCE IN THE 'SYMPOSIA' OF PLATO AND XENOPHON

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

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Representing the *Symposion*.

Identity and Performance in the *Symposia* of Plato and Xenophon

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Abstract

This thesis contends that to uncover the 'real' *symposion* from its literary and artistic representations is a difficult task. Every representation of the *symposion* is informed by its author's wider textual ambitions. Its shape, the roles it plays, and the meanings it conveys are all determined by considerations other than providing an authentic snapshot of sympotic life.

However, by acknowledging and investigating these authorial strategies, it might just be possible to catch a glimpse of the event they purport to represent, as this close reading of the *Symposia* of Plato and Xenophon aims to show. For, at the heart of Plato and Xenophon's ambitions lies an interest in the protocols and procedures of the *symposion*, even as these are shaped for philosophical ends.

Chasing the *symposion* via this route will lead us into a world of philosophy and education, where the democratic city clashes with and is subsumed into processes of elite self-fashioning. The performances in Plato's idealised *symposion* are *epideixeis* which affirm (at the same time as they open up and explore) their performers' claims to be well-educated, *symposion*-going *kaloi kagathoi*. By contrast, the *epideixeis* of Xenophon's symposiasts take part in a discussion of *kalokagathia*, and suggest how the *symposion* might (or might not) facilitate its learning. Both Plato and Xenophon are concerned with the *symposion* as a location for *kalokagathia* and with *kalokagathia* as a *process*.

In its quest for the *symposion*, this thesis uncovers two distinct, but related, conceptions of the *symposion* and suggests some new ways of reading Plato and Xenophon's *Symposia*. For Plato, the *symposion* operates alongside

the more traditionally 'philosophical' content of his dialogue. By contrast, Xenophon imposes his writerly agenda on top of his *symposion*, extolling the merits of his textual *Symposium* over the *symposion*.

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Acknowledgements

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As this thesis has progressed, my mum, dad and brother Iain have been alongside me every step of the way, sharing in my tears, joy and frustration. I can only begin to express my gratitude for their unwavering love and support (and my mum's proof-reading skills!). Special thanks are due also to Andrew Clark, my well-shod Socrates; and to Ian Grey, whose warmth and affection have made the final stages of this project that bit easier to bear.

I have had the good fortune to share my postgraduate years with Ralph Covino, Craig Galbraith, Yukiko Saito and John Serrati, whose laughter will continue to light up my life for many years to come. I would also like to thank the many other postgraduates who have crossed the threshold of Craigard 32, in particular Joanne Walker and Eilidh Macleod, for their friendship and encouragement.. Finally, I would like to extend my gratitude and best wishes to

all members of the School of Greek, Latin and Ancient History which has nurtured me for the better part of a decade. I will look back on my time there with the fondest and best of memories.

Preliminary Notes

References to ancient names and works are made according to the list of 'Authors and Works' set out in *A Greek-English Lexicon Compiled by Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott*, revised and augmented by H. Jones and R. McKenzie (Oxford, 1968), xvi-xxxviii.

Abbreviated titles of modern journals are cited in accordance with the 'Liste des Périodiques Dépouillés' in *L'Année Philologique*, volume 71 (Paris, 2000), xxi-xlvii.

References to the *Symposia* of Plato and Xenophon are taken from the recent editions by C. J. Rowe (1998) and A. Bowen (1998) respectively. Both derive their text from the relevant *Oxford Classical Text* (Burnet, 1901; and Marchant, 1921), but modify it to take into account changes suggested by subsequent scholarship. In addition, for Plato's *Symposium*, I have consulted Dover (1980), and Robin (Budé, 1989); and for Xenophon's *Symposium*, I have referred to Thalheim (Teubner, 1915) and Ollier (Budé, 1961).

Finally, the *Symposia* of Plato and Xenophon (like other authors and their works) will be given their traditional Latin title – the *Symposium*. However, the *symposion* will be transliterated in its hellenised form, as will Greek value-terms and other cultural phenomena. This not only follows common usage, but highlights the distinction between text and institution which underlies my approach. All Greek transliterations are made in their nominative or infinitive forms.

Introduction

Parties are a popular object of cultural debate in twenty-first century Britain. They are in our theatres (*Abigail's Party*, Whitehall Theatre, London), on our television screens (*The Dinner Party Inspectors*, C4; *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner?*, BBC2) and (we are told) in our homes. Self-styled party experts like Paul Burrell, Victoria Mather and Meredith Etherington Smith are all on hand to teach us how to entertain with style.[1] They give us advice on how to plan our parties, who to invite and how to invite them, what food and drinks we should serve, and how we should behave.[2] At the heart of this popular interest and introspection lies a voyeuristic interest in what takes place in the dining rooms of our fellow Britons, and an anxiety about what goes on behind our own closed

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[1] Burrell, 1999. Victoria Mather and Meredith Etherington Smith are the etiquette experts in *Dinner Party Inspectors*; cf. note 3, below.

[2] See Burrell, 1999: 8, whose wonderfully unironic *Entertaining With Style* reinforces the notion that there are correct ways of entertaining, and that anyone can entertain correctly with just a little help from the experts. The former butler to Diana, Princess of Wales, writes 'style is not the exclusive preserve of the rich and famous. Style can be achieved by anyone and is often most effective when simply executed. We all entertain; it may be as simple as inviting a friend for lunch or dinner at home, as special as a family gathering at Christmas, a christening or a wedding, or as challenging as a children's party. Whether we entertain on a simple level or with lavish flair depends on our individual style and how we want to show our hospitality, and also on the strength of our budget ... I will take you through the steps to ensure that your party is a success'. Cue advice on planning, selecting drinks, good manners and some menu suggestions which change according to the different seasons.

doors.[3] These plays, books and television programmes tell us that (we should care that) there are right and wrong ways of doing a party and demand we (know it is socially important to) ask how to throw a party, how to behave at one, and what makes a party a failure or a success.

Mike Leigh's improvised television drama *Abigail's Party* opens up the party to this kind of critique.[4] The viewer is invited into one middle-class, suburban living room, where Beverley and her husband Laurence are hosting a party for their neighbours. Yet, while the hosts try to supply the right drinks, play the right music, and make polite conversation, their efforts are painfully undermined from within. Marital unhappiness, snobbery, sexual infidelity and violence permeate the conversations, and eventually spill over into the party itself, bringing discomfort, anger and, finally, death. As the horror of this event unfolds, another party, Abigail's party, takes place next door. The audience's experience of this event is constructed entirely through the observations made by Beverley and her guests regarding what they imagine should be, and is, going on there. The two parties stand against one another, acting as testimony to the

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[3] These concerns are clear from Dorota Nosowicz's review in OTV 8 June 2003, page 21. on *The Dinner Party Inspectors*, which belongs to the currently fashionable television genre of 'reality TV meets self-help manual': 'Social commentator Victoria Mather and society hostess Meredith Etherington Smith are the 'dinner party inspectors' analysing six dinner parties – each with a purpose. First in line is Jamie, professional solo cellist and foodie, who is introducing his long-lost sister to his closest friends for the first time. What follows is an, at times, embarrassing, funny and competitive evening, during which our commentators, who are watching remotely from a spare bedroom, show us how Jamie's guests commit all sorts of appalling social faux pas. Some excruciating moments and hilarious commentary. Great fun'.

[4] Originally televised in 1984.

transgressive potential of a social gathering fuelled by alcohol, and the need for it to be contained. This anxiety is embodied in the figure of Abigail's mother whose concern for her daughter's party mounts as Beverley's party spirals out of control.

The social components of the party as a place where friends, family and acquaintances come together under specific (quasi-)ritual circumstances to eat, drink and communicate makes the party a prime target for anthropological investigations too. Focusing on the communal nature of eating and drinking, anthropologists define it as a 'rite of commensality', which Grignon describes as 'a gathering aimed to accomplish in a collective way some material tasks and symbolic obligations linked to the satisfaction of a biological individual need'.[5] As Grignon shows, these 'material tasks and symbolic obligations' not only establish communality between guests (as the studies found in Douglas' collection on *Constructive Drinking* show), but also involve the construction of identity through opposition, separation and segregation.[6] By coming together to eat and/or drink, party-goers make statements about themselves as members of their immediate group, and in relation to those who are not present. However, the manner in which they do so is crucial to the identities which are being created and affirmed. For example, in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain, the tea ceremony offered its participants the opportunity to prove to one another that they were ladies or gentlemen.[7] In Japan, participation in the tea ceremony was,

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[5] Grignon, 2001: 24.

[6] Douglas, 1998. Grignon, 2001: 25-31.

[7] Emmerson, 1992: 13. As Emmerson (5) notes, the importance of tea-drinking to this process of self-identity is reflected in its establishment as a common motif in portraits of the rich and aspirational at this time.

and still is, linked intimately to status and identity, where performing the Way of Tea affirms a person's character and, in the wider world, his or her national identity. Moreover, the ceremony itself encourages its practitioners 'to look within, to discover not a new self but the natural self so often covered up by successive layers of civilisation'.[8] As a component of the Buddhist tradition, the Japanese tea ceremony consciously fashions itself as an event for self-discovery and (in Western parlance) identity.[9] These two possible uses of tea and the tea party emphasise the diversity which can exist between superficially similar gatherings grounded in different cultures and eras.[10] Commensality may underlie the various practices which we call 'parties', but to understand the functions they fulfil it is necessary to look at individual examples within their immediate cultural milieu.

Popular interest in the social phenomenon of the party and sociological investigations into it have been accompanied by an increased interest in the Greek drinking party (*symposion*) amongst academics over the past twenty years. Drawing on studies of lyric poetry and anthropological theories on social

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[8] Castile. 1971: 19.

[9] I use the term 'identity' here with caution. The Buddhist idea of a 'natural self' which exists independently of society is quite different to Western understandings of identity as i) something outside of the self, created just as it is imposed by society: cf. Althusser, 1971, Foucault, 1976; ii) coming into existence through the agency of the identifying = identified subject, in other words through the acts of identification: cf. Borch-Jakobsen, 1988; and on self-positioning cf. Hall, 1987; or iii) social performances: cf. Butler, 1999.

[10] See also the essays collected by McDonald, 1994. By focusing on drinking and gender, these articles remind us that the act of drinking is not only determined by the culture of the party at which drinking takes place, but by its cultural significance in wider society.

organisation and communal drinking, Oswyn Murray defined the *symposion* as a rite of commensality and placed it at the heart of aristocratic social relations in the archaic city.[11] Over the next two decades, this *symposion* became the touchstone for further investigations into the drinking party, whether based on Homeric epic, lyric poetry, or Athenian figured vases. The archaic *symposion* emerged as a meeting place for aristocrats to come together, drink, sing, and establish their communality apart from the *polis*. Within this atmosphere, the symposiasts gained the chance to compete with one another, and to explore their identities. The few works which have discussed the institution in the classical period claim variously that it continued unchanged into the fifth century, spread amongst the lower classes, and lost its defining characteristics and social significance at this time.[12]

If anthropological recognition of the limitations of traditional theories of 'commensality' is not enough to suggest Murray's model be reconsidered, then post-structuralist developments in literary theory are. As I will show in chapter 1, some of the readings on which Murray and his successors founded their *symposia* do not stand up to scrutiny. By treating representations of the *symposion* in epic, lyric poetry and art as direct doorways into the past, some scholars denied the poet or painter any intention beyond illustrating reality. They downplayed whatever other ambitions the poet or painter may have had in shaping and creating the event they depict; and they overlooked the possibility

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[11] Murray, 1982, 1983a, and 1983b. All the works mentioned in notes 11-15 will be considered in greater detail in chapter 1.

[12] On the classical *symposion* as i) unchanged from the archaic period, see Murray, 1990c, and Davidson, 1997: 43f; ii) spread amongst lower classes: Fisher, 2000; iii) lost its social significance: Rossi, 1982: 49-50.

that their sympotic representations may have had meanings or purposes beyond revealing the truth.

Stehle's work on sympotic poetry has started to disrupt the standard model of the *symposion*, replacing the happy *hetaireia* with a more ambiguous, disturbing and dangerous event.[13] Moreover, studies of the *symposion* on the comic stage have disclosed how the poet's theatrical and ideological ambitions shaped the dramatised event.[14] For comic playwrights who represented the Greek drinking party, the *symposion* was not a static institution with set sociological functions, but a literary device, and a vehicle for conveying their social concerns.

In this thesis I will turn these observations towards my study of the literary, dramatic and philosophical representations of the *symposion* found in Plato and Xenophon's *Symposia*. Over the past century, Plato's *Symposium* has been approached primarily as evidence for Platonic doctrines. Although the dialogue's dramatic character has long been recognised, no serious attempt has been made to ask what the *symposion*, or the discourses in which it participates, add to the *Symposium*. By contrast, until very recently, the *symposion* provided the primary point of departure for studies of Xenophon's *Symposium*. Its 'true to life' depiction of the drinking party was the only redeeming feature of what was often regarded as an otherwise worthless text.[15] Yet, although this negative assessment of Xenophon's *Symposium* has been successfully challenged, the role

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[13] Stehle, 1999: 213-261. See also the earlier but often conveniently ignored works by Donlan, 1985; Levine, 1985.

[14] For example, Bowie, 1997; Pütz, 2000; Wilkins, 2000: 202-222 .

[15] Guthrie, 1969: 341-344. Discussed in chapter 4, page 155, below.

of the *symposion* in the *Symposium* has not yet been fully reassessed. Like the party at Agathon's house, Xenophon's *symposion* draws on, and builds into, wider social discourses which give the *symposion* its cultural meaning, and hence, its 'reality'.[16] To represent the *symposion* I must look at these literary and philosophical representations and ask not what happened in the *symposion*, but what meaning it had for Plato and Xenophon, and what meaning they invested in it for their imaginary readers.

Part 1 of this thesis will investigate Plato's representation of the *symposion*, and its role in his *Symposium*. By engaging with Agathon's party as a dramatic performance within the dramatics of his dialogue, I will investigate Plato's ambitions for it as a social phenomenon, and the effects he creates by putting it at the centre of his *Symposium*. This will influence our understanding of the *symposion* and propose an alternative way in which Plato's dialogue might be read. In part 2, I will turn my attention to the *symposion* in Xenophon's text. While Plato presents his readers with a model version of the *symposion*, Xenophon's party critiques itself through the entertainments it offers, the conversations of its guests and the figure of Socrates. The drinking party *chez* Agathon acts as a training ground for *kaloi kagathoi* which informs positively our reading of Plato's *Symposium*. But the events at Callias' house undermine this aspect of the *symposion*, and promote Xenophon's text over the party itself as a place for learning *kalokagathia*.

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[16] I use the term 'discourse' in the Foucauldian sense of 'practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak': see Foucault, 1972: 49. The relationship which Foucault envisages between discourses and reality are discussed by Mills, 1997: 48-77.

The dynamics of viewing and performing will be central to these investigations. Plato sets up his *symposion* as a staged performance, with repercussions both for the symposiasts who attend it and for the reader-viewer of the *Symposium*. The symposiasts perform for, watch and test one another, whilst the reader-viewer observes this going on. Chapter 2 will ask what role this focus plays in Plato's *symposion*, and how it affects our understanding of it. This will be followed in chapter 3 by a close study of one particular performance, Pausanias' encomium of Eros. Like the other speeches in Plato's *Symposium*, Pausanias' encomium opens up its performer to the gaze and judgement of his fellow symposiasts (and the *Symposium*'s reader-viewer). By reading the speech as part of the sympotic experience, rather than a philosophically defective account of *erōs*, I will investigate how Plato presents one symposiast negotiating the demands of the *symposion*.

Viewing and performance also define Xenophon's *symposion*. However, as part of its self-critique, the *symposion* takes advantage of its performances to assess the place and value of viewing and performing in the *symposion*. As chapter 4 will show, these performances create a hierarchy into which different entertainments and different entertainers must fit. Moreover, in both *Symposia*, the processes of viewing and performing are allied to the negotiation of identity. The participants in Plato's *Symposium* shape their performances as *epideixeis*, or proofs, of their status as *kaloi kagathoi*. In Judith Butler's words, the actions and speeches of the *symposion* are 'performative'.[17] Through their individual and group performances, the symposiasts create the very identities they hope to

[17] On performativity, see Butler, 1990, 1993, and 1999, whose ideas are considered from a sympotic perspective on pages 57-58 (chapter 1), 85 (chapter 2) and 201-202 (chapter 4).

confirm. In doing so, they expose this identity to renegotiation. The competitive and communal elements of the *symposion*, which will be discussed in chapter 2, facilitate this process. The speech of Pausanias therefore provides an interesting insight into how the symposiast might seek to affirm and recreate his identity as *kalos kagathos* in the *symposion*.

The events of Xenophon's *symposion* are also 'performative' (in Butler's sense of the word). However, Xenophon is more explicitly concerned with his symposiasts' performances as a means of *exploring kalokagathia*. In chapter 4, we will discover that the uninvited laughter-maker and hired dancing troupe are as vital to this process as the invited guests. Their performances offer the viewing symposiasts a means of reassessing and exploring their own self-conceptions. Like Pausanias, and Plato's other symposiasts, Callias' guests ground their *kalokagathia* in their performances. But moreover, as chapter 6 will show, they link their personae as *kaloi kagathoi* explicitly to their ability to teach *kalokagathia*. Xenophon's symposiasts are *kaloi kagathoi*, and in being *kaloi kagathoi* they (should) teach one another *kalokagathia*.

However, at the same time as Xenophon produces a *symposion* in which *kaloi kagathoi* teach one another to be better men, he undermines the symposiasts' ability to do this. Socrates is the symposiarch of Xenophon's *symposion*: he sets the pattern of drinking for the evening, and co-ordinates the entertainments. However, in chapter 5, I will emphasise the differences between the *symposion* Socrates tries to create, and the *symposion* which actually takes place. Moreover, despite his leading role, Socrates stands outside of the *symposion*. He is a *gelōtopoios*, and a *spoudaiogeloios*; he makes laughter, and at the same time mediates its dangers through his serious jokes. Xenophon

creates the impression that without Socrates the *symposion* would spiral out of control, and the teaching, learning and exploration of *kalokagathia* would fall by the way.

The potential failings of the *symposion* as an educational model are further highlighted through the performances of the symposiasts. Taking the speeches of Niceratus, Critoboulus and Charmides as examples, chapter 6 will show how Xenophon sets up a model for learning *kalokagathia* which demonstrates the symposiasts' failure to live up to Socrates' ideal. The *symposion* offers its participants the opportunity to mingle and improve themselves by association with other *kaloi kagathoi*. However, the calibre of the *kaloi kagathoi* means that this ideal is never brought to fruition. In answer to Lycon's question, where might one learn *kalokagathia*, Xenophon answers emphatically 'not in the *symposion*'. Rather, it is Xenophon's text, the *Symposium*, as a literary and philosophical representation of the *symposion*, which fulfils this function. Its structure and contents invite the reader to assess the merits, or otherwise, of the *symposion*, and suggest that reading Xenophon's *Symposium* offers a more profitable route to *kalokagathia* than participating in real-life versions of the event it depicts.

In short, Plato and Xenophon offer models of sympotic life which are shaped by their philosophical and literary ambitions for the *symposion* and for their *Symposia*. Like twentieth-century playwrights and anthropologists, they are sociologists of the *symposion*, who explore its social dynamics and potential functioning. But this project is contained by their desire to present a (philosophically) ideal way of doing a *symposion*, or reading a *Symposium*. My thesis presents a new theoretical approach for interpreting literary representations

of the *symposion* which puts the textual strategies which lie behind these representations at the heart of its analysis. This methodology uncovers how ancient Greeks may have thought about the *symposion*, or envisaged it functioning on a sociological level, and how they could manipulate its representations for literary and philosophical ends. By remaining alert to the problems of using literature as a direct source of historical evidence, I hope to tie down the classical *symposion* in a new way.

Chapter 1: Approaching the *Symposion*. Some Methodological Considerations

For scholars of the ancient world, the *symposion* has long been a recognised feature of Greek life.[1] However, developments in our understanding of the phenomenon over the past century or so have been slow, gradual and determined to a large degree by scholarly interest in other areas. From Reitzenstein's study of *Epigramm und Skolion* through to Vetta's collection of articles on *Poesia e Simposio nella Grecia Antica*, the *symposion* emerges as a self-standing institution because of its function as a place where *skolia*, lyric poetry and elegy were performed.[2] However, in the 1980s, the *symposion* underwent a period of historicisation. Influenced by anthropological investigations into social organisations and rites of commensality, Murray focused on the social construction, operation and function of the aristocratic drinking group.[3] The poetry of the *symposion* combined with other elements of the sympotic

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[1] See. for example, Reitzenstein, 1893; Burckhardt, 1957; Jacobsthal, 1912; Von der Mühll, 1975.

[2] Reitzenstein, 1893; Vetta, 1983. The influence of this trend is apparent in Rossi, 1982. His study of 'Il simposio greco arcaico e classico come spettacolo a se stesso', which treats the archaic *symposion* as if it gained its meaning solely through the performance of poetry. On this reading, when poetry supposedly faded into the background of sympotic experience in the classical period, the *symposion* ceased to exist: cf. Rossi, 1982: 50.

[3] See Murray, 1982: 47-48; 1983b: 197, 199; 1990b: 3-5; and 1995a: 9ff. Nowadays Murray, 2003: 14-15, recognises the role these theories played in his investigations twenty years ago. He further attributes his approach, which I will analyse below, to a tacit acceptance of the Marxist-materialist requirement that all cultural and aristic products be viewed as direct consequences of social forces. Hence, his *symposion* became linked to exploitation and modes of production.

experience to create an institution of political, sociological and psychological import.

Although not everybody agreed with this interpretation, Murray's work freed the *symposion* from the constraints of lyric poetry and provided an opportunity for scholarship on it to flourish.[4] On the one hand attempts were made to uncover the format of the Greek drinking party and its sociological functions more fully. And on the other hand, it became the subject for socio-historical investigations into homosexuality and pederasty, the status of women, and Greek aristocratic concerns.[5] That the *symposion* could be turned to this end was itself a consequence of academic developments: women's studies and gender theory had made their mark on classical scholarship via the efforts of Pomeroy and Dover, who put women and homosexuality on the agenda for a new generation of ancient historians.[6] The archaeology, literature, poetry and art of the *symposion* were called upon to illuminate the sociological questions now being asked.

Thus, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, it is impossible to talk of the *symposion* as 'gemütliche Trinken in frölicher Gesellschaft', as Pauly and Wissowa's *Real-Encyclopädie* once did.[7] The 'modern' *symposion* is an 'institution' with clearly definable traits and purposes. Although some debate exists over its social composition in the classical period, the *symposion* is

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[4] On opposition to Murray's model *symposion*, see pages 23ff and 47-49. below.

[5] A quick glance at the contents of three recent collections on the *symposion*, namely Murray 1990a, Slater, 1991 and Murray and Teçusan, 1995, will show the extent to which these questions dominate contemporary scholarship.

[6] Pomeroy, 1975; Dover, 1989 (first edition 1978).

[7] Pauly and Wissowa, 1893-1978: II.4, 1267.

accepted as a closed affair and a rite of commensality. With wine as its catalyst, it offered participants the opportunity to explore and affirm their identities individually, within the sympotic community, and in relation to society at large. By examining contributions to this view of the *symposion* as a historical institution of sociological and psychological import, I will investigate their methodological approaches. In particular, I will consider whether the questions they ask, and the answers they give, can be justified in light of the poetic and artistic evidence they use.

Historians and the *Symposion.*

Until the developments outlined above took hold, the *symposion* remained a recognised but often neglected aspect of Greek society. Studies of aristocratic lifestyles might have broadly acknowledged it as a component of everyday aristocratic life, but despite a 1926 lecture by Von der Mühll, finally published in 1957, interest in the event itself remained low.[8] However, as just discussed, a combination of scholarly trends permitted Murray to help rescue the *symposion* from obscurity and place it at the heart of investigations into feasting and drinking in the ancient world. The *symposion* also came to the attention of

[8] Von der Mühll. 1975 (originally published in 1957). In his study of Athenian society and Aristophanic comedy, Ehrenberg, 1943: 73-85, esp. 78-80, included the *symposion* amongst a number of defining aristocratic activities without any great thought. Donlan, 1999: 155-178, also placed the *symposion* in this context, although he viewed it from a sociological and functional perspective, implicating it in 'the conscious fostering of a particular manner of life' by which Athens' upper class created an image of itself as different from and better than its fellow citizens. But despite this intriguing conclusion, Donlan chose not to investigate how exactly the *symposion* fulfilled this role.

Schmitt-Pantel, who drew it into the civic realm of the *polis*.[9] Together, these two scholars produced a blue-print for the archaic *symposion* which has influenced other historians seeking to understand its role in the archaic and classical city. However, their use of literary and artistic evidence creates problems for their attempts to investigate the *symposion* as a social and historical institution. Yet, their approach derives in part from earlier efforts to understand the *symposion* which tackled the evidence in similar ways.

In his 1978 teaching pamphlet, Vickers outlined a picture of the *symposion* which reflected the general impression of it established by the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century German-speaking scholars Burckhardt and Von der Mühll.[10] Burckhardt based his *symposion* on Plutarch's *Seven Sages*, 'welches in seiner späten Fiktion das Kostüm einer sehr alten Periode durchzuführen sucht'.[11] Eating, drinking, flute-playing, mixing wine, religious ritual and the act of reclining were placed alongside conversation as the *symposion*'s key components.[12] Topics of conversation and an atmosphere of wit, joking, dispute, malice and amiability were uncovered through the poetry of Theognis and Xenophanes and artistic representations of the banquet on painted vases, and in funeral and cultic reliefs.[13] Thinking more about its historical development, Von der Mühll constructed the *symposion* as an originally Eastern, ritualised occasion attended by the nobility, and related to the numerous other

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[9] Schmitt-Pantel. 1990. 1992.

[10] Vickers, 1978.

[11] Burckhardt, 1957: 144.

[12] Burckhardt, 1957: 144-145.

[13] Burckhardt, 1957: 146.

Greek festivals and *thiasoi* (religious groups) centred on eating and drinking.[14] In addition, he scoured archaic poetry and classical literature for evidence of the actual sympotic experience, drawing from them depictions of the entertainments on offer, the games played, and the rules of drinking followed there.[15] For Burckhardt and Von der Mühll, descriptions of feasting and drinking in Homer, the archaic poets, and the literary *Symposia* of Plato, Xenophon and Plutarch were undistorted reflections of real-life events, unmediated by genre or authorial design.

Despite recognising the difficulties involved in viewing the world of Homer as a reflection of any historical culture, Murray has few misgivings about equating Homeric society with eighth-century Greece.[16] Hence, where Von der Mühll rejects any continuity between the seated banquets found in epic poetry and the reclining banquets of the archaic period on the basis of their differing forms, Murray finds a connection in their social functions.[17] Under the influence of structuralist theory and anthropological studies on rites of commensality and the 'Männerbund' (men's group/bond) he identifies the 'feast of merit' depicted in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* as a predecessor for the archaic and classical *symposion*.[18] These feasts were not merely occasions for eating and drinking, but

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[14] Von der Mühll, 1975: 486, 488-489.

[15] Von der Mühll, 1975: 490-495.

[16] Murray, 1983b: 198.

[17] Von der Mühll, 1975: 483-487; Murray, 1983a: 259ff; 1983b: *passim.*; 1995a: 221-224.

[18] Murray has been particularly influenced in his understanding of Homeric banquets as 'feasts of merit' by Jones, 1974. The Homeric 'feast of merit' is discussed in Murray, 1980: 47-52; 1983a: 259-262; 1983b: 196-197; 1995a: 224.

'a structural element within Homeric society'.[19] The 'feast of merit' combined the fostering of bonds of solidarity and obligation amongst leaders and their warbands (or Männerbünde) with the conscious display of agricultural surplus. Thus, Homeric feasting was a central component of aristocratic competition for honour (*timē*).[20]

However, investigations into Homeric epic as the written culmination of centuries of on-going oral composition have led others to ask whose world the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* reflect.[21] Continuing Parry and Lord's comparative approach, Morris suggested that on the basis of contemporary oral traditions, the world portrayed by Homer was the era in which he lived. It might have been modified by the poet's distancing techniques, but it was essentially a poetic representation of eighth-century Greece.[22] Thus, Morris successfully critiques the arguments of Finley and Snodgrass, who identify the 'Homeric world' with tenth- and ninth-century Greece and as a pastiche of artificial elements respectively.[23] However, his own conclusions are not water-tight. Morris' equation of Homer's world with the eighth-century depends on dating the writing down of the epics to

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[19] Murray. 1983b: 196.

[20] The creation of bonds between warriors: Murray, 1983a: 260; 1983b: 196; 1991: 83-84; 1995a: 220; 1995b: 5. On the warband as the sociological phenomenon of the 'Männerbund', see Murray, 1982: 50-51. Agricultural surplus and competition for *timē*: Murray, 1983a: 260; 1983b: 196-197; 1990b: 3-4; 1995a: 219.

[21] Parry, 1987; Lord, 1960. For a substantial bibliography on the topic of using Homer as evidence for social history, see Morris, 1986: 130-138. Osborne, 1996: 367-368, provides a list of more recent books and articles.

[22] Morris, 1986.

[23] Morris, 1986: 95-115. See Finley, 1977, and Snodgrass 1974.

this period; yet, recent research favours a seventh- or sixth-century date.[24] Moreover, his claim that 'non-literate societies float in a kind of perpetual present', and therefore the institutions of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* must be derived from the poet and his audience's world, does not hold up to scrutiny.[25] Morris argues that the technique of epic distancing, which involved 'archaising' features of everyday life as well as inventing and presenting 'Heroic man' as superior to his modern counterpart, allowed the poet to make Homeric society recognisable to, but different from, that of his audience. He remarks that 'vanished institutions with no present referent could mean nothing'.[26] However, if fifth- and fourth-century audiences could accept the heroic feasts of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* as features of the distant past, when 'feasts of merit' were not practised, there is no reason that Homer's immediate audience would need to see their own habits reflected for the poems to 'make sense'. As Osborne notes, 'the places and objects described in the poems will in many cases have been entirely unfamiliar to any audience of the Homeric poems. Such descriptions owe their existence in the poems not to the pleasure of a shock of recognition, but to the ability to conjure up a lost world which stimulated critical thought about the present situation'.[27] By attempting to find eighth-century *symposia* in the feasting halls of Homeric epic, Murray avoids thinking about the relationship

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[24] For example, Burgess, 2001: 49-53 convincingly dates the writing down of the Homeric poems to at least the seventh century, if not later, while Nagy, 1996: 42-43 and 108-109, posits an initial date of c.550 BC, but notes that the text continued to be altered down until the second century.

[25] Morris, 1986: 87.

[26] Morris, 1986: 89-90; 90.

[27] Osborne, 1996: 147.

between text and reality. Yet, the feasting which took place in the house of Odysseus and in the mess tents of the *Iliad* may have gained its reality in the imaginations of its audience alone.

This methodological question remains an issue when Murray bridges the gap between Homeric feasting and the archaic *symposion* by turning to political and social developments in the seventh and sixth centuries. The rise of the hoplite soldier and the spread of wealth and political power amongst larger sections of *polis* populations reduced the 'feast of merit' from a building block of wealth and stability in the community to a private, inward-looking gathering of aristocrats, detached from the wider *polis*.[28] The men who came together to drink were no longer defenders of the community but 'an aristocracy of leisure'. Under these new political conditions 'the *symposion* became a refuge from the real world, an escape into entertainment and luxury for its own sake'.[29] This postulated connection between the shift in political and monetary capital and the emergence of the *symposion* enables Murray to explain the differences between the old 'feasts of merit' and the new, exclusive gatherings. Moreover it allows him to extend his psychological profiling of the earlier event into the archaic *symposion*. Solidarity and bonding were still key aspects of the sympotic experience; however, they were redirected according to the new political and social requirements of the archaic city.

By linking the *symposia* implied by the poetry of Alcaeus with the accepted picture of political upheaval and social change in the Greek world, Murray finds an explanation for why the *symposion* of the archaic period is

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[28] On the value of the Männerbund to its community, see Murray, 1980: 51-52.

[29] Murray, 1983b: 196; 198. See also, Murray, 1982: 51; 1983a: 263; 1995a: 224ff.

different from its Homeric 'predecessor'. This allows him to depict the new *symposion* as a direct descendant of the feast of merit.[30] He justifies his use of Homeric evidence for 'real societies' by stating that this evidence 'seems to relate to and confirm the picture of the importance of the *symposion* in the Archaic period'.[31] Yet, in the very next sentence he states 'the development of the [archaic] *symposion* out of the Homeric feast shows the same type of social change that we find elsewhere'.[32] Thus, his picture of Homeric feasting derives from the archaic *symposion*, which in turn derives from the Homeric event.

This circular thinking is also reflected in Murray's understanding of the development of the *symposion* within the archaic period. Maintaining a level of gross generality, Murray argues that the shift in political power in Greek *poleis* away from the aristocracy and towards a broader segment of the population led the aristocracy to withdraw from society. The *symposion*, as part of the aristocratic lifestyle, 'became enclosed within itself, no longer relevant to wider social functions' and provided aristocrats with an escape from *polis* life.[33] At the same time, Murray remarks that 'the ritual of the *symposion* also of course became more diffused, as the new military class took on the attitudes of the old, and even intruded itself into the public sphere'.[34] In effect, he claims that there were two *symposia*: one attended by the old aristocracy, and one where newly enfranchised hoplites met. Yet, every one of his articles on the *symposion* talks

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[30] This picture of the changing archaic world was established by Murray, 1980, but has recently been developed more fully by Morris, 1996, Osborne, 1996, and Kurke, 1999.

[31] Murray, 1983b: 198.

[32] Murray, 1983b: 198.

[33] Murray, 1983b: 198; cf. Murray, 1983a: 263.

[34] Murray, 1983b: 198; cf. Murray, 1982: 50-51.

about the institution as a purely aristocratic phenomenon. Wishing to tie his own *symposion* into anthropological studies of the Männerbund, he remarks 'in the case of Greece I see the phenomenon as closely tied to the needs, aims and life-style of the aristocracy'.[35] The hoplite *symposion* which 'of course' developed with the diffusion of political power is either quietly merged into the aristocratic event, or surreptitiously ignored.

Murray's blind-spot regarding the non-aristocratic *symposion* is in part due to his selection and interpretation of the evidence available for the archaic event. The poetry of Theognis, Alcaeus, Archilochus, and Anacreon is interpreted as products of aristocratic society. Hence, when Murray reads Alcaeus' vitriol against Pittacus he generalises this theme to imply the Greek *symposion* was the preserve of discontented, disenfranchised aristocrats.[36] However, as Morris has shown, even assuming an exclusively aristocratic venue for the *symposion*, two different political positions are found within archaic poetry.[37] On the one hand, lyric poetry contains heroic themes and values which reflect 'elitist' desires to create and reassert traditional aristocratic authority.[38] On the other, the elegy of Solon, Theognis, Phocylides and Xenophanes reveals a 'middling' tradition, which reflects a 'Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests'.[39] This poetry promotes moderation as the key value of the good

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[35] Murray, 1983b: 198-199.

[36] Murray, 1983b: 198. In this interpretation Murray follows Rösler, 1980: see pages 37-38, below.

[37] Morris, 1996.

[38] Morris, 1996: 31-36.

[39] Morris, 1996: 20, 28-31. Under this principle each citizen receives the right to speak and be heard, but a select group of citizens still takes decisions for the community as a whole.

citizen, and thus allows members of the aristocratic elite to align themselves with their less well-off fellow citizens, whilst asserting their possession of moderation (*sōphrosynē*), virtue (*aretē*), and wisdom (*sophia*), qualities which entitle them to rule.[40] In addition, the poetry of Theognis recognises two different types of *symposion*. Theognis warns his listeners against participating in the *symposia* of the bad (*hoi kakoi*): while attendance at the *symposia* of good men (*hoi esthloi*) benefits the symposiast, he who mixes with the bad will find his mind destroyed.[41] Murray describes the *andrōn*, or men's room, as a place of refuge where the symposiast might escape *polis* life and reinforce his membership of a distinct group based on common political values and trust (*pistis*). He further claims that the function of the sympotic group was to foment 'unity for action within the *polis* in defence of class privileges'. But this picture tells only part of the story.[42] The *symposia* of non-aristocrats and of non-elitist and middling aristocrats remain out of view.

Murray's studies of the archaic *symposion* led the way for other classicists to investigate the *symposion* as a historical institution. However, his methodology has never been questioned and, with only a few exceptions, his conclusions have not been challenged.[43] Thus, his version of the *symposion* continues to provide the standard model on which innovative scholars like James Davidson build their accounts.[44] However, Morris' study of the archaic city emphasises the plurality of experiences and opportunities for self-positioning

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[40] Morris. 1996: 30.

[41] Theognis 31-8 W.

[42] Murray, 1995a: 226.

[43] See note 4, above.

[44] Davidson, 1997: see below, pages 45-47.

available to the Greek aristocrat within the city. It thereby suggests that Murray's *symposion*, where disenfranchised aristocrats gather to define themselves against the *polis*, should not be approached uncritically.

Schmitt-Pantel is one of the few scholars to openly challenge Murray's *symposion*. In *La Cité au Banquet*, she reinscribes the *symposion* with the religious and public elements rejected by Murray, by placing it within the context of public feasting.[45] She collapses the distinction between the private and public spheres, claiming that communal meals and sympotic activity are indissociable forms of commensality in the archaic world.[46] Within the city, public and private forms of commensality are 'plus complémentaires qu'antagonistes'.[47] The author extends this observation into classical Athens where aristocrats continued to gather together, gaining mutual affirmation through their association. But the *symposion* co-existed with a wide range of other activities which involved eating and drinking, for example feasting at the *tholos* and *prytaneion* at state expense. Thus, two systems of feeding the classical community existed. Sacrifice constituted the democratic redistribution of surplus to the *dēmos*, and *symposia* provided occasions for aristocratic redistribution.[48] The aristocratic *symposion*,

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[45] Schmitt-Pantel on Murray: 1992. 46-48.

[46] In her article in *Sympotica*, Schmitt-Pantel, 1990, 25, clarifies her understanding of the distinction between *privé* and *public*: 'I do not mean to cast doubt on the "private" character of the *symposion* in the sense that it was "restricted to some" or "not open to all", but rather on its "private" character in the sense that it was "connected with the world of the private", a notion basically created to oppose that of the "public world" in the sense of the "political world"'.

[47] Schmitt-Pantel, 1992: 484, and 147-202.

[48] Schmitt-Pantel, 1992: 487.

the religious festivals of the *polis* and state provisions for its officers were different manifestations of the same social phenomenon.

Schmitt-Pantel finds a place for the elite *symposion* within the wider community of the *polis*, but her account assumes the integrity of the *symposion* as a closed, aristocratic institution. Like Murray, this assumption affects her analysis of the poetic and artistic material associated with the *symposion*.[49] Both scholars take these as direct evidence for everyday aristocratic life, to the extent that changes in sympotic imagery on Athenian figured vases at the end of the fifth century are for Schmitt-Pantel 'l'écho des transformations sociales dans la cité'.[50] The sources they examine are interpreted as products and reflections of the exclusive aristocratic *symposion*. Their possible circulation at non-aristocratic gatherings and their consumption by, interaction with, and relation to, non-aristocratic symposiasts remain unexplored.

Art and the *Symposion*.

Stein-Hölkeskamp attempts to redress this problem in her article 'Lebensstil als Selbstdarstellung: Aristokraten beim *Symposion*'.[51] By examining a selection of sympotic representations from the repertoire of the vase painter Euphronius, she contends that a decrease in the representation of luxury items, the disappearance of weapons and hunting imagery, and Euphronius' depiction of himself at a

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[49] Schmitt-Pantel's division of poetry depending on the occasion for which it was composed, and of artistic representations of feasting into generic banqueting scenes of aristocratic life, and scenes of the *symposion* presented as a private affair does not change this: Schmitt-Pantel, 1992: 17-41.

[50] Schmitt-Pantel, 1992: 19.

[51] Stein-Hölkeskamp, 1992.

symposion, demonstrate that by the last quarter of the sixth century the *symposion* was no longer an aristocratic affair. By this point, Athens' new political elite had adopted aristocratic practices to strengthen its position.[52] Hence, vase-paintings now reflected the lifestyles of the *nouveau riche*. With this interpretation, Stein-Hölkeskamp confirms the *symposion*'s private role but challenges the notion of its continued importance as an aristocratic phenomenon.[53] Late archaic vases display the comparatively humble lifestyle of the men who use them.

With this approach Stein-Hölkeskamp follows Dentzer and Schmitt-Pantel, who also assume that the feasting and *symposia* depicted on Athenian figured vases reflected reality.[54] However, her conclusions are challenged by the possibility of reading her vases in other ways. Stein-Hölkeskamp assumes that Euphronius' paintings represent the *symposion* exactly as their viewers experienced it: late sixth-century Athenian symposiasts reclined on stripy mattresses rather than couches (*klinai*) in dining rooms devoid of all luxury.[55] However, as Osborne noted with regard to the Homeric world, the *symposion* represented on the vase need not relate precisely to any historical drinking party.[56] Euphronius' *symposia* may be stylised or idealised representations of actual drinking parties, or relate only tendentiously to the real-life event. In this connection, the slaves and low-status men and women who painted Attic pottery were unlikely to have been symposiasts as Murray, Schmitt-Pantel and Stein-

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[52] Stein-Hölkeskamp. 1992: 44.

[53] 'Privatisierung': Stein-Hölkeskamp, 1992: 45.

[54] Dentzer, 1982: 125-126. See also Fehr, 1971.

[55] Stein-Hölkeskamp, 1992: 45.

[56] For Osborne's comment, see above, page 18.

Hölkeskamp imagine them.[57] But, to accept that Euphronius replicated the *symposion* on his vases would be to assert that men and women of all statuses took part in the event, not just the aristocracy or members of the *nouveau riche*. Although Stein-Hölkeskamp wishes to expand the composition of the *symposion* so that it might now include vase painters, she does not address the issue of the painter's probable status; nor does she consider the possibility that Euphronius gave his name to one of his painted symposiasts in order to indulge in a spot of wish-fulfilment, fantasy, irony or humour.[58]

Thus, it is just as likely that the *symposia* which decorate late archaic black-figure vases are products of their painter's imagination and intentions as depictions of actual Greek drinking parties. The painter might represent the *symposion* as a 'hyper-reality', depicting something which is beyond or different to, even whilst it is recognisable as, that event. Alternatively, he might 'other' the *symposion* through the inclusion of satyrs, male-female transvestism, Scythian garb, ugly figures and obscene behaviour in sympotic scenes. Recent studies have suggested that this 'othering' might remove the *symposion* from the real world of the viewer, offering him a platform from which to think about

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[57] Webster, 1972: 4ff, argued that potters and painters could attain high status within Athenian society; however, this proposition is challenged by Williams, 1995: 151ff, who claims that the average pottery factory employed a mixture of metics, slaves and citizens.

[58] For example, Neer, 2002, shows that images of potters at *symposia* echo the playful and competitive atmosphere of the sympotic event. He further ties them into the socio-political upheaval that characterised the late fifth century, arguing that pictures of potters at parties do not so much reflect social upheaval but take part in it: Neer, 2002: 127-128.

himself in relation to the satyric, the feminine, the barbarian, the divine, and the 'other'.[59]

Furthermore, by arguing that mattresses and sparse wall-hangings imply austerity and therefore poverty, Stein-Hölkeskamp imposes her own assumptions about austerity onto the *symposion*. However, the passing of Solon's sumptuary legislation and a move towards less ostentatious grave markers in sixth-century Athens suggest on-going social, moral and political concern with private and public displays of luxury.[60] As Kurke's study of luxury (*habrosynē*) in lyric poetry and elegy indicates, enjoyment of a luxurious, orientalising lifestyle was the cornerstone of aristocratic identity in the seventh century. This developed in reaction to the increased distribution of wealth and political power amongst wider sections of the *polis*.[61] Hence, Sappho's claim to love *habrosunē* is a 'programmatic political statement'.[62] However, Solon's sumptuary legislation and the poetry of Xenophanes reveal that in the sixth century a debate evolved

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[59] On satyrs on Athenian vases, see Lissarrague, 1990, and on transvestism, see Frontisi-Ducroux and Lissarrague, 1990. Kurke, 1992: 97-98, and Dupont, 1999: 69-70, give different interpretations of the images they discuss. Schmitt-Pantel, 1990: 425-470, discusses the banquets of Persians and non-Greeks, as well as of the gods, while Miller, 1995, asks whether symposiasts in Persian hats were exploring their non-Greek side on the pots and in real life. On divine *symposia* on Athenian figured vases see Carpenter, 1995. For the juxtaposition of female-barbarian-satyr on Attic head jugs, read Lissarrague, 1990: 58. Sutton, 2001, discusses ugliness and obscenity in the *symposion*.

[60] Changes in funerary habits are charted by Kurtz and Boardman, 1971, and interpreted by Morris, 1996: 24-25, 39-40 and Osborne, 1996: 312ff, who relate the change in funerary *stelai* to the growth of democracy too.

[61] Kurke, 1992: 94-96.

[62] Kurke, 1992: 96, discussing Sappho 140 L-P.

concerning 'how the wealth of the elite within the polis should be used'.[63] The modernising side of this discourse is also found in several fragments of Solon's poetry, in which the poet returns frequently to the topic of wealth: greedy men threaten to destroy Athena's city, and satiety (*koros*) gives birth to arrogance (*hybris*).[64] Bad men (*hoi kakoi*) are wealthy, while the good (*hoi agathoi*) are poor, but the latter can always count on the wealth of their virtue (*aretē*), whilst money comes and goes.[65] In these poems Solon binds the issue of luxury and elite display within the language of morality: moderation in all things, including feasting and drinking, are the mark of the *anēr agathos*, who does not flaunt his wealth, and is a good and virtuous man.[66] Thus, if Euphronius' sympotic paintings did represent the reality of his drinker's experience (and I have argued

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[63] Kurke. 1992: 103.

[64] Solon 4; 6 W. For a more nuanced understanding of *hybris*, see Fisher, 1992.

[65] Solon 15 W.

[66] In contrast to Kurke,1992: 96, who states that only Xenophanes and Semonides are not uniformly positive in their judgement of *habrosunē*, my reading of Solon's poetry places its author firmly on the side of those who seek to curb excessively luxurious lifestyles amongst his city's aristocracy. The connection Solon makes between *ploutos*, *kakos*, and *hybris* on the one hand, and poverty and *agathos* on the other takes one step further Sappho's (148 L-P) comment that 'wealth (*ploutos*) without excellence (*aretē*) is no undestructive neighbour./ But the mixture of both holds the peak of blessedness' (discussed by Kurke, 101). Solon suggests that wealth and *aretē* cannot be combined in this way. Similarly, in 24 W Solon contrasts a life characterised by gold and silver, land and horses, with that in which filling one's stomach, enjoying a young boy or girl, and one's own youthfulness are more important than wealth. Thus, when he links this latter lifestyle to *habra pathein*, translated by Kurke (93) as 'the good life', he in effect redefines the aristocratic lifestyle of *habrosunē* as one which allows the aristocrat to enjoy the benefits of his status without the excesses of private luxury. On Solon as a poet of the 'middling' tradition, see Morris, 1996: 30.

they did not), the simplicity of the late sixth-century *andrōn* might have reflected political and moral trends towards moderation amongst one section of Athens' aristocratic elite, rather than the assumed relative poverty of its *nouveau riche*.

The above observations show how difficult it is to use the images on sympotic vases as direct evidence for everyday *symposia*. In addition, the relationship between vase-painting and reality is made more difficult by the question of who actually used so-called sympotic vessels. Of the approximately fifty percent of Attic figured vases whose provenance is known, more than eighty percent were found in Etruscan tombs.[67] This fact has opened up a seemingly irresolvable debate over whether Athenian pottery was made explicitly for the export market or reached Etruria, and the various other places around the Mediterranean where pots have been found, second hand.[68] This issue impacts on the extent to which Athenian figured vases can be used as evidence for the *symposion*. If vases were intended for sale outside Athens, were they decorated specifically with this audience in mind? The answer to this question affects the deployment of Athenian figured vases and their iconography as evidence for

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[67] Lewis. 2002.

[68] See Spivey, 1991: 139-141, whose study of amphorae potted and painted by the Nikosthenes group implies that at least some workshops geared their production towards foreign markets. Gill, 1991, disagrees, suggesting instead that Athenian pots were originally made for an Athenian market but that traders exported them as moveable ballast. The idea that breakable ceramic ware would have been carried as ballast has been criticised by Sparkes, 1996: 166, who proposes instead that workshops produced vessels specifically for the export market alongside or independent of those intended for sale. A similar claim is made by Johnston, 1991, whose study of market influences on shapes and decoration concludes that while there was a healthy market for Attic figured vases across the Mediterranean, a second hand trade and home market existed too.

developments in Athenian culture and ideology. For example, Schmitt-Pantel uses the red figure *kylix* Florence 3922, which depicts men reclining, drinking, playing *kottabos*, and listening to a flute boy, as evidence for the practicalities of the Greek banquet.[69] But if this picture was only ever seen, or intended to be seen, by the people who buried it in a tomb in Chiusi, Italy, can it really be taken as an indicator of Greek practice? Similarly, Bremmer's use of 'pederastic courtship scenes' on black- and red-figure vases to support his views of a disintegrating aristocratic archaic world witnessed through erotic practices in the *symposion* becomes problematic.[70]

Even if the original provenance of sympotic scenes in the workshops of the Cerameicus is taken as sufficient to allow analysis of the vases within Athenian culture, a further question remains over which members of Athenian society made use of figured pottery.[71] This question is related specifically to the value of Attic ceramic figure-ware in archaic and classical Athens.[72] Vickers and Gill's proposal that these vases were poor men's imitations of the silver- and gold-figure metal containers used by the rich was quickly challenged by historians of ancient art.[73] In general, the low monetary value of ceramic goods has been accepted; however, a low cost does not necessarily dictate a lower class purchaser. Neer observes that plate remained rare in Greece before the fourth century and so the 'luxurious' living of Athens' elite must be judged by the

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[69] Schmitt-Pantel. 1992: 22.

[70] Bremmer, 1990: 143-144.

[71] Note that a good deal of black- and red-figure ware has been found in the Agora, suggesting Athenian use in some contexts: see Moore, 1986 and 1997.

[72] Vickers, 1985; Gill, 1991; Vickers and Gill, 1994.

[73] See, for example, Cook, 1987; Robertson, 1992: 4-5.

standards of their own time.[74] This uncertainty implies that cups and kraters need not have portrayed specific aristocratic *symposia*. Indeed, scenes of drinking, game-playing, and general revelry need not represent the *symposion*, as Murray, Schmitt-Pantel or Stein-Hölkeskamp understand it, at all.

Beard responds to these problems by stating that 'the questions matter ... But given that (on the present state of the evidence) certainty is impossible, it is better to admit our ignorance and think constructively about how different answers to such questions would lead to different interpretations of the images'.[75] Thus, studies which locate black- and red-figure ware within the Athenian *symposion* are not wrong to do so. However, where the problems of provenance and use are not recognised, and the dynamics surrounding the production of an image and the interaction of this image with its viewer are ignored, any conclusions reached remain open to challenge.

In *The Aesthetics of the Greek Banquet*, Lissarrague negotiates these problems by blurring the boundaries between the world depicted on his drinking vessels and the physical world of the *symposion*.[76] This technique is illustrated by his discussion of a red-figure stamnos dated to c.480.[77] Both sides of this stamnos depict male figures reclining on separate couches. On one side, a woman stands between two reclining men and pours wine for one of them; on the other, two couches are occupied by a bearded man and a youth. A krater sits under one handle, and an altar under the other. Lissarrague remarks:

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[74] Neer, 2002: 210; 214-215.

[75] Beard, 1991: 19.

[76] Lissarrague, 1990.

[77] Oxford 1965.127. Lissarrague, 1990: 23-25.

> 'Youths and adults are linked in this image, which is arranged as a continuous frieze around the whole vase. The painted surface is not circular but cylindrical; still, like the earlier example, the space is pictorially constructed as an uninterrupted circle. It is worth noting that this image appears on a stamnos, and that a krater appears under one of the handles – twice removed, a vase painted on a vase. By imagining this krater among the drinkers, we find something like a reverse symmetry, a mirror image, between the drinkers in the hall and their depiction on the krater. The pictorial surface is cylindrical, hence centrifugal, while the couches in the room are arranged so that they converge. The image sends the guests a reflection of their own activity'.[78]

Lissarrague concentrates on the 'pictorial vocabulary' of the Oxford stamnos, and above all on how the picture's composition speaks to its viewer.[79] However, the identity of that viewer is not fixed. Initially, he talks about how we, the modern viewer, might imagine the vase working in a *symposion*. From here, he suggests how the cup and its imagery might operate within the actual event. Lissarrague then relates the altar in the scene to the 'earlier stage of the banquet, but without showing the sacrifice'. He thereby links the image firmly with what is 'known' about the *symposion* from literary texts.[80] The simultaneous

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[78] Lissarrague. 1990: 25.

[79] 'Pictorial vocabulary': Lissarrague, 1990: 28.

[80] Lissarrague, 1990: 25.

distinction between, and blurring of, modern and ancient audiences helps Lissarrague to avoid talking about the *symposion* as a physical event. Further, it allows him to create an impression of the *symposion* without making any definite statements about what it was. However, the overall effect of this method and his continual return to lyric and elegiac poetry and literary representations of the *symposion*, build a picture of what happened in the *andrōn*. The *symposion* emerges from his study as a location for experiencing the madness of Dionysos, challenging and shaping identities, and testing self-control; it is not just a place where poems were sung and games played.

Lissarrague approaches the archaeological and artistic evidence for the *symposion* in a subtle manner which recognises a multiplicity of possible readings for any one image. However, he ultimately uses Athenian figured vases which are connected with wine through their shape and imagery to describe the *Realien* of the *symposion*. In his chapter on 'Reflections', he states,

> 'In its ingredients the *symposion* includes the images that circulate with the vases passed from hand to hand, along with wine, poetry and music. It provides room for the expression of a culture that is as visual as it is verbal, based on an acquaintance with both picture and song. The imagery depends for its effect on the memory of the painters, who transmit and transform the iconographic motif, and on the memory of the drinkers, who *recognize the painted scenes and their own likenesses in the mirror of the vases*' (my emphasis).[81]

[81] Lissarrague. 1990: 103.

By searching for the *symposion* on vases and within images connected to wine, and in the interaction of these vessels with their sympotic viewers, Lissarrague hopes to come closer to the sympotic experience. While he does not accept the images as direct representations of reality, his elision of himself with the sympotic viewer inevitably brings his own preconceptions about what the *symposion* is into the equation. Moreover, he uses archaic poetry, tragic and comic plays, and the *Symposia* of Plato and Xenophon to back up the picture he is creating without considering whether the *symposia* represented in these sources can be used unproblematically in this way.

Artistic representations of the *symposion* therefore provide a tantalising source of evidence for the event they portray, but extreme caution is required when trying to assess the nature of the insight they give, and how this insight might be used. Although the search for 'reality' is unavoidable, Lissarrague employs a useful, self-critical and self-aware approach which attempts to 'see' the *symposion* through the possible experiences generated amongst symposiasts by their drinking vessels. This movement away from direct interpretations of sympotic representation as reflections of reality and towards a more complex analysis is reflected in twentieth-century scholarship on the poems performed in the *symposion* too.

Poetry in the *Symposion*

At the same time as historical accounts of the *symposion* started to appear, renewed focus on lyric poetry also brought it to the fore. Through the studies of Gentili, Rösler and Rossi, the *symposion* emerged as the primary location for the

performance of all varieties of monody.[82] Henceforth (and somewhat circularly), it became a crucial factor in their analyses of archaic poetry. Just as Lissarrague promotes a methodology for vase-paintings which focuses on the interaction between object and viewer, so these scholars emphasise the importance of the poet-audience relationship. As Rösler shows, previous scholarship treated elegiac and lyric poetry as a source for 'Selbstzeugnis' (personal testimony). Hence, the poet used his medium to convey personal thoughts and experiences.[83] By contrast, Rösler and Gentili sought to understand archaic poetry in light of its audience and in the moment of its performance.[84] For Gentili, lyric poetry, performed before an audience, informed and instructed; but it also 'needed to win the sympathy of that audience, and hence a surface of explicit statement embodying social attitudes that the audience can share comes back into poetry'.[85] Thus, lyric embodied 'a "performance psychology" aimed at giving public dimensions to what is personal and subjective, which set up an emotional rapport between speaker and audience'.[86] Using these criteria as the basis for his analysis, Gentili looked at the work of several poets to consider the ideas and

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[82] This location was first suggested by Reitzenstein, 1893; cf. Jacobsthal, 1912. See Gentili, 1981, and 1988; Rösler, 1980; Rossi, 1982. Cf. Vetta, 1983, whose compilation brings together a number of essays on the topic of poetry and the *symposion* published since the 1940s, and translates them into Italian.

[83] Rösler, 1980: 9ff; 'Selbstzeugnis': 11. In some corners, such an approach is still mainstream today. For example, West, 1993: ix, says of Lyric poetry 'we have virtually no contemporary prose literature, and we rely on lyric above all for evidence of the beliefs, attitudes and opinions most prevalent in those times … it shows us real Greeks speaking their minds'.

[84] Rösler, 1980: 33-34.

[85] Gentili, 1988: 3, 24; 22-23.

[86] Gentili, 1988: 42.

attitudes shared by the poet and his audience. For example, the poetry of Anacreon, composed in or for the *symposion*, reveals the symposiasts' understanding of the operation of Eros at their communal gatherings.[87]

Rösler took a similar approach to Alcaeus' poetry, asserting that three particular components shaped his work: the sympotic occasion, the poem's self-identification with the sympotic group through the use of 'we' and 'you (plural)', and the presentation of views and aims specific to the friendship group (*hetaireia*).[88] Thus, Alcaeus' poetry acted within the *symposion* to promote bonds of friendship, turning the group into an embodiment, or representation, of the institution.[89]

As noted above, this analysis of Alcaeus was particularly important in shaping Murray's view of the historical *symposion* as a place for togetherness and bonding. Thinking about the topics which dominated lyric poetry, Murray concluded that songs recording heroic deeds, warfare, and erotic desire reflected the shared interests of their listeners.[90] When the poet spoke directly to his audience on these matters, he reaffirmed their communal identity. In addition, this process of self-affirmation had a political edge. For example, Alcaeus, a vocal opponent of the ruling tyrant of Mytilene, spoke within the *symposion* of his political aims and the importance of *pistis* amongst friends. With his shared confidences, he built community, reciprocity and trust amongst the present members of his *hetaireia*, men who held similar ambitions and opinions

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87 Gentili, 1988: 89-104.

88 Rösler, 1980: 37.

89 Rösler, 1980: 37.

90 Murray, 1983a: 265-268; 1983b: 198.

concerning the *polis*.[91] On this analysis, lyric poetry provides an insight into the means and processes of the *symposion*, and adds a political dimension to our understanding of its nature. Murray notes ironically that 'originating perhaps in the genuine social needs of the *polis*, it [the *symposion*] could end by becoming an alternative to the *polis*'.[92]

Murray's *symposion* also owes much to Rossi's study of the *symposion* as a 'spettacolo a se stesso' which introduced the concept of 'sympotic space'.[93] Rossi describes how singing at the archaic *symposion* involved not only the recitation of poetry composed specifically for or in the *symposion*, but also a high level of improvisation.[94] The direct participation of guests in singing, and conversational deliberations as well, blended with the exclusive composition of the party and its poetry's themes to create a closed and self-sufficient space.[95] Within this space each symposiast presented himself in turn, so that 'diventa elemento di spettacolo per gli altri'. This self-presentation was part of a process of self-definition by which the outside world was excluded from the *symposion*, and the solidarity of the group, which Rossi describes as 'la funzione principale del simposio', is reinforced.[96] By locating lyric poetry within the *symposion*, Murray follows in the footsteps of Gentili, Rösler and Rossi. Rossi's psychological 'sympotic space' complements the physicality of the *andrōn*, encouraging Murray to identify which messages different poems give out to their

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[91] Murray, 1995a: 226; 1983b: 198.

[92] Murray, 1995b: 13.

[93] Rossi, 1982.

[94] Rossi, 1982: 44.

[95] Rossi, 1982: 45-7.

[96] Rossi, 1982: 48.

audience and to think about how these messages create a sense of shared community.[97] However, his work enters a catch-22 situation where his ideas about the sociological functions of the *symposion* inform his readings of the poetry performed there, so that the genre ends up supporting his ideas about the *symposion* as a conventional rite of commensality.

Other scholars have also built on the work of Rösler and Gentili, deepening Murray's impression of the archaic *symposion* as a place for friendship, bonding, and political machinations on the part of disenfranchised elites. Bowie reconsiders the evidence of martial exhortations in elegy to show that they could have been made in a civilian *symposion.* At the same time, he examines the relationship between the poems' words and the self-identification of the listening symposiast-citizen-soldier.[98] Similarly, Rösler's own studies on memory and on truth consider how lyric poetry encapsulates aspects of the symposiast's experience.[99] In the former, Rösler investigates how the *symposion* offered a location for the development and expression of a communal memory. He notes, '*Mnemosyne* in the *symposion* includes not merely remembering but also eliciting memories from others'.[100] By bringing to mind previous *symposia*, wars and political events, lyric poetry served an interest in history and reaffirmed

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[97] On the creation of a sociological 'sympotic space' through the physical components of the *andrōn* see Berquist, 1990. Murray himself talks about this 'sympotic space' in 1990b: 7, and 1995a: 224. See also Cooper and Morris, 1990, who show how round dining rooms provided a space with different effects on social interaction.

[98] Bowie, 1990.

[99] Rösler, 1990; 1995.

[100] Rösler, 1990: 232.

the collectivity of the sympotic group.[101] Rösler uncovers this process of community building in his study of poetic references to 'wine and truth' too. Wine led symposiasts to speak truthfully and frankly, encouraging an atmosphere of 'mutual acceptance' where the drinker could speak without fear of criticism. More importantly, openness created closeness amongst guests at the *symposion*, who were expected to hide nothing from their *hetaireia*.[102]

The treatment of poetry as an active, spoken force within the *symposion* illuminates the communal preoccupations of symposiasts, and suggests a means by which poetry could create a sense of communality between guests. This is especially true of poems whose subject was the *symposion*. For example, Levine shows how the poems attributed to Theognis reveal their poet's preoccupation with the *symposion* as a microcosm of the *polis*.[103] Themes of education, the mean (*to metrion*), good order (*kosmos*), cunning (*mētis*) and a utopian desire for peace underlie the poet's idealising depictions of the drinking party and of the city.[104] However, although it demonstrates one way in which the poet and his audience conceived of the *symposion*, Levine does not think about the relevance of this for understanding the sympotic audience or event. Theognis' presentation of the *symposion* as a *polis* raises interesting questions for his audience's positioning of themselves, their attitudes, desires and traditions within their immediate and wider communities; however, as in the works of Gentili, Rösler, Murray and Bowie, these issues remain unexplored.

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[101] Rösler, 1990: 233-234.

[102] Rösler, 1995: 109.

[103] Levine, 1985.

[104] Levine, 1985: education: 178-179; *ho metrios* and *kosmos*: 179-185; *mētis*: 185-190; utopia: 190-194.

Moreover, the idealising picture of the *symposion*-cum-*polis*, with its companionable atmosphere and expressions of trust is a reflection of the poetry which Murray, Gentili, Rösler and Levine chose to discuss. Donlan's study of *pistos*, *philos*, and *hetairos* in the poetry of Theognis implies that the dynamics of trust and friendship which these poems associated with the *symposion* were far removed from this ideal.[105] According to Theognis' prescriptions, the symposiast must continually look out for duplicity and treachery amongst his drinking companions. Friendships formed amongst *hetairoi* at the *symposion* could not be guaranteed outside the *andrōn* in serious matters or difficult times.[106] Moreover, these friendships were repeatedly put to the test, and deception between friends was not only to be expected, but necessary.[107] This last proviso resulted directly from social upheaval within the *polis*.[108] Theognis warns his listener that when *stasis* characterises relations within a community, its effects extend into the *symposion*.

Even the poetry of Alcaeus betrays the uncertainty of friendship. Written from the perspective of exile, the poet complains that Pittacus has broken his oath to the *hetaireia*.[109] Thus, whilst it recreates the *symposion* as a place of harmony, loyalty and friendship, lyric poetry also reveals the presence of disruption and distrust. Hence, it encapsulates what Ferrari refers to as 'two

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[105] Donlan. 1985.

[106] Donlan, 1985: 229-230: Theognis 115-116, 643-644, 857-860; 79-82, 697-698, 645-646 W.

[107] Donlan, 1985: 231ff: Theognis 125-128, 417-418, 641-642, 571-572; 253-254, 851-852, 91-92; 63-64 W.

[108] Donlan, 1985: 240-241.

[109] Alcaeus, 129 W.

procedures of good and bad exchange'.[110] Because the archaic *polis* was governed by the principle of 'being a friend to one's friends and an enemy to one's enemies, doing good to the former and bad to the latter', the bonding of social groups of friends by necessity led to the exclusion of those who could become enemies. However, economic pressure might culminate in the exclusion of those who are presently one's friends from the group and their redefinition as enemies. [111] Thus, good exchange which created bonds of friendship was continually challenged by bad exchange where 'bad exchange is simply what happens when the outsiders we inevitably exclude through good exchange will not *stay* excluded, but insert themselves where they do not belong, as a spurious presence'.[112] From this vantage point, Theognis' poetry defines the *symposion* as a convergence point for good and bad exchange, where the surreptitious presence of interlopers continually undermines the harmony between friends. It is a place where social bonds and personal identities are endangered and undermined, and not simply reaffirmed.

This process is brought to the fore by Stehle in *Performance and Gender in Ancient Greece*.[113] Her chapter on the *symposion* concentrates on the direct relationship between the performance of poetry and the creation and/or reinforcement of gendered identities through the interaction of the speaker and his audience. Stehle's study proceeds on the basis that the poetry of Alcaeus, Theognis and his contemporaries was not confined to the *symposia* which these

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[110] Ferrari, 1988: 51.

[111] Ferrari, 1988: 51.

[112] Ferrari, 1988: 52.

[113] Stehle, 1997.

poets attended. Instead, it spread organically from *symposion* to *symposion*, and down the generations, so that poems and their audiences continued to interact anew into the fifth century.[114] By harnessing a modern theoretical perspective, Stehle follows in the traditions of Gentili and Rösler, but pushes their conclusions one step further.

Drawing on contemporary performance theory, Stehle emphasises 'the self-presentation of performers to their audiences' so that performances become 'acts of staging themselves'.[115] Moreover, these acts have 'enabling and legitimating' dimensions: the self-presentation of the performer gains reality and acceptance through the act of performing, and the interaction with the audience it requires.[116] For Stehle, this process of self-performance and affirmation by men and women before a gendered community is inextricably bound up in perceptions of masculinity and femininity. Taking up Gleason's view of manhood as 'enacted through body languages', she states that for men 'gender is a powerful code through which self-display and competition with others is channelled'.[117] In poetry and performance this code is 'used for ideological ends and manipulated between visual and linguistic levels'.[118]

The performance of poetry within the *symposion* did not merely create community between viewer and listener. Rather, like other forms of entertainment enjoined there, it participated in the closed discourse of the

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[114] As previously claimed by Rösler. 1980: 87-88; 95-97.

[115] Stehle, 1997: 7. She thereby gives a more theoretical basis to Rossi's claim that the symposiast, like the *symposion*, was a 'spettacolo a se stesso'. See note 2 and page 37, above.

[116] Stehle, 1997: 9.

[117] Stehle, 1997: 11. Stehle quotes Gleason, 1990: 391.

[118] Stehle, 1997: 14.

hetaireia, helping individual symposiasts find a voice for themselves within the collective whilst remaining a part of that fragile group.[119] The employment of gendered imagery helped the singer to tread this thin line. He found a place in the sympotic group by positioning himself against the female other: the group's enemies became feminised, whilst the singer's portrayal of himself as the ideal male distanced himself, and his audience, from the female world.[120] This positioning could involve a political element. For example, Alcaeus describes the life of a political fugitive from a first person perspective: he laments his leading of a rustic life, far from the assembly and council of the political world, and compares himself to one Onomacles, 'the Athenian wolf-man'.[121] Stehle suggests that by adopting this persona, the symposiast might highlight the cohesion of the present *hetaireia* through contrast. However, she also adds that the audience's reception of the performance of this poem was not predictable. The pre-existing status of the performer within the drinking group determines their response more than the poem itself. An unpopular symposiast might find himself putting forward the case of the lone wolf-man, rather than distancing him from his adopted persona.[122]

Stehle's analysis locates the poetry of the *symposion* within a performance culture. Where Rösler and Gentili focus on the poet's performance as an embodiment of the ideas and ideals of the sympotic group, Stehle views the recitation of innovative or traditional poetry as act of self-presentation by which

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[119] Stehle. 1997: 217-227.

[120] Stehle, 1997: 228-230.

[121] Alcaeus, 130b PLF.

[122] Stehle, 1997: 228-235.

the symposiast attempts to communicate and establish his own identity before his audience. In addition, the act of viewing forces the audience to interact with this self-representation, to find common ground with the speaker, or to reject his persona. Stehle thus provides a tantalising new perspective from which to view the competitional and community-building aspects of the *symposion*.

Finally, Dupont provides an alternative insight into the *symposion* via the poetry performed there. She claims rather plausibly that poetry within the *symposion* was originally fluid and oral and bound to the ritual of the *symposion*. Different types of poems were appropriate to different stages in the drinking party, and these underwent free 'hot' recomposition via the inspiration of the Muse at every event.[123] However, in the sixth century, lyric was written down to aid its memorisation by performers at local and panhellenic festivals. The sympotic personae of Ur-poets like Anacreon and Alcaeus became symbols of communal self-expression.[124] Although poetry may have continued to be recited in the *symposion*, it was now memorised and 'cold'. The *symposion* was no longer spiritually enthused and poetry lost its original function as a stage-marker in its rituals.[125]

Dupont's analysis of the oral *symposion* is highly imaginative and draws its validity from comparison with Andalucian flamenco rather than evidence from the ancient world. Moreover, her quasi-structuralist division between 'hot', oral, changing culture and 'cold', written, fossilised culture does not stand up to scrutiny. As Stehle's analysis shows, the memorising of poetry did not render its

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[123] Dupont. 1999: 42ff.

[124] Dupont, 1999: 51-66.

[125] Dupont, 1999: 85-87.

recitation cold and devoid of meaning.[126] Lyric poetry was not meaningful in and of itself, but gained its meaning through the act of performance in the *symposion*.

The Classical *Symposion*: History and Comedy

Aside from Stehle's innovative rethinking of poetry's role in the *symposion*, the majority of studies on the *symposion* considered so far develop a clear and coherent picture of their subject as a historical institution which functions sociologically and psychologically to sustain a politically obsolete aristocracy in a hostile or disinterested world. Yet what happened to the *symposion* in the classical period as the political dynamics shifted and stabilised again? Murray suggests that in Athens at least the basic characteristics of the institution, namely its exclusivity and antagonism towards the *polis*, survived. Moreover, the parody of the Eleusinian Mysteries and the mutilation of the Herms drew the *dēmos*' attention to the hybristic nature of the *symposion* and the post-party *kōmos* (revelry).[127] Despite the *symposion*'s continued influence on literature into late antiquity, 'its social significance lessened as democratic norms of behaviour became more prevalent'.[128] The political situation in fifth-century Athens caused an even greater split to emerge between the aristocratic sympotic group and democratic society.

Davidson upholds Murray's view of the classical *symposion* as an alternative reality for aristocrats in democratic Athens and as an 'almost perfect

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[126] See further, chapter 5, page 256-7, below.

[127] Murray, 1990c.

[128] Murray, 1982: 50.

example in fact of the anthropologist's commensal model of drinking in which socialising is paramount'.[129] However, his approach to the *symposion* is problematic. The opening chapter to *Courtesans and Fishcakes* claims that his study of 'the consuming passions of classical Athens' will be a study of discourses; he hopes to reveal how an incident or concept was talked about and conceived, rather than to indicate a particular truth.[130] In line with this he warns against using texts as 'windows ... as if the Greeks wanted to give us a view on the ancient world'.[131] However, he also cautions against going too far in the opposite direction, claiming that, 'in fetishising a culture's representations of the world in this way, Foucault and his followers sometimes seem to forget about the world itself, which is still waving through the window, as if what a culture says is, is, on some important level, as if the Greeks walked around in a virtual reality they had constructed for themselves from discourse.'[132] Davidson thus presents his own work as critically and theoretically aware; indeed, his examination of the *opson*-eater (*opsophagos*) negotiates these problems superbly. It therefore comes as a great surprise when his analysis of fifth- and fourth-century vase-paintings and poetry, and the *Symposia* of Plato and Xenophon, results in a discussion of the practical arrangements of the *symposion*, the drinking of wine and the various entertainments on offer to symposiasts; for example, comedy, acrobatics, flute-girls and *hetairai*.[133] On the whole, he forgets that representations of the *symposion* also existed within a culturally significant discourse, and, to use his

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[129] Davidson, 1997: 43.

[130] Davidson, 1997: xxi.

[131] Davidson, 1997: xxii-xiii.

[132] Davidson, 1997: xxv.

[133] Davidson, 1997: 43-51; 51-52; xix, 81, 91-97.

own metaphor, do not provide direct windows into the classical *andrōn*. However, Davidson redeems himself with an analysis of maritime metaphors for the *symposion*. From these he discerns that the *symposion* was 'a dynamic series of circulations, evolving in time as well as in space, with the potential for uncoiling into long journeys, expeditions, voyages'.[134] The sympotic voyage is facilitated by the interplay between wine and conversation, which binds the participants in sociability and competition.[135] In these observations, Davidson fulfils his initial promises, and approaches the *symposion* as a textual construct, part of a discourse on the *symposion* which extends beyond representing 'reality' or providing metaphors for actual experience. However, in his analysis, Davidson is constrained by earlier attempts to understand the sociology and psychology of the *symposion*. His classical *symposion* is virtually identical to Murray's archaic institution.

This view of the classical *symposion* has come under fire from Fisher as part of his wider project to redefine current perceptions of the extent to which the 'common people' were involved in supposedly aristocratic leisure-time occupations.[136] Davidson sees the *symposion* as a counterpoint to drinking practices of the *dēmos*, which centred on the local *kapēleion* (tavern), 'a far more demotic and promiscuous space than the private and selective *andrōn*'.[137] In contrast, Fisher convincingly argues that the *symposion*, defined as an all-male

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[134] Davidson. 1997: 44.

[135] Davidson, 1997: 51.

[136] Fisher, 2000. See also Fisher, 1998, and 2001: 51, where he argues that by the late fifth-century the *gymnasion* and *palaistra* were attended on a regular basis by the *dēmos*, and that their associated courting rituals now involved non-aristocratic youths.

[137] Davidson, 1997: 53.

event at which guests reclined, drank and were entertained, was enjoyed not only by Athens' elite, but also moderately wealthy citizens who aspired to luxurious lifestyles.[138] Thus, the Athenian *dēmos* could relate to images of the *symposion* on the comic stage not as 'an alien world of license and misbehaviour', but as an activity with which they were personally familiar.[139] Rather than excuse scenes in which comic characters indulge in *symposion*-like activities as some kind of fantastical wish-fulfilment, he establishes that good food and wine were available to the common man through a number of social mechanisms: the political institutions of the *prytaneion* and *tholos*, religious festivals, the meetings of *thiasoi* and of social associations.[140] These activities presented opportunities for drinking, conversation, and entertainment akin to the variety encountered in the 'official' *symposion*, as it is described by Murray and Davidson. Fisher accepts that in the classical period groups of aristocrats may still have gathered together for private parties in the men's room of their houses. However, he disputes the extent to which these gatherings were of the conspiratorial, anti-democratic variety, or that these were in any way the norm. Instead, he claims that that kind of *symposion* was 'a deliberate perversion of more conventional practices of sociability'.[141] Fisher places Murray's *symposia*, internally focused gathering-places for the anti-democratic elite, within the wider context of commensality in classical Athens, and finds them to occupy only a small place in the overall scheme. However, he also finds the trappings of these *symposia*, the *andrōn*, the

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[138] Fisher. 2000.

[139] Fisher, 2000: 356-369. 'An alien world of license and misbehaviour': Murray, 1990: 149; quoted in support of his own position by Davidson, 1997: 53.

[140] Fisher, 2000: 360-366.

[141] Fisher, 365.

couches for reclining, the drinking, the conversations, and the various entertainments in other events where men gathered together. For Rossi, this shift towards a politically impotent gathering of non-aristocratic citizens signalled the disappearance of the 'real' *symposion*.[142] In contrast, Fisher proposes that while the aristocratic *symposion* may have been the exception rather than the rule in the Athenian city, its formula invaded social gatherings throughout its population.

Like scholars of the archaic *symposion*, Fisher finds a place for the classical institution within the *polis*. However, while they attempt to analyse the *symposion* from within, he locates himself outside the walls of the aristocratic *andrōn*. He refuses to study it as a psychologically, sociologically or politically potent event. This approach is quite different from earlier attempts to describe the historical reality of the *symposion* and of sympotic experience, and raises the question of whether Murray's *symposion*, with its community building and competition, exists in the classical period..

Recent approaches to the *symposion* through Old Comedy similarly bypass traditional preoccupations with uncovering the 'real' institution through its literary and artistic representations. Although Wilkins discusses current debates on the nature of the classical *symposion*, he avoids becoming bogged down in the issue by focusing on comic *symposia* as 'versions of the *symposion*' experienced in elite and non-elite *andrōnes* across the city.[143] In his analysis, he talks explicitly about 'comic exploitation of sympotic features', and the 'comic presentation of the paraphernalia of the *symposion*', reflecting his opinion that

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[142] Rossi. 1982: 49-50.

[143] Wilkins, 2000: 208.

'the comic world reflects the "real" world of the *polis*, but at a remove.[144] Thus, the poet utilises the repertoire of sympotic entertainment to create a *symposion* which is, firstly, recognisable as the event, and secondly, fits the requirements of a particular scene or play, or the comedic genre.[145]

Wilkins' view of the comic *symposion* is also found in the studies of Bowie and Pütz.[146] Bowie shows how Aristophanes deploys the *symposion* to different ends in different plays. In *Clouds* and *Knights*, it acts as a locus for representing exclusion from and inclusion in civilised, democratic society. In *Clouds* the disrupted *symposion* becomes a synonym for the degeneration of relations within the *oikos* and *polis*, caused by new philosophical modes of thinking.[147] And in *Knights* the action which takes place within the *symposion* indicates the relationship between Demos and the Paphlagonian. At the beginning of the play the mastery of the Paphlagonian over Demos is portrayed by their relations at the dinner table, and later Demos' dominance is restored through the same motif.[148] In his interpretation of these two plays, Bowie uses the term *symposion* in its widest sense, so that it refers individually to the acts of dining, drinking and their associated singing. In *Wasps*, the *symposion* is more strictly defined as an aristocratic after-dinner drinking party. In this play, the sympotic *topos* links into the exploration of democratic, monarchic and oligarchic justice. The aristocratic *symposion* is shown to operate according to

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144 Wilkins, 2000: 205: xvii.

145 Wilkins, 2003, extends this analysis to include 'sympotic' representations in tragedy as well as comedy.

146 Bowie, 1997; Pütz, 2000.

147 Bowie, 1997: 4-5: *Nu.* 1354-1358, 1364-1367.

148 Bowie, 1997: 6-8: *Eq.* 40-70, 85ff, 1161ff.

its own laws and so offers an alternative to the justice of the democratic law courts, and the monarchic justice earlier dispensed in Philocleon's kitchen.[149] Finally, in *Lysistrata*, *Acharnians*, *Peace* and *Ecclesiazusae*, the *symposion* is a symbol of peace and prosperity. The women's plans to end the war are configured throughout *Lysistrata* as a *symposion* and *kōmos*, while the imagery of the *symposion* infuses Dicaeopolis' personal peace.[150] In *Ecclesiazusae* the *symposion* 'does not simply symbolise a social utopia, but actually constitutes it: the democracy is replaced by a form of sympotic communion'.[151] Pütz's study of Aristophanic comedy also identifies the connection between the *symposion* and themes of peace and utopia.[152] Moreover, she demonstrates that Aristophanes' choice of sympotic imagery was firmly dictated by plot development and theme. The *symposion* was deployed whenever the achievement of peace allowed feasting to resume, circumstances in the *polis* and the lives of his characters made feasting possible, and conflict between the generations was at issue.[153] Thus, Bowie and Pütz reveal that in each of Aristophanes' plays, the *symposion* as an event and as a structuring theme plays a different role. Whenever Aristophanes reproduced the *symposion* on the theatrical stage, he shaped its events and dialogue to fit his immediate concerns. The comic *symposion* was

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[149] Bowie. 1997: 8-11.

[150] Bowie, 1997: 12-15: *Lys.* 195-7, 1228-1235; Bowie, 1997: 15-18: *Ach.* 582-586, 937-939.

[151] Bowie, 1997: 19.

[152] Pütz, 2000: xi, 3-145. Cf. Carrière, 2003, who connects Aristophanes' sympotic utopias with Aristophanes' ambitions as a political moderate.

[153] Pütz, 2000: 135. In the first group Pütz places *Acharnians*, *Peace* and *Lysistrata*; in the second, *Birds*, *Ecclesiazusae*, *Wealth* and *Frogs*; and in the last, *Clouds*, *Wasps* and *Knights*.

never merely an institution or an event, but a way of communicating ideas about the *polis*.

Ruffell also discusses this aspect of the comic *symposion*.[154] However, he shifts the perspective away from the direct intentions of the comic playwright, and towards his audience in the theatre of Dionysos. Ruffell's interpretation of the comic *symposion* as 'metafestive', that is a (Dionysian) festival within a (Dionysian) festival, underlies his analysis of the *symposia* of Aristophanes, Eubulus, Plato and Theopompus.[155] By allying the *symposion* with *kōmōidia*, Ruffell describes the comic *symposion* as a performance, and a spectacle for the consumption of a civic audience.[156] Thus, like comedy itself, it speaks to its audiences' political concerns. In the case of the *symposion* these are more specifically the 'fears of political activity outside of mainstream civic and democratic procedures, and in particular the expressions of political and cultural alternatives'.[157] In short, 'the metafestive *symposium* is concerned with civic ideology, and the rival claims of the construction of this ideology'.[158] Ruffell plugs the comic *symposion* directly into the theatrical process, emphasising the social role played by comedy, and the relationship between performance, audience and occasion. These are crucial to understanding the viewer's response to sympotic representations. Ruffell's argument influences Wilkins, who talks of

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[154] Ruffell, unpublished.

[155] Ruffell, unpublished: 1.

[156] On comedy and its audience, cf. Slater, 2002.

[157] Ruffell, unpublished: 12.

[158] Ruffell, unpublished: 13.

the *symposion* as a discourse, an act through which socially potent themes are raised and explored.[159]

These recent interpretations of the comic *symposion* mark a significant shift away from previous preoccupations with the history, sociology and psychology of the event. They recognise that the *symposion* on stage is not a reflection, or representation of reality. It is a constructed image which might draw on and appeal to its writer's and audience's experiences, but which has been shaped according to its creator's specific literary strategies, namely plot development and underlying themes. Moreover, the performed *symposion* communicates with and gains meaning through its interaction with its viewers.[160] Therefore, the constructed *symposion*, although created in the mind of one playwright, is a socially potent force. The interaction between staged *symposion* and audience builds on social conceptions of the sympotic event, for example the predominance of eating, drinking, talking and sex. Furthermore, the *symposion* participates in *polis*-wide discourses on citizenship, democracy, justice, and freedom.

An Approach to the *Symposion*? Some Answers and Some More Questions

The approach which Wilkins *et al* take towards the comic *symposion* draws (explicitly or otherwise) on the observations of so-called literary theory. Various views of theory disrupt 'common sense' attempts to uncover 'reality', and

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[159] Wilkins. 2000: 211-212.

[160] This observation will be of special importance when investigating Plato's *symposion* in chapter 2 , below.

question the validity of any cultural product to convey 'the truth'.[161] As Goff observes, in its various post-structuralist, deconstructive, feminist, and Marxist-materialist forms this 'theory' focuses 'on the *way that meaning is produced and conveyed* rather than on the meaning itself of the texts' (my emphasis).[162] This way of critical thinking affects our approach as ancient historians to what our sources are and what they do. White's work on history as narrative emphasises the 'literary' nature of the written documents we, as historians, use.[163] And if they are literary, then they are open to the same analysis and deconstruction as any other piece of literature. On the one hand, questions of narrative strategies and authorial ambitions must inform the reading of our texts. And on the other, we must think about what meanings are created through the act of being read. In Derrida's famous formulation, 'il n'y a pas de hors-texte'.[164] The represented *symposion* gains its 'reality' within the 'categories, concepts, codes, and structures of representation which creates it'.[165] Moreover, this 'reality' only gains its potency through the interaction between the text in which it is represented and the text's reader.

Hence, Kennedy cautions against searching for reality in literary representations, noting that the very term 'representing ... opens up a disjunction, expressed as between "art" and "the world", or "literature" and "life"'.[166] But, as Kellner remarks, 'rhetoric, representation and reality ... cannot

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[161] On Theory versus Common Sense, see Culler, 1997: 4.

[162] Goff, 1995: 1.

[163] White, 1978, and 1980.

[164] Derrida, 1974: 158.

[165] Norris and Benjamin, 1988: 20.

[166] Kennedy, 1993: 1.

be separated from one another'.[167] Historical investigations into the *symposion* must begin by accepting that the *symposia* represented in lyric poetry, works of art, and other 'historical sources' are informed by their author's narrative and rhetorical strategies and ambitions. They do not provide straight-forward snap-shots of reality. Yet, as Kennedy and Kellner both admit, reality always sneaks back in: 'in criticizing the "rhetoric" of reality (that is the way *others* use the term), one cannot avoid creating a "reality" within which one's own discourse is ostensibly grounded'.[168] Moreover, a representation is a representation of *something* which creates *some kind of reality* through the discourses it takes part in, and through the meanings it creates.

For, as Martindale remarks, 'meaning ... is always realised at the point of reception'.[169] Thus, the act of reading is complicit in the creation of any text's meaning. The reader and audience of lyric poetry, the viewer of a figured vase, the audience at a play by Aristophanes and, as we will see, the reader of philosophical dialogues, do not find their meaning in whatever 'text' they perform, read about or see, but contribute towards its creation. Hence, the processes of 'viewing' the *symposion* are essential components in a discourse which gives the drinking party its social significance.

Engaging with our sources for the *symposion* from this theoretical perspective avoids the pitfalls encountered by Murray, Schmitt-Pantel, Stein-Hölkeskamp and Davidson in their efforts to reconstruct a historical institution. It reflects more closely the efforts of Lissarrague, and the scholars of lyric poetry

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[167] Kellner, 1989: 2.

[168] Kennedy, 1993: 23.

[169] Martindale, 1993: 3.

(in particular Stehle), who focus on the *symposion* as a point of reception for artistic and written texts. By adopting a theoretically aware approach, I hope to combine these benefits into my study of Plato and Xenophon's *Symposia*. Firstly, keeping the problematic relationship between representation and reality in mind, I will avoid treating the *symposion* of either *Symposium* as a direct presentation of the historical event. The philosophical ambitions which shape the *symposia* of Plato and Xenophon will remain at the forefront of my investigation.

Secondly, Plato and Xenophon's *symposia* are framed within a written text, yet the dramatic components of the dialogues bring them alive to the reader-viewer. As I will discuss in chapter 2, the reader of a *Symposium* engages with the events of its *symposion* in a similar (if not identical) manner to the spectator in the theatre of Dionysos. Through the written text, he is invited to view Plato and Xenophon's *symposia* as if they were being acted out in front of him. This thesis will investigate the dynamics of these *symposia* from within their texts, looking at how the performances of their participants create the event. And I will ask how these performances invite the reader-viewer to respond to and interact with them, and what meanings might be engendered in the process.

I will therefore be dealing with two levels of performance: the performances between participants in the represented *symposion*, and the performance between reader, *symposion* and text. To help think about them, I will engage (like Stehle) with modern performance theories which will at once embroil me in the question of making identities. Goffman's analysis of social gatherings led him to conclude that the interaction between two individuals involves non-verbal conversation between the performer and his audience. 'Each individual can *see* that he is being experienced in some way, and he will guide at

least some of his conduct according to the perceived identity and initial response of his audience … he can be seen to be seeing this, and can see that he has been seen seeing this'.[170] A person's performance is informed by the situation in which he performs, and the response of his audience. Moreover, the performances reflect on their performer's identities. A person presents his or her identity forward to be confirmed by the recognition of his or her audience.

For Butler this analysis is too ontological.[171] Building on (and in doing so contributing towards) the theoretical developments discussed above, she suggests that a performer does not only *reveal* his identity through the act of performing, but *creates* it. Butler therefore pushes De Beauvoir's observation 'one is not born a woman, but rather becomes one' a step further; one's gender is continually renegogiated and redefined through social performance.[172] She notes, '*woman* itself is a term in process, a becoming, a constructing that cannot rightfully be said to originate or end. As an ongoing discursive practice, it is open to reinvention and resignification'.[173] Identity is therefore 'performative'.

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[170] Goffman. 1963: 16. Cf. Goffman, 1959.

[171] Butler, 1990: 279-280. See also the anthropologist Cohen, 2000: 5, who remarks 'Goffman's legacy to identity studies was intellectually seductive and profoundly damaging, because it overstated the gamelike character of social interaction, and the extent to which individuals and groups can control their own destinies. It understates culture. It ignores self-consciousness and the commitment made by individuals, and perhaps groups, to views of themselves which, contrary to another horrendously overused term in identity studies, they do *not* regard as 'negotiable''.

[172] De Beauvoir, 1953: 295; Butler 1993: 3-9.

[173] Butler, 1999: 43.

In an effort to avoid again imposing modern theory on the ancient world, I intend to use Butler's arguments to help me investigate the classical *symposion*, rather than to classify or define what goes on there. However, my approach still runs the risk of presenting yet another (albeit quite different) essentialising account of the *symposion*. One of the central dilemmas which post-modernism frequently fails to address is its own tendency to assert a 'true' way of reading which leads to some form of reality.[174] Furthermore, the Greeks had no word for 'performance' or for 'identity'. The performances which take place in the *symposia* I will study are *theōriai*, sights or spectacles which are defined primarily through the processes of being watched; *epideixeis*, competitive displays, demonstrations or 'proofs', where the emphasis is on showing; and *agōnes*, competitive performances through which participants acquire social status. As Goldhill shows, these 'performances' are bound up in the politics of the city. [175] Moreover, recent understandings of 'identity' emphasise the existence of 'identities', the different ways and means by which an individual constructs himself within, and is constructed by, society. This construction is further filtered through the individual's participation in culturally specific discourses of class, gender, and race or ethnicity. In our *Symposia*, all three 'performances' will be found contributing to the symposiast's construction of his

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[174] Though see Fuss, 1989, who not only recognises the impossibility of escaping essentialism, but positively embraces it. Indeed, as Harvey, 1990: 359, reports, critics of post-modernism seek to transcend its limitations by a return to 'realism' and historical-geographical materialism.

[175] See Goldhill, 1999: 1-10.

identity; as a result, I focus on the symposiast as a (well-educated) (*symposion*-going) (Athenian) (citizen) (male).[176]

[176] I use these brackets with caution to indicate the co-existence and independence of these categories within the person of the symposiast.

Chapter 2: The *Synousia* and the *Agōn* in Plato's *Symposium*

There is something for everybody in Plato's *Symposium*: story-telling, speech-making, drama, sex, drunkenness, philosophical disputation, erotic theory, and Platonic Forms. In antiquity this banquet became a model for actual philosophical practice, and, together with Xenophon's *Symposium*, it spawned an entire genre of literary and philosophical endeavour.[1] As Plutarch remarks, Plato and Xenophon have left models (*paradeigmata*) not only for meeting together and conversing with one another through wine, but for remembering what has been said.[2] Today, Plato's *Symposium* provides endless scope for studying the philosopher's theories and methods. Yet although historians have nonchalantly plundered its speeches for evidence of Athenian social customs, nobody has yet approached the *Symposium* as a source for the *symposion*.

This reluctance stems in part from the canonical place which Plato and his dialogues occupy in Western philosophy. Until very recently, scholars who studied Plato's works tackled him exclusively as (what they understood to be) a philosopher. They may have disagreed over his methods and his conclusions, but

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[1] This at least was the view of Second Sophistic writers who envisaged Plato and Xenophon as the progenitors of a long tradition of sympotic writing; see, for example, Plu. *Moralia* 612d. Cf. Relihan, 1992, and Mossman, 1997. However, Huss, 1999a: 13, tentatively suggests that Plato and Xenophon had their own model *Symposium* in Antisthenes' *Protrepticus* on the grounds that a fragment (SSR V A 64) of this text might imply a sympotic setting. Cf. Bowie, 1994, for other possible origins of the philosophical *symposion*, and Rutherford, 1995: 179, who places the *Symposium* within a wider literary tradition of a 'sympotic genre'. And on the philosophical banquets of the Hellenistic period, see Tecuşan, 1993.

[2] Plu. *Moralia* 686d.

by unwritten consensus Plato was defined first and foremost as the Father of Western Philosophy.[3] Even recent attempts to unsettle his elevated position approach him above all as a writer of philosophy, although they recognise his conception of philosophy and his own dialogues are not exactly what we have traditionally thought them to be.[4] However, Plato is slowly re-emerging from this enforced isolation. Monoson's study of *Plato's Democratic Entanglements* puts the philosopher back into the Athenian *polis*.[5] Her Plato is not an armchair anti-democrat detached from political life, but an enthusiastic participant in 'contemporary demotic forms of civic discourse and the democratic ideals celebrated therein'.[6] Ludwig's study of *Eros and Polis* submerges Plato even deeper into these discourses, comparing Aristophanes' speech on *erōs* in the *Symposium* to other discussions of *erōs* within the city.[7] By aligning Plato with Homer, Thucydides, the tragedians, and orators, Ludwig treats the Platonic dialogue form as one genre for investigating issues which other forms of literature also explore. Plato and his philosophical investigations cannot be isolated from the political discourses which produce them. As Dover remarks, 'Plato writes not as a scholar or a scientist but from the first to last as an

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[3] For the ubiquity of this dogma, see Kraut, 1992b: 1, who opens the *Cambridge Companion to Plato* with the comment 'Plato stands at the head of our philosophical tradition, being the first Western thinker to produce a body of writing that touches upon the wide range of topics that are still discussed by philosophy today'.

[4] See, for example, the essays collected by Klagge and Smith, 1992, Press, 1993, and Gonzales, 1995.

[5] Monoson, 2000.

[6] Monoson, 2000: ix.

[7] Ludwig, 2002.

advocate, and heir to the tradition of didactic poetry, a nurseling of Attic drama and a product, no less than the politicians and litigants, whom he criticised so articulately, of a culture which admired the art of a persuader'.[8]

I will not go so far as Ludwig in detaching the *Symposium* entirely from its philosophical context.[9] After all, Plato's dialogues are distinctive because they show an explicit interest in the nature and virtues of mankind, and how best to examine and achieve these by doing what he calls philosophy. However, by consciously setting the search for erotic theory and Platonic Forms to the side, I will reassess Plato's ambitions for the *Symposium*. In this chapter, I will show that the dramatic dimensions of the text offer an alternative view of the *Symposium* which fits more closely with Plutarch's understanding of the text as a paradigm of sympotic behaviour.[10] By setting up his symposiasts as a spectacle for his reader's observation, Plato offers a model of good sympotic practice. Moreover, this practice is tied closely to the social and political identity of its participants as *kaloi kagathoi*. Agathon's guests display and negotiate their identities through their performances within the *symposion*. Hence, in chapter 3, I will analyse one particular performance, the speech of Pausanias, to investigate this process in action. Plato's Pausanias engages with wider political discourses on sexual desire to affirm his own place within the closed society of the *symposion*. However, Plato is not only concerned that 'we learn (from reading the *Symposium*?) to become *fit company*' (my emphasis), as Henderson

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[8] Dover. 1980: viii.

[9] Indeed, Halliwell, 2003, criticises Ludwig for this act of severance, which prevents him fully grasping Aristophanes' conception of self-love.

[10] Plu. *Moralia* 686d, discussed on page 60, above.

suggests.[11] The *symposion* is intimately connected to the quest for and display of the virtue associated with being *kalos kagathos* (which Xenophon terms *kalokagathia*) and involves the symposiasts in performative *mimēseis*.

Dramatising the *Symposion*

As already noted, Plato's *Symposium* offers itself up to a variety of interpretations. Some scholars have found an expression of the Form of Beauty in Socrates/Diotima's discussion of Eros.[12] Others unpack Plato's *erōs* from the dialogue as a whole, picking out specific speeches to compare and contrast with one another.[13] Their conclusions might be drawn into a wider study of Platonic *erōs*, or used to illuminate tensions within the text: for example, the shortcomings in Socrates' ideas about *erōs*, and/or the question of Socrates' effectiveness as a teacher.[14] Alternatively, the action and speeches of the

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[11] Henderson. 2000: 289.

[12] See for example, Ferrari, 1992: 253-260, finds Socrates/Diotima outlining a path to Beauty and True Virtue. Burnyeat, 1977, Pender, 1992, Steiner, 1996, and Edmonds, 2000, examine how Diotima's metaphor of 'spiritual pregnancy' envisages the initiate of Eros experiencing Beauty (although they disagree about how pregnancy is envisaged and who the Midwife of Beauty is). See also Halperin, 1990: 113-151, who wonders why Diotima is a woman.

[13] For example, on Aristophanes' speech, see Dover, 1966, Rockford, 1974, Ludwig, 1996; and on the speech of Pausanias: Gallagher, 1974; Görgemanns, 2000. On the speeches in general, see Strauss, 2001, Rosen, 1968, Penwill, 1978, and Mooney, 1994.

[14] For example, Halperin, 1985, Osborne, 1994, and Price, 1989 draw the *erōs* of the *Symposium* into a wider Platonic theory of love, while Price also compares it to Aristotle's theories of friendship. Brentlinger, 1970, Schein, 1974, Gagarin, 1977, Nussbaum, 1986, Price (on Nussbaum), 1991, Gregory and Levine, 1998, and Henderson, 2000 all contemplate the implications of the difference between Alcibiades' speech and what has gone before.

symposion might reveal some underlying themes; for example, the relationship between comedy and tragedy, the critique of genres, and the question of how to do philosophy.[15] Sometimes, aspects of the *symposion* are deployed to other effects, perhaps to shape the *Symposium* as a festival of Dionysos, or to give its contents a socio-historical significance.[16]

Although the majority of these studies are above all concerned with philosophical issues like Forms, theories of desire, teaching, and doing philosophy, they approach the *Symposium* not only as the embodiment of philosophical dogma, but as a text which functions on dramatic and literary levels too.[17] Plato manipulates the drama of the evening, the setting, the characters and their performances, to give his philosophical arguments potency and form. For example, Alcibiades' drunken arrival in the *andrōn* and his encomium of Socrates offer Plato a chance to critique Socrates' earlier account

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[15] See Plochmann, 1971. On comedy and tragedy in the *Symposium*, see Bacon, 1957, Clay, 1975, Brock,1990, Patterson, 1982. On the *symposion* as an analysis of the *encomium* form, see Nightingale 1993 and 1995. And on the *symposion* as a critique of doing philosophy, see Halperin, 1992, Arieti, 1995, and Henderson, 2000.

[16] Sider, 1980; Blanckenhagen, 1992. In addition, the *Symposium* has been hijacked by psycho-analysts as a vehicle for their conceptions of self and desire: see for example, the article by the French feminist Irigaray, 1989.

[17] The literary and dramatic components of the *Symposium* were virtually ignored in early twentieth century work on the dialogue. Although recognised by Bury, 1909: lxi, the dramatic elements were sidelined in favour of the *Symposium*'s linguistic and philosophical aspects. However, the importance of setting and character are now widely recognised: cf. Blanckenhagen, 1992; Blondell, 2002. On the *Symposium* as i) drama, see Wolz, 1970, Arieti, 1995, and Press, 1995; ii) performance, see Von Reden and Goldhill, 1999, and Henderson, 2000; iii) literary 'work of art', see Frede, 1992.

of *erōs*.[18] And, as we will soon see, Aristophanes' hiccuping not only effects a change of seating which aligns one set of speakers against the other, but demonstrates the competitive components of the *symposion*. In addition, Plato's dialogues do not follow a set pattern, or expound philosophical issues in certain ways, but represent a genre in evolution. Nightingale argues that Plato used the dialogue form to define (his way of doing) philosophy.[19] This required him to critique other discursive forms from within.[20] Hence, Nightingale contends that the *Symposium* critiques the praise-genre of the encomium.[21]

Nightingale's view of the *Symposium* as a critique of genre is echoed in Clay's investigation into 'tragic' and 'comic' elements in the dialogue. Clay concludes that the *Symposium* establishes Plato as the poet discussed in the final scene, a man who can combine tragedy and comedy in one play. On this analysis, the dialogue is a 'tragi-comedy ... or a new form of philosophical drama'.[22] Thus, Cartledge's observation that Plato's dialogues 'may well have owed much to his first-hand experience of Athenian dramatic exchanges' tells only part of the story.[23] Plato's dialogue consciously incorporates and

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[18] See note 14. above. for references.

[19] Nightingale, 1995: 10. Nightingale asserts that Plato is the instigator of the dialogic tradition. Yet, Clay's discussion of the *sōkratikoi logoi* highlights the ancient tradition that the teachings of Socrates were first put into written form by Alexamenus of Teos and Simon the Shoe-maker: Clay, 1994: 32-33. However, the form of their treatises remain unknown, and their existence does not deprive Plato of his innovating role.

[20] Nightingale, 1995: 11.

[21] Nightingale, 1993, and 1995: 111-131.

[22] Pl. *Smp.* 223c6-d6. Clay, 1975: 249.

[23] Cartledge, 1997: 9.

manipulates elements of the two dramatic forms, producing a new form which alleges to offer an alternative, and indeed better, path to wisdom and understanding.[24] Or, as Henderson more sensationally puts it, Philosophy offers Theatre a 'show-down'.[25]

Plato's dramatic ambitions for the *Symposium,* or rather his *symposion,* are developed in the opening scenes of the dialogue.[26] Apollodorus tells his current audience that he is not unrehearsed in telling the story of Agathon's *symposion* because just the other day someone he knew (Glaucon) asked him to tell it, and, as he explained to them, he had got the story first-hand from Aristodemus. Aristodemus had also told Phoenix the story (who told it to someone else, who then told it to Glaucon), and Apollodorus had verified his version of events with Socrates. This is the story Apollodorus will now tell, and

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[24] Clay, 1975: 251 and 2000: 121, presumably following Diogenes Laertius 3.5-6. states twice that Plato began his career as a tragic poet, but does not question the validity of this tradition. On the Platonic dialogues as versions of tragedy, see also, Nussbaum, 1986: 126-132. As we shall see below, Halliwell, 2002: 55, observes that Plato's dialogues depend on the same element of *mimēsis* as other forms of *poēsis*; this contingency might provide a more productive starting point for investigating the relationship between the dialogue form and poetry.

[25] Henderson, 2000: 292-293. Although Halliwell, 2002: 55, observes that 'all of Plato's dealings with poetry come from a position not of uncomprehending hostility toward, but profound appreciation of, as well as indebtedness to, the traditions of poetry themselves', thus taking the sting out of this supposed attack.

[26] My analysis will focus on a select number of dramatic features in Plato's text, which elevate the *symposion* into a performance. For Plato's *Symposium* as a theatrical performance in its own right, see Nussbaum, 1986: 126-134. In addition, Gordon, 1999: 65-69, and 84ff, outlines some of the linguistic, structural, and processual features which establish Plato's dialogues as a form of theatrical poetry.

which occupies the rest of the *Symposium*.[27] Halperin suggests that this layering of narration reflects Plato's concerns with story-telling, and highlights the potential for oral wisdom to become lost or exposed as false within the textual re-telling.[28] However, whilst it embroils the reader in the processes of transmission, the opening drama has a distancing effect too. The conversation reported by Apollodorus establishes the *symposion* in a by-gone era, when Agathon still lived in the city and before its narrator had met Socrates.[29] This sets the action above and apart from the present day, in much the same way as the *andrōn* at the house of Agathon provides a physical cocoon for the coming action.

With its multi-layered narrative and scene-setting, the opening of the *Symposium* marks off one set of dramatic action (Apollodorus' telling of the *symposion*) from another (the *symposion*). Thus, it is a paratext, 'a *threshold* … a "vestibule" that offers the world at large the possibility of either stepping inside or turning back … as Philippe Lejeune put it, "a fringe of the printed text which in reality controls one's whole reading of the text"'.[30] The opening scenes create a frame for the activities of the *symposion*, and a viewpoint from which they might be observed. The effect is to shape the *symposion* as a performance. Goffman writes of theatre in general, 'a line is ordinarily maintained between a staging area and an audience region … The central understanding is that the audience has neither the right nor the obligation to participate directly in the

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[27] Pl. *Smp.* 172a1-174a2.

[28] Halperin, 1992: 113-116. Discussed below in chapter 5, page 256.

[29] Pl. *Smp.* 172a4-c7. On the possible significance of the historical setting see Nussbaum, 1986: 168-71; Blanckenhagen, 1992: *passim*; and Halperin, 1992: 100.

[30] Genette, 1997: 1-2.

dramatic action occurring on the stage'.[31] In Plato's *Symposium*, the *symposion* constitutes the staging area, whilst Apollodorus' listener and the *Symposium*'s reader become its audience. The reader finds himself within the *Symposium* – but not the *symposion* – learning about Agathon's party at the same time as Apollodorus' audience. Thus, by contrast to Henderson, I argue that reading this text does not equate with being a guest.[32] The 'amateur dramatics' of the *Symposium* place the reader and the symposiasts on opposite sides of a divide. From his position in the audience, the reader can watch the symposiasts in their *symposion*. The interaction between them remains primarily extra-textual and one-sided.

Although the *Symposium* begins with Apollodorus' telling of the story, it ends at the same time and in the same way as Agathon's *symposion*. As day breaks, Aristophanes and his host fall asleep, and Socrates wanders off towards the Lyceum with Aristodemus in tow.[33] This asymmetry echoes the dramatic structure of some Greek tragedies like Euripides' *Hippolytus* and *Electra*, where a god or central character sets the scene at the beginning of the play, but does not reappear in the guise of narrator at the end. The action which follows the prologue is made to speak for itself and at the end of the play/dialogue the audience must reflect on and perhaps dissect what they have seen without further authorial guidance.[34] The introductory framing device and this failure to return

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[31] Goffman. 1974: 124-125.

[32] Henderson, 2000: 289.

[33] Pl. *Smp.* 223d7-11.

[34] The similarity between the opening and closing scenes of these plays and the beginning and end of the *Symposium* remind us that Plato's dialogue form interacts with and develops out of the dramatic tradition, but this similarity should not be pushed too far. The dramatic prologues

to the narrator at the end emphasise the 'plottedness' of the *Symposium*.[35] The *Symposium* is the story of a story, with Plato and Apollodorus as *poiētai*, weaving a sympotic tale for their respective audiences.

These dramatic elements do not make the *symposion* or the *Symposium* into a piece of theatre, but they do show its author enmeshed in and engaging with the dramatic tradition.[36] As a written drama, the *Symposium* garbs itself in the attributes of the theatre, presenting the *symposion* within it as a *theōria*, a spectacle which seeks to engage the reading, listening, and imagining audience.[37] It therefore immerses itself in the politics of performance and of viewing. In recent years, these politics have been investigated thoroughly by scholars of the Greek theatre, in particular those working on Athenian tragedy. Numerous

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proceed in monologue form, whilst the opening scene of the *Symposium* is comprised of a dialogue. Moreover, the action of the *symposion* is mediated through Apollodorus' narration, while the authority of the tragic poet/narrator is conveyed through the voices of his characters.

[35] Cf. Henderson, 2000: 293.

[36] Three striking differences exist between Plato's *Symposium* and the plays of the Athenian stage. Firstly, the ritual contexts within which the plays of the Great Dionysia and Lenaea are performed do not have their correspondence in the reading or recitation of the Platonic dialogue. Therefore, an intrinsic part of the audience's dramatic experience is missing: cf. Goldhill, 2001c: 44-46, on the importance of these rituals in the theatrical experience. Secondly, in terms of its structure, story-pattern and action, the *Symposium* does not meet the requirements of either comedy or drama. For example, of the typical comic progression, from prologue, through *parodos*, *agōn*, *parabasis*, consequence of the *agōn*, to *exodos*, only the spirit of the *agōn* is recreated in the *Symposium*; cf. Cartledge, 1990: 18-20. Thirdly, E. Hall, 1997: 93, describes three typical story-patterns which comprise the tragic plot, but do not fit the mythologem of the *symposion*: the male performer represents i) mythical Athenians interacting with outsiders; ii) women; and *iii*) significant slaves.

[37] Goldhill, 1999: 5-6.

studies have investigated the social import of the plays of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides in the exact moment they were staged.[38] Thinking about democratic culture, the collectivity of the audience, and themes of association and difference, these studies suggest that the classical Athenian theatre provided an arena in which social observations could be made, tensions recognised and resolutions explored.[39] At a *polis* level, the theatre acted as a locus for 'civic ideology', which might be defined as a performative discourse through which the audience as 'we' found a place for itself within its continually (re-)constructed civic world-view.[40] Thus, the tragic and comic performances of the Athenian

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[38] See Vernant and Vidal-Naquet, 1990; the collection of essays in Euben, 1986; Winkler and Zeitlin, 1990; Goff, 1995; Silk, 1996; and Pelling, 1997. Recently scholarship on Old Comedy, and particularly on Aristophanes has turned to focus on the issue of how the comic play interacts with its audience, or thinks about comedy in relation to the audience as collective representatives of the Athenian democracy. Since Henderson, 1990, argued that Aristophanes incorporated political comment into his comedies, its workings have also been investigated by Sutton, 1994, Konstan, 1995, and McClure, 1999, who search for civic ideologies within Aristophanes' plays. In addition, Slater, 2002, demonstrates how Aristophanes self-consciously draws attention to the theatrical nature of his plays in order to make comments on political life. Although see *Bryn Mawr Classical Review* 2003.06.08 (Fletcher on Slater), 2003.07.07 (Buckler on Fletcher on Slater), and 2003.07.13 (Fletcher on Buckler on Fletcher on Slater), for a debate on the merits of this approach.

[39] The validity of these themes as areas for exploration, and of their conclusions, are challenged point by point in an article by Griffin, 1998, who prefers to see the success of tragedy in terms of its emotional appeal. His critique and focus on the emotional have in turn been analysed by Goldhill, 2001c, who shows that there is plenty of room for emotional interaction and a subconscious process of self-identity in the tragic performance.

[40] Goldhill, 1990. This definition is intended to reflect the wide-ranging attempt to provide some answers to the question 'what is ideology?' proposed by Eagleton, 1991: 1-31. However, to even

stage offered the citizen audience, to whom the plays were primarily directed, the opportunity to reflect upon their identity as male, theatre-going, citizens of the Athenian democracy.[41] Moreover, the audience itself became bound up in the performance. Goldhill describes 'the pervasiveness of the values of performance in Greek culture and in particular the special context of democracy and its institutions, where to be in an audience is above all *to play the role of democratic citizen*' (his italics).[42] The staging of a play and attendance at its performance were events which allowed the citizen actors and citizen audience to engage in a dialogue concerning the identity of the *polis*, and to thereby investigate their place within it. Together, actors and audience performed an act of civic ideology whilst at the same time questioning it, and discussing what it meant to be a participant in the democracy.

Goldhill's claims for the Athenian theatre are similar to Plato's views on the psychological efficacy of dramatic *mimēsis* on its audience, expressed in book ten of the *Republic*. As Halliwell observes, 'part of the potency of poetry is located by Plato in its performance on public occasions where it functions as

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attempt such a definition is perhaps disingenuous when Eagleton himself refuses to boil ideology down to one single concept. Instead, drawing on the works of the twentieth century thinkers Althusser, Hirst and Geuss, he outlines some possible ways of defining it.

[41] The presence of representatives from around Athens' empire, metics, and possibly women and children, at the Great Dionysia does not negate the power of drama as a vehicle for civic ideology. Goldhill, 1997: 58, notes that 'many texts treat the proper or intended audience of tragedy as the collectivity of citizens'. The non-citizen audience could still interact with the play as a facet of civic ideology, even if it was in a completely different way from citizen spectators.

[42] Goldhill, 1997: 54.

ideological rhetoric for the *polis* as a whole'.[43] By shaping the *symposion* as a *theōria* and pushing his readers into the role of spectator Plato throws the theatrical experience onto them. The *Symposium* builds up a picture of elite values and behaviours against which the reading and listening audience are invited to position themselves. However, unlike the tragic and comic poets, Plato's audience does not equate with the entire citizen body. Although it is difficult to conclude who Plato's target audience was, his written dialogues demand their audience have the time, money and learning to devote to their study. To this extent, Plato's audience was a philosophy-doing, and perhaps wealthy, elite. And if, as Blondell and Nussbaum suggest, the dialogues are intended to draw their audience into doing philosophy through association, then the reader must be able to imagine himself as a member of a sympotic group.[44] In this case, the relationship between performance (the *symposion* of the *Symposium*) and audience (potential performers in the *symposion*) remains self-reflexive, but the ideology which is being shared, explored and created is that of a probably wealthy, *symposia*-going, philosophy-doing elite; an elite, however, whose members might also be citizens of democratic Athens.[45]

The dramatic underpinning of Plato's *Symposium* therefore opens up the staged *symposion* to investigation as a place for the performance and discussion of elite values and behaviour. With its focus on the physical and verbal

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[43] Halliwell. 2002: 61.

[44] On Blondell and Nussbaum, see page 107 and note 104, below.

[45] I use the term 'elite' to describe the relative status of the members of Plato and Xenophon's *symposia*, in respect to the non-elite *phauloi* whom they define themselves against. My investigations in chapters 3, 4 and 6 will show that in our two *Symposia*, the *symposion*, as an event and a discourse, provide a means of constructing what being 'elite' entailed.

interaction between guests, the narrative provides an image of a past, but near-contemporary elite society for the reader's consideration and evaluation. The location of the *symposion* in a time before Athens' defeat by Sparta, the oligarchic coups of the very late fifth century and the restoration of democracy, means that the identity of the reading audience does not scan exactly onto the identity of the men they observe.[46] However, this need not be a particular concern. As Zeitlin discusses, a key feature in the operation of tragedy and comedy is its chronological and temporal remove.[47] Further, Plato is writing for his current audience; the social references he makes are ones that he expects them to understand. In the next two sections, I will investigate what meanings the *symposion* at Agathon's house might create for the reader of the *Symposium*. As I will show, Plato did not only choose a sympotic setting in order to facilitate his philosophical discussion of *erōs*. Through the action of the symposiasts, he advances his ambitions for the *symposion* as a gathering (*synousia*) of *kaloi kagathoi*. Plato's sympotic ideal blends communality with competition, and promotes the *symposion* as a testing-ground for being *kalos kagathos*. And through the *symposion*, Plato puts performance at the heart of elite self-identity. In these terms, the *Symposium* (and *symposion*) is a lesson in virtue which stands apart from (if still alongside) his theory of Forms.

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[46] On the dating of Plato's *Symposium* to the mid-380s, see Dover, 1965. Cf. chapter 4, note 34.

[47] Zeitlin, 1990.

Competition and Communality in the *Synousia-Symposion*

As Tecuşan discusses, the institution of the *symposion* makes regular appearances in dialogues other than the *Symposium*.[48] It provides the background setting for the *Timaeus*; and in the *Republic*, *Gorgias* and *Theaetetus* the *symposion* is criticised as the preserve of *hoi kakoi*, men completely lacking in virtue. Conversely, in the *Laws*, the Athenian Stranger suggests the drinking party as the model for the further education of its city's elite. Finally, Socrates outlines for the eponymous sophist of the *Protagoras* the best forms that gatherings of *kaloi kagathoi* could take.[49] However, between these texts, Plato's moral judgement of the *symposion* swings between positive, negative and neutral. Tecuşan credits this to a shift in Plato's thought in the last decade of his life. This shift does not concern the *symposion per se*, but reflects changes in the philosopher's attitudes towards wine and the irrational, and his new understanding of the roles they play in the lives of men.[50] His evaluation of the *symposion*'s guests swings accordingly: at one moment the *symposion* is occupied by *kakoi* (*Republic, Gorgias, Theatetus*) and the next a place where citizens might learn to become more virtuous (*Laws*). And in the Protagoras, Socrates describes for us two different *symposia*: one undertaken by men who are *phauloi*, and one where the symposiasts are *kaloi kagathoi*.

Thus, Plato's varying representations of the *symposion*, and of its participants, depend on the immediate context in which they are expressed.

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[48] Tecuşan, 1990.

[49] For references, see Tecuşan, 1990: 238-245.

[50] Tecuşan, 1990: 260. However, on the problem of dating Platonic dialogues according to thematic developments from one text to another, see Kahn, 2002.

Hence, it is impossible even to talk about 'Plato's views on the *symposion*' in a definitive way. However, the ideal *symposion* inhabited by *kaloi kagathoi*, which Socrates puts forward in the *Protagoras*, seems to reflect and inform his depiction of the drinking party at the house of Agathon.[51]

In the *Protagoras*, Socrates uses the *symposion* as a means of establishing the correct form which a gathering, or a *synousia*, of *kaloi kagathoi* should take. Although he begins by using the drinking parties of 'low-born people of the *agora*' (*hoi phauloi kai agoraioi anthrōpoi*) as a metaphor for talking about poetry, he soon recommends that his companions proceed according to his model of the good *symposion/synousia*:

> καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀλλήλοις δι' ἑαυτῶν συνεῖναι ἐν τῷ πότῳ μηδὲ διὰ τῆς ἑαυτῶν φωνῆς καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν ἑαυτῶν ὑπὸ ἀπαιδευσίας, τιμίας ποιοῦσι τὰς αὐλητρίδας, πολλοῦ μισθούμενοι ἀλλοτρίαν φωνὴν τὴν τῶν αὐλῶν, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐκείνων φωνῆς ἀλλήλοις σύνεισιν· ὅπου δὲ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ συμπόται καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι εἰσίν, οὐκ ἂν ἴδοις οὔτ' αὐλητρίδας οὔτε ὀρχηστρίδας οὔτε ψαλτρίας, ἀλλ' αὐτοὺς αὑτοῖς ἱκανοὺς ὄντας συνεῖναι ἄνευ τῶν λήρων τε καὶ παιδιῶν τούτων διὰ τῆς αὑτῶν φωνῆς, λέγοντάς τε καὶ ἀκούοντας ἐν μέρει ἑαυτῶν κοσμίως, κἂν πάνυ πολὺν οἶνον πίωσιν.

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[51] The suggestion that the *Protagoras* 'informs' the *Symposion* assumes the former precedes the latter, as the traditional chronology of Plato's dialogues, based on thematic developments, suggests. Cf. Taylor, 1991: xviii-x, although Taylor highlights the inadequacies of this method of chronological analysis. The relative dating of Platonic texts is also discussed by Kahn, 2002.

> 'For these men, through their inability to be with (*suneinai*) one another themselves over drink and with their own conversations – such is their lack of education – put a premium on the *aulos*-girl, and pay large sums for the other sound of *auloi*, and they carry on their intercourse by means of that other voice; but wherever the symposiasts are *kaloi kagathoi* and educated (*pepaideumenoi*), one would see neither *aulos*-girls nor dancers nor harp-girls, but they can entertain (*suneinai*) themselves with their own conversation, without such idle talk or playfulness, speaking and listening to themselves in turn in a dignified fashion, even if they drink a great deal of wine'. (Pl. *Prt.* 347c5-e1 Burnet)

The format of the gathering which Socrates recommends fits exactly the pattern of entertainment which Eryximachus proposes to Agathon's guests.[52] The doctor explains that the *aulos*-girl is to be expelled from the *andrōn* because,

> ἡμᾶς δὲ διὰ λόγων ἀλλήλοις συνεῖναι τὸ τήμερον.
>
> 'Today, we will be with one another through words'. (Pl. *Smp.* 176e8-9)

Both men advocate a *symposion* where guests associate and interact verbally with each other. This focus is reflected in the prominence of *suneinai* in both passages which, in the context of a gathering, may be defined as 'to be together',

[52] As noted, but not explored, by Taylor. 1991: 148.

or 'to converse with'. This sense of close interaction amongst guests is further highlighted by reference to *allēlōn*, 'one another', and in the *Protagoras* through Socrates' repeated use of the plurals *autōn* and *heautōn* to signify the (lack of) voice, speech and education of low-born and well-educated symposiasts at group levels. Eryximachus' invitation to his fellow symposiasts to be united together is further echoed in Socrates' definition of good and bad symposiasts/synousiasts. In the *Protagoras*, the philosopher groups together the well-educated *kaloi kagathoi* who are able to come together in their own voices and words against low-born men (*phauloi anthrōpoi*) who gather in the *agora* and cannot speak for themselves.[53] This distinction is enhanced by his further association of the former group with his own immediate circle:

> οὕτω δὲ καὶ αἱ τοιαίδε συνουσίαι, ἐὰν μὲν λάβωνται ἀνδρῶν, οἷοίπερ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοί φασιν εἶναι, οὐδὲν δέονται ἀλλοτρίας φωνῆς οὐδὲ ποιητῶν.
>
> 'And thus, such gatherings (*synousiai*), if they are made up of the sort of men most of us claim to be, do not need the voice of others, nor of poets'. (Pl. *Prt.* 347e1-3 Burnet)

Through their own ability to speak for themselves, the people present at the current *synousia* are connected explicitly with the well-educated *kaloi kagathoi*

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[53] On the association between social status and speaking see chapter 3, in which the ability to speak cleverly is presented by Pausanias as a mark of difference between men who desire in right and wrong ways: 127-137. Moreover, as chapter 4, page 164, will discuss, the *aulos*, as a signifier of 'other voices', played a part in these democratic ideologies: cf. Wilson, 1999.

who attend the ideal *symposion* which Socrates has just outlined. This association may even be extended out to the supposed reader of the *Protagoras*; wishing to believe himself just this type of man, he is also drawn into comparison and identification with the group.

By making Eryximachus frame the *symposion* as a *synousia* in which each symposiast will contribute a speech in turn, Plato's *symposion* fits the anthropological model of commensality on which Murray bases his archaic *symposion*. Their participants indulge in 'rituals of eating and drinking together, as equals and as expression and reinforcement of community values'.[54] However, the way in which the *synousia-symposion* recommended in the *Protagoras* and in the *Symposium* effects this commensality has its own cultural and institutional specificity. Against a background of moderate drinking, each symposiast will speak and listen to his companions in turn. He will thereby act out his similarity to the other educated men gathered in the *symposion* who also display their ability to speak with their own voice. At the same time, he will reinforce his difference from the low-born members of the democratic citizenry who frequent the *agora*, and whose inability to speak results in their participation in a wholly inferior sympotic affair. Both processes create a sense of place for the symposiast within the solidarity of the immediate group.

Moreover, in practice, the conversation which Socrates and Eryximachus each recommend for the well-educated symposiast has the potential to disrupt the very unity that it creates.[55] As Nightingale observes, the round of speaking in Plato's *Symposium* has a distinctly agonistic edge: with each person speaking and

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[54] Murray, 1990b: 5.

[55] Pl. *Smp.* 177c7-d5.

listening in turn, 'the result is a series of attempts to achieve originality within determinate generic boundaries, to manipulate stock techniques ("amplification" and "comparison") and material (the ancestry, accomplishments and virtues of the subject) and yet produce something superior to the other offerings'.[56] Thus, the speeches in the *symposion* are individual performances designed to persuade the audience of the superiority of their argument, and the greater skill of their speaker. These speeches are encomiastic examples of *epideixeis*, defined by Lloyd as 'pretentious exhibition speeches' and 'exercises in persuasion' by which pre-Socratic philosophers and medicine men sought to convince audiences comprised of their peers of the correctness and greatness of their thought.[57] The speech-making of the *symposion* therefore exists within, and is shaped by, the competitive culture which permeates the intellectual life of the Athenian *polis*. Moreover, Goldhill notes,

> '*epideixis* requires an audience; when competitive, as *epideixis* almost inevitably is, it necessarily triangulates competition through an audience. It establishes a dynamic of self-representation where self-promotion is restricted by the fears and limitations of the group constituted as an audience. *Epideixis* becomes the site where the self-advancement of the citizen is negotiated in the city of words'.[58]

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[56] Nightingale, 1995: 111.

[57] As noted by Plochmann, 1963: 3; Lloyd, 1989: 61, 133.

[58] Goldhill, 1999: 3-4.

Although Goldhill locates the *epideixis* within the democratic processes of the city, his observations are as valid when the *epideixis* is confined to the elite world of the *symposion*. The speeches given by Plato's symposiasts not only seek to persuade their audience of the correctness of its speaker's encomium. Rather, as the discussion of Pausanias' speech in the next chapter will show, they are occasions for the symposiast to negotiate and advance his position within the drinking group. The 'city of words' which he must manipulate is the language of his audience, the means by which well-educated, *symposion*-going, philosophy-doing citizens of the Athenian democracy construct positions for themselves within their immediate circle, and in society at large.

In the *Protagoras*, Socrates blurs the boundaries between the drinking party and the *synousia* to reinforce the competitive element underlying both events. Further similarities can be found in the location of each gathering in the private house of someone rich and famous. Indeed, in the location of *Protagoras* it is possible to imagine an allusion to Eupolis' play *The Flatterers*, where a number of famous philosophers converse at a *symposion* in the house of Callias.[59] A significant overlap occurs between the two guest lists: Socrates, Pausanias, Agathon, Eryximachus, Phaedrus and Alcibiades are present on both occasions.[60] And in addition, even before Socrates demands that its participants concentrate their efforts on verbal sparring, the *synousia* was progressing according to the philosopher's model for the ideal *symposion*; covering a great

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[59] Eupolis 157 K.-A.

[60] See Blanckenhagen, 1992: 58, who uses this coincidence to advance a deliberate 'then' and 'now' relationship between the two texts which adds poignancy to the dialogue through the known fates of Alcibiades, Socrates and Agathon.

many subjects, Callias' guests already spoke and listened in turn. Moreover, in his competitive conversation with Socrates, Protagoras deploys archaic poetry in a similar manner to the speakers of the *Symposium*; and likewise, he receives applause and praise from its listeners.[61] Finally, Socrates tells his audience that if they are to interact with one another directly, they should avoid the kind of meetings that good symposiasts are also instructed to avoid. Instead, Callias' guests are urged,

> ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῶν λόγοις πεῖραν ἀλλήλων λαμβάνοντες καὶ διδόντες.
>
> 'To test (*peiran*) one another in mutual argument'. (Pl. *Prt.* 348a1-2 Burnet)

Socrates issues this invitation to the synousiasts as part of his subsequent challenge to Protagoras: talking to one another in their own words, rather than those of the poets, they should make a test of (*peiran*) the truth and of themselves.[62]

By speaking and listening in turn, the symposiasts put each other to the test. Further, in light of Socrates' challenge to Protagoras, Eryximachus' act of setting up Eros as the topic of conversation for the evening is itself a competitive act; and by agreeing to put themselves on show, his companions accept the terms

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[61] Although of course it also leads Socrates to provide his model *symposion* in protest: Pl. *Prt.* 338e6 ff.

[62] Pl. *Prt.* 348a2-6.

of this competition. However, it is also an indication of the cohesion of the group. This is clear from Alcibiades' retort to Protagoras, who delays responding to Socrates' request. He says,

> Ὦ Καλλία, δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, καὶ νῦν καλῶς Πρωταγόρας ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἐθέλων εἴτε δώσει λόγον εἴτε μὴ διασαφεῖν; ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐ δοκεῖ·
>
> 'Callias', he said, 'Do you think Protagoras is being fair now, not wishing to make clear whether he will give an answer or not? Because I don't think he is'. (Pl. *Prt.* 348b3-5 Burnet)

As Alcibiades goes on to explain, Protagoras' procrastination disrupts the flow of events; if the sophist does not wish to debate with Socrates, then he should say so, and allow someone else the opportunity to do so.[63] However, his reticence also disrupts the communal atmosphere, because he has failed to perform in the manner expected of a member of the *synousia*. The importance of performance is reflected in Socrates' recommendation that his companions emulate (*mimeisthai*) the sort of person (*toioutos*) who uses his own words and voice when talking and listening in the ideal *symposion*, and in an ideal *synousia*.[64] By taking turns to speak and test one another, Protagoras and Socrates imitate and hence act out their identity as well-educated *kaloi kagathoi*. The judgement of their audience, and their continued acceptance within the immediate community,

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[63] Pl. *Prt.* 348b5-8.

[64] Pl. *Prt.* 348a2-3. On appropriate translations for *mimēsthai*, see Halliwell, 2002: 16-17.

relies on the success with which they can demonstrate their belonging via the testing ground of the spoken word (*logos*).

The resemblance between Socrates' recommended drinking party in the *Protagoras* and the events of the *Symposion* encourages a comparison between the guests who attend both. Just like the well-educated *kaloi kagathoi* of the ideal *symposion*, Agathon and his guests come together through their words whilst at the same time testing their abilities in a round of speech-making. Are the *Symposium*'s symposiasts therefore *kaloi kagathoi*? As I will discuss in greater detail in chapter 6, the meaning of *kalos kagathos* and its associated virtue *kalokagathia* was a contested topic in antiquity, as well as amongst scholars today. Towards the end of the fifth century, the traditionally aristocratic attributes of beauty and goodness became, in their amalgamated form, an indicator of moral worth. The term *kalos kagathos* thus came to encapsulate the social connotations of an elite, noble upbringing, within an emerging political and philosophical debate on the moral implications of being *kalos kagathos*.[65] Yet, although the various discussions of *erōs* in the *Symposium* suggest understandings of, or ask questions about, *to kalon* and *to agathon*, the formula is never used to describe the symposiasts as individuals or as a group.[66] However,

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[65] See pages 263-273.

[66] Socrates' speech (199c5-212c3) in particular explores the relationship between *to kalon* and *to agathon*. Through his elenchic debate with Agathon and his recollection of Diotima's speech, Socrates initially considers whether what is good is necessarily beautiful and vice versa, and whether something lacking goodness necessarily lacks beauty, before exploring more specifically on the attainment of beauty. The two concepts are sometimes brought into association with one another (202d1-d4), and twice describe a specific quality (*kalos kai agathos*) which someone might search after (203d3-7) or think he possesses (204a3-5).

the relationship between *kalokagathia* and the doing of philosophy is intrinsically linked. Diotima warns Socrates that those who philosophise might think themselves to be *kalos kagathos* when they are not.[67] Yet, when Alcibiades arrives he declares that listening to Socrates' apparently banal conversations aids those who wish to become *kaloi kagathoi*.[68] Plato may be suggesting that those who 'do philosophy' are not *kaloi kagathoi*, or that only those who listen to Socrates might become *kaloi kagathoi*. Alternatively, Alcibiades, who is remarkable within the *Symposion* for his excessive drunkenness and wilful self-denigration, may be presenting a dubious view.

The place of the *kalos kagathos* and *kalokagathia* in Plato's *Symposium* is therefore far from straightforward. As good symposiasts (according to the Socrates of the *Protagoras*) Agathon and his guests might be considered *kaloi kagathoi*; however, Plato does not explicitly name them as such. Moreover, the *Symposium* suggests that being *kalos kagathos* involves more than just doing philosophy; so more than simply discussing Eros, to use philosophising in its loosest sense. Yet, Plato's symposiasts might be the very men who (Diotima would believe) claim to be *kaloi kagathoi* on account of their discussions of Eros. In this respect they are *kaloi kagathoi*, intent on proving themselves to be *kaloi kagathoi* to one another. If they fail to be *kaloi kagathoi* in Diotima/Plato's eyes, it is because of their philosophising does not meet the grade. Yet, by listening to the wisdom of Socrates they (as Alcibiades' claims) might learn to be *kaloi kagathoi* too. Thus, despite failing to describe the symposiasts as *kaloi kagathoi*, the *Symposium* allows for them to be thought of in this way.

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[67] Pl. *Smp.* 104a3-5.

[68] Pl. *Smp.* 222a1-6.

In this light, the performances of the synousiasts/symposiasts are therefore 'performative': through their interaction in the *symposion*, the symposiasts 'effectively constitute the identity they are said to express or reveal'.[69] Moreover, as Butler shows, the performative act is not simply a matter of 'being' but of negotiating one's identity through the act of performance. Using transvestism as her example, she claims that, '*in imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender itself – as well as its contingency* ... In the place of the law of heterosexual coherence, we see sex and gender denaturalised by means of a performance which avows their distinctness and dramatises the cultural mechanisms of their fabricated reality' (Butler's emphases).[70] In a similar way, the symposiasts imitate the style of the *kaloi kagathoi* in order to present themselves as, and hence become, *kaloi kagathoi*.

Thus, the *symposion*, as it is represented by Plato, is a microcosm of elite behaviour which simultaneously reinforces a set of proposed 'norms'. However, in the very moment these norms are enacted through performance, they come under scrutiny. When Plato's *kaloi kagathoi* participate in the *symposion*, they construct an identity for themselves in imitation of what is expected of them as well-educated symposiasts. However, this process of display exposes the constructed component of that identity for all to see. The coherence in *kalokagathia* (the embodiment or expression of being *kalos kagathos*) can only be maintained by a successful performance. Every performance exposes the symposiast to possible failure, and the resulting loss of their primary social identity.

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[69] Butler. 1999: 180.

[70] Butler, 1999: 177.

In the *Protagoras*, Plato presents a model for the ideal *symposion* and *synousia* which emphasises the relationship between the *synousia* (a general social gathering) and the *symposion* (a specific type of *synousia*). The practical details which make the *symposion* a special type of *synousia*, for example the absence of sympotic ritual, sitting rather than reclining on couches, and, most significantly, the lack of drinking, disappear behind a shared emphasis on correct modes of behaviour for members of Athens' educated elite.[71] This version of the ideal *symposion* resonates with the more elaborate depiction of the event found in Plato's *Symposium*. In the epideictic round of speaking and listening in turn, Pausanias, Phaedrus, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon and Socrates each seek to convince one another of their ability to speak with their own voice and to participate in such an event. They thereby assert their shared identity as members of the *symposion*-going, well-educated, Athenian elite. Thus, Plato shapes his *symposion* as a place in which competing and being together exist side-by-side. However, this relationship is not antagonistic. As I will now show, competition in Plato's *Symposium* is not given free rein, but is restrained by the requirements of maintaining a sense of communality amongst Agathon's guests.

Competitive Strategies in Plato's *Symposion*

Negotiation and interaction between the competitive and communal elements of the *symposion* are seen again and again in the conversational and physical ploys of the gathered symposiasts. In particular, as Nightingale's brisk survey shows, the round of encomiastic speech-making is permeated by competitive strategising: building on Phaedrus' initial challenge to writers who have failed to

[71] Though note that some of the synousiasts at the house of Callias do recline: Pl. *Prt.* 315d.

praise Eros, each speaker tries to get the better of those who have gone before.[72] However, her preoccupation with the encomium as a genre, which she maintains Plato wants to present as flawed, leads her away from a close examination of these strategies, and of the purpose and effects of competition within the *symposion*. By examining the opening gambits with which several speakers preface their contributions and the episode of Aristophanes' hiccups, I will make up this shortfall. My investigations will provide an insight into how competitive performances shape Plato's *symposion* into an *agōn* and the ways in which its agonistic operations relate to, and are constrained by, the dictates of communality.

The potential for competition, testing and judging within the *symposion*, which is first intimated by the conversation between Agathon and Socrates on the latter's arrival in the *andrōn*, is reiterated later on by Socrates, as he addresses Eryximachus in anticipation of Agathon's encomium:

> Καλῶς γὰρ αὐτὸς ἠγώνισαι, ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε· εἰ δὲ γένοιο οὗ νῦν ἐγώ εἰμι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἴσως οὗ ἔσομαι ἐπειδὰν καὶ Ἀγάθων εἴπῃ εὖ, καὶ μάλ' ἂν φοβοῖο καὶ ἐν παντὶ εἴης ὥσπερ ἐγὼ νῦν.
>
> 'You have competed (*agōnizesthai*) well, Eryximachus; but if you were to be in the position I am now, or rather the one I will be in when Agathon has spoken well, you too would be terrified and as desperate as I am now'.[73] (Pl. *Smp.* 194a1-4)

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[72] Nightingale, 1995: 111.

[73] On the competition between Socrates and Agathon, cf. Pl. *Smp.* 175e7-10.

With his praise of Eryximachus, Socrates presents the speech-making symposiasts as participants in an *agōn*, or contest. Eryximachus has competed well, but the pressure is now on Socrates, who, occupying the last couch, will need to give a speech which tops that of Agathon. Earlier in the evening, Socrates had complained of this seating arrangement, but commented that everyone would just have to do their best and be satisfied with that.[74] Now, with the competition underway, Socrates appears to change his mind. Building on Eryximachus' observation that he would have difficulty following Aristophanes' speech, the philosopher professes to be worried that his best efforts will not be enough to eclipse the tragic victor, Agathon.[75] Recalling Socrates' fears, Nightingale remarks, 'the encomiastic genre, Socrates suggests, is a contest with winners and losers – a contest where the language of commendation is a vehicle for the author's pursuit of glory'.[76] However, the competition which Socrates refers to is not confined to the genre of encomium, but relates to the encomium as an *event*. In praising Eryximachus for his skill at competing in the *agōn* (*agōnizesthai*), Socrates commends his ability to participate in the speech-making of the *symposion* and not his skill at giving encomia. Indeed, Socrates' poor opinion of his predecessor's attempts at praising Eros soon becomes very clear.[77]

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[74] Pl. *Smp.* 177e4-7.

[75] Pl. *Smp.* 193e5-8.

[76] Nightingale, 1995: 112.

[77] Pl. *Smp.* 198c6-b5.

According to Nightingale, Socrates' praise of Eryximachus and his confession of fear depict the *symposion* as an *agōn* which proceeds according to the standard zero-sum formula.[78] As Gouldner observes, Greek society was founded on a contest system which acted as 'a mechanism for social mobility or a method for distributing prestige or public status among the citizen group'.[79] The *agōn* was founded on a 'win-lose' precept, whereby a citizen could increase his standing by defeating an opponent whose status decreased accordingly.[80] Moreover, zero-sum competition was conducted through performances which took place in the city's training grounds (*palaistrai*), the Pnyx and the lawcourts, and in the arenas of sexual relations and state liturgies. A good performance glorified its performer and increased his standing beyond, and at the expense of, all those whose performances he bettered.[81] Winkler situates zero-sum competition alongside androcentricism and the symbolism of the phallus as items that in Athenian society 'would not generally have been regarded as negotiable'.[82]

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[78] Nightingale, 1995: 111.

[79] Gouldner, 1965: 45-46.

[80] Gouldner, 1965: 49-50. The zero-sum/win-lose concept filtered into modern conceptions of ancient Greece from the business world via anthropological investigations into the 'shame cultures' of twentieth century Mediterranean societies. See, for example, the collection of essays compiled by Peristiany, 1966; and the analysis of classical Athens as an honour-shame, zero-sum culture provided by Cohen, 1991.

[81] With the exception of sexual relations, all participants in these competitions are of Athens' aristocratic elite. On the competitive aspects of *leitourgiai*, see Wilson's account of the *khorēgia*: Wilson, 2000: 144-147.

[82] Winkler, 1990b: 174.

Nightingale's analysis of Socrates' fear implies that Plato's *symposion* is yet another site for zero-sum competition: each speaker must build on and better the contribution of his predecessor or else he will be deemed a failure. However, a closer study of some of the competitive elements of sympotic banter will show that the zero-sum formula provides an inadequate interpretation of competition within this *symposion*. Socrates' fear of failure is not necessarily concomitant with a desire for outright victory.

Following Socrates' lead, Nightingale identifies the moments when speakers refer to the efforts of their predecessors as a key strategy in the competitive encomium. Looking back to previous speeches, speakers summarise their failings and promise to provide something far superior.[83] For example, Pausanias, the second symposiast to speak, opens his own contribution with an allusion to Phaedrus' encomium:

> Οὐ καλῶς μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Φαῖδρε, προβεβλῆσθαι ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, τὸ ἁπλῶς οὕτως παρηγγέλθαι ἐγκωμιάζειν Ἔρωτα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἷς ἦν ὁ Ἔρως, καλῶς ἂν εἶχε, νῦν δὲ οὐ γάρ ἐστιν εἷς· μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἑνὸς ὀρθότερόν ἐστι πρότερον προρρηθῆναι ὁποῖον δεῖ ἐπαινεῖν. ἐγὼ οὖν πειράσομαι τοῦτο ἐπανορθώσασθαι, πρῶτον μὲν Ἔρωτα φράσαι ὃν δεῖ ἐπαινεῖν, ἔπειτα ἐπαινέσαι ἀξίως τοῦ θεοῦ.
>
> 'Phaedrus, our subject does not seem to me to have been put forward to us well, to have been instructed simply to give an encomium to Eros. For if Eros were one, it would be fine, but as it is he is not one;

[83] Nightingale. 1995: 111.

> and as he is not one, it is more correct first to say beforehand which Eros one should praise. And so I will try to put this right, to declare firstly which Eros one should praise, then to give an encomium worthy of the god'. (Pl. *Smp.* 180c4-d2)

In the first instance, Pausanias' criticism of the way the question regarding Eros is phrased, and the innovations he promises in his own speech, appear to be competitive strategies: they denigrate Eryximachus, the proposer of conversation, and Phaedrus, whose observations informed the proposal, and who has just given his own response. Moreover, they promote Pausanias as more intelligent and knowledgeable than both men. Similarly, the introduction to Eryximachus' contribution appears to open with a jibe intended to knock Pausanias off his self-erected pedestal:

> Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, ἐπειδὴ Παυσανίας ὁρμήσας ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον καλῶς οὐχ ἱκανῶς ἀπετέλεσε, δεῖν ἐμὲ πειρᾶσθαι τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι τῷ λόγῳ.
>
> 'As Pausanias started upon his speech well, but did not bring it to a fitting conclusion, in my opinion it is necessary to try to impose an ending on his speech'. (Pl. *Smp.* 185e6-186a3)

The doctor asserts that although his fellow symposiast started well, he did not end his speech in a satisfactory way; Eryximachus says that he will now do what Pausanias could not. However, the gambits with which Pausanias and Eryximachus open their speeches are not exclusively competitive. Pausanias'

criticisms of Eryximachus and Phaedrus are delicately concealed behind a modest and impersonal veneer. He does not attack either man directly, and his initial comment 'it does not seem well to me' (*ou kalōs moi dokei*) could be perceived as diffident, rather than aggressive. Further, Pausanias addresses Phaedrus personally, thereby establishing an immediate link between the foregoing speech and his own efforts. Eryximachus' reference to Pausanias has a similar effect. Furthermore, Eryximachus' opening lines are not completely hostile: he praises what he thinks Pausanias has done well, and highlights his deficiencies only to negotiate a starting point for his own encomium. Indeed, the doctor does not disparage the previous speech, but presents his monologue as a continuation of it.

Thus, with opening comments which compare and contrast coming encomia with those which have gone before, Pausanias and Eryximachus institute an element of rivalry which is fitting to the competitive spirit of the *epideixis* and encomium. However, the two men are also concerned to establish connections with the previous speeches as a way into their own. They attempt to show their audience that they can participate in the *logos* of the *symposion*, and, therefore, that they belong to the group as well-educated *kaloi kagathoi*. The same considerations are apparent in the backwards references and banter of the other speakers too. Pausanias' concern to praise Eros correctly is echoed in Agathon's assertion that previous speakers have concentrated on the good Eros brings to men; in contrast, *he* will praise the god in his (Eros') own terms.[84] Aristophanes makes a similar distinction between the contributions of Pausanias

[84] Pl. *Smp.* 194e4-7.

and Eryximachus, mankind's opinions of Eros, and what he will now say.[85] Each speaker is concerned to do something different from the other symposiasts. Their introductions subtly imply the superiority of their own approach without rejecting earlier contributions out of hand. This conscious avoidance of win-lose tactics is reflected in the fluidity of the evaluatory process which accompanies the round of speaking. As Socrates and Eryximachus claim, as each speech is given, it becomes more difficult for the symposiast on the next couch to think of something clever to say. However, as the attention of the audience follows the circle, the efforts of the previous speakers recede from view. Individual symposiasts might attempt to summarise the failings of previous contributions, but the reaction of the wider audience remains out of view. Only occasionally does a speech elicit a reported response: Eryximachus gives high praise to Aristophanes, the crowd cheer when Agathon finishes his encomium, and Socrates receives praise from everyone except Aristophanes.[86] There is no clear increase in appreciation as the *symposion* proceeds from beginning to end: the last speaker does not receive the loudest praise, and most audience responses (and indeed some speeches) are not even recorded. It is enough that the speakers participate successfully in the round of speaking and listening for the event to flow. The competition of the *symposion* lies more in testing the ability of the symposiasts to show themselves capable of acting like a member of the sympotic group, than in the linguistic or rhetorical merits of their individual speeches.

The purpose of competition in the *symposion*, and the importance of *synousia* in shaping it, prevent the agonistic spirit of aristocratic relations from

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[85] Pl. *Smp.* 189c3-9.

[86] Pl. *Smp.* 194e4-5; 198a1-3; 212c4-6.

spilling over into zero-sum warfare. Introductory and concluding allusions to the listening audience and the absence of outright winners and losers maintain the status of the drinkers and the equilibrium of the *symposion*.[87] However, this overriding situation does not prevent its participants from indulging in competitive behaviour which provides a real challenge to the standing of other symposiasts within the group. The deceptively facile bout of hiccups suffered by Aristophanes provides the starting point for one such instance in which competition struggles to take hold of the *symposion*.

In the past, the hiccuping episode has given rise to various analyses. It has been thought of as i) a means of satirising Aristophanes, ii) a 'symbol of the inarticulateness of poetry and justice', iii) an assertion of life after Pausanias' rejection of bodily desires, iv) a clowning reaction to a surfeit of 'lugubrious theorizing', and v) an excuse by which the speeches and arguments of Aristophanes and Eryximachus might be transposed.[88] Most recently, Sonin has invested Aristophanes and Eryximachus' hiccups and sneezing with physiognomical meaning. Drawing out the symbolic significance of these bodily functions, she adds depth to their operation as a disruptive and mocking force in the *Symposium*.[89] However, when Aristophanes' hiccups are viewed within the competitive framework of the *symposion*, they take on a quite different significance. His bout of hiccups allows Aristophanes to issue a series of

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[87] Agathon concludes his speech with an appeal to Phaedrus: Pl. *Smp.* 197c2-4; Socrates similarly addresses Phaedrus and the wider audience: 212b1. Eryximachus and Aristophanes turn attention to one another in the final lines of the encomia: 188e15; 193d7-e2.

[88] i) Bury, 1909: xxii-xxiii; ii) Rosen, 1968: 91; iii) Mitchell, 1993: 47; iv) Brentlinger, 1970: 13; v) Plochmann, 1963: 10, and Henderson, 2000: 310.

[89] Sonin, 1999: 151-175.

challenges to Eryximachus which put the doctor's professional and social status to the test; and, when Eryximachus rises to the challenge, Aristophanes finds himself under siege. Both men must utilise their wit and intelligence to maintain their positions in the immediate group, and prevent the *symposion* falling into disarray.

When he has finished recounting Pausanias' speech, Apollodorus tells his audience,

> Παυσανίου δὲ παυσαμένου (διδάσκουσι γάρ με ἴσα λέγειν οὑτωσὶ οἱ σοφοί) ἔφη ὁ 'Αριστόδημος δεῖν μὲν 'Αριστοφάνη λέγειν, τυχεῖν δὲ αὐτῷ τινα ἢ ὑπὸ πλησμονῆς ἢ ὑπό τινος ἄλλου λύγγα ἐπιπεπτωκυῖαν καὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι λέγειν, ἀλλ' εἰπεῖν αὐτόν (ἐν τῇ κάτω γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸν ἰατρὸν 'Ερυξίμαχον κατακεῖσθαι) "Ὦ 'Ερυξίμαχε, δίκαιος εἶ ἢ παῦσαί με τῆς λυγγὸς ἢ λέγειν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ, ἕως ἂν ἐγὼ παύσωμαι". καὶ τὸν 'Ερυξίμαχον εἰπεῖν "Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ἀμφότερα ταῦτα· ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἐρῶ ἐν τῷ σῷ μέρει, σὺ δ' ἐπειδὰν παύσῃ, ἐν τῷ ἐμῷ. ἐν ᾧ δ' ἂν ἐγὼ λέγω, ἐὰν μέν σοι ἐθέλῃ ἀπνευστὶ ἔχοντι πολὺν χρόνον παύεσθαι ἡ λύγξ· εἰ δὲ μή, ὕδατι ἀνακογχυλίασον. εἰ δ' ἄρα πάνυ ἰσχυρά ἐστιν, ἀναλαβών τι τοιοῦτον οἵῳ κινήσαις ἂν τὴν ῥῖνα, πτάρε· καὶ ἐὰν τοῦτο ποιήσῃς ἅπαξ ἢ δίς, καὶ εἰ πάνυ ἰσχυρά ἐστι, παύσεται". "Οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις λέγων", φάναι τὸν 'Αρισοτφάνη· "ἐγὼ δὲ ταῦτα ποιήσω".

> 'When Pausanias came to a pause (for wise men teach me to balance things in this way), Aristodemus said it was necessary for Aristophanes to speak, but he happened to be having a fit of the

> hiccups, whether on account of being full, or some other reason, and it was impossible for him to speak, except to say (for the doctor Eryximachus was reclining in the couch down from him), 'Eryximachus, you are bound either to stop my hiccups or speak for me, until I stop'. And Eryximachus said, 'but I will do both these things: for I will speak in your turn, and when you stop, you in mine. While I am speaking, if you wish to hold your breath for a long time, your hiccups should stop; if not, gargle with water. But if then they are really severe, take up something to tickle your nose, and sneeze; and should you do this just once or twice, even if they are really severe, they will stop'. 'If you start speaking', said Aristophanes, 'I will do these things'. (Pl. *Smp.* 185c4-e5)

Aristophanes asks Eryximachus to take his place in the round of speaking whilst he cures his hiccups. At first glance this appears to be a request to keep the conversation going and the circle of speaking intact; even if the speaking order has changed, the actual proceedings will continue undisturbed. However, the actual effect of Aristophanes' appeal is to disrupt the communality of the *symposion*. By asking Eryximachus to take his place and cure his hiccups, Aristophanes issues his fellow symposiast with a challenge. As a result of this seemingly benign request, the doctor is now required to jump into the round of speech-making a turn early. At best, Eryximachus will have his encomium ready, and so need only improvise a connection between his own coming contribution, and those which have gone before. In this case, Aristophanes' request simply heightens the tension a little bit, requiring Eryximachus to give

his contribution under some unexpected, on-the-spot pressure. However, at worst, Eryximachus has not yet composed his encomium of Eros, and is faced with the more difficult task of improvising something suitable there and then. Thus, by asking the doctor to change places with him, Aristophanes hopes to increase the level of difficulty Eryximachus must face as he puts his ability to act like a good symposiast on display for the gathered *kaloi kagathoi*. Moreover, this test is combined with a trial of Eryximachus' professional status. Earlier in the evening, Eryximachus gave the *symposion* his doctorly opinion on the medical drawbacks of drinking.[90] Now, he is confronted with an ailment in need of immediate remedy, and his success or failure in curing it will be acted out before the same men to whom he previously lectured.

Eryximachus rises to Aristophanes' challenge; he proposes a number of treatments the comic playwright might try out, and gives a speech which, given the lack of censure from the other guests, appears to satisfy the demands of the occasion. Moreover, after applying the sneezing method, Aristophanes' hiccups disappear.[91] However, although Eryximachus comes through unscathed, he has by no means 'won' the competition. Having issued Aristophanes with a selection of remedies for his hiccups, he must speak against what Henderson usefully calls the 'interactive backing track' of Aristophanes' hiccups, gargling and sneezes.[92] While these noisy antics provided an alternative focus for the listening audience, we might imagine the sympotic group distracted by the sight of the poet holding his breath, and tickling his nose. In the drama of the

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[90] Pl. *Smp.* 176c1-d5.

[91] Pl. *Smp.* 189a1-3.

[92] Henderson, 2000: 310.

Symposium, Eryximachus' cures inadvertently create a platform from which the comic poet can carry out a visual and aural assault on the doctor's performance.

However, having come through the fray, Eryximachus now turns his attention towards Aristophanes, and uses the privileged position of his 'victory' to gain the upper hand. When the poet rambles on about his hiccups and sneezing, Eryximachus chastises his adversary:

> Ὦγαθέ, φάναι, Ἀριστόφανες, ὅρα τί ποιεῖς. γελωτοποιεῖς μέλλων λέγειν, καὶ φύλακά με τοῦ λόγου ἀναγκάζεις γίγνεσθαι τοῦ σεαυτοῦ, ἐάν τι γελοῖον εἴπῃς, ἐξόν σοι ἐν εἰρήνῃ λέγειν.
>
> 'Aristophanes, my good man', he said, 'look at what you are doing. You are about to speak, and you are playing the laughter-maker (*gelōtopoiein*), and force me to become the guardian of your words, in case you say something laughable (*geloion*), when you should speak in peace'. (Pl. *Smp.* 189a7-b2)

Eryximachus' warning to Aristophanes tries to set limits on Aristophanes' behaviour. By acting like a *gelōtopoios*, a man of low status who is hired at parties to provoke laughter through his self-debasing antics, Aristophanes complicates his position within the sympotic group.[93] As Xenophon's depiction of Philippus shows, the figure of the *gelōtopoios* enacts his own feeble status

[93] On the derogatory connotations of being a *gelōtopoios*, see chapter 4, pages 194-205, and chapter 5, pages 235-251, below.

through his performances.[94] Thus, Eryximachus' accusation that Aristophanes acts like a *gelōtopoios* does not merely charge him with 'buffoonery', as commentaries on the *Symposium* assume.[95] Instead, Eryximachus chastises Aristophanes because he puts himself on display as a lowly, self-abusing *gelōtopoios*, when his performances should demonstrate his membership of an elite group.[96]

Aristophanes' hiccups bring disruption to the *symposion* several times over: through the poet's challenge to Eryximachus, the attempted sabotage of the latter's speech, and the reduction of a member of Athens' elite to a quite ridiculous hiccuping, giggling, sneezing, breath-holding, and now *gelōtopoios*-like spectacle. By chastising Aristophanes, Eryximachus regains the control which Aristophanes' challenge earlier deprived him of. He once again sets himself up as symposiarch, a role he had earlier adopted when proposing the evening's topic of conversation and establishing the amount of wine to be drunk.[97] Presenting himself again as the guardian of the *symposion*'s good order, Eryximachus counters the negative effects of Aristophanes' challenge by repositioning himself on the moral high-ground. However, far from being disappointed that the doctor has emerged successfully from the fray,

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[94] See chapter 4, page 197ff, below.

[95] For example, Rowe, 1998: 49, 153.

[96] Of course Aristophanes is a *gelōtopoios* of sorts, writing comic plays intended to provoke the laughter of his audiences. But Eryximachus makes the point that this behaviour is not suitable for the *symposion*. On the *gelōtopoios*, and the dangers which accompany his laughter making, see chapters 4 and 5, below.

[97] Pl. *Smp.* 177a1-d5; 176e4-10.

Aristophanes gracefully accepts Eryximachus' victory, and his new position of authority:

> Καὶ τὸν ' Αριστοφάνη γελάσαντα εἰπεῖν, Εὖ λέγεις, ὦ
> ' Ερυξίμαχε, καί μοι ἔστω ἄρρητα τὰ εἰρημένα. ἀλλὰ μή με
> φύλαττε, ὡς ἐγὼ φοβοῦμαι περὶ τῶν μελλόντων ῥηθήσεσθαι,
> οὔ τι μὴ γελοῖα εἴπω - τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἂν κέρδος εἴη καὶ τῆς
> ἡμετέρας μούσης ἐπιχώριον - ἀλλὰ μὴ καταγέλαστα.
>
> And laughing, Aristophanes said, 'you speak well, Eryximachus; please let the things I said be unspoken. But don't keep watch on me, because I am afraid of what I am about to say, not that I will say something laughable (*geloia*) – for that would be an advantage and in the province of our muse – but lest I say something contemptible (*katagelasta*)'.[98] (Pl. *Smp.* 189b3-7)

Aristophanes plays out their new relationship in two ways. Firstly, by laughing at Eryximachus' description of him as *gelōtopoios*, he admits that for the moment the doctor has the upper hand. However, even here, Aristophanes

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[98] I translate *katagelasta* as 'contemptible' in accordance with Dover, 1980: 112. Following Eryximachus' accusation of *gelōtopoiein*, Aristophanes agrees that there is a danger that his comic performance will earn the derision of his fellow symposiasts on this count. It is this which informs his fears, not a worry that he will not be able to say something serious, as Rowe, 1998: 153, suggests. This provides one solution to Corrigan's, 1997: 57, conundrum regarding these passages: 'the meaning of γελωτοποιεῖς and γελοῖον is unclear: funny in a positive sense

cheekily retains the advantage. He may have used his hiccups to challenge the Eryximachus' professional abilities, but the comic playwright claims that the doctor has momentarily taken over his professional function, referring to the source of his comic inspiration as *tēs hēmeteras mousēs*, 'our muse'. This comparison is not flattering to Eryximachus, whom it embroils in the imagery of the laughter-maker. Moreover, Aristophanes confesses his fear that his coming performance will not live up to his profession and social standing and that he will again say something that paints him as *gelōtopoios*. As a result he will fail in the competition of the *symposion* and his membership of the sympotic group will be lost.

However, if Aristophanes hopes to gain any quarter from the man his antics nearly humiliated by painting himself as inferior and worried he is quickly disabused of this notion. Eryximachus lays the situation out in black and white:

> Βαλών γε, φάναι, ὦ ' Αριστόφανες, οἴει ἐκφεύξεσθαι· ἀλλὰ πρόσεχε τὸν νοῦν καὶ οὕτως λέγε ὡς δώσων λόγον. ἴσως μέντοι, ἂν δόξῃ μοι, ἀφήσω σε.
>
> 'Having cast, Aristophanes', he said, 'you think to escape: but take heed and so speak in the knowledge that you will be called to account. But perhaps, if I so decide, I will let you off'. (Pl. *Smp.* 189b8-c2)

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or comic buffoonery in a negative sense?'. Laughter and (self-)abuse in Xenophon's *Symposium*, are discussed in chapter 5, below.

Eryximachus recognises Aristophanes' proclaimed inferiority as the ploy for sympathy that it is; having set Eryximachus the challenge of talking on the spot, Aristophanes must now take whatever the doctor decides to throw at him. Aristophanes' position in the group is put at issue, and Eryximachus alone will decide whether Aristophanes' performance lives up to his status as comic poet and his membership of the *symposia*-going elite.

In conclusion, the hiccuping episode is not simply a device by which Plato can change the order of speaking, or defend Socrates' reputation by showing Aristophanes in a bad light; nor is its only role to provide a physically derogatory assessment of the foregoing speeches. By focusing on the banter surrounding the speeches of Eryximachus and Aristophanes, Aristophanes' hiccuping emerges as a platform from which the comic poet can mount a good-spirited attack on one of his fellow drinkers. The episode thus plays out the competitive tensions which exist within the *symposion*. However, it also reveals a concern amongst the symposiasts that these tensions be resolved. Although Eryximachus is keen not to excuse Aristophanes for putting his position to the test, harmony between the two symposiasts is restored when Eryximachus judges Aristophanes' speech positively. Not only does the doctor say that he found Aristophanes' *logos* pleasurable but he comments that he is glad not to be required to follow it.[99] As before, the desire to maintain an atmosphere of *synousia* restrains the competitive spirit of the symposiasts. Moreover, the episode again reveals that sympotic competition is primarily performative. Challenges are set and judgements made in relation to the symposiasts' ability to perform as they should: they must participate in the round of speaking in a

[99] Pl. *Smp.* 193e4-8.

manner which reveals their status as members of the sympotic group, members of Athens' well-educated elite. Yet, this process only confirms status once it has been put at issue, and made a test of. Every time a symposiast takes the floor, what it means to be a symposiast is (or has to be) (re)negotiated, (re)stated, and (re)affirmed.

The banter between the symposiasts reveals a careful balancing of competition and communality in Plato's *symposion*. The moments of interaction studied above bear witness to the fragility of a game which imbues the competition with an element of communality, and vice versa. Yet, although the *symposion* acts as an arena for the testing of status, the competition which takes place there is not fully of the zero-sum variety. The *symposion* provides its participants with the opportunity to promote their standing through performance, but the atmosphere of *synousia* means that the chances they will fail are minimal. No-one acts hybristically like Philocleon in the *Wasps*, and so the group remains undisturbed.[100] The *symposion* therefore provides a safe venue for the exploration and testing of what it means to be an educated, *symposia*-going, Athenian male.

Conclusion: Testing, Training and *Mimēsis* in the *Symposion*

In Plato's *Laws*, the Athenian Stranger recommends wine as a medium for testing and training one's sense of shame (*aischynē*), as well as courage (*andreia*), excellence (*aretē*) and moderation (*sōphrosynē*). Wine offers its drinker a safe environment in which to face, fight and conquer the dangerous and

[100] Ar. *V.* 1303ff. On Philocleon's behaviour, see below, chapter 4, 167-169.

shaming impulses it arouses.[101] However, the *symposion*, where men drink together, offers its participants a slightly different challenge. In nature and by practice the symposiast has already established his superiority over wine. His drinking must therefore demonstrate (*epideiknusthai*) his excellence (*aretē*); he should neither behave incorrectly nor drink too much, and so act with *sōphrosynē*.[102]

The testing (*agōn*) and training (*gymnasia*) which the Athenian Stranger promotes through the *symposion* takes a similar form to the performances recommended in the *Protagoras* and witnessed in the *Symposium*. According to Socrates in the *Protagoras*, the good symposiast-synousiast should be able to converse correctly, no matter how much wine he has drunk. And at Agathon's house, the symposiasts drink moderately and subsume their potentially shaming sexual desires into a round of speech-making. Yet, the symposiasts continue to test and be tested by one another, and in the process of testing they train themselves to be *kaloi kagathoi*. Their *epideixeis* act as proofs to their *kalokagathia*.

However, if Plato's ambitions in the *Laws* are taken to their extreme, then the *agōn* of the *symposion* is a training ground for a man's participation in the *polis*. Yet, the *symposion* restrains the zero-sum competition which the symposiasts practice from its most damaging excesses. This raises two possibilities. On the one hand, Plato's *symposion* provides a safe arena in which its participants might try out the competitive strategies they will need to master if they are to participate fully in political life, without endangering their identity.

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[101] Pl. *Lg.* 646a-649b.

[102] Pl. *Lg.* 648d-e.

On the other hand, Plato rejects zero-sum competition as a component in the social relations between, and in their performances as, *kaloi kagathoi*. In its place, he provides an alternative model of identity construction based on *mimēsis*. Thus, Plato may envisage his *symposion* operating in a *polis* where a win-lose ethic does not operate; or he may imagine it as a place for developing the skills which participation in zero-sum competition demands without the danger of losing status. However, a third explanation lies in Plato's ambitions for the *symposion* as an educational *mimēsis*. As I will now discuss, the symposiasts' *mimēseis* provide their audience with models of virtue for direct imitation. The absence of zero-sum competition may not relate to Plato's ambitions for the institution of the *symposion*, but for the *symposion* in the *Symposium*.

While Socrates encourages the synousiasts of the *Protagoras* towards a *mimēsis* of *kaloi kagathoi*, the dramatised *symposion* is itself a *mimēsis*, a poetic imitation of the real-life event. For the reader-viewer, the consequences of this are two-fold. Reading the *Symposium* out loud, the reader becomes a performer of the *mimēsis*. Hence, as Halliwell concludes from Plato's analysis of *mimēsis* in the *Republic*, 'the reciter is drawn intensely into, and thereby takes on, the mental and ethical cast of each speaker ...so *mimēsis* functions here as a process whereby the world of the poem *becomes* the world of the mind imaginatively (re)enacting it'.[103] He is not merely a silent guest in the *symposion*, but takes on the part of all the guests in turn. Blondell suggests that this process encourages the reader of Plato's dialogues to enter into them and take part in the doing of

[103] Halliwell. 2002: 53.

philosophy.[104] However, in the *Symposium*, the dramatic setting offers the reader an alternative experience. The reader engages with the *symposion* as a place for testing and training, and becomes embroiled alongside the symposiasts in their *epideixeis* of *kalokagathia*.

Moreover, watching from outside, the viewer is also an audience for the *symposion*. Again Plato's *Republic* offers a way of understanding the viewing audience's position. As Halliwell observes, 'for audiences as such, *Republic* 10, no doubt drawing on genuine scrutiny of the behaviour of mass audiences in the Athenian theatre, posits a psychically deep engagement with characters, and a 'surrender' to the emotions they evoke, but one that takes the form of 'sympathy' rather than 'identification' and leaves some degree of (sub)conscious dissociation from the characters'.[105] In the guise of reader-performer, the reader of the *Symposium* takes on the experience of the symposiast who is testing out his identity. Yet, as the reader-viewer he can subject their performances to scrutiny. The reader can ready himself for participating in the *symposion*, just as future soldiers are trained for the hardships of battle by witnessing real-life military exploits.[106]

In the act of reading or reciting the *Symposium*, the reader experiences the potential responses of both performer and audience. This allows him to

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[104] Blondell, 2000: 143. See also, Nussbaum, 1986: 126ff, and Bowen, 1988. Gordon, 1999: 44-60, posits a similar interaction between reader and Platonic text, but bases her observations on 'reader response theory', rather than the ambitions which emerge from readings of Plato's dialogues. On reader response theory, see Iser, 1978 and 1989; Freund, 1987.

[105] Halliwell, 2002: 81.

[106] Monoson, 2000: 217-218, on Pl. *R.* 467c-e, and 218 n. 24 on Plato's ambitions for his spectators in the *Gorgias* and *Republic*.

experience the *symposion* as a symposiast, and engage with it at a distance. The reader can see how to act in the *symposion*; and at the same time he joins the symposiasts in acting in it. By engaging in their performances he learns not only about the *symposion* as a place for communality, competition and identity exploration, but receives an interactive lesson in *how to behave* in this *symposion*. The sympotic frame through which Plato's reader experiences the philosophical discussion of beauty and *erōs*, and thereby learns to do philosophy (posited by Nussbaum and Blondell as the main purpose of Plato's dialogues), offers that reader an alternative way of achieving virtue: by doing 'philosophy' in the *symposion*.[107]

Through the text of the *Symposium*, Plato provides a model *symposion* for his reader's imitation and contemplation. It is a safe place for the *kalos kagathos* to display, but also re-negotiate and reaffirm, his identity. Even the drunken Alcibiades, with his shocking encomium of Socrates, fits this bill. The symposiast can engage safely in competition with his companions, knowing that the communal atmosphere of the *symposion* will not allow any permanent reduction in his or their status.

In the next chapter I will delve deeper into Plato's sympotic *mimēsis* by zooming in on the speech of Pausanias. The content of his encomium contributes towards Plato's philosophical discussion of Eros, a version of *erōs* against which Socrates' bare-footed, philosopher-like god can be examined. However, it is also defined by Pausanias' desire to participate successfully in the testing ground of the *symposion*. As with all the other speeches, its shape and content demonstrate and test its speaker's *kalokagathia*. Yet, more than anyone else, Pausanias

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[107] For references to Nussbaum and Blondell, see above, note 104.

engages directly with the issue of what it means to be *kalos kagathos*. His discussion of male sexual relations in the *polis* suggests not only how the *kalos kagathos* should act in erotic affairs, but how he should talk about it in the *symposion*.

Chapter 3: Democracy and Elites in the Speech of Pausanias

Almost nothing is known of the historical Pausanias outside of his Platonic persona. However, in this incarnation he is above all a man of Eros. In the *Protagoras* he lies next to a young *kalos kagathos* named Agathon, whom the narrator imagines to be his boyfriend (*paidika*).[1] Aristophanes alludes to this relationship in the *Symposium*, where Pausanias praises Eros with an exploration of sexual conduct in Athens and elsewhere.[2] Moreover, in Xenophon's *Symposium*, Socrates alludes to Pausanias, the lover (*erastēs*) of Agathon, as an expert in these matters.[3] Building on this erotic persona, Pausanias' speech offers an insight into identity-formation within the sympotic community in two ways. Firstly, like all other contributions to the round of speech-making, his *epideixis* displays techniques which its speaker deploys in order to prove himself capable of talking as a *kalos kagathos* within the *symposion*. And secondly, it presents (and thereby tests out) a code of conduct for the *kalos kagathos* in his erotic relationships. At the same time as Pausanias invests himself in (the

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[1] Pl. *Prt.* 315d-e.

[2] Aristophanes on Pausanias and Agathon: Pl. *Smp.* 193c7-8; Pausanias' praise of Eros: 180c-185c.

[3] Xen. *Smp.* 8.32-34. Thesleff, 1978: 168, and Bowen, 1998: 123, claim that Xenophon's knowledge of Pausanias and his opinions derives directly (indeed, Bowen suggests is misremembered) from Plato's *Symposium*. However, Huss, 1999a: 418, gathers evidence which implies Pausanias was a more widely known figure. See below, chapter 6, pages 293 and note 90, for Xenophon/Socrates' treatment of Pausanias as an 'expert' in *erōs*.

success or failure of) this model, he demonstrates how the *kalos kagathos* might construct his erotic and social identity by talking about *erōs*.

Philosophy, Sexuality and the Imaginary Community of the *Symposion*

Without simplifying too much, Pausanias' speech enters modern scholarship in two particular ways. On the one hand, philosophers examine its place within the philosophical discourse of the *Symposium*; and on the other, historians extract it from its literary context to give weight to their theories about sex and sexuality in the classical Athenian city. The first approach can be found in the works of Bury, Rosen, and Strauss, and more recently in an article by Görgemanns. All four separately conclude that Pausanias provides a self-interested and 'wrong' account of *erōs* to justify his own sexual preferences and relationships.[4] However, the opinions of these scholars occupy a wide spectrum. For example, Bury characterises Pausanias as a 'first-rate pleader', whose speech is infused with sophistry, inconsistency, and contradiction.[5] Equally as damning, Rosen makes the accusation that Pausanias 'is seriously concerned with neither logic nor morality. He is engaged in an intricate and sophistic attempt to secure his own erotic advantage.'[6] Both scholars believe that Socrates' later account of Eros teaches Pausanias the error of his ways.

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[4] Bury, 1909: xxvi-xxvii; Rosen, 1968: 63; Strauss, 2001: 67-69; Görgemanns. 2000: 189-190. Note that Strauss' *On Plato's Symposium*, 2001, is a posthumously published collection of lectures originally presented in 1959, worked up by Strauss in the following decade, and later by their editor, Bernadete.

[5] Bury, 1909: xxvi-xxvii.

[6] Rosen, 1968: 63.

Alternatively, Strauss places Pausanias' speech within the *polis*, and connects it to Plato's political, rather than erotic, philosophy.[7] Pausanias' encomium asserts the legality of its speaker's practices through a 'defence of pederasty': only the man of virtuous reputation can have erotic success.[8] However, like the defences offered by Eryximachus and Aristophanes, Strauss maintains that this speech fails because its scope is too narrow; hence, it cannot be applied at a universal level.[9] Görgemanns also locates Pausanias' argument within the *polis*, but relates it more traditionally to Platonic ideas about desire. But where Bury and Rosen consider Pausanias to be a scheming, self-interested *erastēs*, Görgemanns' virtuous Pausanias tackles the problem of pederasty in Athenian custom (*nomos*) and its 'Doppelmoral' in a measured and conservative way.[10] He concludes that it is not Pausanias who fails in his response to *erōs*, but the *polis*.

The second approach to Pausanias' encomium positions it within the Athenian *polis* too. But whereas Strauss and Görgemanns link it with Plato's philosophical ambitions for the *Symposium*, social historians detach Pausanias' account of Athenian customs from the text and the sympotic setting in which it is performed in order to provide evidence for sexuality and sexual lives in classical Athens.

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[7] Strauss' approaches to Plato are often controversial; cf. Burnyeat, 1985; and Kraut, 1992b: 47-48. While his interpretation of Pausanias' speech *per se* offers little new, its application feeds into his idiosyncratic view of the *Symposium* as a political dialogue (even if it is the 'least political' dialogue of them all: Strauss, 2001: 11).

[8] Strauss, 2001: 67-71.

[9] Strauss, 2001: 72.

[10] Görgemanns, 2000: 189-190.

In the 1970s, sex and sexuality burst onto the academic scene as exciting new, no-holds-barred, topics of inquiry. In the field of ancient history and classics, Dover 'outed' the ancient Greeks as a nation of homosexuals and pederasts. He took male-male sexual relations off the sidelines to which they had been relegated and placed them at the heart of Athenian society.[11] Pausanias' description of the *erastēs*' pursuit of his potential beloved (*erōmenos*), and the attempts of the *erōmenos* to evade being caught, became testimony for Dover in his attempt to construct an ancient 'scheme of values' for erotic conduct in the Greek *polis*.[12] This scheme of values divided the Athenian citizenry into active, male, penetrating *erastai* and passive, unmanly, penetrated *erōmenoi*. Thus, the potential for an adult male to become unmanly through taking on the role of the *erōmenos* lay inherent in it. However, this problem was neutralised by confining sexual passivity to adolescence.

Dover's 'scheme of values' became the basis for Foucault's model of ancient Greek sexuality. In his unfinished monograph series, *The History of Sexuality*, Foucault intended to illuminate the constructed nature of sexuality, and to promote new ways of understanding its operation in the modern world.[13] In volume 2, *The Use of Pleasure*, he travelled back to fourth-century Athens to establish that sexuality could be constructed in a radically different form to its current, post-Christian, twentieth-century manifestation. In addition, he sought to demonstrate how sex emerged as a category and an issue at this time. The series of oppositions which Dover identified between passive and active,

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[11] Dover. 1989.

[12] Dover, 1989: 81-91; 81.

[13] Foucault, 1985: 3.

penetrator and penetrated, dominant and subordinate fulfilled both these demands. Modern conceptions of our own society as a continuity of ancient Greece and Rome offered a false sense of familiarity against which Foucault could strike, giving his presentation of an alien Athenian value system an added twist.[14] In addition, Dover's Athenian scheme of values attempted to render sexuality safe by creating a series of complex rules and regulations which simultaneously revealed and off-set the anxieties which sex raised. It thus provided a clear example of the 'problematisation' of sexual values which (Foucault contended) still govern western understandings of sexuality today[15]. Like Dover, Foucault turned to Pausanias for illumination and confirmation of the protocols surrounding sexual relations between males which showed ancient concerns over the honour of young men engaging in shaming sexual pursuits. His acceptance of Pausanias' model of erotic relations is reflected in his opinion of Aristophanes' speech: in his presentation of an alternative version of sexual conduct for men, the comedian is regarded as challenging society's (and Pausanias') 'norms'.[16] Yet, if Dover or Foucault had read Aristophanes' speech alongside, rather than in opposition to, Pausanias' account of *erōs*, their

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[14] However, by taking ancient Greece as his starting point, Foucault's genealogical approach puts its author as much in thrall to ancient Greece and Rome as the people whose monolithic understanding of sexuality he attacks. As Poster, 1986: 208ff, explains, Foucault is interested in the pre-Christian, Greek world as 'different' from our own to the extent that he smothers potential similarities between the two, but he ultimately succumbs to the 'Tyranny of Greece'.

[15] On 'problematisation': Foucault, 1985: 14-32, 33-78.

[16] Foucault, 1985: 232-233.

understanding of male-male sexual relations (and Foucault's argument about sexuality) might have looked quite different.[17]

Foucault's investigations brought about a major shift in modern conceptions of ancient sexuality, and gave rise to a wide range of work inspired by his theories and observations. For example, in *One Hundred Years of Homosexuality*, *The Constraints of Desire*, and *Before Sexuality*, Halperin, Winkler and their associates explore further the social construction of sexuality in the ancient world.[18] Halperin in particular highlights the differences between modern and ancient conceptions of homosexuality, demonstrating how the active-passive debate first recognised by Dover pervades classical discourse, in contrast to the notions of 'acceptance', 'tolerance', and 'rejection' which

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[17] As Ludwig, 1996 and 2002: 28-63, shows, Aristophanes presents an alternative to Pausanias' account of Athenian *nomoi* which is equally valid within the *Symposium* and Athens, and which is not incongruous with it. His promotion of lifelong partnerships between men is also recommended by Pausanias (Pl. *Smp.* 181d1-7: cf. Ludwig, 1996: 557), and his praise of former *erōmenoi* as 'manly' fits his ambitions for Athenian society (Ludwig, 1996: 553ff; 2002: 49-54). Although the discussion between Pausanias and Aristophanes reveals a discourse surrounding sex and sexuality, the resultant impression of a society negotiating its sexual *nomoi* does not correspond exactly to the 'problematisation' which Foucault envisages. On Ludwig's interpretation of Aristophanes' speech, see Halliwell, 2003, mentioned in chapter 2, note 9, above.

[18] Halperin, 1990; Halperin, Winkler and Zeitlin, 1990; Winkler, 1990a. But the reaction to Foucault's contribution to ancient history and the classics has not always been positive. For example, feminist scholars like Dean, 1994, Foxhall, 1994, and Richlin, 1991 and 1998, have taken issue with the Foucauldian emphases on male experience, while Black, 1998, complains that by distancing himself from Freudian psychoanalysis, Foucault has taken the sex out of sexuality. For a selection of perspectives on *The History of Sexuality* in the classics, see Larmour, Miller and Platter, 1998.

dominate contemporary discussions today.[19] Winkler also draws on Dover and Foucault's work, labelling their scheme of values or 'fundamental conceptions' as 'protocols' which dictated how men presented their behaviours to one another.[20]

However, the Dover-Foucault-Halperin-Winkler model has recently been challenged by Davidson. His nuanced analysis of the rhetoric of pleasure in fourth-century Athens demonstrates that the oppositional model, which Dover and Foucault have made an institution, does not correspond to a straightforward division between the praise of activity, dominance and penetration, and the condemnation of passivity, submission and being penetrated. Rather, the Athenian citizen is judged by the amount of pleasure he seeks in sex (and also eating and drinking): those who moderate their passions, either for penetrating or being penetrated are praised, whilst those who do not are castigated with the labels *katapugōn* or *kinaidos*.[21]

As Fisher observes, there is no reason why the moralising models of Dover, Foucault and Davidson cannot exist side by side.[22] Describing his own approach to the question of 'homosexuality', he notes 'there were a good many conflicts, variations and moral problematisations throughout the society.'[23] These emphases on variety and problematisation are developed by Hubbard, who follows Thorp in questioning the extent to which ancient Greek constructions of homosexuality, and attitudes towards it, really differed from their modern

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[19] Halperin, 1990: 97.

[20] Winkler, 1990a: 5.

[21] Davidson, 1997: 175-182.

[22] Fisher, 2001: 47.

[23] Fisher, 2001: 36.

counterparts.[24] Focusing on Old Comedy, he provides evidence for the censure of relations between men and men, and men and boys, on the grounds of the relationship alone. Hubbard forcefully asserts that, 'the principal issue was always class, not who was penetrating who'.[25] Yet, he produces an argument which avoids reducing attitudes towards homosexuality to a matter of class status.[26] For example, when Aristophanes describes Agathon as smelling of little boys' penises he signifies Agathon's elite status; but he also builds on the tragedian's other known characteristics: for example, his effeminate behaviour.[27] The acts of oral and anal penetration, pederasty, and sexual relations between men were not only socially, but also morally, inscribed. Hubbard concludes, 'For the classical Athenians ... homosexuality was neither persecuted nor completely accepted, but was, to borrow a term from Foucault, "problematised"'.[28] Reclaiming the language of Foucault from his so-called followers, Hubbard reminds his reader that Athenian constructions of

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[24] Hubbard, 1998; Thorp, 1992.

[25] Hubbard, 1998: 70. Hubbard's vehemence is more due to his desire to reject the monolithic perspective of Halperin and Winkler, which came to dominate discussions of homosexuality in the 1990s, than any socialist, or Marxist, agenda of his own.

[26] Although Hubbard is attuned to (if not convinced of) the distance between modern and ancient notions of sexuality, the problem of using modern conceptions of 'class' to comprehend the ancient world seems to have eluded him. My study of *kalokagathia* in chapter 6 highlights some of the difficulties involved in attempts to study fifth- and fourth-century Athenian society through a class prism.

[27] Hubbard, 1998: 57-58; Ar., *Thes.* 253-255.

[28] Hubbard, 1998: 72.

'homosexuality' were not as black and white as Dover, Halperin and Winkler suggest.[29]

This unsettling of Doverian and Foucauldian views of male sexuality in Athens requires a return to Pausanias' speech. Any new reading must contextualise the speech within a society whose attitudes towards sex were diverse, and (like the *symposion*) not straightforwardly accessible. Sexual 'customs' and 'norms' did not exist independently of the political, legal and theatrical rhetoric which created them. As Fisher's study of Aeschines' *Against Timarchus* shows, within these media, sexual acts were never simply functions of the body.[30] Instead, they were blank canvases onto which the immediate intentions of the speaker, and his assumptions about the opinions of his audience, could be projected. By second-guessing the attitudes of his audience towards sexual promiscuity, buggery, prostitution and so on, the speaker created (what on some readings would appear to be) a coherent picture of Athenian attitudes. However, this coherency was an illusion; the various oratorical accounts of Athenian *nomoi* were products of their speaker's interested reconstruction of his

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[29] However, Hubbard's sense of achievement is undermined by Parker, 2001: 326, who criticises him alongside these scholars for the unquestioned assumption that Greek sexuality neatly divided, like sexuality supposedly does in the West today, between 'hetero-' and 'homosexuality'. Her article shows that the two 'biological sexes' (and I use this term with perhaps more caution than Parker herself) can map onto a variety of 'genders'. On the discontinuity between 'sex' and 'gender', see also Butler, 1999: 119-140, who contends that the notion of 'biological sex' is equally as constructed as 'gender'.

[30] Fisher, 2001: 44ff. See also Sissa, 1999.

audience's attitudes and expectations, not the attitudes and expectations themselves. They thereby plug into the city's 'imaginary'.[31]

Recent investigations into the social imaginary in ancient Greece have concentrated on the civic arena of the classical Athenian *polis*. For example, Loraux investigates the imaginary of the democratic city reflected in, and created and conveyed by, funeral orations (*epitaphioi*) composed in the fifth and fourth centuries.[32] By analysing the *epitaphioi* of Thucydides' Pericles, Gorgias, Lysias, Plato, Demosthenes and Hypereides as if in performance, Loraux shows how spoken assertions about the city and its citizens made before a demotic audience gave rise to (and reflected) communal conceptions of the democratic city and its citizens.[33] Similarly, Ober's analysis of fourth-century lawcourt speeches shows how defendants and prosecutors both plugged into a communal discourse on the values associated with the good citizen. Presenting themselves

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[31] This notion of a community as imaginary is usefully discussed by Anderson, 1990: 6-7, who remarks, 'the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion ... Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined'. On this analysis, every political and social grouping builds its identity on an 'imagined' community, which thinks of itself as 'limited', 'sovereign', and, most importantly, as a 'fraternity'.

[32] Loraux, 1986.

[33] Although, as Loraux, 1986: 8-12, acknowledges, the grouping together of these different types of texts by different writers with different intentions, not all of which involved public performance, creates problems for her arguments.

as *hoi metrioi*, 'middling men', they professed to share the hopes, fears, desires, attitudes and lifestyles of the average man in the agora.[34]

However, their approaches might be applied equally to the smaller community of symposiasts in Plato's *Symposium*, where the exploration and affirmation of status were established through 'public' performances. From this perspective, the speech of Pausanias does not provide evidence for fixed Athenian practices, or a 'scheme of values' according to which these practices are assigned praise or blame. Rather, Pausanias' encomium of *erōs* gives an example of how a *symposion*-going, Athenian male citizen might imag(in)e his own lifestyle, in accordance with his political and social status in the city. Strikingly, however, Pausanias does not detach himself from the rhetoric of the democracy. Instead, it is central to his conception of elite identity.

Model Behaviours: Aphrodite Pandemos versus Aphrodite Ourania

The first section of Pausanias' speech sets *erōs* within a mythological and moralising framework, and demonstrates the speaker's interaction with the *symposion* and the city. On the one hand, the distribution of erotic behaviour under the headings of Aphrodite Pandemos and Aphrodite Ourania places his account within the competitive speech-making of the *symposion*. On the other hand, the manner in which morality is inscribed onto these behaviours typifies aristocratic strategies of self-definition in relation to the Athenian *dēmos*. Pausanias thereby claims an 'aristocratic' identity for Pausanias and his audience.

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[34] Ober, 1989: 251-289. Ober's ideas will be discussed further in chapter 6, page 270-271. below.

Pausanias opens his account of *erōs* with the assertion that there is not one Eros, but two Erotes. This dive into mythology is a typical opening gambit for speakers in Plato's *Symposium*.[35] For example, Phaedrus and Agathon also appeal to the traditional stories related by Hesiod and Parmenides to promote their own descriptions of Eros.[36] Furthermore, the entire contribution of Aristophanes takes the form of a pseudo-mythology; the motifs of monstrous double humans, human transgression, divine punishment, and the mediation of transgression and punishment through sex are all common elements of ancient Greek folklore.[37] Hence, Pausanias begins his encomium by launching straight into the competitive fray. With his account of two Aphrodites, he will employ the common motif of mythology, but, he declares, in a more intricate, innovative and imaginative way than his predecessor, Phaedrus.[38]

In *The Children of Athena*, Loraux showed how mythological stories acted as a primary site for the imaginary of classical Athens.[39] Retold and replayed in civic life, myths of autochthony, and those involving Pandora, reinforced the Athenian citizen's identity as an Athenian and, in terms of gender,

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[35] The tendency for sympotic speakers to appeal to the authority of dead authors is critiqued by Socrates in Xenophon's *Symposium*: cf. chapter 6, pages 292-294 ff.

[36] Pl. *Smp.* 178b1-c1; 195b6-c4.

[37] The similarities between Aristophanes' myth and traditional myths concerning the gods are charted at some length by Dover, 1966. Dover's claim that Plato gives Aristophanes a story with closer affinity to myth than comedy is challenged by Reckford, 1996: 64, n. 1, but his observations still hold.

[38] This is the sense of his introduction: Pl. *Smp.* 180c4-d3. Agathon uses similar tactics, but makes his one-upmanship over Phaedrus more explicit: Pl. *Smp.* 195b6 ff.

[39] Loraux, 1993.

as a man. Myths, therefore, were not simply stories, but tales which could be manipulated, reinvented and redirected in the name of civic consciousness. By welding two separate myths about the birth of Aphrodite to an explanation for different behaviours Pausanias does precisely this, albeit on a smaller, sympotic, scale. While Phaedrus and Agathon purport to retell correct versions of stories, using the poems of renowned mythographers as their testimony, Pausanias consciously plays with these versions, offering a new mythology in which he can situate his own unique encomium of Eros. He therefore goes one step further than Phaedrus in his use of myth, taking the competition to a new level. Like Aristophanes, who must follow and at least attempt to better his predecessor's effort, Pausanias uses myth to create his own mini-cosmos, with its own customs and associated system of morality.[40] Later, he expands this cosmos to embrace what he implies are the customs of the Athenian city at large. However, the erotic realm over which his two Aphrodites reign is constructed according to Pausanias' ambition to talk his fellow drinkers into recognising and accepting his 'imaginary' world.

Thus, Pausanias' assertion that there are two Erotes, and hence two Aphrodites, acts as a typical starting point for his spoken contribution to the *symposion*, and structures his subsequent discussion of *erōs*. Recalling the stories of Aphrodite's birth recorded by Hesiod and Homer, Pausanias derives two models of *erōs*, each of which belongs under the auspices of the appropriate

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[40] In the 'creating a new mythology' stakes, Pausanias is clearly trumped by Aristophanes, whose whole speech is one big mythology. Indeed, Ludwig, 1996: 552-553, sees Aristophanes' contribution as a satire on Pausanias' entire account. Socrates too engages in this competition, inventing a new genesis for Eros by giving him Penia, 'Poverty', and Ponos, 'Resource', as parents: Pl. *Smp.* 203b1-c5.

Aphrodite.[41] The difference in generation between the two Aphrodites becomes the basis of the division between them, and the content of their related models of behaviour.[42] Pausanias asks rhetorically,

> πῶς δ' οὐ δύο τὼ θεά; ἡ μέν γέ που πρεσβυτέρα καὶ ἀμήτωρ Οὐρανοῦ θυγάτηρ, ἣν δὴ καὶ Οὐρανίαν ἐπονομάζομεν· ἡ δὲ νεωτέρα Διὸς καὶ Διώνης, ἣν δὴ Πάνδημον καλοῦμεν.
>
> 'So how could we suppose that the goddesses are not two? At all events, there is the older and motherless daughter of Ouranos, whom we also give the name Ourania; and the other is the younger daughter of Zeus and Dione, whom we call Pandemos.' (Pl. *Smp.* 180d5-e1)

With this statement Pausanias introduces the labels by which he maintains a division between the two Aphrodites: Ourania, and Pandemos. The former title conveys a sense of the heavens, of timeless authority, and the exclusive realm of the divine; in contrast, the latter means literally 'of all the people'. Although, as Dover notes, both *ourania* and *pandēmos* are known epithets of the goddess in Athens, the slogan *pandēmos* grounds the younger Aphrodite fully in the world

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[41] Hesiod, *Th.* 188-209, Homer. *Il.* 5.370-430. Cf. Dover. 1980: 96: Rowe. 1998: 141. The lines along which Pausanias divides Eros, or at least the manner in which he uses this divide, may be unique to Pausanias, but the notion that there was more than one type of *erōs* relating to particular forms of desiring is found in Euripides' *Theseus*, fr. 388 Nauck, and Aeschines 1.132-159; cf. Görgemanns, 2000: 181 and n. 13.

[42] On the importance of genesis as an general theme of the *Symposium*, see Brentlinger, 1970, 1, 26.

of the *polis* and democracy.[43] Thus, the *erōs* which Pausanias will ascribe to Aphrodite Pandemos is couched in terms of the politically active Athenian masses. Pausanias may distinguish between Aphrodite Ourania and Aphrodite Pandemos on the basis of their mythological geneses, but the opposition which he creates is highly political. If Aphrodite Pandemos is goddess to the many, Aphrodite Ourania might reside with those who place themselves apart from the political masses: Pausanias' audience, the *symposion*-going, aristocratic elite.

In short, the mythological basis for Pausanias' argument allows the speaker to give his account of *erōs* an explicitly political dimension. Whatever Pausanias now says will be coloured by the labels 'ouranian' or 'pandemic'. In addition, he imposes a moralising rhetoric on top of this politicised account of erotic practice. Moving away from mythology into the 'real' world, he states:

> πᾶσα γὰρ πρᾶξις ὧδ' ἔχει· αὐτὴ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς πραττομένη οὔτε καλὴ οὔτε αἰσχρά. ... καλῶς μὲν γὰρ πραττόμενον καὶ ὀρθῶς καλὸν γίγνεται, μὴ ὀρθῶς δὲ αἰσχρόν. οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὸ ἐρᾶν καὶ ὁ Ἔρως οὐ πᾶς ἐστι καλὸς οὐδὲ ἄξιος ἐγκωμιάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ ὁ καλῶς προτρέπων ἐρᾶν.

> 'For every action is like this: done by itself, it is neither fine (*kalē*) nor shameful (*aischra*). .... but done in a fine way (*kalōs*), and correctly (*orthōs*), it becomes fine (*kalon*), and being done incorrectly (*mē orthōs*) it becomes shameful (*aischron*). Thus indeed it is with desire (*to eran*) and Eros: not every one is fine (*kalos*) or

[43] Dover. 1980: 96-97.

worthy to be given an encomium, but only the Eros which urges us on to desire in a fine way (*kalōs*).' (Pl. *Smp.* 180e4-181a2, 181a4-7)

Pausanias' outline of 'ouranian' and 'pandemic' behaviour as correct and incorrect, and *kalos* and *aischros*, employs a traditionally aristocratic vocabulary of moral judgement.[44] It characterises the love of Aphrodite Pandemos as not only 'truly of the people' (*alēthōs pandēmos*), but also that *hon hoi phauloi tōn anthrōpōn erōsin*, 'which base men desire'.[45] From Aeschylus onwards, *phaulos* was used by elite writers to describe the antithesis of the classical, aristocratic ideal.[46] As Cartledge notes, the *phauloi* of the fifth and fourth centuries were the exact opposite of the pseudo-Xenophon's *hoi gennaioi*, 'the well-born', and *hoi chrēstoi*, 'the good'.[47]

With these characterisations, Pausanias emphasises the moral exclusion of the *dēmos* from the sympotic, aristocratic group. However, he also qualifies the pandemic lover in accordance with his actions:

ἐρῶσι δὲ οἱ τοιοῦτοι πρῶτον μὲν οὐχ ἧττον γυναικῶν ἢ παίδων, ἔπειτα ὧν καὶ ἐρῶσι τῶν σωμάτων μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ψυχῶν, ἔπειτα ὡς ἂν δύνωνται ἀνοητοτάτων, πρὸς τὸ διαπράξασθαι μόνον βλέποντες, ἀμελοῦντες δὲ τοῦ καλῶς ἢ μή.

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[44] See Adkins, 1960, and Yamagata, 1994: 225-238. The combination of these terms reflects the Homeric connotations of *kalos*, 'seemly', and *aischros*, 'unseemly', identified by Yamagata.

[45] Pl. *Smp.* 181a8; 181b1-2.

[46] Donlan, 1977: 97.

[47] Cartledge, 1998: 65. For more on the *phauloi*, see chapter 6, page 268, where we will also learn how moral polarities might be employed in relation to various segments of society.

> 'Firstly, such men [*hoi phauloi tōn anthrōpōn*] desire women no less than boys; secondly, of those they desire their bodies rather than their souls; then again, they desire those who are as foolish as can be (*anoētotatoi*): looking towards the end result alone, they do not care if it is done well or not.' (Pl. *Smp.* 181b2-6)

On this model, pandemic and ouranian lovers can be distinguished on the following grounds: whether they desire women and boys or only boys; whether they desire their bodies or their souls; and the intellectual capabilities of the objects of their desire. This last consideration is thought to determine the intentions or attitude of the lover, whether he is interested in acting *kalōs*, 'well' or in simply seeking sexual gratification. The principal consideration for assessing a lover as pandemic or ouranian is therefore not his social status, but his behaviour. The pandemic lover is considered *phaulos* by his association with the female as well as the male, his focus on the satisfaction of bodily desires, and his lack of concern over the approval or disapproval his behaviour will attract. He refuses to be measured according to the standards of merit and shame which Pausanias would seek to impose on him. In contrast, the ouranian lover embraces these restraints, and seeks to act in the most praiseworthy way. Pausanias' pandemic lover is highly reminiscent of the *katapugōn* or *kinaidos*, as described by Davidson. The lover who is *phaulos* is unwilling to play the game set out for him by his peers just as the *katapugōn* and *kinaidos* refuse to restrain their sexual appetites to meet social expectations.[48]

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[48] Davidson, 1997: 167-182.

Thus, despite describing the pandemic lover as *ho alēthōs pandēmos* and *ho phaulos tōn anthrōpōn*, the distinction Pausanias makes does not primarily refer to his membership of the politically active Athenian masses. Instead, Pausanias uses the labels to identify the behaviours which he considers incorrect, (*mē orthōs*) and shameful (*aischros*), when carried out by members of the aristocratic elite. Before such an audience, he charges those who fit the pandemic criteria with behaving like wretched, low-born, members of the Athenian masses. In the mouth of Pausanias, *pandēmos* and *phaulos* become first and foremost words of moral condemnation, rather than (or perhaps concomitant with) political abuse.

Pausanias' definition of the pandemic lover is quite straightforward; however, his description of correct love, experienced by those under the influence of Aphrodite Ourania, is far from clear-cut. In the first instance, the man who loves correctly rejects the female, and loves only boys: *to phusei erōmenesteron kai noun mallon echon agapōntes*, 'feeling affection for those by nature more vigorous and having greater minds'.[49] Here, Pausanias repeats commonly held views of the inferiority and weakness of women, and plugs his argument into his city's discourse on gender.[50] The Athenian man is praised or condemned by the associations he forms: the shameful pandemic lover matches himself with the physically and intellectually inferior woman, while the youthful vigour and intelligence of his beloved youth reflects back positively on the

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[49] Pl. *Smp.* 181c6-7.

[50] For this view of women, see for example Xenophon's *Symposium* 2.9, where Socrates claims that women can be educated in spite of their inferiority in reasoning (*gnōmē*) and strength (*ischus*).

standing of his ouranian *erastēs*. Thus, Pausanias not only discusses the 'homosexuality' of the Athenian male in terms of the sexual desire of one male for another, but places it within a gendered hierarchy of position.[51] On Pausanias' understanding, the biological sex and socially constructed gender of a man's object of desire feeds back into that man's standing within an elite community which defines itself as composed of desiring, *symposion*-going, aristocratic, Athenian, citizen, males.

However, it is not only the sex and gender of his lover which affects this. Pausanias states that the age and intelligence of a chosen beloved are equally as important. The pandemic lover, whose behaviour is characterised by shamelessness, desires weak women and boys who, like himself, lack intelligence. By contrast, the ouranian lover, who is concerned to desire in a fine way, will choose a youth whose suitability is manifest in his newly developing intelligence.[52] The focus on the maturity of the mind as a criterion for suitability moves the sphere of reference away from the bodily realm, towards the soul, and prefigures Pausanias' future arguments regarding the conduct of boys in sexual relationships with men.[53] The would-be lover is warned against associations with younger boys, whose intelligence is not yet in evidence because the final

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[51] Like Fisher, 2001: 27. I employ the term 'homosexuality' with reservations and caution. Restricting its definition to 'the desire of one male-sexed person for another' will hopefully avoid the dangers of imposing modern ideas about sexuality, itself a modern construction, on the past. On these dangers, see Foucault, 1976 and 1984, *passim.*; Halperin, 1990: 29-38; and Parker, 2001, discussed in note 29, above.

[52] Pl. *Smp.* 181c7-d3.

[53] Pl. *Smp.* 184a5-b7.

destination of their souls and bodies in terms of vice and virtue are uncertain.[54] Pausanias proposes that if a desiring man wants to ensure that he conducts himself in a fine way, he must wait until the object of his desire is old enough that any tendency towards moral decrepitude or excellence is clear. Therefore, it is not mental agility that Pausanias is concerned with, but the moral propensity of the potential beloved as one basis on which the character of the beloved, and hence of his older partner, will be judged.

To summarise, in spite of its mythological beginnings, Pausanias' speech locates *erōs* firmly within the contemporary Athenian *polis*. Sexual relations are described within the boundaries of Athenian behaviour, and placed within the city's moral landscape. However, far from providing a straightforward account of Athenian *mores* with regard to sexual desire, it points to a diversity of attitudes within the city.[55] This is suggested by Pausanias' wish to present his audience with strict models of 'correct' and 'incorrect', and 'fine' and 'shameful' patterns of behaviour. But, by promoting one form of erotic behaviour, Pausanias inadvertently attests the existence of other types of relationships too. Long-lasting partnerships between men and suitable youths, which Pausanias will later commend, existed alongside those which he characterises as pandemic: transient and permanent sexual relations between men and women, and between men and younger boys. Pausanias' attempt to confine *erōs* within one overriding model betrays the multiplicity of citizen male experiences which it seeks to hide.

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[54] Pl. *Smp.* 181e1-3.

[55] This point is made by Fisher, 2001: 34, who notes, 'by the period of full democracy, as our literary sources become more abundant, Athenian society itself became more complex, and increasingly contained many contradictory ideologies and values ... As the speech given to Pausanias in Plato's *Symposium* explained, this was especially true of same-sex relations'.

Moreover, Pausanias constructs his model of erotic relations within contemporary discourses relating to democracy and gender. Opposing Aphrodite Ourania with Aphrodite Pandemos, he draws on the vocabulary of anti-democratic rhetoric, inscribing political status onto his account of 'good' and 'bad' *erōs*. In this way, he takes to the floor like Ober's forensic orator: forced to defend his actions before the masses, he couches his appeal in the vocabulary of merit and shame – although in Pausanias' case the 'masses' are his fellow symposiasts. By using anti-democratic rhetoric, lawcourt tactics, moral vocabulary and traditional gender hierarchies, Pausanias imagines himself as an aristocratic Athenian male citizen *erastēs*, and places his words and actions within the politicised and gendered discourses of classical Athenian society. He thus demonstrates his identity as *kalos kagathos* by deploying the shared language of an elite audience of Athenian males who defined themselves through traditional aristocratic value-structures, and through a contemporary discourse of democratic opposition.

In the process, Pausanias contributes to the continued development of these discourses. His moral and political definition of the *phaulos*, his moralising of erotic behaviour, and his creation of gender-based sexual hierarchies provide his audience, immediate and extratextual, with potential ways of thinking about *erōs* and about being a desiring man; or more precisely, about being a male, desiring, elite member of the Athenian city. The competition of the *symposion* offers Pausanias an opportunity to interact with, but also redefine the criteria for acting like, and talking about acting like, a *kalos kagathos*.

Ho Peri Ton Erōta Nomos in Greece and Athens

With his moralising overview of *erōs* and its associated relationships complete, Pausanias turns to discuss 'the custom regarding *erōs*' (*ho peri ton erōta nomos*), in a selection of Greek *poleis* outside of Athens, and then in Athens itself.[56] Penwill suggests that his purpose is to compare and contrast the customs of different cities to the benefit of Athens.[57] On this reading, Pausanias politicises the *symposion* by promoting its participants as citizens, positioning them against non-Athenian 'Others'. By establishing a divide between Athenian and non-Athenian customs, and then aligning his own model of erotic behaviour with Athenian *nomoi*, Pausanias endeavours to construct an image of himself which fulfils the requirements of the sympotic competition. Pausanias calls upon the language of his audience's imaginary in order to align himself with the group, and to insinuate his own speech into an established discourse of erotics.

Sex in the Non-Athenian City

> Καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ περὶ τὸν ἔρωτα νόμος ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι νοῆσαι ῥᾴδιος, ἁπλῶς γὰρ ὥρισται· ὁ δ' ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ποικίλος. ἐν Ἤλιδι μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐν Βοιωτοῖς, καὶ οὗ μὴ σοφοὶ λέγειν, ἁπλῶς νενομοθέτηται καλὸν τὸ χαρίζεσθαι ἐρασταῖς, καὶ οὐκ ἄν τις εἴποι οὔτε νέος οὔτε παλαιὸς ὡς αἰσχρόν, ἵνα οἶμαι μὴ πράγματ' ἔχωσιν λόγῳ πειρώμενοι πείθειν τοὺς νέους, ἅτε ἀδύνατοι λέγειν.

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[56] Pl. *Smp.* 182a8.

[57] Penwill, 1978: 145.

> 'And, indeed, the custom regarding desire in other cities is easy to observe, for it is defined absolutely (*haplōs*); but here and in Lacedaemonia it is complex (*poikilos*). But in Elis and in Boeotia, and where they are not clever at speaking (*mē sophos legein*), it is ordained by law simply as good (*kalos*) to grant favours to lovers; and no-one would say, neither young nor old, it is shameful (*aischros*), so that, I believe, they can spare themselves the trouble of trying to persuade (*peithein*) the young by word (*logos*), because they are incapable of speaking (*adunatoi legein*).' (Pl. *Smp.* 182a8-b5)

Pausanias describes the erotic customs of Boeotia and Elis as straightforward and absolute (*haplōs*): a youth might indulge his lover's sexual desires without fear of criticism.[58] This lack of moral appraisal stands in direct contrast to the outline he establishes for acting out one's desires in shameful and praiseworthy ways. However, Pausanias' criticism of this custom does not lie primarily in the behaviour it necessitates, nor in the arbitrariness with which it is applied. Rather, Pausanias is dissatisfied because the customs exist as a result of their followers' inability to speak cleverly. This deficiency prevents the lover and beloved from participating in the kind of educational, erotic relationship which Pausanias has

[58] Therefore the interpretation of this passage provided by Strauss, 2001: 68. is back to front. He claims 'the savage Greeks say grant favours as you please. The Athenians say grant favours with discretion'. However, Pausanias' description reveals he is not concerned that Elis and Boeotia 'have no restrictions whatsoever', but that they follow one absolute pattern of behaviour. And Athenian custom is not praised because it has numerous restrictions, but because of its many levels and variations.

already described as *kalos*.[59] However, his censure of the inability to speak in a sophisticated fashion and to persuade others with words reflects the concerns of the Athenian democracy. The ability to speak was integral to an Athenian citizen's identity as a member of the democratic community. *Isēgoria* and *parrhēsia*, 'freedom of speech' and 'frank speaking', were essential aspects of the deliberative and decision-making processes characteristic of Athenian democracy. Moreover, when Herodotus attributes Athenian military victory to their internal political situation, *isēgoria* is used to signify the new democracy.[60] Freedom of speech, alongside frank speaking, was bound ideologically to the democratic Athenian city as 'a principle that helped create Athens' democratic identity and shaped daily conduct'.[61]

Hence, despite the predominance of rhetoricians in the assembly, it was still necessary for each citizen to believe himself able to convey his concerns verbally: the ability to speak lay at the centre of 'Athenian patriotic self-image'. The Athenian who did not speak freely, nor frankly, and so did not put himself, his intentions and his beliefs, on display as a citizen, might come under suspicion and criticism.[62] This belief extends into Pausanias' criticism of the Boeotians

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[59] And he will soon describe in more detail: Pl. *Smp.* 184d-e.

[60] Hdt. 5.78.1.

[61] Wallace, 1996: 114. Hansen, 1991: 83, also recognises the connection between *parrhēsia* and Athenian *polis* ideologies when he records that Athens named one of its ships Parrhēsia, alongside Dēmokratia and Eleutheria. See *IG* II^2 1624.81. Note that *isēgoria* and *parrhēsia* were also envisaged as key components of the democracy by those who appraised it; for example, Plato (*Republic* 557b) and Isocrates (7.20). Cf. Wallace, 1996: 105.

[62] See Monoson, 2000: 56-59.

and Eleans. Because they cannot speak well, they do not make judgements of praise or shame.

In addition, the ability to persuade and a willingness to be persuaded by others were crucial features of democratic practice. In his study of *Persuasion in Greek Tragedy*, Buxton documents its role in Athenian political life, as attested in the poetry of Solon, the assembly speeches reported by Thucydides, and the lawcourt orations of the fourth century. He concludes, 'persuasion was not only central to Athens' own idealised version of her political life, as represented, e.g. in Euripides' *Suppliants*, but to her real life also ... Faith in public argument lay at the root of the Athenian democracy.'[63] Further, at Athens persuasion (*peithō*), was vital to the lover's image of himself as a successful suitor.[64] As Rothwell notes, Gorgias' presentation of the seduction of Helen is built on the combined

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[63] Buxton, 1982: 16. Buxton (pages 58-63) also asserts that *peithō* is a symbol of the civilised Greek world, in contrast to the uncivilised world of the barbarian. Thus, he creates a series of binary oppositions revolving around *peithō*, and its opposite, *bia*. These are: *peithō*/*bia*, civilised/uncivilised, inside *polis*/outside *polis*, *nomos*/absence of *nomos*, *dikē*/absence of *dikē*, mankind/animals, Greeks/barbarians. However, Pausanias' location of the inability to persuade within Greek *poleis* where *nomos* rules destroys the coherence of these polarities. Pausanias does create a mini-polarity between Athens and non-Athenian states. However, it does not provide an absolute model for self-definition, but co-exists with other oppositions, and differs in significance at different stages in the speech. Moreover, Pausanias' presentation of non-Athenian Greeks reinforces Harrison's, 2002: 7, view that, 'the Greeks themselves, moreover, were far from being a homogeneous group. Though the projection of a barbarian "other" may often serve to reinforce the unity of the "Greek", it may also shed light on the fragility of the Greek-barbarian antithesis'.

[64] Indeed, Rothwell even suggests that *peithō* might be translated as 'persuasion' in a rhetorical context, and as 'seduction' in the affairs of *erōs*: Rothwell, 1990: 30. On the connection between *peithō* and *erōs* in ancient Greece, see further Gross, 1995: ch. 2.

powers of *bia*, 'force', *erōs* and *peithō*.[65] Thus, Pausanias' comment on the inability of poor speakers to persuade merges the democratic citizen with the successful lover. For the moment, the attributes by which an Athenian citizen defines himself are those of any lover, whether pandemic or ouranian.

Pausanias thus draws a distinction between the Athenian's capacity for speaking and persuasion, deliberation and judgement on the one hand, and the Boeotian's and Elean's one-dimensional *nomos* on the other. This difference is reiterated when Pausanias sums up: wherever it is deemed good to gratify lovers it is because of the mental laziness (*tēs psuchēs argia*) of the law-givers.[66] Non-Athenian Greeks thereby share an affinity with the Pandemic lover, who carries out his relations in a shameful way, and desires women and boys who are *anoētotatos*, 'as foolish as can be'.[67] The lover of ignorant youths becomes associated with those who follow the uncomplicated custom which allows boys to gratify their lovers. The former lover is 'of the *dēmos*', criticised from within the moralising language of an aristocratic elite. By contrast, the latter is portrayed as thoroughly removed from the democratic world, unable to participate in the spoken discourses which characterise Athenian civic life. This seemingly incongruous juxtaposition highlights the cultural complexity of Pausanias' world view. Pausanias blurs the boundaries between aristocratic rhetoric, which underlies his description of the bad lover as 'pandemic', and democratic ideology, which informs his view of Greek men who do not belong to the democratic Athenian *polis*. He styles himself as an aristocrat, a member of

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[65] Rothwell. 1990: 26-27.

[66] Pl. *Smp.* 182d1-3.

[67] Pl. *Smp.* 181b5.

Athens' wealthy elite, positioning himself against the Athenian masses, and as a member of the Athenian citizenry, aligning himself with those masses against non-Athenian Greeks.

Unlike at Athens, the actions of Boeotians and Eleans, and of all men who cannot speak cleverly, are not circumscribed by any moral discourse. The inability to participate in a reasoned *logos* allows no room for debate, or for a multiplicity of erotic relationships. Pausanias' criticism of Boeotian and Elean habits is not based on their habits *per se*, but the deficiencies of their practitioners in the realm of self-expression and self-identity. Most strikingly, Pausanias' aristocratic concerns over their erotic customs are filtered through the language and ideology of Athenian democracy. A similar criticism informs his representation of erotic *nomoi* in the Persian-controlled cities of Ionia.

> τῆς δὲ Ἰωνίας καὶ ἄλλοθι πολλαχοῦ αἰσχρὸν νενόμισται, ὅσοι ὑπὸ βαρβάροις οἰκοῦσιν. τοῖς γὰρ βαρβάροις διὰ τὰς τυραννίδας αἰσχρὸν τοῦτό γε, καὶ ἥ γε φιλοσοφία καὶ ἡ φιλογυμναστία· οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι συμφέρει τοῖς ἄρχουσι φρονήματα μεγάλα ἐγγίγνεσθαι τῶν ἀρχομένων, οὐδὲ φιλίας ἰσχυρὰς καὶ κοινωνίας, ὃ δὴ μάλιστα φιλεῖ τά τε ἄλλα πάντα καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἐμποιεῖν.
>
> 'But in parts of Ionia and in other places where they live under barbarians, it [gratifying lovers] is considered shameful. It is because of tyranny that this thing is shameful to barbarians, as indeed are the love of wisdom (*philosophia*) and the love of bodily exercise (*philogumnastia*) as well. For I believe it is not profitable to rulers

> for great thoughts (*phronēmata megala*) to be engendered in their subjects, nor strong affection and fellowship, which all other things, but especially *erōs*, are wont to create.' (Pl. *Smp.* 182b5-c4)

Again Pausanias' argument is bound up with political rhetoric. On the one hand, the Ionians lack some of the properties which Thucydides' Pericles attributes to the Athenians: love of wisdom (*philosophia*) and love of beauty (*philokalia*), the latter being redundant in the absence of *erōs*.[68] As Wohl observes, in the Funeral Oration, Pericles redefines the predominantly elite practice of *philosophia* as an ideological mark of democratic citizenship.[69] When the aristocratic Pausanias deploys its absence as an accusation against Ionians it too contains this democratic significance. While the erotic customs of the Boeotians and Eleans are dictated by their inability to speak cleverly, those of the Ionians are constrained by the desires of non-Greek-speaking tyrants to stamp out opportunities for any kind of verbal and physical interaction amongst their subjects. Although the language of shame re-enters the frame, the morality behind it is dictated by the desire of barbarian rulers to keep their subjects from engaging in activities which might threaten their power: that is, philosophic, gymnastic and erotic activities which create strong personal bonds and high-flying aims in men. These are not the moral criteria by which any self-respecting, philosophy-doing, *gymnasion*-going Athenian would measure himself or his compatriots.

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[68] Th. 2.40.1.

[69] Wohl, 2002: 41-44. On Wohl's discussion of how this idealisation of democratic citizenship is constructed through a discourse linking *erōs* and the *polis*, see Halliwell, 2003.

The folly of Boeotian, Elean and Ionian practices resides within the inability of individuals to take part in what Pausanias regards as the defining activities of the Athenian *polis*; in the latter, this is extended from open debate to the practice of philosophy and the enjoyment of gymnastic activities.[70] The rule of the tyrant infringes on the rights of the individual to lead his life, and carry out his relationships as he likes. This feature of life under tyranny stands in opposition to Pericles' characterisation of Athens in the funeral oration composed by Thucydides. In his programmatic description of the democratic city, Pericles asserts that everyone can go about his daily business without interference from his neighbours.[71] The anti-tyrannical, pro-democratic overtones of Pausanias' comments emerge again in his proud declaration that,

> ἔργῳ δὲ τοῦτο ἔμαθον καὶ οἱ ἐνθάδε τύραννοι· ὁ γὰρ
> ' Αριστογείτονος ἔρως καὶ ἡ ' Αρμοδίου φιλία βέβαιος γενομένη
> κατέλυσεν αὐτῶν τὴν ἀρχήν.
>
> 'Here, the tyrants learned this by deed; for the desire (*erōs*) of Aristogeiton and the affection (*philia*) of Harmodius, being steadfast, brought an end to their rule.' (Pl. *Smp.* 182c4-6)

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[70] Although participation in philosophy remained an ostensibly elite occupation (even if the idea of loving wisdom was drawn into the self-conception of the democratic *polis*), Fisher, 1998, argues convincingly that by the fourth century, participation in the *gymnasion*, where much philosophical activity took place, was a regular feature of Athenian life for citizens of most wealth groups.

[71] Th. 2.37.2.

With the exemplum of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, Pausanias taps into a long tradition of veneration in classical Athens. As Thucydides complains, despite the passing of time between Aristogeiton's attack on Hipparchus and the expulsion of the Peisistratids from Athens, the two events were elided in the popular mind, and the *erastēs* and *erōmenos* were lauded as tyrannicides *extraordinaires*.[72] Their statue was set up in the Agora, later to be recast and re-erected when destroyed by the Persians, and their descendants were given the heroic honour of dining privileges in the *prytaneion*.[73] In the Athenian psyche, Harmodius and Aristogeiton were synonymous with the destruction of tyranny and the establishment of democracy.[74] Moreover, they played a key role in shaping the Athenians' conception of their past, and hence, of their present and future too. When Pausanias boasts of their accomplishment, he aligns himself with the mentality of the Athenian masses.[75]

Pausanias concludes his comments on non-Athenian practices with the observation that,

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[72] Th. 1.20. On Thucydides' exposition on the tyrannicides, see Loraux, 2000: 65-82. She asserts (79-81) that Thucydides invented the erotic bond between Harmodius and Aristogeiton in an attempt to attack the revered status of the liberators and in the hope of expunging *erōs* from the present. However, if these were Thucydides' ambitions, he was more than unsuccessful; the speech of Pausanias refers to the erotic relationship between Aristogeiton and Harmodius as if it were the most important part of an accepted tradition (although of course Pausanias presents it as such for his own reasons).

[73] For a more detailed list, see Taylor, 1981: 185.

[74] See Podlecki, 1966; Fornara, 1970.

[75] See Loraux, 2000: 71-72. As she notes, for Thucydides, the factually erroneous story of Harmodius and Aristogeiton belonged to the *plēthos*, 'the "crowd", but also the majority and the regime that represented it'.

> οὕτως οὖ μὲν αἰσχρὸν ἐτέθη χαρίζεσθαι ἐρασταῖς, κακίᾳ τῶν θεμένων κεῖται, τῶν μὲν ἀρχόντων πλεονεξίᾳ, τῶν δὲ ἀρχομένων ἀνανδρίᾳ·
>
> 'Thus, where it is set up as shameful to grant favours to one's lovers, it rests on the moral defect of those who set it up, the greed of the rulers, and the lack of manliness (*anandria*) of the subjects.' (Pl. *Smp.* 182c6-d1)

He therefore makes the subject Greeks living under Persian tyranny just as responsible for the prohibition of same-sex relations as the tyrants who impose the rule. This context allows Pausanias to imbue the charge of *anandria* with political and social meaning. The Ionian has *anandria* because he is ruled by another, and does not stand up to the tyrant to claim his freedom. This freedom involves not only political self-determination, but the right to attend the *gymnasion*, participate in philosophy, and take part in homoerotic affairs.

In the opening part of his speech, Pausanias works within the traditional vocabulary of aristocratic moralising to present a version of erotic relations which bolsters his claim to membership of Athens' anti-democratic elite. But, his account of erotic *nomoi* outside Athens shows the speaker interacting closely with the contemporary democratic discourses by which the Athenian citizenry imagined itself as positively diverse, clever-speaking, anti-tyrannical, and different in these ways from all other Greeks. Moreover, by constructing his sympotic identity through his erotic relationships, Pausanias takes part in a

discourse which is allied closely to the democracy. Wohl's investigation into the 'spirit of democracy' demonstrates the extent to which democratic discourse was configured through the imagery of erotics. For example, the tyrannicide myth envisaged Athenian democracy as the product of an erotic bond between Aristogeiton and Harmodius, and Hipparchus' thwarted erotic ambitions. It linked pederasty to the democratic values of freedom, courage, and self-sacrifice.[76] And Pericles' Funeral Oration invites the *dēmos* to imagine itself within the *erastēs-erōmenos* relationship, both as lover and beloved of the city.[77] However, the sympotic, agonistic context of Pausanias' speech lends his interaction with democratic discourses an interesting twist. The men whose consciousness Pausanias seeks to reflect are not politically active members of the Athenian *dēmos*, but men whose wealth and lifestyle set them apart from the masses.

Pausanias' speech therefore exists within a network of competing and complementary discourses which permeate the Athenian city. Traditional anti-democratic sentiment and democratic conceptions of the city and its citizens are subtly woven together in an *epideixis* of Pausanias' *kalokagathia*. In her discussion of the funeral oration, Loraux emphasises the continuity between elite and democratic discourses within Athens. The democracy adopted aristocratic value-concepts like *aretē*, *andreia*, and *kalokagathia* because it had no cultural alternative within which to define itself.[78] The speech of Pausanias testifies to a

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[76] Wohl, 2002: 4ff; cf. 267-269.

[77] Wohl, 2002: 30-72.

[78] Loraux, 1986: 218. This assertion will have consequences for our study of Xenophon's *kalokagathia*: see chapter 6, pages 269ff, below.

similar exchange, but one that moves in an opposite direction. When aligning himself with Athens against other Greek *poleis*, the fifth- and fourth-century aristocrat could not define himself outside of the language of the democratic city.

In the 1970s, Althusser's study of ideology led him to describe the process of *interpellation* by which a dominant ideology imposes itself on an individual who is compelled to define herself or himself as a 'subject' within that ideology. The individual only achieves its identity (although it is 'always already' a subject) when 'hailed' by the ideology which shapes it.[79] Although Althusser's conception of ideology has been criticised and his view of subject formation undermined, it seems that on one level at least Pausanias has undergone interpellation.[80] Although he is a member of Athens' elite, Pausanias is hailed by his *polis* as a member of the democracy; hence, he *becomes* a member of the democracy, and talks in its language, whether or not he holds anti-democratic sympathies. Similarly, Pausanias' account of sexual customs in Elis, Boeotia and Ionia, encourages and assists his elite audience to define itself against non-Athenians; they too might identify themselves with the Athenian masses and Athenian democracy, and through their engagement with democratic ideology.

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[79] See Althusser. 1971: 160-171.

[80] See, for example, Hirst, 1975; Eagleton, 1991: 18-22, who also evaluates Hirst's criticism, and Mills, 1997: 29-47. On Hirst's argument against interpellation, see note 9 in the conclusion, below.

The Custom at Athens

When Pausanias returns to the topic of the erotic custom at Athens, the axis of identification shifts once more so that the symposiasts are again invited to identify themselves in relation to the *polis*. Rather than indulging in more moralising rhetoric, Pausanias tries to find a place for himself, his audience, and the relationships he recommends, within the city.

In the introduction to his discussion of *ho peri ton erōta nomos*, Pausanias positions Athenian practice against the customs of other cities on the grounds that their customs are defined simply (*haplōs*), but at Athens they are many-coloured (*poikilos*).[81] Thus, he describes the erotic custom at Athens as 'variegated, complex, or shifting', a characteristic associated with the Athenian democracy.[82] For example, in the *Republic*, the term *poikilos* describes the make-up of the democratic city: Socrates mockingly characterises Athens as a beautiful and *poikilos* assemblage of lifestyles.[83] With his initial observation, Pausanias therefore makes a distinction between the straightforward form of erotic relations engaged in by Boeotians, Eleans and Ionians, and the many different and changing forms of relationship available to the citizens of Athens.

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[81] Pl. *Smp.* 182a8-9.

[82] This definition of *poikilos* is given by Carson, 1986: 24. The term *poikilos* was also variegated, complex and shifting. For example, Hesk, 2000: 36, shows that it might be associated with 'deceit, intricacy, fabrication and beguilement'. Rosenstock, 1994: 376-378, equates the democratic *poikilia* of Plato's *Republic* with the emasculation of citizens; and Monoson, 2000: 224-226, suggests Plato uses it there to describe democracy pejoratively as 'decorous'.

[83] Pl. *R.* 561e3-4. Cf. Rosenstock, 1994: 377, and 390 n. 30, who also maintains that Plato connects the *poikilia* of the city explicitly to women, and thereby to the democracy as 'the site of emasculation'.

At Athens, the sexual custom is not absolute (*ouch haploun estin*), nor easy to understand (*ou rhaidion katanoēsai*).[84]

Yet, when Pausanias goes on to describe the custom at Athens, we find that he is not interested in the variety of Athenian customs, but only in promoting a good 'ouranian' mode of conduct within it. On the one hand, Pausanias aligns his practices with the city's *nomoi*. But on the other hand, he creates a disjunction between this picture of tolerance and acceptance of the *erastēs-erōmenos* relationship at a communal level, and the negative reaction of individual citizens to it. Within this disjunction, Pausanias recommends a model of erotic behaviour which will promote virtue and excellence within oneself and one's beloved, but which is still configured within communal civic space.

Pausanias describes the actions of the *erastēs* who pursues and catches his beloved by entreaty and supplication; he sleeps in doorways and acts in the most slavish of fashions. He is praised for this by friends and enemies alike, and, moreover, by the city, which not only tolerates this reversal of moral norms but encourages and facilitates it.[85] Everyone cheers on men who pursue and catch their prey, as if they were doing nothing shameful (*ouch hōs ti aischron poiounti*).[86] Indeed, custom praises them when they undertake behaviour for which they would normally be denounced.[87] With this claim to universality, Pausanias stamps society's authority on his own account. He and his fellow

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[84] Pl. *Smp.* 183d4-5; 182d4.

[85] Pl. *Smp.* 182d4-183c2.

[86] Pl. *Smp.* 182d6-183a1.

[87] Pl. *Smp.* 182e6ff, 183b2-6.

erastai can rest assured that their actions have the full consent of the city where the custom states that gods and men give full license to those who are in love.[88]

However, not everyone in the city accepts this approbation of the *erastēs-erōmenos* relationship. Using conversation as a signifier of erotic relations once again, Pausanias outlines the opposition of fathers to pederastic relations, and their condemnation by young boys and old men:

> ἐπειδὰν δὲ παιδαγωγοὺς ἐπιστήσαντες οἱ πατέρες τοῖς ἐρωμένοις μὴ ἐῶσι διαλέγεσθαι τοῖς ἐρασταῖς, καὶ τῷ παιδαγωγῷ ταῦτα προστεταγμένα ᾖ, ἡλικιῶται δὲ καὶ ἑταῖροι ὀνειδίζῶσιν ἐάν τι ὁρῶσιν τοιοῦτον γιγνόμενον, καὶ τοὺς ὀνειδίζοντας αὖ οἱ πρεσβύτεροι μὴ διακωλύωσι μηδὲ λοιδορῶσιν ὡς οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγοντας, εἰς δὲ ταὐτά τις αὖ βλέψας ἡγήσαιτ' ἂν πάλιν αἴσχιστον τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐνθάδε νομίζεσθαι.
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> 'But when fathers set up slaves over *erōmenoi* and do not allow them to converse (*dialegesthai*) with their *erastai*, and these commands are given to the slave; and also when friends equal in age reproach him if they see something of the sort happening; and when again old men do not hinder nor abuse those making the reproaches for speaking incorrectly, then someone looking at these things might believe the opposite, that this sort of thing was considered (*nomizesthai*) very shameful here'. (Pl. *Smp.* 183c4-d3)

[88] Pl. *Smp.* 183b-c2.

Under Pausanias' analysis, the men who seek to prevent relationships between *erastai* and *erōmenoi* do so against their city's *nomos*.[89] They thus reject one of the key components of the democracy, that all men might do what they please without interference from their neighbours.[90] They do not allow the custom at Athens to be *poikilos*, but seek to prevent erotic relationships taking place altogether. By contrast, Pausanias promotes his solidarity with Athenian customs when he returns to the topic of how to desire and be desired in good and bad ways. 'Our *nomos*' is designed to test pandemic and ouranian *erastai*, and provides a path for *erōmenoi* to follow.[91] And, two of the city's *nomoi* concerning the pursuit of boys and the pursuit of wisdom must be combined into one which will make the *erōmenos*' granting of favours a fine thing.[92]

Pausanias creates an account of 'our *nomos* at Athens' for his audience which seeks to give the *erastēs-erōmenos* relationship universal validation in the civic community, of which the *symposion* is a subset. Thus, he constructs himself and his audience as good citizens who comply with their city's demands. Under the city's care, good ouranian desire can promote personal excellence in the *erastēs* and *erōmenos*. By giving men and boys license to behave in

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[89] Note that although the focus in this passage lies on the actions of the younger partner, and the scorn he reaps as an *erōmenos*, it is this conversing or relationship which is shaming. This is in contrast to Dover, 1989: 81-84, who argues that rules surrounding pederasty are aimed purely at protecting the *erōmenos* from disgrace; and to Foucault, 1985: 197, who ignores this opinion as an inconvenience, rather than a condemnation of the *erastēs-erōmenos* relationship.

[90] The connection between freedom of action and speech and democracy is made by Lys. 26.5, Th. 2.37.2-3, 7.69.2, and Arist. *Pol.* 1317a40-b14. Cf. Wallace, 1996: 105.

[91] Pl. *Smp.* 183e6-a2, 184b6-7.

[92] Pl. *Smp.* 184c7-d2.

shameful ways (the *erastēs* begging, supplicating and acting in a generally slavish manner; the *erōmenos* allowing himself to be caught by his pursuer and gratifying him sexually), Athens offers them the opportunity to become more virtuous. The lover shows himself to be (and so becomes) *kalos* by behaving in a fine way; and the boy receives an education in *aretē* and wisdom from his *erastēs*.[93] The ouranian lover is not only a good citizen, but a man of virtue and excellence, who is well-educated and can educate others, and whom we might imagine at home in a group of *kaloi kagathoi*.

As discussed above, modern scholars have viewed Pausanias' account of erotic relations in Athenian society as a case of special pleading on the speaker's part. They observe that Pausanias' discussion recognises the existence of other attitudes towards *erōs*, and accuse him of providing a definitive account of Athenian *nomoi*. Under my analysis, this interpretation is still correct. However, Pausanias' motivations are not as facile as these scholars imply. Pausanias is not concerned to give a definitive account of Athenian *nomoi*, but to align himself with them in order to present an encomium of Eros which fulfils the requirements of the sympotic event. The speaker must convince his listeners that he is a well-educated *kalos kagathos*, just like them; therefore, he must draw on their imaginary, and recreate it in his speech. As this section has shown, Pausanias' contribution to the *symposion* suggests that in this imaginary, the *kalos kagathos* might position himself with or against the Athenian *polis*, but never fully outside of its rhetoric and ideologies.

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[93] Pl. *Smp.* 184d3-e5.

Conclusion: Plato and the *Symposion*

The speeches of the *symposion* all take part in the sympotic process of affirming and displaying *kalokagathia*. However, by centring Pausanias' speech on erotic practice, Plato allows a more detailed display of sympotic self-fashioning. Pausanias constructs his identity not only through participation in the *symposion*, but through (talking about) his conduct under the influence of *erōs* too. As Pausanias gives his encomium of Eros, his extra-textual audience share in the *epideixis* of *kalokagathia*, witnessing how to negotiate the demands of the *symposion* through their companion's performance. In other speeches, the symposiast will experience *erōs* as a force for social good (Phaedrus), harmony (Eryximachus) or the creation of beauty (Agathon), as a passionate longing of the soul (Aristophanes), and as a facilitator in the pursuit of True Virtue (Socrates). But in the speech of Pausanias the reader encounters *erōs* as a tool for self-definition and expression within the *symposion*.

Plato's *symposion* is shaped according to its author's ambitions both for the event of the *symposion* and the text of the *Symposium*. It is a philosophical occasion: not only do the symposiasts contribute towards a discussion on Eros, but they also participate in the quest for virtue which underpins Plato's other Socratic dialogues.[94] By imbuing it with the latter purpose, Plato grants the *symposion* a sociological power. On the one hand, like the *symposion* of the *Laws*, the drinking party at Agathon's house is a training ground for the city's elite. They experiment with zero-sum competition, and test out their identities within a safe, communal environment. However, in this way the *symposion* becomes a place for exploring and affirming *kalokagathia*. Like Pausanias, its

[94] See Hobbs, 2000.

participants open up their identities as *kaloi kagathoi* to critique. The symposiast uses his performance to negotiate suitable behaviours, and ways of speaking, for the *kalos kagathos*. Hence, Pausanias' account of erotic customs not only defines Pausanias' outlook, but needs to convince the symposiasts that his viewpoint constitutes his *kalokagathia*. In the *Symposium*, Eros is not only a topic of philosophical interest, but a way for the symposiasts to construct their identities as *kaloi kagathoi*.

Or, to approach the *symposion* as a component of its text, the literary and dramatic representation of the *symposion* puts its reader-viewer on the path towards *kalokagathia*. Plato's *Symposium* offers him the chance to enter into the *symposion*, and experience its processes from a variety of different perspectives. By listening to Pausanias, the reader witnesses his attempts to define himself in the *symposion*, in relation to his fellow symposiasts and the democratic city. Yet, as we established in chapter 2, the distance he retains as reader allows him to evaluate these experiences at length. He learns how to do a *symposion*, and at the same time learns how to talk and act like a *kalos kagathos*.

The dramatics of Xenophon's *Symposium* engage the reader in a similar way. But where Plato implicitly provides a model *symposion* for his reader's consideration, Xenophon consciously shapes his text into a discussion of how to do a *symposion*. The entertainments which characterise Xenophon's *symposion*, the conversations of the guests, and the leadership of Socrates, give rise to an event which critiques itself. Further, Xenophon's reader not only experiences the *symposion* as a place for displaying *kalokagathia*, but is invited to question its merits in this respect too. While Plato's *symposion* gains its potency through its

literary representation in the *Symposium*, Xenophon's ambitions for his text undermine the efficacy of its *symposion*.

Chapter 4: How to be a Good Symposiast and Other Performances. Entertainment in Xenophon's *Symposium.*

Ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔργα οὐ μόνον τὰ μετὰ σπουδῆς πραττόμενα ἀξιομνημόνευτα εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐν ταῖς παιδιαῖς. οἷς δὲ παραγενόμενος ταῦτα γιγνώσκω δηλῶσαι βούλομαι.

Well, in my view not only the serious deeds of *hoi kaloi kagathoi andres* are worth remembering, but also those done in play. And I wish to show you whom I was with when I learned this. (Xen. *Smp.* 1.1.1-2.1)

Νὴ Δί', ὦ Καλλία, τελέως ἡμᾶς ἑστιᾷς. οὐ γὰρ μόνον δεῖπνον ἄμεμπτον παρέθηκας, ἀλλὰ καὶ θεάματα καὶ ἀκροάματα ἥδιστα παρέχεις.

By Zeus, Callias, you entertain us perfectly. For you have not only set out dinner blamelessly, but you also provide pleasures for the eye and ear. (Xen. *Smp.* 2.2.4-6)

Ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ ἄνδρες, ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔφη τὸν οἶνον, οὕτως καὶ αὕτη ἡ κρᾶσις τῶν τε παίδων τῆς ὥρας καὶ τῶν φθόγγων τὰς μὲν λύπας κοιμίζειν, τὴν δ' ἀφροδίτην ἐγείρειν.

But it seems to me, gentlemen, as Socrates said of wine, that this mixture of young boys in their bloom and their sounds soothes our pain and awakens Aphrodite. (Xen. *Smp.* 3.1.3-6)

From the outset, Xenophon's *symposion* is set up as a meeting place for *kaloi kagathoi*, where seriousness (*spoudē*) and playfulness (*paidia*) co-exist and interact. As it develops, *spoudē* and *paidia* mix with the pleasures of viewing and listening, and solemnity and grief are replaced with sexual desire. This *symposion* is a place for dancing girls, *aulos*- and *kithara*-players, beautiful youths, laughter-makers, acrobatic displays, joking and conversing. Yet, in giving his drinking party this character and tone, Xenophon is not merely recreating an actual fourth-century *symposion*, providing 'a most vivid and realistic picture of that curious institution of the time'.[1] As our first excerpt informs us, the playful and serious deeds of the symposiasts at the house of Callias are *axiomnēmoneuta*, 'worth remembering' in their own right. With this opening claim, Xenophon sets out the programme for his *Symposium* and places it alongside the *Hellenica*, where the historical events of the late fifth and early fourth centuries are described programmatically as *ta axiologa*. The compilation of worthy stories give the *Hellenica* a didactic frame. As exempla, the events described fit their author's moralising interest in the pursuit of imperial power and the nature of rulership.[2] Thus, Xenophon's assertion that the serious and

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[1] Guthrie, 1969: 341. The same opinion was surprisingly evinced recently by Gera, 1993: 135 n. 6. In her otherwise insightful analysis of Xenophon's *Symposium*, she comments that his text 'seems true to life despite the author's chronologically untenable claim to have been present at the party he describes'.

[2] Although Xenophon gives no explicit statement of purpose in the *Hellenica*, Tuplin, 1993: 36-40, has identified five key passages which give the text a programmatic form. Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.56, 4.5.14, 4.8.1, 7.2.1, and 7.5.27 connect the subjects of their disquisition with their moral or practical 'worth'. These passages imply that Xenophon constructs his 'history' didactically around *to axiologon*. Cf. Tuplin, 1993: 18, 163-4. And see further Proietti, 1987: xix, where

playful deeds of the *kaloi kagathoi* are worth remembering is also programmatic, alerting the reader to the didacticism of his *Symposium*.

The entertainments which characterise Xenophon's *Symposium* and set it apart from its Platonic counterpart are therefore crucial components of their author's textual designs. The visual and aural delights which Callias and his guests watch, listen to and create raise questions concerning sympotic protocol. In our second passage, Socrates remarks that these pleasures provide perfect entertainment for the symposiasts. But, as we shall see, this statement is part of a wider concern with what makes a good *symposion*, and what makes a good symposiast. The performances of guests and entertainers alike create a forum for asking how the good symposiast should behave in the *symposion*. Should he watch and listen, or produce the entertainment himself? If the former, *how* should he watch and listen. If the latter, *how* ought he conduct himself as an entertainer, providing sights and sounds for his fellow symposiasts to enjoy? At the heart of these questions lies the symposiast's status as *ho kalos kagathos anēr*. How should the *kalos kagathos* act in the *symposion*? And what about those who are not *kaloi kagathoi*?

However, Xenophon's *Symposium* is not only a handbook on good sympotic practice. As a place where these questions are discussed, his *symposion* offers a practical lesson in *kalokagathia*. By spectating, listening and performing, the symposiast participates in the process of being *kalos kagathos*. As I will show, the sexual desire which pervades the *symposion*, recognised by Charmides in the third passage above, provides a framework for this

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Xenophon's *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians* is interpreted as a recollection of *axiologa*, in just this way.

investigation. The performance, viewing and discussion of *erōs*, and the beauty which arouses it, present ways of looking at and responding to beauty. In addition, they investigate the positive and negative connotations of beauty and desire for the symposiast who is *kalos kagathos*.

Moreover, just as Plato's reader is drawn into Agathon's *andrōn* through the text's dramatic elements, so the reader of Xenophon's work is pulled directly into the process. By watching and listening to the performances of guests and entertainers, readers might (learn to) become *kalos kagathos* too. However, the *Symposium* has an additional lesson for its imagined reader. Although Xenophon represents the *symposion* as a place for experiencing the learning of *kalokagathia*, his reader ultimately learns about it through the text of the *Symposium*. Thus, Xenophon challenges his own idea that *kalokagathia* might be taught and learned within the *andrōn*. By reading the *Symposium*, the fourth-century *kalos kagathos* learns all he needs to know.

In the following three chapters, these claims will be more fully explored. However, before embarking on this investigation it is important to note that Xenophon's *symposion* is a very busy place, where different types of performances overlap and combine, and the viewer's gaze constantly shifts from spectacle to spectacle. My study of the *Symposium* reflects this to some degree. I look at the same episode or incident from different angles in different chapters. While this might be disconcerting for my reader, it is very much in the spirit of the *Symposium*, which gains its authority through its textuality. It requires its reader to re-visit the *symposion* again and again, to use the observations which arise from one episode to inform his understanding of other performances and events. My analysis of Xenophon's *Symposium* consciously reflects this.

Xenophon: *Litteratus*, Teacher and *Symposiarch*.

In recent studies of Xenophon and his work it has become almost *de rigueur* for scholars to open their investigations with a *résumé* of the mistreatments suffered by one of antiquity's best-loved authors at the hands of supercilious nineteenth-century scholars and their intellectual descendants.[3] Higgins' introductory assertion that a work on 'Xenophon *qua* Xenophon' requires no justification, is immediately followed by an attempt to justify his work. This signals the extent to which in 1977 the opposite of his statement was actually the case.[4] In his summary of ancient and modern attitudes towards the *Cyropaedia*, Tatum supplies one explanation for this situation.[5] Xenophon and his writings were revered and influential throughout antiquity and again in the early modern period. However, in the nineteenth century, with the emergence of philosophy and history as disciplines with precise attributes and qualities, Xenophon's supposedly historical and philosophical works were found wanting.[6]

Xenophon emerges from Tatum's account as a victim of academic fashion, denied any lasting value by his perceived failure to live up to the standards set by Thucydides and Plato at a time when these standards were being used as benchmarks for good historical and philosophical practice. This failure led to, and was ultimately strengthened by, his general characterisation as a gentleman scholar whose work was just not up to the mark. Chroust described

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[3] Or they at least complain about how unfair this treatment is: as well as Higgins. 1977. Tatum. 1989, Anderson, 1974, Gera, 1993, Tuplin, 1993, Bartlett, 1996b, and Gray, 1998, all introduce their studies of Xenophon and/or his texts in this way.

[4] Higgins, 1977: xi; xi-xiv.

[5] Tatum, 1989: 3-33.

[6] Tatum, 1989: 32.

Xenophon as an 'economist, apologist and literary dilettante' and reduced his Socratic writings to 'fanciful products of creative writing'.[7] Guthrie was similarly scathing about Xenophon's accomplishments, summarising the characteristics of his work as 'a certain literal-mindedness and a tendency to prosiness, a pedestrian outlook which is sometimes frankly dull, and little sign of any capacity for profound philosophical thought'.[8] Yet, as Goldhill has shown, these characterisations fall apart under close analysis. The same Xenophon whom Irwin described as 'a familiar British type – the retired gentleman, staunch Tory and Anglican, firm defender of the Establishment in Church and State, and at the same time a reflective man with ambitions to write edifying literature', was a political radical, an innovator in literary form and the defender of 'a trendy and shocking philosopher'.[9] Similarly, Cartledge, who once accepted Irwin's depiction, now urges us to appreciate the character of Xenophon's writing in its own terms.[10]

In the space of twenty-five years the traditionally accepted and negative appraisal of Xenophon's character and ability has been proven inadequate and inaccurate. New readings of Xenophon have begun to emerge as 'part of the on-going process of competitive reception that characterises all writers deemed worthy of inclusion in a literary canon'.[11] We study Xenophon now for the reason that he has been neglected in the past: we want to reclaim and promote a

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[7] Chroust, 1957: 10: 8.

[8] Guthrie, 1969: 335.

[9] Goldhill, 2002: 289: quoting Irwin, 1974: 410.

[10] Compare Cartledge, 1987: 61-62, 64-65, with Cartledge in Cartledge and Waterfield, 1997: xvii-xix.

[11] Cartledge in Cartledge and Waterfield, 1997: xvii-xviii.

previously shunned author to prove his (and our own) worth. But in addition, Xenophon's renewed popularity can be attributed to post-structuralist developments in the fields of history and literary theory. The rise of 'theory', discussed in chapter 1, has brought to the fore the positivistic and empiricist assumptions which until recently remained implicit in Classics.[12] This development has destabilised 'history' as a concept, and challenged the idea that the primary motivation of ancient writers was to convey reality.[13] Hence, Gray feels obliged to preface her analysis of Xenophon's *Hellenica* with her own understanding of 'history', making a distinction between 'what happened in the past', and written history as 'a record of what happened in the past'. This 'introduces the writer as a medium between the historical events and the written record, the subjective element'.[14] Xenophon is no longer a failed Thucydides or Herodotus (indeed, recent works have proposed that these men were not 'historians' in the traditional sense either) but a man who writes with his own moral, ethical and philosophical intentions.[15]

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[12] Goff, 1995: 1, 16ff.

[13] Goff, 1995: 6. Cf. Foucault, 1970 and 1972; White, 1979; Kellner, 1989.

[14] Gray, 1989: vii.

[15] On the relationship between Xenophon and Thucydides, and the other historians of the fourth century, see Tuplin, 1993: 18-36. And on Xenophon's relationship to Herodotus, see Gray, 1989: 3-9. But note that since Hartog, 1988, questioned the 'historicity' of Herodotus' *historia*, the methods of Herodotus and Thucydides have themselves undergone reanalysis. For a sample of ideas, see Lateiner, 1989; Harrison, 2000; Kurke, 1999; and Thomas, 2000, on Herodotus. And on Thucydides, see Loraux, 1980; Hornblower, 1994; Rood, 1998; and Kallet, 2001. In general, see Kraus, 1999; Pelling, 2000; Luraghi, 2001, Barker, 2002.

Moreover, despite an increased awareness that modern conceptions of ancient philosophy are not consonant with fourth-century understandings, scholars working on Xenophon have been reluctant to extend the title of philosopher to Xenophon.[16] Yet, the discrepancy between modern and ancient ideas about philosophy and their expectations of *philosophoi* is articulated nowhere better than through their respective assessments of Xenophon. In sharp contrast to the negative evaluation discussed above, Xenophon's works were valued enough to be preserved across the Hellenistic period to emerge later as major influences on the writings of the so-called 'Second Sophistic' period in the late first and second centuries AD. In literary and stylistic terms, they became a model of the attic style.[17] Xenophon's *Anabasis* and *Cynegeticus* were stylistically and thematically a direct influence on Arrian's history of Alexander and his work on hunting.[18] Reflections of his *Symposium* can be found in Plutarch's *Table Talk* and Athenaeus' *Dinner Party of the Sophists*, and less

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[16] This is true even of Flacelière, 1961: 93, who laments Xenophon's negative comparison with Plato, when the former has his own 'separate' talent and genius. Moreover, 'je ne suis pas loin de penser que le Banquet est, avec l'Anabase, l'un de ses meilleurs ouvrages'. Modern awareness of this pro-Plato bias and attempts to overcome it are discussed in chapter 2, pages 60-61, above. For more detail, see the articles collected by Klagge and Smith, 1992, Press, 1993, Gonzales, 1995, and Annas and Rowe, 2002, which upset traditional ways of thinking about Plato and his works with some new approaches. They have been aided in their task by Glucker, 1987 and 1996, Burnyeat, 1998, and Taylor, 2002, whose discussions of nineteenth-century attitudes towards Plato demonstrate the extent to which earlier 'paradigms' (to use Taylor's term) shape our current approaches to him.

[17] Swain, 1996: 28, and 43, 62, 253, 309, 384.

[18] On Arrian and Alexander, see Bosworth, 1988: *passim*.; on Xenophon and hunting, see Phillips and Willcock, 1999: 22-23.

reverently, in Lucian's *Symposium*. The questions raised by Xenophon's Socrates in *Memorabilia* and *Symposium* concerning beauty and viewing are engaged with and reacted against by Lucian in *De Domo*, and discussed further in *Images* and *For the Images*.[19] And in addition, Favorinus' *Memoirs* and Musonius Rufus' *The Exile that is Not an Exile* borrow their format from the *Memorabilia*.[20] Finally, Xenophon was explicitly praised by Eunapius as

> Ξενοφῶν ὁ φιλόσοφος, ἀνὴρ μόνος ἐξ ἁπάντων φιλοσόφων ἐν λόγοις τε καὶ ἔργοις φιλοσοφίαν κοσμήσας.
>
> The philosopher Xenophon, the only man out of all the philosophers to adorn philosophy in word and deed. (Eun. *VS* 452f)

Even if, as Anderson believes, Eunapius employed this encomium to tendentiously support his own wish to record trivia, the sentiment expressed was not unusual.[21] Arrian either styled himself, or, as Bosworth suggests, was honoured by others through their styling of him, as 'Xenophon'.[22] Xenophon provided a touchstone for Greekness, literary style and philosophy through (and

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[19] Discussed by Goldhill, 2001b: 161, 189; and Zeitlin, 2001: 213, 227.

[20] Cf. Bowie, 1997; Whitmarsh, 2001: 283-285.

[21] Anderson, 1993: 130-1, who also notes Quintillian's (10.1.75) high praise of Xenophon. Moreover, as Cartledge, in Cartledge and Waterfield, 1997: xix, records, Polybius (6.45.1) describes Xenophon as 'most learned', and Athenaeus (504c) calls his prose 'sweetest and most graceful'.

[22] Bosworth, 1988: 25-26.

sometimes against) which second-century sophists might style themselves and their own works.

These developments in academic self-awareness, together with the high regard in which Xenophon was held in antiquity, have provoked a re-evaluation of Xenophon's status as a writer, philosopher, historian and moralist. For example, over the past ten years, the *Cyropaedia* has gone through several transformations. Rescued from its romantic legacy and nineteenth-century obscurity, Due and Tatum independently redefined Xenophon's account of the education of Cyrus as a moralising treatise on the ideal leader.[23] However, for Nadon this interpretation was too simplistic. By retracing the characterisation of the Persian king, he demonstrated how Xenophon's Cyrus failed to live up to the idealised model of kingship which Xenophon set up within his text. The *Cyropaedia* does not so much supply its reader with a model of how to be a good leader, as a literary discourse on education and leadership framed through the figure of Cyrus.[24] As Cartledge observes, 'the *Cyropaedia* thus not only introduces a new genre of literature, the pseudo-historical novel or romance, but also reflects a new model of political theory, pro-monarchist and not so much anti- as non-civic'.[25] Further, Gera advocates that Cyrus' rulership offers the opportunity for Xenophon to provide a critique of republic versus empire, while

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[23] Due, 1989; Tatum, 1989.

[24] Nadon, 2001.

[25] Cartledge, 1993: 105. Although, see Hesk, 2000: 127ff, who accepts Cartledge's hypothesis for the *Cyropaedia* in general, but states that Cambyses discusses education and military deception in civic terms and grooms his son for life in a language of law and responsibility which is highly reminiscent of the Greek *polis*.

Too concludes that the *Cyropaedia* offered a paradigmatic assertion of the superiority of Athens, and its education system, over Persia.[26]

These studies interpret Xenophon's text in it own terms, focusing on Xenophon's authorial ambitions, and the strategies by which they were realised. In this one work, Xenophon crosses the boundaries between the (modern) genres of biography, romance, and political and educational theory. His interests overlap to some degree with those of Plato, particularly in relation to the processes of *paideia* and political organisation. Yet, these topics are explored in a non-Platonic way.[27] Rather than mediate his concerns through a Socratic figure, or the dialogic form, his moral and political observations emerge through the dialogue and action at various points within the text, and through the *Cyropaedia* as a whole.[28]

Thus, recent investigations into the *Hellenica* and *Cyropaedia* demonstrate Xenophon's competence in shaping and creating genres to fit his didactic needs, and whatever moral issues he wishes to explore. However, this new understanding of Xenophon, his techniques and his ambitions has only started to influence work on his *Symposium*. In the 1970s, Lacey suggested that the primary aim of the *Symposium* was to exonerate Socrates by presenting an inoffensive, and hence earnestly dull, account of the philosopher and his

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[26] Gera. 1993; Too, 1998.

[27] Although, as chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis have implied, Plato's dialogues are equally as 'literary' as Xenophon's Socratic and non-Socratic works.

[28] However, Hesk, 2000: 123 n. 7, 136, shows that Socrates 'haunts' Cambyses' education of Cyrus through the similarities between his instructions and the philosopher's advice on deceiving friends in Plato's *Republic* and Xenophon's *Memorabilia*.

practices.[29] In 1995, Hulse could still cite this as Xenophon's primary intention, although his evaluation of Xenophon's talents is not so harsh. He finds merit in the *Memorabilia* and *Symposium* through their ability to bring the modern reader closer to the historical philosopher than their Platonic equivalents. Xenophon was interested above all in proving Socrates was a virtuous philosopher; hence, his (inferior) discussion of *erōs* in the *Symposium* is constructed to this end, rather than as a philosophical account of *erōs*.[30]

Indeed, recent criticism has accepted that Xenophon's *Symposium* is not a philosophically impoverished source for the historical Socrates, nor its author a failed philosopher. Bartlett demonstrates that although Xenophon uses the *Symposium* as a vehicle for the promotion of Socrates, the action of the *symposion* and the underlying theme of *erōs* actually critique Socrates' philosophy.[31] Moreover, the tables prepared by Huss indicate that the relationship of this text and its Platonic counterpart is complex: the two *Symposia* share stylistic devices, motifs and some underlying themes.[32] However, Xenophon is not only replicating Plato's dialogue but redeploying some of its features in innovative ways. For example, the structural similarity of the opening devices *all' emoi dokei* (Xenophon) and *dokō moi* (Plato), covers, or perhaps highlights, the difference in the events which both narrators recall. Further, Xenophon's use of the first-person here invests his work with an authority which Aristodemus' observation does not lend to Plato's account. Similarly, both

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[29] Lacey, 1971: 37.

[30] Hulse, 1995: 45.

[31] Bartlett, 1996b.

[32] Huss, 1999a: 449-453.

Symposia allude to the combination of *spoudē* and *paidia*, but it is introduced at different points in the text, is given different emphases, and is developed in different ways.[33] The same can be said of the character of the *aklētos*, the inclusion of Gorgianic elements, the beauty of Socrates, the references to Ploutus and Penia as gods, and the use of comparisons. If, as is generally accepted, Xenophon's text as we have it is the latter of the two *Symposia*, I would propose it is not so much derived from Plato's original as it is *inspired* by it.[34]

However, even this supposition is unnecessary: Xenophon's text is interesting and complicated enough to warrant its examination apart from its Platonic counterpart. Huss identifies a number of literary influences in Xenophon's text, aside from Plato's *Symposium*. These include Plato's *Charmides*, *Cratylus*, *Phaedrus*, *Protagoras*, and *Theatetus*; pseudo-Plato's *Alcibiades 1*; Aeschines' *Aspasia*, *Callias*, *Miltiades*, *On Theognis*, *Protrepticus*, and *Teleauges*; Antisthenes' *Physiognomicus*; the *symposia* described by Ion of Chios and the comic poet Plato; and, Aristophanes' *Clouds* and Eupolis' comic

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[33] On *spoudē* and *paidia*, see this chapter, pages 167ff.

[34] On the respective dating of Plato and Xenophon's *Symposia*, see Guthrie, 1975: 365 n. 3, who summarises the arguments before Dover, 1965. From historical and textual evidence, Dover deduced that the Platonic *Symposium* was the earlier work, written in 385-379. However, Thesleff, 1978, challenged this by proposing that i) Plato and Xenophon both relied on a third, 'original' work, now lost, or ii) Plato used Xenophon's version as a model for his treatise, in light of which Xenophon subsequently rewrote his work to include Socrates' monologue on *erōs*, the key evidence for dating Xenophon as later. Thesleff himself finds the latter argument more probable, and it was recently accepted by Bowen, 1998. However, by tracing the literary influences apparent in Xenophon's work, Huss, 1999a: 13-18, convincingly argues for a single composition date during or after the 360s, once Xenophon's exile from Athens was over. Cf. note 87, below, on the errors in Thesleff's argument concerning the Beauty Competition.

plays, *Autolycus* and the *Flatterers*. Moreover, Xenophon's *Symposium* also interacts with his *Oeconomicus* and *Memorabilia*.[35] In addition, Xenophon may have drawn on a wider genre of Socratic *Symposia*, whose works are now lost.[36] The *Symposium* therefore interacts fully with the literary and philosophical culture of the fourth-century Athenian city. It is the product of a vibrant engagement with a variety of literary authors, conventions and genres, not a pale imitation of Plato's *Symposium*.

This is reflected in Gray's reading of the *Symposium* as a piece of 'wisdom literature' designed by its author to establish Socrates as the new Simonides and his methods as *the* new wisdom.[37] According to Gray, 'it is the adaptation of old stories to display the new wisdom that marks his [Xenophon's] contribution, and perhaps the development of these stories into a new literary form marked by greater dramatic and thematic unity'. By constructing his *symposion* to facilitate the 'display of wisdom', and thereby allowing Socrates to take the traditional role of wise man, Xenophon creates a genre for exploring frequently asked questions in a Socratic manner.[38] Moreover, I contend that Xenophon's *Symposium* not only develops in response to existing literary genres, but that it draws on a wider cultural discourse which views the *symposion* as a testing ground for character.

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[35] For references and discussion, see Huss, 1999a: 18-25. He adds (18) that the now lost Socratic dialogues of Antisthenes and Aeschines may also have influenced Xenophon.

[36] See above, chapter 2, note 1.

[37] Gray, 1992.

[38] Gray, 1992: 74. For an analysis of this argument, see chapters 5 and 6, pages 228-229 and 292ff.

In a number of fourth-century lawcourt speeches, appropriate and inappropriate sympotic behaviours illuminate the virtue or baseness of their agent. In Lysias' first speech against the younger Alcibiades, the *hybris* of his opponent is illustrated through his behaviour at drinking parties hosted by the old tyrant Archedemus.[39] While still a youth, the younger Alcibiades drinks, reclines under a blanket with his host, revels until daylight, and keeps his own *hetaira*. On these grounds, Lysias labels him 'most disreputable' (*ponērotatos*), and hopes the jury will agree.[40] Similarly, the good and bad symposiast is drawn into Aeschines' prosecution of Timarchus, where the defendant is described as an extravagant diner and a lover of *aulos*-girls and *hetairai* and his alleged pimp Misgolas is criticised for his love of lyre-playing boys.[41] Moreover, the *aulos*, which was intimately connected with the *symposion*, was itself an object of reproach.[42] The suppression of its player's voice, as well as the voices of others, put it at odds with the Athenian ideal in which a citizen defined himself through his ability to speak.[43] To be a lover of *aulētrides* was not only a criticism of inappropriate or excessive sexual conduct within the *symposion*, but a reference

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[39] The authorship of Lysias 14, *Against Alcibiades*, was contested in antiquity. However, Carey. 1989: 11-12, 147-148, summarises some of the methods used to establish its authenticity, or otherwise, over the past one hundred years, and concludes that Lysias was the author of the speech.

[40] Lys. 14.25.

[41] Aeschin. 1.42, 74; 1.41

[42] Wilson, 1999: 85-90.

[43] See Wilson, 1999: 86. We witnessed a similar process of self-definition in action in Pausanias' criticism of the Boeotians and Eleans, discussed in chapter 3, pages 130-135.

to that lover's disgraceful preference for the 'other voice' of the *aulos* over and above his own.[44]

However, the notion of correct and incorrect ways of doing the *symposion* was already in circulation in the sixth and fifth centuries. The poet(s) of the Theognidea suggest(s) how their listeners should behave in the company of friends whilst drinking, and how they might gain benefit from their *symposia*.[45] Their poems stipulate how much wine to drink, how to conduct conversations, what not to say, and how to learn from the experience.[46] The late sixth-/early fifth-century poet Xenophanes describes a version of a good *symposion* where the floor is cleaned, incense burned, and libations made. He asserts that the good symposiast should not drink more than he can hold, nor tell the old myths about strife and violence. Instead, the stories and conversations of the *symposion* should focus on *aretē*, and as such benefit its participants and listeners.[47] In addition, a poem by the oligarch Critias presents an idealised *symposion*, where good and bad sympotic practice are framed through an opposition between

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[44] Socrates similarly condemns parties where *hoi phauloi tōn andrōn* come together to listen to the flute rather than talk in Pl. *Prt.* 347c. Cf. chapter 2, pages 75ff.

[45] On the contested authorship of the Theognidea, see the compilation of articles edited by Figueira and Nagy, 1985. Cf. Dupont, 1999: 51-98, whose model for the 'invention of Anacreon' (if approved) might be extended to Theognis too.

[46] Thgn. 509-510, 627-628, 959-962, 989-990; 295-298, 413-414; 563-566 W.

[47] Xenoph. 1 W. This poem is discussed at some length by Ford, 2002: 46-58, esp. 53-58. He comments that traditionally Xenophanes' prohibition on telling stories about Titans, Giants and battles has been interpreted as a pre-Platonic attack on poetry (46-7; for bibliographical references see 47, n. 5). However, Ford contextualises the poet's prescriptions within the *symposion*, finding in it the *symposion*'s 'traditional concerns' with 'justice and graciousness in speech', and an authorial assertion of wisdom.

moderate Spartan and debased Athenian customs.[48] Finally, these tensions are reflected in *Wasps*, where Bdelycleon's attempts to educate his father in the ways of the *symposion* are placed against the debacle which the old man makes of them.[49]

Thus, Xenophon's *Symposium*, and indeed Plato's text as well, takes part in a long-standing literary tradition which seeks to circumscribe the sympotic experience, and to shape its activities for the moral benefit of participants and audiences alike. Xenophon's interests in correct drinking patterns and the proper way to conduct conversation within the *andrōn* find their precedents here. By putting his concerns into a dramatic format, and drawing on the events and ideas found and explored in many other contemporary texts, Xenophon gives shape to his *symposion*. Xenophon's adaptation of the sympotic form blends elements of contemporary literary genres and compositional techniques with traditional understandings of the *symposion* as a place where identities are created, shaped and revealed through good and bad sympotic practice.

With these observations I join Gray and Huss in their re-evaluation of the *Symposium* as a worthwhile object of study for cultural historians of classical Athens, and assert its utility as a source for ideas about and conceptions of the *symposion*. I propose that the *Symposium* is a unique work which draws on traditional literary genres, but redefines them according to contemporary interests and in innovative ways. Its traditional concern with good and bad sympotic practice is melded to Xenophon's interest in *kalokagathia*, an interest which

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[48] Critias. 6 W.

[49] Ar. *V.* 1175-1264; 1299-1321. On the *symposion* in *Wasps*, see below, pages 170-173.

emerges strongly in *Memorabilia* and *Oeconomicus* too.[50] Earlier poets and contemporary orators used specific types of entertainment to outline good and bad sympotic practice, and the good and bad character of symposiasts; but, Xenophon extends this analysis through the acting-out of these entertainments. The performances of a dancing troupe, a laughter-maker, and the conversations of the invited symposiasts help Xenophon fulfil his promise to show the *kaloi kagathoi* he was with when he learned that the playful and serious deeds of the *kaloi kagathoi* were worth remembering.

Xenophon's *Symposium* is therefore an *epideixis*, a proof composed via display.[51] When Callias invites Socrates into his *andrōn* to receive an *epideixis* of his worth (*axion*), the host imitates the process by which Xenophon entices the reader into his *Symposium* with promises to show *hoi kaloi kagathoi andres*, whose deeds are *axiomnēmoneuta*.[52] Unlike Theognis, Xenophanes, Critias, and Plato, Xenophon will not simply tell his audience how good and bad men behave at *symposia*. As the architect of this *symposion*, indeed its symposiarch, he will use the *epideixeis* of Callias' *andrōn* to show them.

Making your Own Entertainment: *Spoudē* and *Paidia* in the *Symposion*

Οὗτοι μὲν δή, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἱκανοὶ τέρπειν ἡμᾶς φαίνονται· ἡμεῖς

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[50] On the centrality of the *kalos kagathos* to the *Oeconomicus*, see Ambler, 1996: 103, 113-14; and in *Memorabilia*, see Tredennick and Waterfield, 1990: 59-61. *Kalokagathia* in these works will be discussed in chapter 6, below.

[51] The term and concept of *epideixis* is discussed with relevant bibliography in chapter 2.

[52] Xen. *Smp.* 1.6.1-3. Or perhaps Xenophon imitates Callias. The fluidity of the boundaries between the textual *Symposium* and the world of the *symposion*, considered in chapter 5, leaves the question of who imitates who open.

> δὲ τούτων οἶδ' ὅτι πολὺ βελτίονες οἰόμεθα εἶναι· οὐκ αἰσχρὸν οὖν εἰ μήδ' ἐπιχειρήσομεν συνόντες ὠφελεῖν τι ἢ εὐφραίνειν ἀλλήλους;
>
> 'Gentlemen, these people are clearly competent to give us pleasure; but I know that we believe ourselves to be much better than them; and so is it not shameful if we do not try to benefit and cheer one another while we are together?' (Xen. *Smp*. 3.2.2-4)

When Socrates recommends that he and his fellow symposiasts should take responsibility for their own entertainment, it is on the grounds that they are *polu beltiones*, much better, than the dancing girls and boys. This focus on social status underlies Xenophon's characterisation of his guests, and hence informs his representation of their words and actions in the *symposion*. From the start, Xenophon introduces his guests as *hoi kaloi kai agathoi andres*, men whose behaviour embodies the virtue of *kalokagathia* which is so important to Athenian elite ideology.[53] These *kaloi kagathoi* are men whose playful and serious deeds are *axiomnēmoneuta*, worth remembering, and who will be the focal point for Xenophon's didacticism.[54]

This introductory assertion elevates the playful to the same level of importance as the serious, and rehabilitates it as a worthwhile topic of gentlemanly consideration.[55] Xenophon undertakes this task in deference to

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[53] However, it is also important to democratic ideologies too, as will be discussed chapter 6. below.

[54] But turn to chapter 6 for an alternative assessment of Xenophon's *kaloi kagathoi*.

[55] See Bartlett, 1996b: 174.

Socrates' playful educational methods. As Bartlett notes, 'Socrates' life seems to have been devoted to the serious *inquiry* into what virtue ('gentlemanliness', i.e. *kalokagathia*) is, and, as a result he had neither the time nor the capacity to *act* seriously'.[56] As I will reveal, this absorption of serious investigation into play marks the combination of *spoudē* and *paidia* in the *Symposium*. Socrates tries to lead the symposiasts towards the greatest playfulness; however, it is the deeds of the *kaloi kagathoi* which interest Xenophon and give substance to his *symposion*. The *symposion*'s reputation as a place for *paidia* offers the author a suitable location to display the *kaloi kagathoi* and their playful deeds. In his representation of Sophocles at a *symposion*, Ion of Chios says of his contemporary, 'he was playful in wine' (*paidiōdei par' oinon*).[57] Elsewhere, the same poet offers Dionysus of the *symposion* a life of drinking, playing (*paizein*), and judicious counsel.[58] Moreover, an anonymous poet of the fourth century places *paidia* and *spoudē* side by side in the *symposion*.[59] However, whilst the poet contrasts playful blather with speaking seriously in turn, Xenophon injects seriousness into his symposiasts' joke-making, and inserts playfulness into the rounds of speaking. Although Xenophon initially elevates and rehabilitates the playful, he is concerned with it only in conjunction with the serious. Thus, he makes the *symposion* a place where *kaloi kagathoi* mix *spoudē* with *paidia*, and where (their) serious inquisitions are subsumed into the latter.

In this respect, Xenophon's *symposion* is quite different from the ideal

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[56] Bartlett. 1996b: 175.

[57] Ath. 603f.

[58] Ion Eleg. 26 W.

[59] Ades. Eleg. 27 W.

synousia of Plato's *Protagoras*, where Socrates urges his companions to express their *synousia* through their own voices, but 'without foolishness or play' (*aneu tōn lērōn te kai paidiōn*).[60] Further, Socrates condemns Agathon's encomium, described by its speaker as 'in part playful, in part serious' (*ta men paidias, ta de spoudēs metrias*) because of its banality.[61] For Socrates at least, the combination of the serious and playful does not convey any serious meaning here.[62] However, Agathon clearly strives to make his contribution to the *symposion* light-hearted and serious. He equates happy and most beautiful Eros with the tragic poet to describe his powers over mankind, and his companions appreciate the effect.[63]

Xenophon professes to show his reader the serious and playful *deeds* of the *kaloi kagathoi*. Yet, where he focuses on the symposiasts as performers (rather than viewers), his account is comprised mainly of their *spoken words*. The centrality of the spoken word, rather than the physical actions, of the *kaloi kagathoi* within the *symposion* is made explicit when Socrates suggests the symposiasts bring benefit and cheer to one another. The companions immediately assume that they will do so by making conversation.[64] However, the conversation in Xenophon's *symposion* bears little resemblance to the speech-making in its Platonic counterpart. Apart from Socrates' speech on *erōs*,

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[60] Pl. *Prt.* 347d7-8.

[61] Pl. *Smp.* 197e6-8; 199c5-201c9. The mixture of serious and playful elements in Plato's *Symposium* will be visited again in chapter 5.

[62] On Socrates' assessment of Agathon's argument in the following bout of elenchus, see Mooney, 1994.

[63] Pl. *Smp.* 195e4-197e5.

[64] Xen. *Smp.* 3.2.5-6.

long set pieces are avoided in favour of short speeches and quick-witted banter. Indeed, the proceedings at Callias' house bear closer resemblance to the *symposia* imagined and described in Aristophanes' *Wasps*, where guests tell jokes, sing capping songs and make funny comparisons.[65] Similarly, at the *symposion* recorded by Ion of Chios, Sophocles and his friends exchange jokes based on famous maxims from poetry.[66] All these elements make their appearance in Callias' *andrōn*.

Gera observes that in this respect, as well as its focus on *spoudē* and *paidia*, Xenophon's *symposion* reflects standard elements of the literary *symposion*.[67] However, she does not ask why Xenophon brings his text into alliance with earlier sympotic representations; nor does she question the extent to which events at his *symposion* really conform to earlier models. I will argue that Xenophon makes use of joking and comparing, standard elements of the sympotic repertoire, to discuss the types of *logoi* suitable for his *symposion* and his symposiasts. The idea that some *logoi* are appropriate to the *symposion* whilst others are not is not unique to Xenophon's *Symposium*. For example, Plutarch reports that Ion of Chios records how the conversation at a *symposion* attended by Cimon turned to the topic of the general's exploits 'as was fitting in drink' (*hoion eikos en potōi*).[68] Further, in Aristophanes' *Wasps*, Bdelycleon presents learning to participate in the *logoi* of the *symposion* as an important element in his father's re-education. Once he has instructed the old man in appropriate

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[65] Ar. *V.* 1175-1264: 1299-1321.

[66] Ath. 603f-604b.

[67] Gera, 1993: 135ff.

[68] Plu. *Cim.* 9.2.

fashions and has taught him how to swagger, he proposes that Philocleon tell grand and serious stories (*logos semnos*) to the learned and clever men.[69] However, when he arrives at the *symposion*, Philocleon does not quite get it right. Describing the old man's drunken antics, the slave Xanthias remarks:

> τοιαῦτα περιύβριζεν αὐτοὺς ἐν μέρει,
> σκώπτων ἀγροίκως καὶ προσέτι λόγους λέγων
> ἀμαθέστατ', οὐδὲν εἰκότας τῷ πράγματι.
>
> In such ways he acted hybristically (*perihubrizein*) to them in turn, joking crudely and, moreover, speaking the most ignorant words, that had nothing to do with the situation. (Ar. *V.* 1319-21 Sommerstein)

MacDowell describes the sympotic scenes of the *Wasps* as 'important evidence for the customs of the *symposion*'.[70] Reading Xanthias' comment from this perspective, conversation becomes a primary form of entertainment in the *andrōn*, and a testing ground for symposiasts. The good symposiast can talk the talk, participating in, and creating, an overall *logos* for the *symposion*. Meanwhile, the bad symposiast reveals his ignorance and reinforces his exclusion by what he says. However, the *symposion* and Philocleon's rascally behaviour at it are implicated in Aristophanes' political ambitions for his play. On current interpretations of these ambitions, Philocleon's *hybris* might be a consequence of his status as an über-symposiast who plays the games of the

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[69] Ar. *V.* 1174-5; 1195.

[70] MacDowell, 1995: 171.

symposion too well; or it might typify his membership of a wretched *dēmos*.[71] Moreover, Philocleon's education in sympotic habits and his bad behaviour at the *symposion* fulfil the principal criteria of Old Comedy: they are ludicrous and funny.[72] Hence, Philocleon's behaviour cannot only be regarded as a breach of 'correct' protocols. However, from within these different perspectives, Philocleon's spoken contributions mediate his position within (or outside of) the sympotic group, alongside his drinking, farting, laughing and fighting. In *Wasps*, certain styles of speech appear to emphasise the symposiast's affinity with the group; others put him at risk from the charge of *hybris*.

Where Philocleon demonstrates his status through the kinds of speech and actions which are unsuitable in the *symposion*, Xenophon uses his guests' contributions to suggest how jokes, speeches and comparisons should and should not be made. Xenophon's concerns here meet explicitly with (or are framed by) the ambitions of his symposiasts. They ask Socrates to lead them towards the kind of conversation which will especially (*malista*) bring benefit and cheer to

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[71] For Philocleon as an über-symposiast, see Konstan, 1995: 26. Konstan maintains that the aim of the *symposion*-scene is to spoof the antics of Cleon and his associates and to reveal that, though rich and powerful, they are far from gentlemen. Philocleon, whom he also argues is really a well-off member of Athenian society, is a symbol of their pretensions, an *über*-symposiast, and a tool in the class conflict which *Wasps* portrays. Olson, 1996, challenges Konstan's evaluation of Philocleon, reasserting his identity as a low-status member of the *dēmos*. As such, Philocleon's *hybris* exemplifies the masses' inability to improve themselves and informs the viewing audience that they must find new masters who can benefit and control them (143-150).

[72] See Hubbard, 1991: 134-135. Hubbard also links Philocleon's mischief-making to Aristophanes' self-identification with his son; both Aristophanes and Bdelycleon are unsuccessful in their attempts to tame the '"Cleon-loving" public' (223).

themselves.[73] Further, they contribute to Xenophon's assertion that the serious and playful deeds of the *kaloi kagathoi* are worth remembering. Playful conversations provoke the symposiasts towards contemplating serious issues related to *kalokagathia.* Moreover, like the speech-making in Plato's *Symposium*, their conversations allow the symposiasts to engage in competition with one another against a backdrop of communality. Both processes provide lessons for Xenophon's reader; these are what make the symposiasts' deeds *axiomnēmoneuta.*

Making Jokes

The jokes made by Xenophon's symposiasts are innovative and spontaneous. They emerge naturally from the flow of conversation, and are absorbed just as easily into it. In this respect, they differ from the jokes of the *gelōtopoios.* In the first instance, Philippus introduces himself to the audience with a joke derived from Aristophanes' *Frogs.*[74] In addition, as I will shortly discuss, his most successful gags disrupt the conversation of the *symposion.* He specialises in visual gags which centre on his body; these reinforce his low status and distance him from the sympotic group. Moreover, Philippus' jokes provoke laughter (he is, after all, a *gelōtopoios*), while the symposiasts' do not. The significance of this will be investigated fully in chapter 5; however, for now it should be observed that the success of the jokes made by invited guests is marked by the

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[73] Xen. *Smp.* 3.2.6. On the symposiasts' concerns with what is fitting to the *symposion*, see chapter 5, 227-9

[74] Xen. *Smp.* 1.11.6-12.1; 1.12.5-6. Cf. Bowen, 1998: 92. Indeed, at the beginning of *Frogs* (1-31), Aristophanes plays on 'burdened by nothing' as a typical poor-quality joke. On Philippus' introductory jokes, see pages 197ff below.

tacit acceptance of the listening audience. These differences emphasise the different roles given to the various members of the *symposion*, and the different functions of their jokes. The *gelōtopoios*' jokes highlight his lowly status as a *gelōtopoios*, while the jokes of the symposiasts assert their communality and provide an opportunity to explore the serious business of (learning) *kalokagathia*.

The joke-making which accompanies the first acrobatic performances of the dancing troupe demonstrates this well. When the dancing girl juggles with hoops, Socrates remarks that on the basis of her performance, it would be wrong to say women were different from men, aside from their poor skills of reasoning and their strength. Like Ischomachus in the *Oeconomicus*, Socrates tells his audience that they should instruct their wives in whatever they see fit.[75] Antisthenes responds:

> Πῶς οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω γιγνώσκων οὐ καὶ σὺ παιδεύεις Ξανθίππην, ἀλλὰ χρῇ γυναικὶ τῶν οὐσῶν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τῶν γεγενημένων καὶ τῶν ἐσομένων χαλεπωτάτῃ;
> Ὅτι, ἔφη, ὁρῶ καὶ τοὺς ἱππικοὺς βουλομένους γενέσθαι οὐ τοὺς εὐπειθεστάτους ἀλλὰ τοὺς θυμοειδεῖς ἵππους κτωμένους. νομίζουσι γάρ, ἂν τοὺς τοιούτους δύνωνται κατέχειν, ῥᾳδίως τοῖς γε ἄλλοις ἵπποις χρήσεσθαι. κἀγὼ δὴ βουλόμενος ἀνθρώποις χρῆσθαι καὶ ὁμιλεῖν ταύτην κέκτημαι, εὖ εἰδὼς ὅτι εἰ ταύτην ὑποίσω, ῥᾳδίως τοῖς γε ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις συνέσομαι.

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[75] Xen. *Smp.* 2.9.1-5. Xen. *Oec.* 7.5ff: for one possible explanation of the ambiguities of this teaching, see below, chapter 6, pages 252-3.

> 'If that is your view, Socrates, how come you don't teach Xanthippe, instead having as your wife the most difficult woman I believe to have been born, and yet to come?'
>
> 'Because I see that those wishing to be horsemen do not buy the most obedient horses but the most high-spirited. For they believe that if they are able to restrain such horses they might easily manage the rest. Wishing to consult and associate with men, I have acquired this wife, knowing well that if I can put up with her, I will mix easily with all other men.' (Xen. *Smp.* 2.10.1-10)

Antisthenes mocks the philosopher's advice by pointing out his failure to educate his wife Xanthippe, playing with her reputation as the most awkward woman in the world. This challenge requires a quick response. Instead of taking offence at Antisthenes' joke, Socrates builds on it. He makes fun of his wife, comparing her to an unbridled horse and declaring that association with her teaches him how to mix easily with all others.

This verbal sparring exemplifies Xenophon's ambitions for *spoudē* and *paidia*. Socrates' serious comments are quickly subsumed into playful joking. However, a serious vein continues to run below the surface. Antisthenes' challenge and Socrates' response put the philosopher's original teaching to question. Socrates begins by saying men can instruct women because women are only inferior in strength and reason, but ends by declaring that his wife teaches him. Socrates learns an important aspect of *kalokagathia*, namely the ability to be with (*suneinai*) other men and be useful to them, from a woman. Xenophon takes advantage of the playful spirit of these comments to raise questions not

only about whether a *kalos kagathos* can educate his wife, but about how *kalokagathia* should be learned.

In this quick burst of joking, Antisthenes tests Socrates as a philosopher and as a symposiast. As the latter, Socrates proves himself capable of meeting the challenge: his answer draws agreement and approval from the other guests, conveyed by the authorial voice of Xenophon.[76] With everyone settled in harmony, the conversation of the *symposion* can flow on. However, as a philosopher his ideas are still at issue. The *Symposium*'s reader is invited to think about the topics raised, and the *symposion* as a place for the discussion of these topics through particular spoken forms.

However, the sparring between Antisthenes and Socrates is not finished. After watching the stunt girl dive through swords, Socrates calls his companion to witness the girl's bravery as proof of his assertion on the teachability of women. Rather than challenge Socrates on the matter again, Antisthenes accepts his point, and asks if it would not be better for the Syracusan to display his dancing girl to the city and thereby teach the Athenians courage to dance among the spears.[77] This time, the joke is a political one. Antisthenes uses the immediate apparatus of the *symposion* to focus the attention of the gathered *kaloi kagathoi* on the world outside. However, his abuse of the Athenian *dēmos* also draws their attention inward to their shared sympathies and superior status: they do not need to pay a dancing master to teach them *andreia* from a dancing girl. Thus, Antisthenes consolidates the drinking group and ends his quarrel with Socrates with a joke which will be appreciated by all. However, at this point

[76] Xen. *Smp.* 2.10.10-11.

[77] Xen. *Smp.* 2.13.2-4.

Philippus, acting more like a symposiast than a *gelōtopoios*, jumps in to cap Antisthenes' joke with one of his own. He would gladly see the demagogue Pisander tumbling amongst knives because at the moment he is afraid to face enemy spears, and so does not go campaigning.[78] Philippus continues Antisthenes' visual adaptation of the sympotic entertainment currently provided by the dancing girl and his theme of cowardice and reiterates them in relation to one particular demagogue.

Philippus' joke acts like a capping song (*skolion*), an element of sympotic entertainment which is not explicitly found at Callias' drinking party. It picks up and extends the themes of the previous joke with the aim of improving on it. As Stehle notes, the capping songs found in lyric poetry and Aristophanes' *Wasps* act as a spur to communal activity, uniting the group in a round of singing, but also testing each symposiast's ability to compete.[79] This capping joke and the series of dancing jokes which follows incorporate these communal and competitive elements.

The final round of joking in this episode is initiated by Socrates, who says that he would like to be taught some dance-steps by the Syracusan. When Callias asks him why, the philosopher replies:

> Ὀρχήσομαι νὴ Δία. ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἐγέλασαν ἅπαντες.
> καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης μάλα ἐσπουδακότι τῷ προσώπῳ, Γελᾶτε, ἔφη,
> ἐπ' ἐμοί; πότερον ἐπὶ τούτῳ εἰ βούλομαι γυμναζόμενος μᾶλλον
> ὑγιαίνειν ἢ εἰ ἥδιον ἐσθίειν καὶ καθεύδειν ἢ εἰ τοιούτων
> γυμνασίων ἐπιθυμῶ, μὴ ὥσπερ οἱ δολιχοδρόμοι τὰ σκέλη μὲν

[78] Xen. *Smp.* 2.14.1-4.

[79] Stehle, 1997: 221-222.

παχύνονται, τοὺς ὤμους δὲ λεπτύνονται, μηδ' ὥσπερ οἱ πύκται τοὺς μὲν ὤμους παχύνονται, τὰ δὲ σκέλη λεπτύνονται, ἀλλὰ παντὶ διαπονῶν τῷ σώματι πᾶν ἰσόρροπον ποιεῖν; ἢ ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ γελᾶτε, ὅτι οὐ δεήσει με συγγυμναστὴν ζητεῖν, οὐδ' ἐν ὄχλῳ πρεσβύτην ὄντα ἀποδύεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀρκέσει μοι οἶκος ἑπτάκλινος, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν τῷδε τῷ παιδὶ ἤρκεσε τόδε τὸ οἴκημα ἐνιδρῶσαι, καὶ χειμῶνος μὲν ἐν στέγῃ γυμνάσομαι, ὅταν δὲ ἄγαν καῦμα ᾖ, ἐν σκιᾷ; ἢ τόδε γελᾶτε, εἰ μείζω τοῦ καιροῦ τὴν γαστέρα ἔχων μετριωτέραν βούλομαι ποιῆσαι αὐτήν; ἢ οὐκ ἴστε ὅτι ἔναγχος ἔωθεν Χαρμίδης οὑτοσὶ κατέλαβέ με ὀρχούμενον;

'I'll dance, by Zeus'. And then everybody laughed. And Socrates pulled a very serious face, and said, 'Why are you laughing at me? Is it because I wish to become healthy by exercising rather than eat and sleep in comfort, or because I eagerly desire to do these exercises, not like long-distance runners who thicken their legs but thin their shoulders, nor like boxers who thicken their shoulders but thin their legs, but to work my whole body to make it completely balanced? Or do you laugh because I won't have to seek a training partner nor strip off in the crowd at my age, but the seven-couch room will be enough for me, just as now this room is fine for this serving boy to get up a sweat in? In winter I can exercise indoors, but when the heat is too much, I will exercise in the shade. Or do you laugh at me because I have a large stomach for my age and I wish to make it more modest? And don't you know that just lately at dawn Charmides here caught

me dancing?' (Xen. *Smp.* 2.17.1-19.3)

Socrates' serious face belies the hilarity of the image he conjures up, mixing him up with the acrobatic troupe which currently entertains the symposiasts and with well-toned athletes at the *palaistra*: he will not have to exercise in the *gymnasion* because he'll be able to dance in the *andrōn*, at the *symposion*, just like the beautiful young dancing boy does now. Given Socrates' large belly and renowned ugliness, this proposal is visually ridiculous. Socrates mocks himself in order to make his companions laugh. Charmides, who finds himself roped into Socrates' joke, is compelled to add the image of himself dancing.[80] Philippus then extends the humour by offering a comparison of Charmides, saying that he believes Charmides would not be punished by the market inspector if his legs were weighed out against the upper half of his body.[81]

As with Socrates' *eikasmoi*, Philippus' comparison of Charmides is based on visual analogy. Far from being offensive, the *gelōtopoios* gently mocks Charmides for already having the kind of balanced body Socrates says that he is desperate to achieve. Following this joke, Callias offers to join in dancing lessons too.[82] However, his offer is quickly capped by Philippus, who actually starts to dance, imitating the young dancers to whom Socrates earlier compared himself.

The humour of the dancing episode therefore works to bring the group together in a series of verbal and performative jokes which begin by making fun

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[80] Xen. *Smp.* 2.19.5-9.

[81] Xen. *Smp.* 2.20.1-4.

[82] Xen. *Smp.* 2.20.1-4.

of Socrates, but slowly extend to include several of the group's other members. As the mockery comes from within the group, it causes no offence to the participants, who appreciate the ludicrousness of *kaloi kagathoi* prancing around like dancing boys. Again elements of competition can be seen in the desire of participants to cap the previous joke. However, by mocking themselves at the same time the symposiasts' competition remains friendly; it loosens up the atmosphere and contributes to the *paidia* of the *symposion*. In the *Agesilaus*, the Spartan king's ability to take pleasure in *paidikoi logoi*, 'playful speaking', with his friends characterised his *euchari*, 'agreeability', and his sympathetic relationship with his friends.[83] Moreover, in the *Symposium*, it generates an atmosphere in which *kalokagathia*, and the learning of it, can be discussed. The playful and serious aspects of joke-making indicate to Xenophon's reader how he could behave in a *symposion* which gains its shape and definition through its discussion of *kalokagathia*. Moreover, the reader participates directly in this discussion, learning how to be *kalos kagathos* whilst the symposiasts explore this virtue.

Eikasmoi

In Aristophanes' *Wasps*, Philocleon finds himself participating in a bout of comparing with one of his fellow guests. When Lysistratus compares (*eikazein*) him to a new wine or a donkey because of his exuberance, Philocleon responds with a comparison based on Lysistratus' poverty.[84] Thus, the comparisons made in that *symposion* take the form of verbal reconfigurations of

[83] Xen. *Ages.* 8.1-2.

[84] Ar. *V.* 1308-1311.

their creator's observations regarding their subjects' physical appearance or renowned status. Although comparing figures prominently in Xenophon's *Symposium*, it only once conforms to this type, when Philippus compares Charmides' limbs to loaves of bread.[85] While Xenophon's comparisons also build on visual analogies, these are built up over time. Moreover, Socrates and Philippus undertake most of the comparing; thus, the philosopher and *gelōtopoios* are drawn into comparison with one another.

As discussed above, the first comparison of the evening is initiated by Socrates in his asserted desire to dance. Philippus then follows this with the bread analogy for Charmides' limbs, and later with a physical performance. Aiming to cap the sequence of dancing jokes, Philippus stretches the visual imagery of comparison into physical reality. Taking to the floor, he imitates the movements of the dancing boy and girl, contorts himself into the shape of a hoop, and proceeds to dance like a mad man until thoroughly exhausted.[86] Through this *mimēsis*, the *gelōtopoios* elicits a visual comparison between his own mature body, and the beautiful young bodies of the dancers. Moreover, he extends Socrates' original comparison to make real the spectre of a 'dancing Socrates'. The comparison therefore works in three directions, establishing correspondences between Philippus and the dancing troupe, between Philippus and Socrates/Charmides, and hence between Socrates/Charmides and the dancing troupe. As I will investigate further in my discussion of the *gelōtopoios* below, this three-way comparison raises issues for the self-perception of the viewing symposiast: in Philippus' exuberant performance, the *kalos kagathos* sees the

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[85] Xen. *Smp.* 2.20.1-4

[86] Xen. *Smp.* 2.21-3.

derisible proposal of a dancing symposiast turned into a living spectacle. Philippus' performance asks the symposiasts to consider the limits of behaviour set for the *kalos kagathos* and warns them of the dangers of exceeding these bounds.

The next set of comparisons raises similar questions. In his 'beauty competition' with Critoboulos, Socrates sets up his own body in stark contrast to that of his opponent. While it is possible that the beauty competition was a common element of sympotic proceedings, the voice-over which accompanies Socrates' display makes this pageant unique.[87] In this event the visual and verbal combine to create an event which displays the beautiful (*to kalon*) in order to test and redefine it.

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[87] Thesleff. 1978: 166 asserts that the beauty competition was an established feature of the *symposion*. However, the competition in Xenophon's *Symposium* bears no resemblance to the *euandria*, *euexia* and *kallisteion*, the beauty competitions of fourth- and third-century Greece investigated by Crowther, 1985. Nor is it similar to the competition in Plato's *Symposion*, as Thesleff supposes. He remarks 'Plato has employed it [the beauty contest motif] with more refinement than Xenophon, making it essentially a contest of wisdom, dividing it into different stages, and having it judged not by the guests, but by Dionysus, who acts through Alcibiades'. However, this conclusion is based on three invalid assumptions. Firstly, Thesleff assumes that the speeches of Agathon and Socrates can be separated from those of the other symposiasts into a competition of wisdom, when, as chapter 2 has shown, all the symposiasts display themselves equally through their encomia of *erōs*. Secondly, he puzzlingly equates Agathon's contribution with a beauty contest on the grounds that Agathon talks about beauty. And thirdly, he suggests Alcibiades crowns Agathon's head as a mark of victory in a competition he has surely lost. Therefore, Thesleff's conclusion that Xenophon's text must have priority over its Platonic counterpart on the grounds that Plato improves on Xenophon's beauty competition cannot stand.

Socrates begins the beauty competition against Critoboulos with a typical piece of Socratic elenchus, leading the latter to concede that something is beautiful if it serves the purpose for which it is used.[88] He then attempts to prove that his face and body are more beautiful than his opponent's because they are better fitted to their purpose. To do so he draws repeated comparisons between his own features and those of Critoboulos, animals, satyrs, and immortals. Socrates initiates the first comparison between the two competitors' eyes, alleging that his are more beautiful, or better suited to seeing, because they stand out from his head.[89] Critoboulos follows this up by asking if the crab is therefore the animal best equipped for seeing.[90] This mention of a crab immediately draws the attention of the listener, viewer or reader to the crab-like properties of Socrates' eyes, a comparison which the philosopher affirms. Secondly, Socrates uses an explicitly comparative formula to complain about Critoboulos' description of his mouth:

> Ἔοικα, ἔφη, ἐγὼ κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον καὶ τῶν ὄνων αἴσχιον τὸ στόμα ἔχειν. ἐκεῖνο δὲ οὐδὲν τεκμήριον λογίζῃ ὡς ἐγὼ σοῦ καλλίων εἰμί, ὅτι καὶ Ναΐδες θεοὶ οὖσαι τοὺς Σειληνοὺς ἐμοὶ ὁμοιοτέρους τίκτουσιν ἢ σοί;
>
> He said, 'By your argument I apparently have a mouth more ugly even than a donkey. But do you not count this as proof that I am more beautiful (*kalos*) than you, that the Naiads, who are gods, give

[88] Xen. *Smp.* 5.4.4ff

[89] Xen. *Smp.*5.5.1-7

[90] Xen. *Smp.* 5.5.8-9.

> birth to Silenoi who are more similar (*homoioteros*) to me than to you?' (Xen. *Smp*. 5.7.5-8)

Socrates' comparison draws the philosopher into the suitably sympotic Dionysian world of immortal nymphs, donkeys and satyrs, and builds on Critoboulos' earlier assertion that if he were uglier than the philosopher then he would be uglier than all the Silenoi in satyr plays.[91] Throughout the beauty competition, Socrates aligns himself with the animal, immortal and supra-human realms, comparing his 'useful' and famously 'satyric' features with the traditionally beautiful, human features of Critoboulos.

The *eikasmoi* of this beauty contest visualise the comparative process that lies at the heart of any competition. However, they are particularly pertinent to the sympotic competition, because, like the comparisons of Philippus before, they put the body of the *kalos kagathos* at issue. In Philippus' comparison of the hired acrobats, the gathered *kaloi kagathoi* are invited to view the boundaries of their own possible behaviours through Philippus' moulding of the male body into extreme and ridiculous forms. Similarly, Socrates uses his own body, and comparatively that of the physically desirable Critoboulos, to reassess *to kalon*. The philosopher's ugliness made his body particularly apt for this task. 'The deliberate visualisation of ugliness [in the artistic and literary portrayal of Socrates *satyros*] represented … a clash with the standards of *kalokagathia*. That is, a portrait like this questioned one of the fundamental values of the Classical *polis*'.[92] Huss further remarks, 'Der scherzhaft ἀγὼν κάλλους, den Socrates

[91] Xen. *Smp*. 4.19.3-4.

[92] Zanker, 1995: 38.

verliert, zeigt ...auf, daß die wahre καλοκἀγαθία nichts mit körplicher Äußerlichkeiten zu tun hat'.[93] But more importantly, Socrates attempts, for the second time in the evening, to de-eroticise the *symposion*. Critoboulos has only just described how desirable his companions find him.[94] By directing the symposiasts' attentions towards the body of Critoboulos, and describing his physical features, Socrates both highlights his opponent's beauty, and challenges it. Socrates' reinscription of beauty as 'being fit for use' aims to dispel his audience's erotic desires, and hence, to steer them away from the dangers of immoderation and slavishness.

With more than a touch of *paidia*, Socrates provokes the symposiasts towards serious contemplation of their identities. If Socrates is like a satyr, and Socrates is *kalos*, are Silenoi *kaloi*? If so, is the *kalos kagathos* satyric? These questions again push the symposiasts to explore the boundaries of *kalokagathia* without involving them in behaviour which would ultimately negate their status.

The final comparison of the *symposion* arises from the Syracusan's insults towards Socrates. These lead Antisthenes to call upon Philippus to perform an *eikasmos* of the offending man:

> Σὺ μέντοι δεινὸς εἶ, ὦ Φίλιππε, εἰκάζειν· οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ὁ ἀνὴρ οὗτος λοιδορεῖσθαι βουλομένῳ ἐοικέναι;

[93] Huss. 1999a: 319.

[94] Xen. *Smp.* 4.10.3-11.1.

> 'Philippus, you are clever at comparing: does this man not seem to you to be like (*eoikenai*) someone trying to be insulting?' (Xen. *Smp.* 6.8.3-5)

Antisthenes uses his own mini-comparison of the Syracusan as someone wishing to be insulting in the hope of sparking off an *eikasmos* by the *gelōtopoios*. However, before Philippus can do it, Socrates intervenes, warning him that if he makes a comparison, he will seem like someone trying to be insulting, just like the Syracusan.[95] The laughter-maker protests that if he makes a comparison of the *kaloi kagathoi*, he himself might be compared to someone who praises rather than abuses.[96] Philippus thinks that by comparing the Syracusan to the other symposiasts, who are *pantes kaloi kai hoi beltistoi*, he will be complimenting the latter. However, Socrates disagrees: the mere act of performing such a comparison will be insulting and prove Philippus to be *loidoroumenos*.[97] Like Philocleon in *Wasps*, Philippus runs the risk of over-stepping the mark with his comparisons.[98] Socrates puts an end to the *gelōtopoios*' complaining with the order that if it is not necessary for him to speak then he should remain silent.[99]

Thus, the act of comparing is brought into disrepute by a series of threatened *eikasmoi*. By making comparisons of the Syracusan, the *gelōtopoios* runs the risk of being compared to him. However, as Philippus finally asserts, making comparisons is his job: if he cannot make comparisons he must be quiet,

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[95] Xen. *Smp.* 6.9.1-2.

[96] Xen. *Smp.* 6.9.3-5.

[97] Xen. *Smp.* 6.9.6-7. On *loidoria* chapter 5, 223-224, below.

[98] Ar. *V.* 1318ff.

[99] Xen. *Smp.* 6.10.7-8.

and if he must be quiet how can he make the symposiasts laugh?[100] Socrates remains unmoved.

In short, the comparison of one symposiast by another drew the two men into a brief relational bond, the nature of which depended on the content and success of the *eikasmos*. Similarly, renegotiation took place between the author of the comparison and the group. Whilst a clever comparison brought an element of humour into the proceedings, it also certified the communal value of its author. Conversely, an insulting comparison might negatively affect the standing of the man who compares and the object of his comparison. Thus, an *eikasmos* which took an insult too far, into the realm of *loidoria*, would bring its speaker into opposition with the whole group, and threaten the harmony of the *symposion*. Socrates tries to enforce an etiquette which will keep the entertainment of the *symposion* entertaining. However, while the *gelōtopoios*' comparisons embody the dangers inherent in *kalokagathia* and run the risk of disrupting the sympotic group, Socrates' comparisons have no such effect. The *eikasmoi* of the beauty competition urge its viewers towards a less dangerous conception of *to kalon*. Beauty without *erōs* avoids the hazards of slavishness and immoderation which Socrates warns of when Critoboulos recounts his desire for Cleinias. Thus, although Socrates and Philippus both make comparisons, the philosopher is not identical to the *gelōtopoios*.[101] Socrates' *eikasmoi* bring balance and stability to the group, whilst Philippus' comparisons threaten to disrupt it.

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[100] Xen. *Smp.* 6.10.5-6.

[101] See further the discussion on Socrates *gelōtopoios* in chapter 5, below.

Beauty and Desire

While the beauty competition between Socrates and Critoboulos combines serious and playful elements, it also plugs into the eroticism which underlies the entertainments of Xenophon's *symposion*. Indeed, the sympotic action is framed by two erotically charged performances. It begins with the spectacle of Autolycus' beauty, and it ends with a sexy pantomime of the wedding of Ariadne and Dionysus.[102] Beauty and sexual desire pervade other entertainments too. The youthful bloom and music of the dancing troupe cause Charmides' thoughts to turn to Aphrodite.[103] In the round of speaking Critoboulos praises his own beauty and describes the desire which the beauty of others arouses within him. And while Socrates seeks to de-eroticise *to kalon* through the beauty competition with Critoboulos, his hopes are thwarted when the young girl and boy reward the victorious and beautiful Critoboulos with a kiss. Finally, Socrates' speech on *erōs* recognises and draws attention to the presence of the god in the *symposion*.[104]

With his every appearance, the young boy Autolycus is connected intimately with desire. He is introduced as the young pankratic victor who is currently being courted by Callias, and when he is coaxed into revealing the source of his pride in the round of speaking, his contribution brings pleasure (*hēdesthai*) to his fellow symposiasts.[105] However, it is his first appearance in Callias' *andrōn* which allows Xenophon to unpack the sexual connotations of his

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[102] On the dancers' final performance as a form of pantomime, see Garelli-François, 2002: 182ff; Andrisano, 2003: 297-298.

[103] Xen. *Smp.* 3.1.3-5.

[104] Xen. *Smp.* 8.1.3-2.1.

[105] Xen. *Smp.* 1.2.2-4; 3.13.1.

physical prowess at the *gymnasion*, and demonstrate why his words later bring the symposiasts such joy. When the symposiasts are washed and oiled and have lain down, their attention is drawn immediately to the young boy sitting beside his father. According to Xenophon, his modesty, self-control and kingly beauty (*kallos*) drew everyone's eyes towards him, like a beacon in the night, and moved their souls.[106]

With this description, Xenophon transforms Autolycus from just one of many guests at the *symposion* into the evening's first spectacle. Through his beauty, Autolycus comes to embody *aidōs*, and *sōphrosynē*, and becomes the focus of the adult male symposiast's gaze. The metaphor of light, and the attention paid to the effect on the symposiasts' eyes emphasise the physical efficacy of Autolycus' beauty and its reception by the audience as a visual delight. Callias had earlier told Socrates that his presence would make his party glamorous or brilliant (*lampros*), but it is Autolycus who seems to glow.[107] The effect of his beauty on the symposiasts is overwhelming: some become silent, whilst others react with gestures (*schēmatizesthai*).[108] The spectacle of Autolycus' beauty evokes a reaction in his viewers, so that they become part of the performance of beauty and desire.

As Xenophon goes on to explain,

> πάντες μὲν οὖν οἱ ἐκ θεῶν του κατεχόμενοι ἀξιοθέατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι· ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἐξ ἄλλων πρὸς τὸ γοργότεροί τε ὁρᾶσθαι καὶ φοβερώτερον φθέγγεσθαι καὶ σφοδρότεροι εἶναι

[106] Xen. *Smp.* 1.8.3-9.5.

[107] Xen. *Smp.* 1.4.3.

φέρονται, οἱ δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ σώφρονος ἔρωτος ἔνθεοι τά τε ὄμματα φιλοφρονεστέρως ἔχουσι καὶ τὴν φωνὴν πραοτέραν ποιοῦνται καὶ τὰ σχήματα εἰς τὸ ἐλευθεριώτερον ἄγουσιν. ἃ δὴ καὶ Καλλίας τότε διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα πράττων ἀξιοθέατος ἦν τοῖς τετελεσμένοις τούτῳ τῷ θεῷ.

All who are possessed by some god seem to be worth seeing (*axiotheatoi*); yet those who are possessed by other gods tend to look more gorgonesque, to sound more fearful, and to be more violent, while those inspired by sober Eros hold their eyes affectionately and make their voice more gentle, and they hold their demeanour (*ta schēmata*) more freely. So Callias then, influenced by *erōs*, was worth seeing (*axiotheatos*) for the initiates of that god. (Xen. *Smp.* 1.10.1-9)

Callias shifts the axis of viewing so that this description now applies to him. Under the influence of *erōs*, Callias becomes a worthy object for his companions' gaze. However, as all eyes are currently on Autolycus, Xenophon's reader is the only one to witness this performance. By watching Callias watch Autolycus, the reader perceives the positive effects of desiring in a sober fashion, and learns the more appropriate, or freer, way to react to beauty in the *symposion*. Moreover, he learns how the symposiast must compose his gestures (*schēmata*) to become *axiotheatos*. As Sonin's study of body politics proposes, 'the σχῆμα, which includes both physical features and bodily motion, and yet,

[108] Xen. *Smp.* 1.9.5-6.

being more than the sum of physical parts, reflects also a person's total being. The σχῆμα is used as a communicative vehicle through which authors can shape character types … attributed with identifiable virtues'.[109] The viewer of beauty conveys his own status by composing his body in response to it in particular ways; he in turn becomes a spectacle for his viewer's gaze. In the interaction between performance and spectator, Callias uses his body to assert his identity as a sober lover. Hence, he *becomes* a sober lover, and someone who is worth seeing.[110]

This episode also ties into Critoboulos' later confession of his desire for the beautiful young Cleinias. Here, erotic passions put the status of the *kalos kagathos* at risk. Critoboulos states that he would rather be poor than rich, and slavish than free, if Cleinias were his master; moreover, he would rather be blind to the whole world than never see Cleinias.[111] Just as the symposiasts are aroused by Autolycus, and then by the sight of beautiful young dancers, Critoboulos' desire arises upon seeing his beloved in the flesh. The act of looking at Cleinias' beauty endangers his status as a free member of Athens' elite as much as the kisses to which Socrates later attributes his pupils' madness.[112] However, Critoboulos' response to the beauty of his beloved heightens this risk. In his stone-like silence Critoboulos is like the symposiasts who react to Autolycus' behaviour in the wrong way.[113]

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[109] Sonin. 1999: 232.

[110] Note that Socrates also directs the symposiasts' gaze towards Hermogenes, who displays his love of *kalokagathia* in a similar manner to Callias: Xen. *Smp.* 8.3.4-6.

[111] Xen. *Smp.* 4.12-14. These passages will be discussed in more detail in chapter 6, below.

[112] Xen. *Smp.* 25-6.

[113] Xen. *Smp.* 4.24.3-25.3.

The *symposion*'s opening entertainment therefore offers an ideal model of viewing and performance, which at the same time discloses how the good symposiast responds to beauty. The good *theatēs* (spectator) will react with moderation, and hence become an object for the gaze of other men. Further, through the performances of Autolycus and Callias, Xenophon attempts a redefinition of beauty which anticipates Socrates' later efforts in the beauty competition. Beauty is not purely a matter of physical appearance, but is imbued with a kingly, self-controlled and modest nature. Moreover, viewing beautiful objects and being enthused with erotic desire need not cause the symposiast to lose all sense of modesty and decorum.

Xenophon uses erotic behaviour as a touchstone for Callias' status as a man who is *axiotheatos* and to highlight the dangers of unchecked desire, as embodied in the figure of Critoboulos. He thereby ties his text into wider discourses on *erōs* in sympotic literature and in democratic Athens. As discussed in chapter 3, Pausanias uses his speech to pin-point his place within the myriad of erotic possibilities available in the Athenian city, and within the present company. Callias' bodily performance similarly finds a position for the symposiast in relation to Eros and the object of his desire, and in relation to his fellow symposiasts too. Unlike Pausanias, however, Callias becomes *axiotheatos*; his viewer (Xenophon's reader) must now position himself and react according to what he sees. In doing so, he too can act out and affirm his identity.[114]

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[114] See also pseudo-Demosthenes' *Erotic Essay* 51.7, where the speaker appears to put his own status at issue by offering praise and advice to the object of his affections. He implies that the quality of advice he gives to his beloved will reflect his character, proving that he is either

Outside Entertainment

The performances by which Xenophon's symposiasts entertain one another are interspersed with *paidia* and *spoudē*, *to kalon* and *erōs*, and *paideia* and *kalokagathia*. Playful discussions, jokes and comparisons make serious points and beauty and desire are explored. Furthermore, the symposiasts not only discuss elements of *kalokagathia* to the elucidation of their companions; by combining the serious and the playful, and interacting with beauty and desire they provide serious lessons on how *hoi kaloi kagathoi andres* should behave. Yet, this self-stimulated entertainment is only one aspect of the symposiast's experiences. In this section I turn to discuss in greater detail the performances of the laughter-maker and the Syracusan's troupe in order to evaluate their place in Xenophon's sympotic discourse.

Philippus the 'Laughter-Maker'

> Φίλιππος δ' ὁ γελωτοποιὸς κρούσας τὴν θύραν εἶπε τῷ ὑπακούσαντι εἰσαγγεῖλαι ὅστις τε εἴη καὶ δι' ὅ τι κατάγεσθαι βούλοιτο, συνεσκευασμένος τε παρεῖναι ἔφη πάντα τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ὥστε δειπνεῖν τἀλλότρια, καὶ τὸν παῖδα δὲ ἔφη πάνυ πιέζεσθαι διά τε τὸ φέρειν μηδὲν καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀνάριστον εἶναι.

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ignorant and incontinent or lives a pure and moderate life. In that composition, talking about one's beloved, and undertaking a paideutic role towards him are configured as another platform on which the lover constructs his identity as a good man and an *erastēs*.

> Philippus the laughter-maker (*gelōtopoios*) knocked at the door and told the man who answered to announce who he was and why he wished to enter; he said he had arrived prepared with everything necessary to dine at another's expense, and he added that his slave was quite crushed by having nothing to carry, and from lack of breakfast. (Xen. *Smp.* 1.11.2-2.1)

> Ὅτι μὲν γελωτοποιός εἰμι ἴστε πάντες· ἥκω δὲ προθύμως νομίσας γελοιότερον εἶναι τὸ ἄκλητον ἢ τὸ κεκλημένον ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖπνον.

> That I am a laughter-maker (*gelōtopoios*) you all know. I come in the firm conviction that it is funnier to come to dinner as an uninvited rather than invited guest. (Xen. *Smp.* 1.13.2-4)

The *gelōtopoios* was a familiar figure in classical Greece. Athenaeus recalls a fourth-century fragment of Aristoxenus which mentions Eudicus the *gelōtopoios*, a talented imitator of athletes and boxers; and, Xenophon brings in a company of laughter-makers to entertain the Odrysian prince Seuthes in his *Anabasis*.[115] However, Xenophon's *Symposium* advances the only extensive portrait of a *gelōtopoios* in action, making jokes, clowning around, imitating and doing comparisons of other members of the *symposion*. Yet, Philippus' double introduction places the *gelōtopoios* firmly within a literary framework. His witty banter with Callias' doorman, his lack of invitation, and his desire to exchange

[115] Ath. 19f; Xen. *An.* 7.3.33.

laughter for food link the *gelōtopoios* with three literary tropes: the parasite (*parasitos*), the flatterer (*kolax*), and the uninvited guest (*aklētos*). As Wilkins notes, the parasite commonly appeared in Middle and New Comedy and was linked intimately to the figure of the flatterer.[116] Both were characterised by their unsolicited presence at dinner parties, and their performance of witty remarks, games and self-abasement in return for dinner. However, the *aklētos* is found further back in time, in the art and poetry of the archaic period.[117] Odysseus enters his home a stranger, uninvited to the party which will lead eventually to his reincorporation into the household. And the poet Archilochus accuses Pericles of coming to dinner without being called, and without bringing a contribution, unlike a friend. [118] The archaic *aklētos* was characterised by his uninvited status and his physical, moral and social inferiority to the invited guests. But, in contrast to the *parasitos* and *kolax*, this inferiority was made explicit through performance.[119] The performances provided by Xenophon's

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[116] Wilkins, 2000: 71: he adds further that his generic predecessors might be recognised in various characters from Old Comedy too. See also, Bremmer, 1997: 12-16. However, Damon, 1997: 5-7, unhelpfully elides the distinction between the two by translating *kolakeuein* (Xen. *Mem.* 2.9.8) as 'to play the parasite' rather than 'to play the flatterer'. The *kolax* and *parasitos* might be connected to one another in the comic repertoire, but Theophrastus, *Characters* 2, implies that the *kolax* had a range of responsibilities outside the banquet.

[117] Discussed by Fehr, 1990.

[118] Archil. 124b W. See Fehr, 1990: 185-187.

[119] Fehr, 1990: 189-192, finds support for this argument in the fat-bellied dancers (*Dichbauchtänzer*) painted on late seventh-century Corinthian ware and sixth-century Athenian, Boeotian and Laconian vases. Their distended bellies, abnormally proportioned bodies, and their lewd and mocking participation in dancing, athletics and courting emphasise their remove from

uninvited *gelōtopoios* exemplify these traits. However, they go one step further, exploring, rather than just expressing, the status of the *parasitos/kolax/aklētos/gelōtopoios* within the *symposion*, and his relationship with the sympotic group.

From his first appearance on the doorstep of Callias' house, Philippus gives performances which are highly self-reflexive. His opening witticism that he has come equipped to dine at another's expense identifies the *gelōtopoios* as a *parasitos*-type, and at the same time supplies an example of the jokes he has brought with him to exchange for dinner. His subsequent joke about the slave who is burdened with having nothing to carry and no food in his stomach advertises this too. By redeploying an well-known gag, Philippus demonstrates his professional capabilities, and by inference promises more of the same.[120] Moreover, his choice of topic, namely the slave's lack of breakfast, draws attention to Philippus' own empty belly.[121] It highlights the very situation which has compelled the *gelōtopoios* to call at Callias' house. Similarly, Philippus' next joke, made before the assembled symposiasts, plays with his identity as an *aklētos*, and *gelōtopoios*. By stating that it is funnier to come to dinner uninvited than with an invitation, he implies that his very appearance at the *symposion* is funny, and thereby restates his primary purpose, to make others laugh.

Like the *aklētoi* of archaic literature and figured vases, Philippus' performance consciously exploits his identity as an uninvited guest who must

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society. However, the scenes which Fehr presents need not be read in this way. For references to other works on the padded dancers see Fehr, 1990: 188, nn. 31-33, and 189, n. 34.

[120] See note 74, above.

[121] See Huss, 1999a: 108.

evoke laughter in his audience or go hungry. While parasites and flatterers in Old and New comic plays might explain this motivation to their audience, only Philippus builds this dynamic into his performance.[122] Philippus is explicitly invited by Callias into his *andrōn* on the grounds that he bring laughter into it too.[123] However, he has little immediate success:

> δειπνούντων δὲ αὐτῶν ὁ Φίλιππος γελοῖόν τι εὐθὺς ἐπεχείρει λέγειν, ἵνα δὴ ἐπιτελοίη ὧνπερ ἕνεκα ἐκαλεῖτο ἑκάστοτε ἐπὶ τὰ δεῖπνα. ὡς δ' οὐκ ἐκίνησε γέλωτα, τότε μὲν ἀχθεσθεὶς φανερὸς ἐγένετο. αὖθις δ' ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἄλλο τι γελοῖον ἐβούλετο λέγειν. ὡς δὲ οὐδὲ τότε ἐγέλασαν ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ παυσάμενος τοῦ δείπνου συγκαλυψάμενος κατέκειτο.
>
> As they dined, Philippus at once tried to say something funny, so that he might accomplish that for which he had been called each time to dinner. But when he failed to raise a laugh, he became visibly cross. And again, a little later, he tried to say something else funny. But as no one laughed at him, he stopped in the middle of dinner, wrapped himself up, and lay down. (Xen. *Smp.* 1.14.1-7)

In shrouding his body and lying down, Philippus' responds to his failure to live up to his professional requirements by acting out his dilemma: as he goes on to

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[122] Parasite-type flatterers who discuss their need to raise laughter or starve can be found in Eupolis, *Flatterers* 172 K-A, and Epicharmus, *Hope or Wealth* frr. 34-5 K-A. This theme is echoed in the jokes of the *parasitoi* recored by Athenaeus, 6.245d-246e.

[123] Xen. *Smp.* 1.13.5-6.

tell Callias, if no-one laughs at his jokes he will have no dinners to go to, and without this sustenance he will die.[124] To emphasise his pitiful state, Philippus wipes his nose and makes his voice weepy. This elicits the required response: the symposiasts promise to laugh at him, and Critoboulos even guffaws at Philippus' self-pity. Now Philippus can get up, take off his veil, rejoin the group and be of good cheer: as Xenophon observes, there will be contributions, and he will dine again![125]

When his verbal jokes fail, Philippus degrades himself into a spectacle designed to draw his audience's pity. By covering his body and lying down he physically removes himself from the circle of reclining symposiasts. His runny nose and tearful voice add to his self-characterisation as a poor man whom no-one will invite to dinner, and hence, cannot survive without the contributions of others. This performance emphasises the social distance between the *gelōtopoios* and the circle of *kaloi kagathoi* with whom he currently dines, but whose company he is entitled to keep only as long as he makes them laugh.

Philippus' performance is thus highly stylised. Through his words and actions Philippus characterises himself as an uninvited guest, defined in accordance with the model provided by comic parasites and flatterers. Yet, in his self-pity Philippus admits that he is called to dinners to make the company laugh.[126] Somewhat paradoxically, Philippus is invited to the parties at which he plays the *aklētos*. Indeed, despite his assertions, he may even have received an invitation from Callias; after all, when Philippus enters the *andrōn*, the host looks

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[124] Xen. *Smp.* 1.15.2-10.

[125] Xen. *Smp.* 1.16.3-6.

[126] Xen. *Smp.* 1.15.4-6.

over to Autolycus to see what he thinks of the new arrival.[127] Moreover, when not involved in self-debasing spectacles, Philippus reclines and partakes in less abusive forms of joke-making. Thus, he is both an invited member of the sympotic group and a self-styled outsider. As the latter, Philippus' self-presentation draws a distinction between himself, a *gelōtopoios*, and the other guests who are not required to make laughter for their invitation or subsistence. His claim to be *aklētos* might be slightly disingenuous and contrived, but the laughter-maker's adoption of the parasitic/flatterer persona allows him to create a low-status position for himself within the sympotic group, built on differentiation and self-debasement.

This process is dramatised again when Philippus concludes Socrates' dancing conversation with his own physical *mimēsis* of the dancing girl and boy. He prances around in the most ridiculous fashion (*hapa tēs phuseōs geloioteron*), and bends backwards in imitation of the girl imitating a wheel. Then, because they praised the young boy for exercising his whole body in dancing, Philippus let his legs, head and hands go all together. Through this performance, the *gelōtopoios* emphasises his separation from the sympotic group twice over. Firstly, his imitation of the dancing girl and dancing boy aligns him with the Syracusan's troupe of entertainers. Earlier he joined in joking conversation with the symposiasts; but, detaching himself from the group he now becomes a spectacle for their gaze. Secondly, while Socrates and Charmides amuse one another and their companions with their proclaimed desire to dance, neither man goes so far as to put his claim into action. When Socrates first says he will dance, the entire *symposion* bursts out laughing. As discussed above, the

[127] Xen. *Smp.* 1.12.3-5.

philosopher builds on this reaction, creating a virtual spectacle for the symposiasts' amusement.[128] Charmides responds to this virtual image by saying he was panic-stricken and feared Socrates was going mad.[129] When Philippus mimics the professional dancers, he provides a physical expression of the ridiculous spectacle which Socrates has just conjured up in the imagination of his audience. No wonder the symposiasts laugh so much they become thirsty. Philippus demonstrates for the audience just how ridiculous a dancing Socrates would be.[130]

In their response to the beauty of their beloveds, the bodies of Callias and Critoboulos become sites for the expression of their identities. Callias' free and modest gestures allow others to view him as a sober lover, whilst Critoboulos' stillness reveals him to be the opposite. These processes of identity construction are 'performative'. Each symposiast conveys his identity according to 'not what one is but what one does'.[131] Philippus' performances can also be characterised in this way. However, in this the *gelōtopoios* is more akin to Butler's transvestites or transsexuals, than to Callias. In *Gender Trouble*, Butler discusses how performances create an illusion of coherent identity: 'acts, gestures, and desire produce the effect of an internal core or substance, but produce this *on the surface* of the body, through the play of signifying absences that suggest, but never reveal, the organising principle of identity as the cause' (Butler's emphasis).[132] In the case of transvestites and transsexuals, the surface of the

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[128] Xen. *Smp.* 2.17.1-19.3.

[129] Xen. *Smp.* 2.19.3-4.

[130] Xen. *Smp.* 2.23.5-6.

[131] Culler, 1997: 103.

[132] Butler, 1999: 173.

body becomes a locus for competing and seemingly incompatible identities. 'If the heterosexualisation of identification and morphogenesis is historically contingent, however hegemonic, then identifications, which are always already imaginary, as they cross gender boundaries, reinstitute sexed bodies in variable ways. In crossing these boundaries, such morphogenetic identifications reconfigure the mapping of sexual difference itself'.[133] Similarly, the *gelōtopoios* embodies two potential identities. He is a male Athenian citizen who reclines with the invited symposiasts; and, at the same time, his actions liken him to the despised, low status, self-deprecating *parasitos* and *kolax*. The incongruity of these identities are acted out through his performances. Xenophon's laughter-maker is both an anomoly within the sympotic group and, through the performances he gives, an integral element of the *symposion*.

Where Philippus' first performance reinforces the distance between the invited symposiasts and the pitiful, snivelling *gelōtopoios*, his dancing supplies these same symposiasts with a warning about over-stepping this divide. Watching Philippus dance, the symposiasts see a counter-model to their own *kalokagathia*. What constitutes an amusing diversion when talked about between friends opens the *kalos kagathos* up to the shock, laughter and ridicule of his peers, as well as the possible charge of madness, when performed in the real world. In the body of the *gelōtopoios*, the symposiasts witness how *geloios*, or worthy of laughter, they would become if they were to use their bodies in a similar fashion. Their laughter enacts their distance from the *kalos kagathos* and communicates their comprehension of the dangers inherent in acting like (and hence becoming) a *gelōtopoios*.

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[133] Butler. 1993: 91.

Xenophon's *gelōtopoios* fulfils, and indeed exceeds, the performative functions envisaged by Fehr as the defining features of the archaic *aklētos*. Yet, he does not map directly onto the best known *aklētos* in Greek literature, namely Alcibiades in Plato's *Symposium*. Both Philippus and Alcibiades beg entrance to their respective *symposia* from outside the door of their future host's house, and then outside the door of his *andrōn*. However, the distance this creates between the *aklētos* and the sympotic group is strengthened when Philippus is allowed in to entertain the symposiasts; but it collapses when Alcibiades is invited to join his friends. Alcibiades and Philippus raise laughter through their own debasement, Philippus by means of his self-performances and Alcibiades by retelling his attempted seduction of Socrates. Yet, Philippus' performance acts as a locus of 'otherness' in relation to which the symposiasts can think about their status as *kaloi kagathoi*. In contrast, Alcibiades is *kalos kagathos*; his performance might disrupt the *symposion*, but by the end of the party he is fully integrated into the sympotic group.

Gilula downplays the importance of Philippus' comparatively low status, suggesting that the difference in status between Philippus, a free-born Athenian citizen, and the Syracusan is more dramatic.[134] However, at the same time as Philippus' performances emphasise the distinction between the uninvited *gelōtopoios* and the invited symposiasts, they align him further with the Syracusan. This is most fully apparent in Socrates' negative reaction to Philippus' request to compare (*eikazein*) the Syracusan. The Syracusan's abusive questioning and Philippus' proposed comparisons are each defined as *loidoria*, and are effectively silenced by other members of the *symposion*. Thus,

[134] Gilula. 2002: 209.

as will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5, the imposed silence of the Syracusan and the *gelōtopoios* positions them against the invited symposiasts who must not be silent, and who must contribute to the *logoi* of the *symposion*.

The negative characterisation of Philippus echoes the sentiments of a character in Euripides' *Melanippe Bound* who expresses his or her distaste for *hoi geloioi*. He or she says,

> ἀνδρῶν δὲ πολλοὶ τοῦ γέλωτος οὕνεκα
> ἀσκοῦσι χάριτας κερτόμους· ἐγὼ δέ πως
> μισῶ γελοίους, οἵτινες τήτηι σοφῶν
> ἀχάλιν, ἔχουσι στόματα· κεἰς ἀνδρῶν μὲν οὐ
> τελοῦσιν ἀριθμόν, ἐν γέλωτι δ' εὐπρεπεῖς.
>
> Many men therefore practice mockery for the sake of laughter. However, I hate these funny men, who keep unbridled mouths through want of wise things to say. They do not count as real men, though laughter becomes them. (492 Nauck)

Although the wider context for this fragment is uncertain, and its tone and intention are opaque, Philippus' performance embodies the two characteristics the speaker here attributes to the hated men of laughter: lack of *sophia* in speaking, and incompleteness as men.[135] In spite of his best attempts to join in

[135] Cropp in Collard, Cropp and Lee, 1995: 244, records speculations that this fragment belonged to a debate between Metapontus and Melanippe, or Melanippe and the Queen, or Melanippe and her twin sons, on topics which might have included marriage, adoption and lifestyle. Hartung and Webster even guess that one of the twins is arguing the case for hunting

the round of speaking, and to do an *eikasmos*, Philippus remains firmly on the edge of the sympotic group.

Hence, Xenophon's *gelōtopoios* is not merely a (stereo)type who also invades later adaptations of the sympotic literary form.[136] Nor is he a one-dimensional figure brought into the *andrōn* because laughter-makers were expected to be present at (literary) *symposia*.[137] His performances identify him with the *parasitos*, *kolax* and *aklētos*, characters who co-exist within him to create a spectacle for the invited symposiasts to react to, and define themselves against. By making himself *geloios*, Philippus ends the symposiasts' inappropriate silence, and brings laughter back into the *symposion*. As we will see in chapter 5, this laughter also plays a role in the symposiasts' self-definition, and their exploration of *kalokagathia*.

The Syracusan's Troupe

The Syracusan's dancing troupe are a looming presence within the *symposion*. Whenever conversation lulls the young boy and dancing girls are on hand to perform an acrobatic stunt, play an instrument or look beautiful. Such performances are standard features of literary and artistic *symposia*. Theognis tells Cyrnus that his fame will be such that beautiful young men accompanied by

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over the *symposium* (for references, see Cropp, 27). However, he ultimately concludes (255) that the context is uncertain.

[136] As Martin, 1931: 51-79, implies. For example, Martin compares Philippus with the *gelōtopoios* in Lucian's *Symposium* (18), and Aesopus in Plutarch's *Banquet of the Seven Sages*. Cf. Huss, 1999a: 104-106.

[137] As insinuated by Huss, 1999a: 105, who states that 'Die Spaßmacher sind ein normaler Bestandteil von Symposien gewesen und werden aus dem Leben in die Literatur übernommen'.

the *aulos* will sing of him at dinner, and in Aristophanes' *Wasps*, Philocleon abducts a young *aulos*-girl from the high-class *symposion* he attends.[138] Although Plato originally expels the *aulos*-girl from Agathon's *andrōn*, when Alcibiades later turns up to disrupt the serious round of speech-making, he arrives with an *aulos*-girl in tow.[139] As we have already seen, *aulos*-girls and *kithara*-players were stock signifiers for sympotic activity in lawcourt oratory. And finally, *aulos*-girls, lyre-players, acrobats and singers are common features of the Athenian vase painter's sympotic repertoire.[140] However, as might be expected from Xenophon's adaptation of the *gelōtopoios*, his dancing girls and beautiful boys are not mere *topoi*. From the first, Xenophon sets them up as spectacles to be displayed, whose skills and beauty are amazing to behold.[141] He describes their visual and aural performances as *epideixeis*, placing their contributions in explicit comparison with the *epideixis* promised by Callias and later provided by all the symposiasts.[142] As our introductory passages claim, these displays contribute to the pleasure of the viewing and listening symposiasts and lead them on to thoughts of Aphrodite. Moreover, they act as a catalyst to the symposiasts' own performances.

Thus, the Syracusan's troupe plays an integral role in the *Symposium*'s discussion of viewing and performance, sympotic procedure, *spoudē* and *paidia*, *to kalon* and *erōs*, and the doing of a *Symposium*. The dancing, singing, music-

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138 Thgn. 239-243 W.

139 Pl. *Smp.* 176e5; 212c6-d1. These features are discussed by Wilson, 1999: 88-92, who draws them into the discourse surrounding the *aulos*, discussed on pages 164-165 above.

140 See Lissarrague, 1990: *passim.*; 1999: 26-35.

141 Xen. *Smp.* 2.1.3-5.

142 Xen. *Smp.* 2.1.3-2.1

making, and acrobatics of the troupe provide the invited guests with a pleasing spectacle of beauty. Yet, unlike the beautiful Autolycus, the hired performers provoke the symposiasts towards their own playful performances, rather than towards serious silence. For example, the music played by the *aulētris* and *kitharistēs* leads Socrates to comment on how well Callias entertains his guests, which in turn leads into a discussion on scent and *kalokagathia*.[143] Then, when the dancing girl begins to juggle hoops, Socrates begins a conversation on the differences between men and women.[144] After seeing the girl dive in and out of swords, he provokes a discussion on the topic of *andreia*, and the boy's dancing sparks off the series of jokes which culminates in Philippus' mimetic debacle.[145] Finally, their performances allow the symposiasts to critique entertainments as suitable and unsuitable to the *symposion*. Charmides praises the beautiful dancers for provoking sexual desire in their viewers, while Socrates directs the symposiasts away from the dancing troupe to entertain themselves by conversation.

The troupe's performances thus act as spring-boards to jokes, conversations, and spectacles concerned with aspects of *kalokagathia*, and the contemplation of suitable and unsuitable sympotic behaviours. Under Socrates' guiding hand, the symposiasts come to think self-reflexively about their own identities, using the performances of the musicians and dancers to stimulate their exploration of how brave, manly *kaloi kagathoi* should behave. In addition, the symposiasts turn away from the visual and aural displays to talk amongst

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[143] Xen. *Smp.* 2.2ff

[144] Xen. *Smp.* 2.8ff.

[145] Xen. *Smp.* 2.11ff.

themselves, thereby realigning the viewing-performance dynamic. With their attention turned inwards and away from the external entertainers, the symposiasts fulfil the roles of performer and viewer themselves.

This continual transfer from external performance to internal display shapes the *symposion* in such a way as to mirror the evening's drinking pattern: in Callias' *andrōn* drinks are to be served in small drafts, but often.[146] Small blasts of dancing, music, and acrobatics are followed by quick bouts of conversation and humour. Moreover, in this stage of the party two different forms of *epideixis* – the physical displays of the dancing troupe and the verbal conversations of the symposiasts – coalesce into a discussion of different virtues. In this respect, the episode provides a microcosm of the *symposion*. Throughout the evening, the attention of the invited symposiasts switches continually towards and away from the entertainments supplied by external sources. This enables Xenophon to shape the *Symposium* into an *epideixis* of visual and aural spectacles, created by the symposiasts and their entertainers, which together address the issue of *kalokagathia*.

Xenophon thereby uses the activities of the Syracusan's troupe to develop his ideas on how the *symposion* might operate as a place for learning and exploring *kalokagathia*. Moreover, the troupe's final contribution, which acts out the wedding of Ariadne and Dionysus, feeds into his discussion on the roles of beauty and desire in the sympotic processes of self-performance and self-identification.

As noted above, erotic desire plays an important role in the configuration of identity in the *polis* and within the *symposion*. In response to beauty, men of

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[146] Xen. *Smp.* 2.25-26.

moderation like Callias lower their gaze, and dampen their speech and gestures; but they should not do so to the extent that they forsake all communication with their companions. Moreover, Socrates' diversion of sympotic entertainment away from Aphrodite and towards conversation between symposiasts, his response to Critoboulos' declared passion for Cleinias, his attempts to shape 'the beautiful' into 'the useful', and his speech on Eros, paint *to kalon* and *erōs* as real dangers to *sōphrosynē*. They must be regulated and controlled. Thus, the final performance by the dancing boy and girl feeds into an already established discourse on erotics.

The wedding of Ariadne and Dionysus is performed in direct response to Socrates' request for a performance which will make the *symposion* much more graceful (*polu epicharitōteros*).[147] Whether the spectacle the Syracusan puts on meets this criterion, or cheekily circumvents it, remains (perhaps deliberately) unclear, but the performances of the dancers certainly cheer their audience, as the ring-master promises.[148] Through a combination of music and movement, 'Ariadne' and 'Dionysus' blend *mimēsis* with reality to produce a convincingly real spectacle which excites their audience so much that married men jump on their horses and ride home to their wives, while their bachelor friends swear to get married.[149] Following Calame, Garelli-François argues that this *schēma* brings Dionysus, whose presence has so far been side-lined, back into the *symposion*. Further, it raises questions about the role of *hetairai* there, and the

[147] Xen. *Smp.* 7.5.1-4.

[148] Xen. *Smp.* 7.5.5-7.

[149] Xen. *Smp.* 9.7.1-4.

relationship between sexuality and civic life.[150] Thus, Xenophon offers his readers a moral ending to his *Symposium*. The rampant desire of Critoboulos 'est remplacée par un petit drame destiné à sublimer des désirs qui, sagement, ne seront assouvis ni dans le banquet ni dans le texte'.[151]

However, as this chapter has discussed, erotic desire is present in the *Symposium* from the moment the symposiasts recline until they leave the *andrōn*. The *mimēsis* of the young dancers does not sublimate *erōs*, but consciously evokes it in the guests who watch in eager anticipation as the dancers kiss on the lips. When the married symposiasts ride home to their wives, it is not because Xenophon believes their passion ought to be sated by a woman rather than a man, or by a wife rather than a *hetaira*. Rather, these eager young *kaloi kagathoi* indulge in one last *eikasmos*; they rush home in order to act out their own *mimēseis* of the *mimēsis* they have just seen. Thus, in the final act of the *Symposium/symposion*, Xenophon repositions his *kaloi kagathoi* one last time. He collapses the boundaries between viewing and performance, between jest and the serious identity-affirming business of sex, and between sympotic and non-sympotic space. He thus blurs the distinction between performance and reality. To all intents and purposes the dancers, who are named after the gods, are Ariadne and Dionysus in their bridal chamber. They kiss in earnest and declare their love so sincerely that the viewing symposiasts might believe they were not acting out forms but doing what they desired.[152] The *mimēsis* of the young husbands who run home to their wives extends this process further. Thus, in his

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[150] Garelli-François, 2002: 181; Calame. 1999: 121.

[151] Garelli-François, 2002: 182.

[152] Xen. *Smp*. 9.5-6.

finale, Xenophon challenges the distinction between hired entertainer and *kalos kagathos*, the mortal and the divine, and the *symposion* and the outside world.

Andrisano proposes that the *mimēsis* executed by the Syracusan's dancing troupe is characterised by an excessive realism which seduces its audience in a trivial way. This is a consequence of their dancing master's inability to teach his pupils the appropriate control required for the execution of forms. Under his analysis, Xenophon's presentation of the dancers is part of an authorial critique of actors and their 'pantomimes', and his presentation of Callias as highly uncultured.[153] Yet, the erotic component of the performance is not excessive, nor a symptom of the dancers' lack of self-control. Rather, realism is a key component of the visual *mimēsis*.

In the *Memorabilia*, Socrates investigates the subject of representation (*eikasia*) and *mimēsis*. His questioning convinces Parrhasius that his paintings can imitate character as well as physical detail, and forces the sculptor Cleiton to admit that the artistic imitation of feelings which affect the body in real life

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[153] Andrisano. 2003: 299-300. Andrisano links Xenophon's description of the 'Marriage of Ariadne and Dionysus' to comments made by Aristotle in the *Poetics* (61b28-62a11) which denounce the actor's craft of *mimēsis* when it involves dancing and flute-playing as vulgar (*phortikē*). Concentrating on its physical form, she does not perceive the performance as an investigation into *mimēsis*. She further asserts that this 'pantomime' demonstrates the vulgarity of the party's host (300). However, my investigations imply that Xenophon does not condemn Callias through his *symposion* but uses it to construct a critique of sympotic practice. Finally, Andrisano links the 'pantomime' to the antics of the *gelōtopoios*, 'un bouffon consommé', who uses the language of his body to amuse his audience (296-298). Again, her interest in the *symposion* as a source for minor theatre (289) does not lead her to analyse how this language, and Philippus' performances, operate in Xenophon's *Symposium*.

produces an effect in those who look at his statues.[154] For Goldhill, these conversations are evidence for a city-wide concern with the citizen as spectator (*theatēs*), and 'a new culture of viewing that changes the relations between the object and subject of art'. Hence, Xenophon promotes the philosopher's usefulness to the city through his ability to participate in this discussion.[155] But Xenophon is interested in these topics in their own right.[156] In the *Symposium*, he uses the dancers' performance to investigate the boundaries between *mimēsis* and reality, and the ability of *mimēsis* to influence action in the real world. The response of the symposiasts to the sexually charged union of Ariadne and Dionysus conveys the power of the image over its spectator.

As discussed in chapter 2, the Socrates of Plato's *Republic* recognises some of the effects which a dramatic *mimēsis* might have on its audience. In that dialogue, Socrates seeks to limit the 'dangerous illusionism' of *mimēsis* within the city.[157] Xenophon's response is similarly negative, but for reasons which are informed by his intentions for the *symposion* and the *Symposium*. The *mimēsis* which urges the symposiasts to perform their own *mimēseis* also leads the

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[154] Xen. *Mem.* 3.10.1-5; 6-8.

[155] Goldhill, 1998: 112.

[156] As Halliwell, 2002: 122-124, demonstrates in his analysis of these passages. Like Plato, Xenophon was interested in the relationship between appearance and *mimēsis*, and the interaction between audience and *mimēsis*. However, as my study suggests, Halliwell (124) is perhaps not entirely fair in his dismissive statement that 'we need not attribute to Xenophon a deep insight into fundamental issues of aesthetics'.

[157] The 'dangerous illusionism' of mimetic poetry is attributed by Halliwell, 2002: 110, to its competency in 'insidiously expressing and transmitting a whole set of feelings about, a whole evaluative attitude toward, the "life" whose appearance it represents'.

symposion to collapse. On a practical level, it requires the symposiasts to leave the *andrōn* to bed their wives. But it also causes them to experience through emulation the lowly and divine. As our analysis of comparisons has shown, and the discussion of laughter in chapter 5 will show, Xenophon seeks to protect his symposiasts from the dangers concomitant with becoming anything other than *kaloi kagathoi*. Moreover, I will shortly argue that Xenophon promotes his text over the *symposion* as a place for learning *kalokagathia*. As a literary *mimēsis* of the *symposion*, the *Symposium* offers a more instructive, and safer, lesson in *kalokagathia* than witnessing visual mimetic performances in the flesh.

Conclusion

Xenophon's *Symposium* is constructed from standard sympotic *topoi*: the laughter-maker and dancing boys and girls are as stereotypically sympotic as the round of speaking between the invited guests, the conversations they hold, and the jokes and comparisons they make. Similarly the presence of *erōs* and *to kalon*, of *paidia* and *spoudē*, and elements of competition and communality reflect the *symposia* described in lyric poetry, and for which they were composed; the features which Murray, Schmitt-Pantel, Stehle, and many other scholars of the archaic *symposion* find in their *symposia* are also present here. Yet, within Xenophon's text, each component is given its own function, its own life, and is developed quite apart from the requirements of the sympotic genre. Combined, the entertainments of the *symposion* provide Xenophon with a pool of resources which can be deployed to meet his didactic ambitions. Every performance and every act of viewing draws the intra-textual symposiast and extra-textual reader into thinking about *kalokagathia*.

However, as chapter 5 will imply, this 'model' *symposion* is far from stable. As the *symposion* progresses, it assesses and establishes its own value. Callias, Charmides and the other symposiasts are all concerned that the *symposion* proceed correctly. Callias worries that it is too serious, Charmides commends the soothing benefits and erotic pleasures of the dancing boys and girls, and everyone wants to entertain each other in the best way. However, their ideas about the *symposion* are set alongside Socrates' ambitions. In the role of symposiarch Socrates tries to shape the *symposion* to fit his idea of a good drinking party. This self-conscious dialogue between the symposiasts and their *symposion* makes the negotiation of sympotic practice found in Xenophon's text a crucial component of good sympotic behaviour.

Thus, in the next chapter, I will investigate the dynamics which operate within the text of the *Symposium*. If, as I have proposed, Xenophon's primary aim is didactic, how does he envisage his text working? Does it provide a model for his reader to emulate, like the *symposion* described by Xenophanes, or a sympotic anti-type, more in line with Critias' critique? Or do his *symposion* and his symposiasts act as platforms for didactic discussion, just as the *Cyropaedia*'s Cyrus acts as a locus for Xenophon's concerns? As the first section of my thesis proposed, Plato shaped his *symposion* into an idealised *synousia*, offering his reader a chance to learn how the good symposiast behaved. By focusing on the role of Socrates, whose influence is so important in shaping the events *chez* Callias, I will explore how Xenophon conceives of his project, or rather, how he conceives of his *Symposium*.

Chapter 5: Socrates in Xenophon's *Symposium*

Socrates plays a pivotal role in Callias' *symposion*, and in Xenophon's *Symposium*. Yet, his original invitation to the party was apparently quite spurious. Callias was already on his way home from the Panathenaea with Autolycus, Lycon and Niceratus when he happened upon the philosopher and his friends. Callias pounced upon this opportunity to invite such 'men of pure souls' (*andres ekkekatharmenoi*) to his party, so that his preparations would seem more glamorous. Socrates' immediate reaction was to scoff, because Callias was always making fun of them. As was fitting (*hōsper eikos ēn*), Socrates and his friends refused the invitation, but when Callias appeared to be getting angry they agreed to accompany him, eventually reclining with Autolycus and his father in Callias' *andrōn*.[1]

When coupled with Socrates' dominance of the *symposion*, a feature which has already begun to emerge from our study, the philosopher's initial reluctance seems incongruous. But, this incongruity is crucial to Xenophon's representation of Socrates, and his plans for a good *symposion*. In the *Memorabilia*, Socrates is the model philosopher, engaging his interlocutors in stimulating conversation which turns them into *kaloi kagathoi*.[2] The Socrates of the *Symposium* is a more problematic figure. His words and actions define him as both arch-symposiast and an outsider to the sympotic experience. On the one hand, Callias' *symposion* gains its shape primarily through Socrates' guidance: he directs the drinking, conversation and gaze of his companions as he sees fit.

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[1] Xen. *Smp.* 1.3-7.

[2] Discussed in chapter 6, below.

Yet the reader's surprise in finding Socrates at a drinking party of *kaloi kagathoi*, combined with Xenophon's own ideas about entertainments and conduct for the *symposion*, put Socrates' self-appointed role of symposiarch at issue.[3]

In this chapter, I will concentrate on Socrates' role in the *symposion*, and the *Symposium*. Firstly, Xenophon uses Socrates to set up two *symposia* for his reader's consideration and evaluation: Socrates' model *symposion* and the event which actually takes place in Callias' *andrōn*. Through Socrates' recommendations and prohibitions, it is possible to trace the philosopher's attempts to shape the *symposion* into a measured gathering at which the paraphernalia of the *symposion* aids the symposiasts in discussing subjects which benefit and cheer one another. Yet, as chapter 4 showed, the symposiasts also engaged with the entertainments offered by a laughter-maker and the Syracusan's hired troupe. These entertainments played an important role in the *symposion* beyond entertaining the guests, or (as Socrates preferred) provoking them towards beneficial conversation. The difference between Socrates' ambitions and the actual progress of the *symposion*, allows Xenophon to open up the *symposion* to his reader's scrutiny. He can present and explore the *symposion* as a location for pleasure and entertainment as well as for (self-)improvement and learning.

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[3] Of course. Socrates' presence at a real-life *symposion* might have been surprising, but Plato had already established the philosopher's place in literary versions of the event. This may be one reason why Xenophon goes to great lengths to remind his reader that Socrates should not really be there. Then again, Socrates is unsuited to Agathon's party too: the unusually well-dressed philosopher is late and is accused repeatedly of *hybris*. Cf. Gagarin, 1977: 23-26; Relihan, 1992: 214.

In addition, Xenophon styles his Socrates as a *gelōtopoios* whose statements raise laughter amongst the other guests. The co-existence of two alternative *gelōtopoioi* within the *andrōn* offer Xenophon the opportunity to investigate laughing and laughter-making within the educational atmosphere of the *symposion*. Through these two figures, Xenophon seeks to delimit laughter and its negative effects, whilst promoting a mode of learning we might call *spoudaiogeloion*, which places laughter at its core. By plugging laughter-making into the playful and serious environment of his *symposion*, Xenophon adds additional depth to his depiction of the *symposion*, and his ambitions for it.

Finally, I will draws these investigations together to ask how they affect our understanding of Socrates, the *symposion*, and Xenophon and his *Symposium*. Socrates' attempts to steer the *symposion* in an unusual direction and his skills as a *gelōtopoios* make Xenophon's philosopher a radical character with particular aims and objectives. This raises the question, where does Xenophon align himself in relation to the character he has created? How does Socrates facilitate his philosophical ambitions for the *symposion*? And, what consequences do the answers to these questions have for our reading of the *Symposium*?

Socrates *Symposiarchos*?

From the moment the tables are cleared away until his speech on *erōs* comes to an end, Socrates takes proactive steps to shape Callias' *symposion* into the kind of party he thinks should be taking place. He tells Callias that he entertains his guests perfectly (*teleōs*) because he provides aural and visual pleasures in the

form of the dancing, music-making girls and boys who belong to the Syracusan.[4] He then uses the same entertainers as spurs to joking discussions on moral virtues. And when Charmides comments that the dancing troupe awakens Aphrodite, the philosopher directs the attention of the symposiasts inwards and away from the objects of their erotic desires; they now provide entertainment for one another through conversations on the personal attributes of which they are most proud.[5] Socrates takes a leading role in these conversations, not only providing his own comments on the symposiasts' contributions but bringing their offerings to a close when he thinks it is time. For example, he ends the discussion on *kalokagathia* and its teachability by ordering the symposiasts to put their conversation to the side and return their attention to the acrobatics.[6] Again, when his companions become unruly following Antisthenes' request that Philippus perform an *eikasmos*, he starts a song which everybody quickly takes up.[7]

As we have already seen, Socrates leads the symposiasts away from unsuitable behaviour and towards the kind of activities he considers more fitting for a gathering of *kaloi kagathoi*. Further, he censors the actions of symposiasts which he considers to be at odds with his ideal. Through these manipulations, the philosopher's conception of the good *symposion*, and good sympotic protocol, gradually becomes clear.

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[4] Xen. *Smp.* 2.2.4-6.

[5] Xen. *Smp.* 3.1.3-5; 3.1.3-4.

[6] Xen. *Smp.* 2.6-7.

[7] Xen. *Smp.* 7.1-2.1

Socrates' ambitions for Callias' *symposion* are made explicit late in the day when he responds to the acrobatics performed by the dancing girl during the drinking party. He states,

> δοκεῖ οὖν μοι τὸ μὲν εἰς μαχαίρας κυβιστᾶν κινδύνου ἐπίδειγμα εἶναι, ὃ συμποσίῳ οὐδὲν προσήκει. καὶ μὴν τό γε ἐπὶ τοῦ τροχοῦ ἅμα περιδινουμένου γράφειν τε καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκειν θαῦμα μὲν ἴσως τί ἐστιν, ἡδονὴν δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα δύναμαι γνῶναι τίν' ἂν παράσχοι. οὐδὲ μὴν τό γε διαστρέφοντας τὰ σώματα καὶ τροχοὺς μιμουμένους ἥδιον ἢ ἡσυχίαν ἔχοντας τοὺς καλοὺς καὶ ὡραίους θεωρεῖν. καὶ γὰρ δὴ οὐδὲ πάνυ τι σπάνιον τό γε θαυμασίοις ἐντυχεῖν, εἴ τις τούτου δεῖται, ἀλλ' ἔξεστιν αὐτίκα μάλα τὰ παρόντα θαυμάζειν, τί ποτε ὁ μὲν λύχνος διὰ τὸ λαμπρὰν φλόγα ἔχειν φῶς παρέχει, τὸ δὲ χαλκεῖον λαμπρὸν ὂν φῶς μὲν οὐ ποιεῖ, ἐν αὐτῷ δὲ ἄλλα ἐμφαινόμενα παρέχεται· καὶ πῶς τὸ μὲν ἔλαιον ὑγρὸν ὂν αὔξει τὴν φλόγα, τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ, ὅτι ὑγρόν ἐστι, κατασβέννυσι τὸ πῦρ. ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐκ εἰς ταὐτὸν τῷ οἴνῳ ἐπισπεύδει.

In my opinion, to tumble into knives is a dangerous display which is not suitable (*prosēkein*) for the *symposion*. Moreove, writing and reading on the spinning wheel at the same time no doubt a wonder, but what pleasure this might provide, I am unable to think. And to watch them turning their bodies and imitating wheels is not more pleasurable than to watch them standing still, if they are young and beautiful. Indeed, an encounter with wonders is not entirely rare, if

> something of this sort is required, but there are things here for our immediate amazement: why when the lamp produces light by having a bright flame, does bronze, which is bright, not give out light but shows other lights reflected in it? And how does oil, which is wet, increase flame, but water, because it is wet, extinguishes fire? But even these topics are not as good a stimulant as wine. (Xen. *Smp.* 7.3.1-5.1)

With this little monologue, Socrates reveals the purpose behind the sympotic manipulations which we witnessed in chapter 4. The wonder of an object derives directly from its ability to provoke contemplation in its viewers. On this reckoning, the dancing troupe is suited to the *symposion* not only because it provides pleasures for eye and ear, but because it stimulates conversation amongst its audience. This concern with wonders (*ta thaumata*) resonates with Socrates' remark in Plato's *Theaetetus* that 'wonder is only the beginning of philosophy'.[8] Moreover, Socrates' recommendations reflect precisely the kinds of entertainment initiated by the philosopher in the early stages of the *symposion*. Following the libations, Socrates uses the actions of the Syracusan's troupe to lead the symposiasts towards a round of joking during which they not only engage in communal competition, but reflect on teaching and learning, the nature of women, bravery, and democratic Athens. Furthermore, in the rounds of speaking, the symposiasts themselves supply the objects for contemplation. Their words and their bodies, in the cases of Critoboulus and Socrates in the beauty competition, give the viewing and listening symposiasts the opportunity

[8] Pl. *Tht.* 155d. Cf. Llewelyn. 1988: 174ff.

to think about justice, education, beauty, poverty, wealth, piety and pandering. Socrates further asserts that the *symposion* is the perfect location for this because of the role of wine, whose portions for the evening were set by the philosopher too.

For Socrates, the main purpose of the *symposion* is to engage in conversations which, according to his model for teaching, improve their participants.[9] The dancing troupe is quite capable of bringing pleasure to their audience, as Socrates observed earlier. But being better men, the *symposiasts* might provide entertainments which are more enjoyable and useful too.[10] The topics Socrates proposes for conversation in his critique of acrobatics reflect his interests in the natural world as they are presented by Aristophanes in *Clouds*, and they are alluded to in the *Symposium* by the Syracusan, when he teases Socrates for his famously earthly interests, and asks him to measure his distance from a flea.[11] However, the course of the *symposion* raises many issues which relate more directly to Socrates' moralising interests in the *Memorabilia*, *Oeconomicus* and *Apology*. Given the opportunity, Vander Waerdt would relate this shift in interest to an amalgamation of the historical Socrates' 'earlier' and 'later' concerns with nature and then morality. Talking about Socratic representation, he notes that the various portraits of the philosopher painted by Plato, Xenophon and Aristophanes were shaped by 'the reporter's philosophical agenda'. He further explains that each author picked and chose which aspects of

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[9] This model of teaching will be discussed in chapter 6, below.

[10] Xen. *Smp.* 3.2.1-4. This passage is quoted and discussed above in chapter 4, pages 167ff, above.

[11] Ar. *Nu.* 143-147: this aspect of Aristophanes' representation is discussed by Vander Waerdt, 1994b: 4-6, and 1994c: 65-67. Xen. *Smp.* 6.6.1-8.2

the philosopher's learning he currently required.[12] However, such an explanation, which masks the complicated task of uncovering Socratic thought from these literary representations, is not needed here.[13] Xenophon's Socrates attempts to initiate discussions amongst the symposiasts which reflects his methodology for investigating the natural world. Thus, it is not natural phenomena which are fitting to the *symposion,* but the *style* of their investigation.[14] Socrates' shaping of the *symposion* allows Xenophon to give expression to *his* primary concerns: namely, as discussed in chapter 4 and 6, the exploration and promotion of *kalokagathia*, and the symposiasts' instruction therein.

In his desire to direct the *symposion* to the greatest benefit of its participants, Socrates not only controls events but condemns activities which are detrimental to this purpose. In the aftermath of Critoboulus' success in the beauty competition, the symposiasts call on him to exact his victory kisses, and make jokes.

> ὁ δὲ Ἑρμογένης κἀνταῦθα ἐσιώπα. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ὀνομάσας αὐτόν, Ἔχοις ἄν, ἔφη, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, εἰπεῖν ἡμῖν τί ἐστὶ παροινία;
>
> καὶ ὃς ἀπεκρίνατο· Εἰ μὲν ὅ τι ἐστὶν ἐρωτᾷς, οὐκ οἶδα· τὸ μέντοι μοι δοκοῦν εἴποιμ' ἄν.
>
> Ἀλλ', ὃ δοκεῖ, τοῦτ', ἔφη.

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[12] Vander Waerdt. 1994c: 55ff.

[13] On the problems of uncovering the real-life Socrates and his doctrines, see Hulse, 1995.

[14] This conclusion fits the observation by Huss, 1999a: 352, that Socrates' final statement on the stimulating effects of wine also rejects natural phenomena as suitable topics for the *symposion*.

> Τὸ τοίνυν παρ' οἶνον λυπεῖν τοὺς συνόντας, τοῦτ' ἐγὼ κρίνω παροινίαν.
> Οἶσθ' οὖν, ἔφη, ὅτι καὶ σὺ νῦν ἡμᾶς λυπεῖς σιωπῶν;
>
> But Hermogenes remained silent even then. And Socrates, calling him by name, said, 'Hermogenes, could you tell us what *paroinia* is?' And he answered, 'If you ask what it is, I don't know; but I might say what I think it is.'
> 'Well, tell us that,' he said.
> 'I judge *paroinia* to be grieving one's companions because of wine.'
> 'Well, do you realise,' he said, 'that you grieve us now by keeping silent?' (Xen. *Smp.* 6.1.3-2.3)

In this short round of Socratic questioning, the philosopher expands Hermogenes' understanding of *paroinia* to include his friend's current silence in the *symposion*. Hermogenes' initial view of *paroinia* reflects the dangers inherent in the *symposion*, where the excessive consumption of wine might lead a symposiast towards hybristic behaviour, causing grief to his companions. This concept fits with the view expressed by Dionysos in a fragment from a play by Eubulus, where drinking too many cups of wine is said to lead directly to damaging hybristic behaviour.[15] Theognis reveals similar anxieties when constructing for himself a moderate position between thirst and difficult drunkenness (*methusis chalepē*): drinking too much wine is *kakos*, but if drunk

[15] Eub. 93 PCG.

advisedly wine is good (*agathos*).[16] Thus, with his definition of Hermogenes' *paroinia*, Socrates transfers traditional sympotic wisdom away from wine and onto other behaviours which might be equally detrimental to the *symposion*. Hermogenes' *paroinia* arises from his non-participation in the conversation of the *symposion*. Like the drunken symposiast, Hermogenes upsets and damages the harmony of the sympotic group with his silence. It excludes him from the communal processes of joking and conversing by which Callias' guests together express and investigate their shared identities. Moreover, by withdrawing into himself, Hermogenes does not entertain or make himself useful to his fellow symposiasts. No one will become a better man through his performance.

By asking Hermogenes to define *paroinia*, and then branding his silence with this term, Socrates forces his companion to consider the propriety of his behaviour and to participate once again in the playful conversation of the *symposion*. However, Hermogenes responds to Socrates' request with his own critique. When asked to end his silence, he replies that it is impossible to be anything other than silent because Socrates talks so much.[17] Thus, while Socrates controls and dominates the conversations of the *symposion* he stifles the flow of conversation. The symposiasts cannot benefit from one another if he is talking all the time. If Hermogenes' allegations are true, Socrates' presence disrupts the very processes he tries to implement in Callias' *andrōn*. Indeed, by calling on his host to help him find an answer to this accusation, Socrates

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[16] Thgn. 509-10, 837-840 W. Similar sentiments can be found in Aristophanes' *Wasps* (1252-5), Plato's *Republic* (395e), and in Demosthenes' *Second Olympiac* (2.19). Note that in *Against Conon* (54.3-6), Demosthenes describes Conon's drunken hybristic behaviour as *paroinia*. Cf. Halliwell, 1991: 287.

[17] Xen. *Smp.* 6.2.6-7.

concedes that he is being refuted by Hermogenes.[18] The *symposion* he wishes to recreate is made difficult by the symposiast's ambivalence to his ambitions, but also by his own over-interference. Socrates' efforts to make the *symposion* a more enlightening event are implicated in the failure of his new model to take hold.

Callias' remark that people are also silent when the flute plays does little to help Socrates' case. However, it gives Hermogenes the opportunity to push his (mock?) indignation a bit further. First, Socrates complains that he doesn't speak, and now Callias recommends that he should speak to the accompaniment of the flute, just like an actor! When Socrates jokingly says this is exactly what he should do, he pulls the rug out from under Hermogenes.[19] The whole debate collapses into playfulness. Proposing that his friend might also strike postures to accompany his words, Socrates resurrects the dancing motif, previously embodied in Philippus' *mimēsis* of the dancing girl and boy. As Hermogenes knows, if he were to follow Callias' advice he would become like the *gelōtopoios*. The boundaries between the hired entertainers, the uninvited guest and Xenophon's symposiasts would become blurred. Hermogenes might as well remain silent, for the result would be quite at odds with Socrates' ambitions for this *symposion*.

Aside from this irony, the resurrection of the dancing motif brings Hermogenes back into the visual and spoken economy of the *symposion*. His withdrawal has come to an end, and he now participates fully in its conversational processes. However, although Socrates' joke concludes the

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[18] Xen. *Smp.* 6.3.1-2.

[19] Xen. *Smp.* 6.3.3-4.5.

discussion of Hermogenes' silence, a conversation on the roles of silence and speech within the *symposion* is still underway. Xenophon uses Socrates' definition of *paroinia*, and Hermogenes' response, to reveal potentially problematic aspects of the sympotic experience. The Syracusan's insults and Philippus' attempts at comparing add a further depth to this discussion on silence and the spoken word in the *symposion*.

The Syracusan is annoyed because, following Hermogenes' reintegration into the group and the resumption of on-going conversation between the guests, no-one is paying attention to his dancers.[20] Hence, he begins an attack on Socrates, asking firstly if Socrates is the so-called *phrontistēs*, or 'thinker', a term of abuse applied elsewhere to Socrates by Aristophanes.[21] He then requests that the philosopher reveal the totally useless matters (*anōphelestata*) for which he is famous. Socrates responds quickly, but with an element of exasperation. By bringing these topics of conversation to Socrates, the Syracusan forces him to respond with *psychra*, or 'frosty jokes'.[22] The Syracusan's insulting questions elicit responses which are equally unfitting to the playful atmosphere promoted

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[20] Xen. *Smp*. 6.1-3.

[21] Xen. *Smp*. 6.3-8.2; Ar. *Nu*. 266; Aristophanes also describes Socrates' school as a *phrontistērion* (94). However, the term may have a more technical application. The kinds of subjects which the Syracusan (and Aristophanes) accuses Socrates of studying are those which Socrates rejects when he turns away from becoming a *phrontistēs* in the *Memorabilia*, 4.7.6. And later in the *Symposium* (7.2.2-3), Socrates admits he may well be a *phrontistēs* because of his interest in natural phenomena. Yet, Xenophon (*Mem*. 4.7.6) also states that men who study the secrets of the gods risk becoming full of pride and deranged (*paraphronein*). This implies that the charge of being a *phrontistēs*, a man who undertakes specific types of investigations, may incorporate an element of abuse.

[22] For this translation, see Huss, 1999a: 341.

within this *symposion*. The Syracusan's envious ill-will (*phthonos*), leads the self-styled symposiarch to speak in a quite inappropriate manner. The wrong kind of conversation begets worse. Yet, the Syracusan (appropriately) fails to comprehend Socrates' point, and continues with his offensive comments.

Socrates is saved from this downwards spiral by Antisthenes' intervention. Using an *eikasmos*, he damns the Syracusan as someone wishing to be insulting (*loidoreisthai*).[23] As Hesk shows, *loidoria* is deployed in law-court speeches and some Aristophanic comedies to indicate an act which transgresses the bounds of accepted behaviour. Moreover, this transgression might be a dangerous substitute for more reasoned and forensic forms of disputation; and as such, it requires policing.[24] The Syracusan incorporates these elements of *loidoria* into his verbal assault on Socrates. Born of frustration, his abusive remarks usurp the light-hearted and serious conversation of the evening, and force two of the invited guests to undertake some damage limitation. However, these endeavours draw Antisthenes and Socrates into the realm of *loidoria* too. Hesk's study of Aristophanes' *Knights*, and Demosthenes' speech *Against Conon* leads him to assert that 'one way of strengthening the propriety of your own arguments and representations is to distance yourself from the field of *loidoria* or to accuse others of engaging in it'.[25] However, despite their efforts, Socrates and Antisthenes are unable to create this distance and find themselves responding to the Syracusan in ways which are equally unsuited to the occasion. Socrates

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[23] Xen. 6.8.3-5. On this *eikasmos* and the comparison Antisthenes proposes that Philippus make, see chapter 4, pages 186-187, above.

[24] Hesk, unpublished: 6.

[25] Hesk, unpublished: 11.

criticises him for his lack of *charis* with unbecoming *psychra*, whilst Antisthenes' accusation constitutes, and attempts to provoke, an uncomplimentary *eikasmos*.

Indeed, Antisthenes' indictment of the Syracusan as *loidoreisthai boulomenōi* recognises this consequence as an intrinsic feature of *loidoria*. In the middle voice, *loidorein* involves an exchange of abuse.[26] This sense is captured by Gray in her translation of *loidoreisthai boulomenōi* as 'one "wishing to abuse/be abused" … the middle voice conveys a deliberate ambiguity'.[27] With his insults, the Syracusan opens himself up to the abuse of his fellow symposiasts, forcing Socrates and Antisthenes to risk becoming abusive themselves.

In Socrates' eyes, this bout of *paroinia* is in danger of continuing as a result of Antisthenes' comparison. With his allusion to Philippus' skill at comparing, Philippus might attempt to cap Antisthenes' comparison of the Syracusan with one of his own. Hence, Socrates steps in with a pre-emptive strike, forbidding Philippus from making his own *eikasmos*.[28] Socrates warns the *gelōtopoios* that by comparing the Syracusan in any way whatsoever, he will commit *loidoria* against the *kaloi kagathoi*. Any comparison, favourable or otherwise, will lessen their standing by association. Hence, Socrates forbids Philippus from comparing the Syracusan to either *kaloi kagathoi* or someone

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[26] See Hesk, 2003, who shows that the two-way effect of *loidoria* is central to its application in the improvised verbal duelling, or flyting, by which Menelaus and Teucer challenge one another's manliness in Sophocles' *Ajax*.

[27] Gray, 1992: 68.

[28] Xen. *Smp*. 6.9.1-2.

worse (*ponēroteros*).[29] Socrates' subsequent command that the *gelōtopoios* keep quiet unless whatever he has to say is necessary or fitting (*dei*), illuminates Socrates' principal concern.[30] By performing any *eikasmoi* in the proposed vein, Philippus will exceed the boundaries which the philosopher has been attempting to impose on the *symposion*. He will continue the pattern of abuse initiated by the Syracusan, and become abusive himself. Antisthenes' response to the Syracusan has already implied there is no room in this *symposion* for that kind of behaviour. And indeed, with Philippus' acquiescence (and silence) the *paroinia* is extinguished.

Gray ties her analysis of this section into her picture of Xenophon's Socrates as *the* wise man for the new generation. She relates the theme of silence to general intellectual interest in the subject, as exemplified in the figure of Simonides presented by Plutarch. The *paroinia* episode in Xenophon's *Symposium* is constructed to allow Socrates to display his wisdom on silence.[31] Gray's argument is undercut on the one hand by the methodological problems which accompany her use of Plutarch's Simonides as evidence for the interests of the historical person or his wise Man persona. But moreover, Gray fails to consider the role of the *paroinia* episode within the *symposion* as a whole. This episode is framed within a discourse on fitting sympotic practice which revolves here around the interaction between silence and the spoken word. It opens in the first instance with the response of the symposiasts to Autolycus' beauty, continues with Socrates' condemnation of Hermogenes' silence, and ends with

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[29] Xen. *Smp.* 6.9.3-10.4.

[30] Xen. *Smp.* 6.10.7-8.

[31] Gray, 1992: 67-8.

his recommendation to Philippus that he keep his mouth shut. Montiglio's study of Athenian religion and poetry emphasises the role of silence as the great excluder. In religious ritual, epic, epinician poetry, and on the tragic stage, silence emphasises a person's removal from society and his or her usual social persona.[32] However, in Xenophon's *symposion* this exclusion functions in different ways depending on who is being silent. For Hermogenes, a fully paid up *kalos kagathos*, participating verbally in the *symposion* is vital; to be silent is fatal. His silence upsets the communality of the event and prevents it from proceeding according to Socrates' plan. If Hermogenes does not take part in the spoken *symposion*, he cannot cheer or benefit anyone. In contrast, the uninvited Philippus should keep quiet unless he can say something worthwhile. Moreover, the Syracusan's *logoi* are abusive and unsuitable within the current playful and communal situation. Socrates implements different protocols for different participants in the *symposion*.

The motif of silence versus the spoken word extends into Xenophon's self-representation. Xenophon claims to show us the men he was with when he realised the playful deeds of the *kaloi kagathoi* were worth remembering. However, Xenophon is completely absent from the proceedings. He is not on the guest list, and he never recalls his own actions; none of the symposiasts address him, or allude to him in any way. However, despite his physical absence, as narrator of the tale Xenophon joins his reader as a silent guest in the *symposion*.[33] Author and reader both view the *symposion* from outside, watching silently.

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[32] Montiglio, 2000: 292, and *passim*.

[33] Hence, Xenophon does not present himself simply as a silent, inaudible, uninvited guest, as Strauss, 1972: 143, maintains.

Unlike Hermogenes, their silence is thoroughly appropriate to their positions. They learn about *kalokagathia* and doing a *symposion* by being with the symposiasts, but not interfering in events. Different protocols dictate what behaviours are suitable for participants in the *symposion* and readers of the *Symposium*.

However, if silence can be a virtue for the viewer-reader of the *Symposium*, who learns *kalokagathia* by observing the *symposion*, can it also be a virtue for the *kaloi kagathoi* in the *symposion*? Socrates admits that Hermogenes' accusation against him for talking too much is correct. The philosopher's incessant chatter disrupts the flow of the *symposion* as much as his companion's silence. Moreover, Socrates engages in *psychra* with the Syracusan; and the philosopher's endeavour to prevent Philippus comparing results in a quarrel which does not immediately restore harmony to the *andrōn*. The philosopher is every bit as guilty of *paroinia* as his friend, the Syracusan and the *gelōtopoios*. The recommendation that Philippus be quiet unless he has something suitable to say might equally be applied to Socrates himself. Through the *paroinia* of Hermogenes, the Syracusan, Philippus and Socrates, Xenophon suggests that silence can become a symposiast when he has nothing to contribute. And for the reader who can only watch and listen, it is vital.

Xenophon therefore uses the actions of Socrates and the other symposiasts to critique the philosopher's recommendations for the *symposion*. Further, Socrates is not the only symposiast concerned with what is, and is not, appropriate to the *symposion* and with his role in it. When Callias invites Socrates and his companions to his house, he does so to make his party more

glamorous, as if this were a defining feature of the good party.[34] Philippus is invited into the *andrōn* because his laughter-making will reassert the proper equilibrium between *spoudē* and *paidia* which has been upset by his friends' reactions to Autolycus' beauty.[35] He is anxious to tell jokes that will fulfil his obligations as *gelōtopoios*, while Callias checks to see if Philippus' jokes make an impression on Autolycus.[36] When the symposiasts accept Socrates' proposed pattern of drinking, they agree with him that the *symposion* should strive towards the greatest playfulness possible.[37] Later, in response to Socrates' recommendation that they entertain one another, many people want to know how this might best be achieved.[38] Finally, Autolycus leaves the party when it is time for him to do so (*ēdē gar hōra ēn autōi*).[39] Throughout the course of events, the symposiasts all try their best to do what is most fitting for the current occasion.

In addition, the symposiasts generally follow Socrates' lead, but they do not always agree with his pronouncements. Although the philosopher forbids Philippus from making a comparison of the Syracusan, the reaction of the symposiasts to this prohibition is not consistent. Some encourage him to do a comparison, while others try to stop him, resulting in a great din (*thorubos*). This is at odds with Socrates' desire for a well-ordered and beneficial *logos*; the philosopher is compelled to restore order by starting up a song.[40] Similarly,

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[34] Xen. *Smp.* 1.4.

[35] Xen. *Smp.* 1.13.5-6.

[36] Xen. *Smp.* 1.14; 1.12.3-5.

[37] Xen. *Smp.* 2.27.1.

[38] Xen. *Smp.* 2.5-6.

[39] Xen. *Smp.* 9.1.1-2.

[40] Xen. *Smp.* 7.1.1-2.

Socrates tells the Syracusan that if dancers were to depict the Graces, Seasons and Nymphs, the *symposion* would be much more graceful (*epicharitōteron*). However, the resulting dance which gives the symposiasts such great pleasure is an erotic *mimēsis* set in the wedding chamber of Ariadne and Dionysos.[41]

Moreover, in a sense Xenophon himself does not always 'agree' with Socrates' ideas for the *symposion* – although of course, it is Xenophon who puts the words into Socrates' mouth. Not only does he critique the philosopher's ambitions for speech and silence, but, as we saw in the previous chapter, Socrates tries hard to de-eroticise an event which Xenophon deliberately imbues with *erōs*. There may be no place for Aphrodite in Socrates' *symposion*, but in the *Symposium* beauty and desire are important testing-points for *kalokagathia*. Further, Socrates treats the beautiful dancers as elements of the *andrōn* which permit conversation and allow the symposiasts to benefit one another. By contrast, their beauty, and the *erōs* which it arouses, play a key role in Xenophon's *symposion*. Similarly, Socrates attempts to prevent Philippus from participating in the *symposion* unless it is absolutely necessary. For Xenophon, however, the performances provided by the uninvited *gelōtopoios* are every bit as instructive, and hence crucial, as those of the invited *kaloi kagathoi*.

Finally, if we remember the circumstances which led Callias to issue his invitation, Socrates was not originally intended to be at the *symposion*. Callias happened upon him by chance, and Socrates rejected his invitation as it was proper for him to do. Socrates controls the rounds of speaking because otherwise the symposiasts will not follow his instructions: on two occasions he is forced to intervene decisively in order to stop the conversation rambling on without clear

[41] Xen. *Smp.* 7.5.1-4; 9.1-6.

direction or purpose.[42] And the symposiasts rebel against his instruction. People still want Philippus to compare, in spite of Socrates' warning, and Socrates is forced to use the dancers as stimuli to conversations because the symposiasts' attentions keep returning to them regardless of his best efforts to the contrary. Although the Syracusan complains that the guests all ignore his troupe because they entertain one another, when Socrates' songs are sung, the dancing girl immediately reappears. Socrates is forced to stall her performance with an analysis of the suitability, or otherwise, of her contributions to the *symposion*. When the Syracusan's troupe emerges for one last time, Socrates' recommendations for a spiritual *erōs*, uttered in his speech only moments before, are completely forgotten in the married symposiasts' haste to return to their wives.[43]

In short, Socrates' participation in the *Symposium* is far from straightforward. On the one hand, Xenophon structures his *symposion* around his philosopher's attempts to implement his ideas about what should go on in a good drinking party. On the other, the resultant *symposion* is continually critiqued from within the text. Xenophon thus sets up a dialogue between Socrates' recommendations for Callias' party and the critique of these ideas which develops as the *symposion* progresses. By presenting these two *symposia* for consideration and comparison, the author encourages his reader to think about how a good *symposion* should progress. How should symposiasts respond to beautiful spectacles, what should they talk about, and what is the purpose of the event? Socrates' model aims to facilitate the symposiasts' improvement through

[42] Xen. *Smp.* 2.6-7. and 7.1.

[43] Xen. *Smp.* 9.7.

conversation with one another. As I will discuss in chapter 6, Socrates' ambitions offer Xenophon a means of investigating the teaching and learning of *kalokagathia*. Yet, by aligning it firmly with the figure of Socrates, Xenophon is able to use the other symposiasts, and the other entertainments on offer to assess (but not fully undermine) these ideas. As a result, negotiating appropriate sympotic practice becomes an important component in the process of demonstrating and learning *kalokagathia*, both for the symposiasts in Callias' *andrōn* and the *Symposium*'s reader.

Socrates *Gelōtopoios* and Socrates *Spoudaiogeloios*

At the same time as Xenophon blurs the line between Socrates *symposiarchos* and his own role as symposiarch of the *Symposium*, he problematises our view of the philosopher further by aligning him directly with another character within the text, the *gelōtopoios*. As we have already noted, they are both outsiders to the *symposion*: Philippus, according to his self-presentation, is a low-status *aklētos/parasitos/kolax/gelōtopoios*, and Socrates is a late and unexpected addition to the event, whose attempts to shape the *symposion* only strengthen the distance between him and his fellow guests. Secondly, Philippus and Socrates are brought into the *andrōn* to meet specific requirements: Philippus is to bring laughter to the serious gathering, while Socrates is to make it more glamorous. Neither are invited for the sake of their company alone. And together they are the primary source of *eikasmoi* and laughter.

Yet, the *gelōtopoios* and philosopher are not identical. Their similarity is most apparent in the dancing episode, where Philippus' crowning *mimēsis* builds on and caps Socrates' proclaimed desire to dance by acting out the virtual

spectacle of a 'dancing philosopher', created by Socrates only moments before.[44] In this episode, both men use their bodies to raise laughter amongst the symposiasts. However, the ridiculous image of a dancing Socrates remains in the imagination of the guests, realised in the *andrōn* only through Philippus' laughworthy performance. Moreover, the two men cause the symposiasts to laugh in different ways. Philippus only finds success with his audience when he moves from verbal joking into physical, self-debasing performances. On the other hand, Socrates raises a laugh via verbal jokes which bring physical and self-debasing elements into their formula. The distinction is subtle, but fits with the notion that specific types of performances, speech, and now jokes, are suitable for different members of Xenophon's *symposion*.

Xenophon's *Symposium* therefore contains two *gelōtopoioi*. However, their status within the *symposion* differs, they elicit laughter through similar but ultimately different types of jokes, and they have varying degrees of success. By juxtaposing the philosopher Socrates with the self-denigrating *gelotopoios*, Xenophon effects his own sympotic *eikasmos*. Like the comparison which he establishes between the two model *symposia*, and like the *eikasmoi* of the *symposion* in general, this comparison opens up an aspect of the sympotic experience to the reader's inquisition. The laughter-inducing performances of the official laughter-maker offer the symposiasts a warning of the dangers that extreme behaviours pose to their status as *kaloi kagathoi*.[45] In contrast, the jokes of Socrates *gelōtopoios* open up aspects of the *kalos kagathos*' experience to further investigation. Socrates' dancing joke turns into a discussion of exercise,

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[44] See chapter 4, pages 178ff, above.

[45] See above, chapter 4, 177-178, and 191ff.

highly reminiscent of a conversation between Socrates and Epigenes in the *Memorabilia*.[46] And in his second laughter-making joke, the philosopher presents himself as a pander in order to indicate how relationships of reciprocity might benefit the city.[47] The inappropriateness of this comparison is conveyed by Antisthenes' angry response when Socrates calls him a pander too.[48] Both performances disclose a serious message for the laughing and learning symposiast, although the precise delivery and content of this message varies.

The potential for these *gelōtopoioi* to become involved in the sympotic exploration of *kalokagathia* derives from their ability to evoke laughter (*gelōs*). The *Symposium* is filled with verbal jokes and witticisms; yet, while these surely contribute towards the playful atmosphere of the *symposion*, they do not produce laughter. This distinction has often been overlooked. For example, Bassett aligns Xenophon's 'fondness for laughter' with his view of the *Symposium* as a 'collection of pleasantries' told for the amusement of common people.[49] Gera equates *spoudaiogeloion* in Xenophon's *Symposium* expressly with the combination of *spoudē* and *paidia*.[50] Likewise, Huss places the 'dancing Socrates' episode within this nexus.[51] However, as our analysis of joke-making in the last chapter implies, joking and playfulness do not necessarily lead to laughter. Moreover, according to Halliwell, when laughter does occur, 'it is necessary to distinguish between the playful and the consequential *within* the

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[46] Xen. *Smp*. 2.17-18: *Mem*. 3.12.

[47] Xen. *Smp*. 3.10.2, 4.64.

[48] Xen. *Smp*. 4.62.1.

[49] Bassett, 1917: 565; 570.

[50] Gera, 1993: 136. The meaning of *spoudaiogeloion* will shortly be discussed.

[51] Huss, 1999b: 389-390.

sphere of laughter'.[52] Halliwell frames this dichotomy around *paizein* and *skōptein* (although he notes that *ta skōmmata* can sometimes refer to straightforwardly playful humour). The former signifies the pleasure of play for its own sake, while the latter encapsulates the potential for (negative) social consequences. This difference is signalled by social responses to *paidia* and *skōmmata*. Unlike *paidia*, the potential for *hybris* within consequential laughter dictates that it be socially regulated and controlled.[53]

Stewart finds evidence for this in the philosophical works of Xenophon, Plato and Aristotle, where again laughter is made distinct from humour or playfulness.[54] In Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, laughter is associated with excess, whilst in Plato's *Republic* it involves a loss of *enkrateia* and *sōphrosynē*.[55] Moreover, laughter was a response to *to geloion*, something ridiculous and laughable, which Plato and Aristotle linked directly to the low and the base, and to deformity and defect.[56] In the *Laws*, the Athenian Stranger allots the ugly bodies and ideas associated with *ta tou gelōtos kōmōidēmata* to slaves and foreigners so that free and noble men might learn *ta spoudaia* through *ta geloia* without becoming *geloioi* themselves.[57]

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[52] Halliwell, 1991: 280.

[53] Halliwell, 1991: 282-285.

[54] Stewart, 1994: 29.

[55] Arist. *EN* 4.8; Pl. *R.* 388e. Cf. Stewart, 1994: 31-32.

[56] Patterson, 1982: 79; Stewart, 1994: 33. Cf. Garland, 1994.

[57] Pl. *Lg.* 816d-e. The location of *ta geloia* within the ugly is also uncovered by Wohl, 2002: 74-75, when she calls attention to the *dēmos*' laughter at the demagogue Cleon (Th. 4.23.5), who is characterised by Aristophanes, *Eq.* 902 and 1194, as a *bōmolochos*. She further compares this

These attitudes towards laughter and the laughable are reflected in Xenophon's *Symposium*. Halliwell suggests that the Greek *symposion* was one form of commensality at which laughter could be given free rein: it gives 'an established and organised place to laughter, creating the space in which its indulgence can be recognised as legitimate and playful'.[58] Indeed, it is true outside of this *Symposium*, laughter is a familiar component of sympotic representation. An elegiac poet of the fourth century told how at the *symposion*, *andres agathoi* mix playful laughter (*gelan paizein*) with serious speaking in turn, while a fragment of Aeschines places laughter alongside wine in the *symposion*.[59] Further, in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, at a feast hosted by Cyrus, the general Hystaspas recounts the tale of another meal at which the antics of a soldier greedy for meat resulted in laughter at the reported feast; and the men to whom Hystaspas tells his tale all laugh too.[60] However, at the *symposion* of Xenophon's *Symposium*, laughter is not given full expression, but is carefully contained. It only arises in direct response to jokes which debase the person who acts them out, or tells them (as is also the case in the episode from the *Cyropaedia*). The symposiasts do not laugh at Philippus' witty repartee or his comparisons, nor at any other non-abusive jokes told in the *symposion*. Philippus is only able to make laughter by adopting physical positions which are perhaps

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'buffoon' to Thersites, the lame, ugly, anti-hero of the *Iliad* 2.211-277, who also draws pitying and scornful laughter upon himself.

[58] Halliwell, 1991: 290. This impression of the *symposion* fits better with the Roman literary tradition in which entertaining invariably involves one's guests insulting each another: cf. Peaching, 2001.

[59] Ades. Eleg. 27 W; Aeschin. SSR VI A 85. On the latter fragment, see Huss, 1999a: 66-67.

[60] Xen. *Cyr.* 2.1.2-5.

appropriate for the *aklētos* and *gelōtopoios*, but are otherwise unfitting for a free-born Athenian citizen at a *symposion*. Similarly, Socrates' jokes rely on his proposed association with what are presented through the reactions of his companions as unworthy occupations: dancing and pandering. And again the former is configured through an image of the philosopher dancing, if not a physical performance itself. As the philosopher later tells the official *gelōtopoios*, the comparison of a *kalos kagathos* with anyone of lower status can only lead to *loidoria*, a kind of abuse which Halliwell links specifically to hostile laughter.[61] To provoke laughter, Philippus and Socrates must play on or ally themselves to the base, and open themselves up to abuse. The *gelōtopoioi* are makers of *to geloion* as well as *gelōs*.

In content, Socrates and Philippus' jokes fit the anthropologist Mary Douglas' definition of ritual joking, where 'a joke is a play upon form. It brings disparate elements into relation with one another in such a way that one accepted pattern is challenged by the appearance of another, which was in some way hidden in the first.[62] Yet, while the *gelōtopoioi* draw the coherence of the concept of *kalokagathia* into question through the physical potentialities of their bodies, their jokes do not definitively subvert the *kalos kagathos*, nor effect a change in the balance of power.[63] Xenophon's *gelōtopoioi* do bear some resemblance to Douglas' 'joker', who 'appears to be a privileged person who can say certain things in a certain way which confers immunity'. This immunity derives from the joker's 'access to another reality than that mediated by the

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[61] Halliwell. 1991: 292.

[62] Douglas, 1975: 96.

[63] Douglas, 1975: 96.

relevant structure'.[64] However, Socrates, the philosopher and reluctant symposiast, and Philippus, the uninvited *gelōtopoios*, do not use this access to reveal truths, but to question the 'truth' of the *kalos kagathos*' self-conception. Moreover, it is not the *gelōtopoios* who is made 'safe' from ridicule and abuse by his performances, but the watching symposiasts.

By locating the laughable within the outsider figures of the *aklētos* and the philosopher, Xenophon protects his other symposiasts from the degrading experience of being derided by their fellow guests. He thereby maintains the harmony and communality of the sympotic group. Moreover, the jokes which evoke laughter play an important role within Xenophon's conception of the *symposion*. As noted above, Philippus' performances allow a serious investigation into the boundaries of *kalokagathia*, while Socrates follows his jokes with potent discussions of different aspects of the *kalos kagathos*' lifestyle and experience. This juxtaposition of *to geloion* with *to spoudaion* is made manifest in the serious facial expressions which Socrates pulls to accompany his jokes.[65] On the surface, this mock-seriousness feeds into the incongruity and ridiculousness of whatever statement Socrates is making. But it also signals surreptitiously that a serious point is about to be made. Xenophon places *spoudē* at the heart of *to geloion* to delimit the detrimental effects of laughter-making for the joker and his laughing audience.

Spoudaiogeloion, the combination of the serious and the laughable, is therefore a *mediation* of the serious through the laughable in Xenophon's *Symposium*, rather than a mixture of the two. It does not simply blend the

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[64] Douglas, 1975: 107-108.

[65] Xen. *Smp.* 2.17.2, 3.10.3.

serious and the playful, as Gera argues; nor is it 'the combination of serious and frivolous themes' and/or the 'presentation of weighty matters in a playful manner'.[66] Instead, *spoudaiogeloion* makes use of a particular type of joke, the kind which provokes 'hostile laughter'. Philippus' jokes force the symposiasts to seriously reconsider their own identities. Socrates' jokes have a similar effect; but moreover, the philosopher uses them to lead the symposiasts towards contemplating other serious issues; for example, the appropriate behaviour for men in the *andrōn* and the *gymnasion*, and the symposiasts' relationships with one another and the democratic city. Both types involve the symposiasts in the serious business of learning *kalokagathia*. Philippus and Socrates' jokes are *spoudaiogeloion*, whilst Socrates himself is *spoudaiogeloios*.

The presentation of the serious through the laughable allows Xenophon to find a place for the dangerous phenomena of laughter and laughter-making within his *symposion*. He makes them safe by binding them to the serious business of learning and exploring *kalokagathia*. But, *gelōs* and *to geloion* do not become sanitised in this process. The integral elements of danger (to one's status) and self-debasement are central to their operation in Xenophon's *symposion*.

This *spoudaiogeloion* fits into a discourse on laughter and *to geloion* which can also be found in Plato's *Symposium*. At Agathon's house being *geloios* and, hence, laughed at by others, are great taboos for the symposiasts. Eryximachus chides Aristophanes for playing the laughter-maker (*gelōtopoiein*), and complains he must guard against the possibility of saying something *geloios* instead of speaking in peace. Aristophanes replies that while being *geloios*

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[66] Gera. 1993: 136.

would be within his remit as a comic poet, he is worried whatever he says will be *katagelasta*; in other words, even more ridiculous than his comic persona allows.[67] In addition, Alcibiades notes that Socrates has chosen to sit by the beautiful Agathon, and not Aristophanes or 'someone else who is and tries to be laughable' (*tis allos geloios esti te kai bouletai*).[68] He thus implies that Socrates wishes to be *agathos* by association, rather than *geloios*. Finally, in this *symposion*, Alcibiades' speech (the speech of an *aklētos*) provides the only occasion for laughter.[69] The symposiasts cannot help but laugh at his *parrhēsia*, or frank speaking: Alcibiades has just debased himself with his admission that he is as a slave to his passions, his ambitions, Socrates, and the *dēmos*.[70]

In his *Symposium*, Plato recognises the problematic nature of laughter-making in the *symposion*, and ties it into the issue of correct sympotic behaviour, where different levels of *geloion* are suitable for different characters within the group. However, Plato does not offer any solutions. By contrast, Xenophon sets out to tackle and control laughter as a potential site of social disturbance. In Xenophon's *Symposium*, as in the episode of the *Cyropaedia*, laughter is always

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[67] Pl. *Smp.* 189a7-b7. On Aristophanes and *to geloion*, see Ercolani. 2002. This collection of articles on *spoudaiogeloion* is essentially an investigation into abuse and vulgarity in Aristophanic comedy. It traces these integral comic components and the strategies by which they were deployed. Thus, although it does not provide a coherent definition of *spoudaiogeloion*, the various studies together uncover the role of the *geloios* in developing and presenting serious political comment. In particular, Mastromarco, 2003: 223, highlights the combination of the carnavalesque and the serious within '*onomasti komodein*', and the poetic with the political.

[68] Pl. *Smp.* 213c3-5.

[69] On Alcibiades as *aklētos*, see chapter 4, page 203.

[70] Pl. *Smp.* 222c1-3; 215a5-222b7.

'consequential'. However, by defining laughter-making as the preserve of the self-debasing *gelōtopoios* and the ambivalent Socrates *spoudaiogeloios*, Xenophon harnesses it to his educational ambitions. In his *symposion*, laughter is both productive (consequential in a good way?) and, for the symposiasts at least, 'safe'.

Furthermore, Xenophon's solution fits into contemporary philosophical concerns with the place of laughter in learning. As mentioned above, the *Laws* puts forward the proposal that it is impossible to learn *ta spoudaia* without *ta geloia*. Plato therefore confines the job of making shameful bodies and words on the comic stage to slaves and foreigners. Those with beautiful (*kaloi*) bodies and noble (*gennaioi*) souls might learn serious matters without opening themselves to abuse.[71] The location of *to geloion* within the two *gelōtopoios*-figures similarly distances the symposiasts from self-debasement, but allows them to learn through it.

Xenophon's attempt to contain laughter within the framework of *spoudaiogeloion* also echoes the tactics of the newly-emerging Cynic movement, as embodied in the words and actions of Xenophon's near-contemporary, Diogenes of Sinope. As Branham notes, Cynic *spoudaiogeloion* referred to both the juxtaposition of (joking) matter and (serious) manner, as well as the (joking) means and (serious) ends to which their jokes were employed.[72] The Cynics used such jokes to challenge received ideas about philosophy, the nature of mankind, and how a good man should lead his life. Later writers referred to

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[71] Pl. *Lg.* 816d-e.

[72] Branham, 1989: 27.

practitioners of this method as *spoudogeloioi*.[73] However, our evidence for Diogenes derives entirely from a period of Cynic reinvention at least four hundred years after his death.[74] The presentation of sayings of the philosopher, and the stories told about him, are therefore informed by second- and third-century conceptions of Cynicism, its origins and precepts, and by the philosophical ideas and textual ambitions of their authors. As Branham and Goulet-Cazé state, '"Diogenes" is, therefore, always already in the process of reception'.[75] It is thus difficult to untangle the threads of early practice from the Cynic movement it went on to produce.

In his study of *spoudaiogeloion* down the ages, Giangrande describes this tradition as 'a kindly philosophy of the comic art wherein good-natured laughter asserts a moral purpose'.[76] However, this interpretation fails to get to grips with classical ideas of 'the comic', and the intricate connection between *to spoudaion* and *to geloion*. As Branham notes, by the imperial period, Cynics understood their methods to involve the telling of stories which were marked by 'comic incongruity and surprise' as well as *parrhēsia* (like Alcibiades' speech in the *symposion*) and *anaideia*, or frank speaking and shamelessness.[77] The deeds and sayings of Diogenes of Sinope, reported by Diogenes Laertius, are further characterised by the philosopher's disdain for *nomos*. According to his biographer, the philosopher lived in the open air and disregarded the boundaries

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[73] Str. 16.2.29: D.L. 9.17.

[74] Branham and Goulet-Cazé, 1996: 4-6.

[75] Branham and Goulet-Cazé, 1996: 7.

[76] Giangrande, 1972: 19.

[77] Branham, 1993: 36-37.

which custom imposed on behaviour in public spaces.[78] He poured scorn on his contemporaries and their 'useless toils' (*achrēstoi ponoi*); and in addition, he challenged his opponents, and answered any charges levelled against him, with not only clever words but actions too. He trampled on Plato's carpet, declaring at the same time that he trampled on Plato's pride; and when that philosopher described man as a two-footed, featherless animal, Diogenes plucked a chicken and brought it to his school.[79] He defecated and masturbated in public, spat on a man's face and ate raw meat; he wandered about town with a tablet round his neck proclaiming his humiliation and abuse at the hands of young symposiasts, and on another occasion tied a wine jar around his neck and dragged it across the Cerameicus.[80] Thus, he not only uttered witty maxims which highlighted deficiencies and incongruities in men's behaviours and philosophical ideas, but often combined them with self-debasing behaviour in order to make serious points. With this strong emphasis on the body and its functions, Diogenes' philosophical performances were truly *geloios*.

The jokes of Philippus and Socrates are both characterised by surprise and shamelessness, and play on incongruity in order to address similar questions to those posed by the Cynics. Like Diogenes, their bodies act as the primary locus for their jokes, and for the serious contemplation which they provoke. Socrates' desire to dance in the *andrōn* also displays a potential disregard for propriety in terms of his status as a symposiast-*kalos kagathos* and the use of

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[78] D. L. 6.22. Diogenes sunning himself in the Craneum: 6.38; dining in a temple: 6.64; doing the 'deeds of Demeter and Aphrodite' 6.69; cf. D.Chr. 8.36; stealing from temples: 6.73.

[79] D. L. 6.24, and *passim*.; 6.71. D. L. 6.26.

[80] D. L. 6.69, 32, 34, 33, 35.

communal space. A final similarity emerges when Charmides claims to have seen Socrates dance, whereupon he thought the philosopher was going mad (*mainomai*).[81] This is the very term which Diogenes Laertius maintains that Plato used when he described Diogenes of Sinope as *Sōkratēs mainomenos*.[82]

However, a clear distinction exists between the traditional Diogenes and Xenophon's Socrates. Through his shaming and laughable performances, the Cynic placed himself (like the *gelōtopoios* Philippus) firmly outside the bounds of accepted society. By comparison, the spectacles which Socrates provides, and which raise laughter amongst the symposiasts, remain spectres. The revered philosopher can make himself *geloios* in the mind's eyes of his companions without really debasing himself. The philosopher's ability to invite virtual abuse upon himself without becoming truly *geloion* derives also from the liminal position he holds within the *symposion*. He is invited into the heart of elite society, but doesn't really fit in. He acts like a symposiarch, but doesn't quite succeed. On occasions, he has more in common with the *gelōtopoios* than the men with whom he dines. Socrates is not always playful, nor always serious. In addition, Xenophon gives the impression that while he is not completely right in his manipulation of the *symposion*, neither is he simply wrong. It is through this outside, ambivalent figure that the dangers of the *symposion*, for instance abusive laughter, excessive drinking, and erotic desire are mediated.

Thus, while Diogenes the Cynic placed his laughable, antinomian ways at the centre of his philosophical endeavours, Xenophon seeks to circumscribe *to*

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[81] Xen. *Smp.* 2.19.5-6.

[82] D.L. 6.54. Diogenes Laertius uses the same word to describe Diogenes of Sinope's pupil Monimus: D. L. 6.82.

geloion within the bounds of sympotic society. Philippus *gelōtopoios* and Socrates *spoudaiogeloios* provide a means for their author to bring laughter into the *symposion*, and at the same time control it. Moreover, he harnesses the laughter-making capabilities of the former, and the latter's ability to mediate the ridiculous through the serious, to draw this unavoidable but potentially unhealthy feature of sympotic experience into his ambitions for the *symposion*.

To allege that Xenophon deploys techniques of *spoudaiogeloion* in the *Symposium* does not make him an early Cynic. Indeed, his methods differ quite significantly from those of Antisthenes, the philosopher whom Cynics of the Second Sophistic appropriated as their 'founding father' (and a participant in Callias' *symposion*).[83] Diogenes Laertius' record of the life and opinions (*gnōmai*) of Antisthenes show the philosopher using witty maxims and absurdities (*alogoi*) to make statements about life, learning and virtue.[84] However, these are not *geloioi*: Antisthenes' body did not become a site for his lessons, nor did the philosopher's actions invite abuse and scorn. And although Antisthenes' contributions to the *symposion* are 'cynical' in their often biting tone and promotion of austerity and self-denial, Xenophon does not champion their values.[85] As the next chapter will show, in the rounds of speaking,

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[83] While ancient Cynics liked to imagine their descent from Antisthenes 'the Dog', Branham and Goulet-Cazé, 1996: 7, submit that he might better be understood as the 'fore-runner' to a movement which really gained its shape and momentum through the teachings and actions of Diogenes and his followers.

[84] D. L. 1.8. On *gnōmai*, see pages 258-259, below.

[85] On the potentially 'cynical' components of Antisthenes performances, see Rankin, 1986: 13-23. However, the task of working out which aspects of Xenophon's representation of Antisthenes are 'true' to the philosopher's methods and beliefs is difficult when the majority of

Antisthenes is chiefly Socrates' side-kick in their task of uncovering the self-delusion of their fellow symposiasts. This representation, and the stories of Diogenes Laertius, suggest that cynicism as it became known in later centuries was only in its embryonic stage at this time.[86]

Yet, if the stories which later Cynics told of their progenitors have any grounding in their fourth-century activities, then Xenophon's use of laughter and his presentation of Socrates as a laughter-maker suggest that our philosopher interacted closely with contemporary questions regarding the philosopher's role in the pursuit of virtue, and the place of laughter and the laughable within it. Xenophon's refusal to dislocate Socrates entirely from the sympotic group, and his concern with how virtue might be achieved through social interaction, may even show him reacting against the type of philosophical investigation which became manifest in the figure of Diogenes.

To conclude, under Xenophon's guidance, laughter, laughter-making, and *spoudaiogeloion*, defined as the mediation of the serious through the laughable, are not only accepted as aspects of the sympotic experience, but become vital components of it. However, just as at Agathon's house the drunken, shameless Alcibiades is the only character to be evaluated by his peers as *geloios*, the roles of *gelōtopoios* and *spoudaiogeloios* are restricted to Philippus and Socrates. Although Callias' guests might mix seriousness and playfulness in their jokes and speeches, they never invite abusive laughter upon themselves. Thus,

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'fragments' compiled by Caizzi are second hand accounts of what Antisthenes said. Moreover, these mainly derive from the imperial period, and include Antisthenes' appearances in Xenophon's *Symposium* and *Memorabilia*.

[86] Indeed, Rankin, 1986: 27, prefers to view Antisthenes as 'not merely a "Cynic" but as a philosopher and individual of Socratic tone and flavour'.

Xenophon's *symposion* is not a place where playful laughter has free rein, as Halliwell's understanding of the *symposion* would require. Nor is it a Bakhtinian carnival, where mocking laughter and grotesque realism, expressed primarily through the material body, run free. In Bakhtin's world of mediaeval carnivals, a world he extends back into so-called primitive cultures (like ancient Greece and Rome), there is no distinction between spectator and performer, carnival and performance. There, the grotesque provides a positive living embodiment of the shared community.[87] But, in the *Symposium*, *to geloion* separates the symposiasts from, and places them in opposition to, the *gelōtopoios*. Only Socrates, who fluctuates from being symposiarch to symposiast to laughter-maker, can transcend this opposition. The *symposion* does not provide a safe space for laughter because it is a *symposion*, but because it is a place for *gelōtopoioi* and *spoudaiogeloioi*.

The notion that being a *gelōtopoios* in the literal sense is inappropriate to the *kalos kagathos* is affirmed when the symposiasts ask Philippus what makes him proud. He replies that his laughter-making skills bring people to him when they are happy, but keep them away when they are in trouble.[88] Although Niceratus jokes that this is a good state of affairs for him to be in, it is in direct contrast with the picture of friendship based on reciprocity which Hermogenes has just recommended to the *kaloi kagathoi*.[89] *Kaloi kagathoi* are emphatically not *gelōtopoioi*, nor *spoudaiogeloioi*. This observation raises interesting questions about Socrates' place in the *symposion* and *Symposium*. Socrates tries

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[87] Bakhtin, 1968: 1-18.

[88] Xen. *Smp.* 4.50.

[89] Xen. *Smp.* 4.51; 4.47-49.

to order the *symposion* to the best benefit of all; he helps set up a model for learning to be *kalos kagathos*, and about *kalokagathia*; and he is called *kalos kagathos* by his future accuser. But this man is also *gelōtopoios* (and *spoudaiogeloios*).

Socrates and Xenophon in the *Symposium*

Xenophon's Socrates is a highly ambivalent and ambiguous character. His presence within the *Symposium* is essential to its character as a *Sōkratikos logos*. Yet, in the *symposion*, he is both superfluous to the drinking party – a last minute addition whose concept of a good party varies considerably from the ideas of the other symposiasts – and pivotal in the direction it actually takes. He plays a crucial role in constructing the *symposion* as a place for good sympotic practice, but his authority is ultimately usurped by Xenophon's overall representation of the *symposion*: the author's *symposion* varies in significant ways from the party Socrates recommends.[90] In addition, as we will see in the next chapter, Socrates sets out a model for learning *kalokagathia* which is embodied in the action of the *symposion*. But his own status as *kalos kagathos* is problematised by his distance from his fellow symposiasts, and his similarity to the *gelōtopoios*.

This situation reflects the tension in Plato's *Symposium*, where Socrates' outsider status is confirmed through his actions, his attitude, and his learning. The philosopher is late for the party, accused repeatedly of *hybris*, and outdoes the other symposiasts in his understanding of *erōs* (even if the other symposiasts do not recognise the brilliance of his performance). Plato plays up this tension to promote his theory of erotic desire against other possible conceptions of *erōs*.

[90] These differences are outlined above, pages 232-233.

Xenophon similarly deploys the outsider Socrates to promote his own philosophical ambitions. Socrates' performance within Callias' *andrōn* allows Xenophon to critique the *symposion* as a place for learning *kalokagathia*. Socrates does not provide a mouthpiece for Xenophon's philosophical theories but offers an alternative position from which to view the processes of *kalokagathia* and the progression of the *symposion*.

In addition, Socrates acts as a mediating figure in the *symposion* and the *Symposium*. The reader might critique Xenophon's *symposion* through Socrates' ambitions for the party, or vice versa. Either way, he comes to think about the *symposion*, and the issues it raises, through the figure of Socrates. Xenophon's relationship with Socrates is therefore ambivalent: the philosopher is the main authority in the *symposion* but not in the *Symposium*. As we shall discover in chapter 6, this reflects Xenophon's depiction of symposiasts like Callias, Critoboulus, Niceratus and Charmides. Unlike in Plato's *Symposium*, the deeds of these symposiasts, Xenophon's *kaloi kagathoi*, are not worth remembering because they prompt imitation. Rather, they act as a stimulus towards thinking about *kalokagathia*, and thereby learning to be *kalos kagathos*.

This understanding of the *Symposium*'s Socrates might have serious consequences for our comprehension of Xenophon's other Socratic dialogues which deal with *kalokagathia*. For example, in the *Oeconomicus*, Socrates gives Critoboulus an account of *kalokagathia* through the words and person of Ischomachus. Pomeroy insinuates that Socrates quotes 'the testimony of a reputed expert' to back up his claims for estate management.[91] However, if Socrates acts as a mediating figure here as he does in the *Symposium*, a different

[91] Pomeroy. 1994: 30.

understanding of the text emerges. Socrates uses the figure of Ischomachus to teach Critoboulus how to be *kalos kagathos*, but this instruction is executed by offering his young interlocutor a model *through which to explore* (and not just emulate) *kalokagathia*. This might clarify the apparent incongruity between the historical wife of Ischomachus – assuming Xenophon's Ischomachus to be the husband of this wife – and the woman described by Socrates.[92] Harvey explains it by suggesting that Xenophon paints a positive picture of Ischomachus' wife in order to rehabilitate her reputation following her defamation at the hands of Andocides.[93] In contrast, I would argue that Xenophon paints a positive picture to create a deliberate ambiguity surrounding the pious and obedient wife of Ischomachus and the adulterous mistress of Callias. Critoboulus and Xenophon's reader are invited to question the validity of the methods for wife-training and household management which Ischomachus, who is known amongst the Athenians as *kalos kagathos*, recommends.

Under this analysis, the Socrates of the *Memorabilia* becomes a more challenging figure. In a preface to the anecdotes which make up the text, Xenophon defends Socrates against charges of impiety and corruption. However, the stories which follow do not show Socrates teaching 'correct' views and opinions to his students. Rather, just as the Platonic Socrates leads his interlocutors to recognise the folly of their opinions, Xenophon's Socrates provokes his companions to rethink their ideas. Interlocutors like Euthydemus

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[92] The identification of Ischomachus as the husband of Chrysilla was made by Davies, 1971, 248, 265-268. However, Pomeroy, 1994: 260-264, gives references to some other historical Ischomachuses to whom Xenophon may have alluded.

[93] Harvey, 1993: 70.

are often left in a state of *aporia*, with their ideas refuted but no firm set of values to take their place.[94] As the passage I quote at the beginning of the next chapter shows, the Socrates of the *Memorabilia* did not tell others what *kalokagathia* was, but lead them towards being *kalos kagathos* by discussing the nature of different virtues and political concepts.[95] He demonstrates how to achieve *kalokagathia* through inquiry and contemplation.[96]

Thus, the Socrates of the *Symposium*, *Oeconomicus* and *Memorabilia* cannot simply be characterised as 'Xenophon's ideal in dramatised form'.[97] Nor is Socrates a one-dimensional, model *kalos kagathos*, created from the same mould as Cyrus, Agesilaus, and Lycurgus.[98] Socrates' role in the *Symposium* as a challenger and creator of *kalokagathia* marks him apart from other figures Xenophon attributes this 'virtue' to.[99]

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[94] Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.23.

[95] Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.16.

[96] This interpretation also reflects Xenophon's assertion (*Mem.* 1.2.3, 1.2.3) that Socrates never professed to teach virtue, which only the gods had mastered, but hoped his students might come towards it by imitation of him. Morrison, 1994: 203-5, regards this comment as testimony that Socrates taught by moral example. However, it might equally imply that Socrates' methods are to be imitated. Thus, lessons in *kalokagathia* are once again mediated for Xenophon's audience through the figure of Socrates.

[97] Tredennick and Waterfield, 1990: 59. By 'Xenophon's ideal', Waterfield means an ideal Xenophon; he declares that 'the values and character of 'Socrates' are really those of Xenophon'.

[98] As claimed by Tredennick and Waterfield, 1990: 59, ft. 2; cf. Huss, 1999a: 25-30.

[99] Even outside the *Symposium*, the *kalokagathia* of these figures is not as unproblematic as Huss' equation of their personalities suggests. For example, Nadon, 2001: 162-180, shows that far from being an ideal leader and teacher, Cyrus and his education are contrasted negatively to

Socrates' influence within the *symposion* is bound up with Xenophon's promotion of his own authority in the *Symposium*. While Socrates provides a medium for learning how to behave in the *symposion*, and for learning about *kalokagathia*, it is Xenophon's *text* which effects these in the real world. Even more than Socrates, Xenophon is an outsider. As we noted above, Xenophon remains an ephemeral presence on the edge of the *symposion*, a narrator who sees and reports all, but makes no contribution towards the event. It is Xenophon, not Socrates, who structures the *symposion*, using the philosopher as much as the dancing troupe, the laughter-maker and the other symposiasts to create a *Symposium* in which to deliberate on his own philosophical interests. Socrates provides the mouthpiece for Xenophon's educational principle that you can learn good from the good; but it is Xenophon who adds depth to this statement, not only illustrating this principle in action but recreating it in the experience of his reader. Socrates is *spoudaiogeloios*; yet, it is Xenophon who reveals the problematic nature of laughter, and finds a safe place for it within his *symposion*. Thus, the lessons which Xenophon's reader learns are mediated ultimately through the text of the *Symposium*, and the *symposion* it records, not the character of Socrates.

Xenophon's textual usurpation of Socrates' oral authority is cheekily signposted in a comment made by Charmides during Critoboulus' speech on beauty. He describes the sight of Socrates and Critoboulus bent over a book together searching for something (*masteuein ti*).[100] The Socrates of Plato's

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his ancestors and their *paideia*. According to Nadon (179), Cyrus' education is 'essentially defective'; the Persian leader does not lead others towards *kalokagathia*.

[100] Xen. *Smp*. 4.27.3-6.

dialogues is famously suspicious of writing, or rather, as Dupont suggests, the decontextualisation of philosophy from the speech act which lends it social and religious meaning.[101] By writing philosophy into the mouth of Socrates, Plato engages with this issue. Halperin shows that the narrative components of Plato's *Symposium* map onto its author's concerns with writing, conveyed in Socrates' critique of writing in the *Phaedrus*.[102] The juxtaposition of the different speeches in written forms allows the reader to compare and contrast Socrates' wisdom regarding *erōs* with the picture of Socrates conjured up by Alcibiades.[103] Through the narrative strategies of the *Symposium*, Plato harnesses the contradictions created by the possibility for multiple readings in any written text to the experience of doing (Plato's) philosophy.[104]

In his *Symposium*, Xenophon goes one step further. Socrates' spoken wisdom is subsumed into Xenophon's ambitions for his text. In her study of the relationship between orality and writing, Dupont alleges that the 'hot' institution

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[101] Dupont, 1999: 87-91. However, Dupont fails to dissociate the historical Socrates from the Platonic version, hence performing an act of decontextualisation herself. Her analysis of Plato's *Ion*, in which Socrates challenges the value of rhapsodic learning, fails to understand the ambiguities created by placing Socrates' arguments within a written framework. Socrates' claim that meaning can only emerge from the speech act comes alive through the act of reading.

[102] Halperin, 1992. See Pl. *Phdr.* 271b-273e.

[103] Halperin, 1992: 114-115.

[104] Halperin here builds on the argument posited by Ferrari, 204-232, that 'what ultimately matters is *neither* writing *nor* reading but the way of life in which they can find a place' (221). For both scholars, the primary intention of the *Phaedrus* is to assess writing as a means of doing philosophy; however, it also engages the reader in doing philosophy too. Compare their arguments with Yunis, 2003b: 205-212, who further examines how Plato's texts (including the *Phaedrus*) stimulate critical reading.

of the *symposion* lost its spontaneity when its poems, originally constructed orally within the *andrōn* in which they were performed, became fossilised statements written down and learned at schools for future recitation. As a result, Athenians now had to be taught how to do a *symposion*.[105] On the one hand, Xenophon's *Symposium* contradicts this picture. The *symposion* he presents is a vibrant affair. The jokes and speeches are all highly spontaneous; for example, when Socrates quotes Theognis he does not merely recite lines of a poem he has learned by rote, but deploys them innovatively. Similarly, he adapts Gorgias' wisdom on drinking to the current situation. This literary *symposion* is not 'cold', according to Dupont's definition of the term. Dupont charges the writing down of poetry with causing entropy: 'once a culture is modelized, theorized, historicized, and given claims to universality, it loses its savour and its soul, and also its ability to communicate intoxication'.[106] However, it is just this supposedly absent flavour and 'hotness' which Xenophon's *Symposium* conveys.

On the other hand, Xenophon expressly intends to teach his reader how to do a *symposion*. The vibrancy of his event *is* fossilised within the text, providing its reader with a model which might lead him towards good sympotic practice. However, the reader is not invited to remember the events he sees, or to recreate them in his own activities. Instead, the *Symposium* operates within the 'reading act', transmitting its meanings in the moments at which the text is 'read' and 're-read'.[107] Xenophon's concern with good sympotic behaviour as a doorway to

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[105] Dupont, 1999: 86.

[106] Dupont, 1999: 87.

[107] This focus on reading does not limit the *Symposium*'s efficacy to a strictly 'reading' audience. The process of reading and rereading that I envisage might also be performed by

learning, exploring and performing (the quest for) *kalokagathia* emerge through the written text. The lessons learnt by the symposiasts in the *symposion* map onto, but are not identical with, the lessons they convey to Xenophon's reader. The two learning processes are quite distinct. By configuring them through his written *Symposium*, Xenophon promotes his style of education above the lessons of the real-life *symposion*. The 'silent guest' at the *Symposium* learns more than those who participate directly in the hubbub. Moreover, by styling his philosopher as a reluctant and extraordinary symposiast, as well as an eager reader, Xenophon deploys Socrates to reinforce his own authority.

Xenophon's ambitions for his written *Symposium* echo his comments in *On Hunting*, where he condemns the Sophists who have written many foolish things (*peri tōn mataiōn polla autois gegraptai*).[108] Their writings do not make men *agathos*, but offer young men pleasures and empty virtue. Moreover, Xenophon writes,

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anyone listening to a reading of the text too. It is the *Symposium*'s nature as a *written text* which is key. See below, chapter 6, page 310.

[108] Xen. *Cyn.* 13.1-2.

> ὀνόματα μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν παιδεύσειαν, γνῶμαι δέ, εἰ καλῶς ἔχοιεν (Xen. *Cyn.* 13.5-6).
>
> For words do not teach, but *gnōmai*, if they are fine, do.

Indeed, Xenophon's *Symposium* is comprised not of words but *gnōmai*, or maxims: that is, short stories with understandings (*noēmata*) embedded in them. Just like the *Cynegeticus*, this work is useful, making men *sophos* and *agathos* as they read.[109] Xenophon is a man who understands the good (*agathon ti epistamenos*), and leads his reader towards virtue.[110]

For the moment I put forward these assertions somewhat speculatively. However, the investigation into *kalokagathia* in my final chapter will allow me to unpack them further. In chapter 4, I inferred that Xenophon's *symposion* promotes a comfortable atmosphere for the subtle contemplation of *kalokagathia*, mediated through the entertainments provided by outside performers and the conversations of the symposiasts themselves. And we have just seen how Socrates *gelōtopoios* and Socrates *spoudaiogeloios* provide a means of bringing serious conversations on matters of importance to the *kaloi kagathoi* who attend the *symposion*. In addition, the conversations of the symposiasts are shot through with on-going and explicit discussions of *kalokagathia*, what it is and how it can be taught. By turning to look at some of these conversations, and the *kaloi kagathoi* who conduct them, I will now examine Xenophon's presentation of the *symposion* as a place for learning *kalokagathia*. However, given the existence of

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[109] Xen. *Cyn.* 13.7.

[110] Xen. *Cyn.* 13.4.

two model *symposia* and two different Socrateses, and the dichotomy they effect between the *symposion* and *Symposium*, we should not expect Xenophon's lessons in learning *kalokagathia* to provide straightforward results.

Chapter 6: Learning to be *Kalos Kagathos* in Xenophon's *Symposium*

ὅπως δὲ δὴ καὶ τοὺς ἔχοντας τὸ σεμνὸν ὄνομα τοῦτο τὸ καλός τε κἀγαθὸς ἐπισκεψαίμην, τί ποτε ἐργαζόμενοι τοῦτ' ἀξιοῖντο καλεῖσθαι, πάνυ μου ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπεθύμει αὐτῶν τινι συγγενέσθαι. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι προσέκειτο τὸ καλὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ, ὄντινα ἴδοιμι καλόν, τούτῳ προσήειν καὶ ἐπειρώμην καταμανθάνειν, εἴ που ἴδοιμι προσηρτημένον τῷ καλῷ τὸ ἀγαθόν. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄρα εἶχεν οὕτως ἀλλ' ἐνίους ἐδόκουν καταμανθάνειν τῶν καλῶν τὰς μορφὰς πάνυ μοχθηροὺς ὄντας τὰς ψυχάς. ἔδοξεν οὖν μοι ἀφέμενον τῆς καλῆς ὄψεως ἐπ' αὐτῶν τινα ἐλθεῖν τῶν καλουμένων καλῶν τε κἀγαθῶν. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸν Ἰσχόμαχον ἤκουον πρὸς πάντων καὶ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ ξένων καὶ ἀστῶν καλόν τε κἀγαθὸν ἐπονομαζόμενον, ἔδοξέ μοι τούτῳ πειραθῆναι συγγενέσθαι.

'My soul very much desired to become acquainted with one of those who are called by that dignified title *kalos kagathos*, so I might consider what behaviours deemed them worthy to be called it. And first, because the word 'beautiful' was added to the word 'good', whenever I saw some beauty, I would go up to him and try to learn if anywhere I might see goodness attached to beauty. But I found it was not like that. I seemed to discover that some who were beautiful in form were utterly depraved in their souls. And so I decided to let physical beauty alone, and to approach one of those called *kalos te kagathos*. And so when I heard that Ischomachus was called *kalos te*

kagathos by everyone, men and women, foreigners and citizens, I decided to try to meet him.' (Xen., *Oec.* 6.14.1-17.3 Marchant)

αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἀεὶ διελέγετο σκοπῶν, τί εὐσεβές, τί ἀσεβές, τί καλόν, τί αἰσχρόν, τί δίκαιον, τί ἄδικον, τί σωφροσύνη, τί μανία, τί ἀνδρεία, τί δειλία, τί πόλις, τί πολιτικός, τί ἀρχὴ ἀνθρώπων, τί ἀρχικὸς ἀνθρώπων, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ τοὺς μὲν εἰδότας ἡγεῖτο καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς εἶναι, τοὺς δ' ἀγοοῦντας ἀνδραποδώδεις ἂν δικαίως κεκλῆσθαι.

But he [Socrates] was always inquiring about human things: what is piety, what is impiety, what is beautiful, what is shameful, what is just, what is unjust, what is self-control, what is madness, what is bravery, what is cowardice, what is a city, what befits a citizen, what is the skill of ruling mankind, what is the ruler of mankind and other things, the knowledge of which he thought should be *kalos kagathos*, but the ignorance of which might justly be called slavish. (Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.16.2-8 Marchant)

In three out of his four *Sōkratikoi Logoi*, Xenophon displays an explicit interest in *kalokagathia* and the *kalos kagathos*. The first book of the *Memorabilia* is devoted to establishing Socrates as a teacher of *kalokagathia*, while the remainder of the text shows the philosopher in action; and on recalling his teachings, by word and example, Xenophon appears to mould his subject into the greatest *kalos kagathos* of them all. In the *Oeconomicus*, Socrates again provides his listeners with lessons in *kalokagathia*, but this time they are mediated through

a conversation on household management between the philosopher and Ischomachus, a man Socrates believes is justly called *ho kalos te kagathos anēr*.[1] And finally, as chapter 4 proposed, the *Symposium* provides a playground for *hoi kaloi kagathoi andres*, where the entertainments on offer in Callias' *andrōn* provide its participants ample opportunity to reflect on, and act out, their status as *kaloi kagathoi*.

In all three texts, Xenophon constructs his lessons in *kalokagathia* through a process of *epideixis*, using Socrates as a lynchpin for his investigations, whether or not the philosopher himself provides a model. However, the *Symposium* differs significantly from its two companion texts on account of its sympotic setting. The performative aspect of this *symposion*, which turns every performance into an assertion and negotiation of status by the performing symposiast, puts each *kalos kagathos* forward as a potential embodiment of *kalokagathia*. However, this process is further configured through a conversational discourse on education, which sets up the *symposion*, already defined as a gathering of *kaloi kagathoi*, as a place for learning *kalokagathia*.

Socrates formalises this process with his observation that men learn good from good men. However, Xenophon's choice of *kaloi kagathoi* and the words he puts into their mouths question the extent to which the *symposion* can operate in this way. The historical personae of the symposiasts and contradictions within their performances imply that these men may not be entirely *kaloi kagathoi*. And if they are not, what lessons in *kalokagathia* can they give? The paideutic nature of the *symposion* becomes problematic.

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[1] Xen. *Oec.* 6.12.

In this chapter, I will investigate Xenophon's presentation of the *symposion* as a place for learning *kalokagathia* and his objective in undermining it. Within the *Symposium* Xenophon establishes a discourse on *kalokagathia* which considers what it is, and how it might be taught. This discourse ultimately rejects the *symposion* as a suitable location for learning and experiencing *kalokagathia* and replaces it with the *Symposium*.

Kalokagathia in Ancient Greece and Modern Scholarship

In the fifth- and fourth-century Athens, the terms *kalos kagathos* and *kalokagathia* were frequently deployed by writers and orators to describe the city's elite and their attributes.[2] *To kalon* and *to agathon* are obviously implicated in the two concepts. However, modern attempts to define the *kalos kagathos* and his *kalokagathia* illustrate the difficulty of determining what their combination within the one term implied. Bourriot's summary of scholarship on *kalokagathia* and the *kalos kagathos* since the nineteenth century portrays a general understanding of the *kaloi kagathoi* as a political, hereditary class (Kortum, Welcker, Tittman, Thirwall, Schneidewin, Wachsmuth, Hermann and Shoeman) defined by a distinct social lifestyle and moral education (Grote, Krause, Schmidt, Burckhardt).[3] Some more recent studies on the subject betray the influence of these ideas. For example, De Ste Croix called *kalos kagathos*

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[2] Herodotus (1.30.4, 2.143.4) makes the first known use of *kalos kagathos*, whilst *kalokagathia* appears for the first time in Xenophon's work (although this does not preclude earlier usage). In addition, Aristophanes (fr. 439 K) uses their verbal cognate, *kalokagathein*: see further Jüthner, 1930: 100.

[3] For full discussion of these scholars' arguments and an evaluation of their conclusions, see Bourriot, 1995: 1-96.

'the language of a class that conceives itself morally and socially superior'.[4] Other historians tried to detach the moral aspect of *kalokagathia* from its political and social components. Jüthner, Ehrenberg and Wankel all supposed that the efforts of fourth-century philosophers made the label *kalos kagathos* a term of moral evaluation rather than (or at least alongside) an assertion of political or social status.[5]

Although these studies offer possible political, social and philosophical interpretations of *kalos kagathos* (and hence, *kalokagathia*), they do not address the issue of what values the term might convey. What might it mean for the *gymnasion*-going, horse-riding aristocrat of the fifth and fourth centuries to be called 'beautiful and good'? Dover's definition of the *kalos kagathos* as 'both good to look at and manifesting goodness in action' makes some attempt to place the term within classical Athenian conceptions of *to kalon* and *to agathon*.[6] However, Dover does not ask how the combination of these two qualities into one value-concept operated within the political discourse of the city.

Bourriot's recent two-volume work entitled *Kalos Kagathos – Kalokagathia*, which devotes a good proportion of its time to Xenophon's work, sheds little light on the problem. In the hope of combating the vague and ambivalent understandings generated by earlier scholars, Bourriot focuses

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[4] De Ste Croix, 1972: 376. See also the earlier study by Gomme, 1953: 65-67, whose analysis of the *kalos kagathos* in Aristophanes' *Knights* leads him to conclude the label designates individuals of a certain moral character, as well as identifying their membership of a 'well-to-do' class. Jaeger, 1957: 249, also views *kalos kagathos* as the highest form of *aretē* for the Greek nobility.

[5] Jüthner, 1930: 107; Ehrenberg, 1951: 112; Wankel, 1961.

[6] Dover, 1974: 41.

directly on individual characters from Greek history whom historians, philosophers and orators describe as *kaloi kagathoi*. For example, his literal reading of Thucydides' and Xenophon's description of the Spartan army as *kaloi kagathoi* leads him to argue that the term *kalos kagathos* arrived in fifth-century Athens via Sparta.[7] It was initially used as a 'terme de publicité' by sophists who had recently set up business in Athens and wanted to attract pupils.[8] Once in the public domain, the term quickly became a criticism of sophists and their select group of followers, or 'jeunes snobs'.[9] Bourriot's mid- to late fifth-century *kaloi kagathoi* gained their *kalokagathia* through their sophistic associations and education. However, a look at the plays of the late fifth-century revealed to Bourriot that between 411 and 403 Athens' notables adopted the term *kalos kagathos* to parade their elite heritage (although why they should want to do this is unclear).[10] Finally, by examining the 'historical' figures to whom fourth-century philosophers and orators called *kalos kagathos*, he declares that *kalokagathia* became a term of moral evaluation.

Amongst the many shortcomings in Bourriot's work his prosopographical focus on individuals at the expense of examining the *kalos kagathos* as a social phenomenon is most detrimental.[11] His chapter on Xenophon demonstrates why

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[7] Bourriot. 1995: 168-173.

[8] Bourriot, 1995: 173-178; 620; 123-130.

[9] So Bourriot, 1995: 133, 138, 139, 199, characterises young men like Alcibiades and Thrasymachus, who attached themselves to fifth-century philosophers and were called *kaloi kagathoi* by Aristophanes.

[10] Namely Theramenes, Niceratus, Leon, Antiphon, Anytos: Bourriot, 1995: 234-252.

[11] See Cairns, 1995: 75; 76; Fisher, 1999: 210. Cairns and Fisher condemn his uncritical use of non-Spartan sources as evidence for the Spartan *kalos kagathos*, and his confusing separation of

his approach does not work. Taking each text produced by Xenophon, Bourriot progresses through the various combinations of *kalos kagathos, kalos kai agathos* and *kalokagathia* to identify who is described by these forms. However, his decision that *kalokagathia* is 'la somme de toutes les vertus concevables dans la vie publique' is every bit as uninformative as his proposal that Xenophon paints all his *kaloi kagathoi* in his own image.[12] He further states that Xenophon's *kalokagathia* lacks substance as a vague and very general term applied to excellence in the artistic and intellectual professions.[13] After all,

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kalos kai agathos from *kalos kagathos*, as if unaware that the former contracts into the latter. Fisher's main complaint is that in all things Bourriot is 'over confident and over-precise', while Cairns identifies his tendency to overemphasise texts that support his argument and play down those which do not. He mournfully concludes, 'the distinctive elements of B's thesis [on the origins and early history of the expression] are very doubtful, while in the discussion of 4th C authors he has little to add that will strike an informed reader as new'.

[12] Bourriot, 1995: 293; 300. On the inadequacy of the latter proposal in general, see chapter 5, page 254 and note 99, above. But, Bourriot is also idiosyncratic in his assessment of who is and is not *kalos kagathos*. For example, he does not include Cyrus amongst his list of Xenophon's *kaloi kagathoi* because he is never described by this term, while other characters in his biography are. His reasoning that Cyrus cannot be *kalos kagathos* because he is not Athenian requires him to make up implausible explanations for why several other non-Athenians, including a woman, are labelled in this way. With no positive definitions of *kalos kagathos* or *kalokagathia*, this kind of wriggling around the issue is endemic. The focus on the moments at which an individual is called *kalos kagathos* also results in Bourriot missing the bigger picture. The more philosophical exploits of Cyrus in many ways resemble those of Socrates, whom the French scholar is happy to refer to as 'le type le plus pur' (311). See for example, Gera, who notes the similarities between Cyrus and Socrates in the feasting scenes of the *Cyropaedia*: Gera, 1993: 154-168. However, Cyrus is not Socrates.

[13] Bourriot, 1995: 314.

'Xénophon, qui n'est pas un philosophe des abstractions, ne cherche guère à définier le contenu de cette valeur abstraite; il se content de la rattacher à un homme et à son groupe'.[14] However, my discussion of *kalokagathia* in the *Symposium* so far has proven that this is not the case.

The combination of political meaning and moral assessment in *kalokagathia* is portrayed more convincingly in Donlan's study of aristocratic ideals in archaic and classical Greece. Donlan describes how the traditional vocabulary by which aristocrats of the archaic period identified their social superiority, as attested in epic and lyric poetry, became problematised in the face of rising democratic sentiment in many Greek *poleis*.[15] For example, in the poetry of Theognis and Pindar, key value-terms like *agathos*, *esthlos*, and *aretē*, which once related to physical and martial prowess, were internalised, moralised, and aligned with the values of the 'middling' citizen, such as *pistis*, *sōphrosynē*, and *charis*.[16] Further, the opposition between *kakos-deilos* and *agathos-esthlos* now reflected a moral and ethical evaluation of 'goodness' and 'badness', and not only courage, or lack of courage, in battle.[17] At the same time, physical beauty (*kallos*) became more strongly connected with *aretē*, now defined as moral excellence, or virtue.[18] Donlan relates these changes in semantics to the aristocracy's wish to maintain cohesion and separation from the masses in a changing world. The poetry of Theognis and Pindar, which fed on and gave substance to this new morality, represented attempts to fashion a new aristocracy

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[14] Bourriot, 1995: 314-315.

[15] Donlan, 1999: 75, 77-111.

[16] Donlan, 1999: 90ff.

[17] Donlan, 1999: 77-80.

[18] Donlan, 1999: 106-107.

within the changing *polis*. Similarly, the fifth century saw the development of a wider vocabulary designed to emphasise negatively the superiority of the aristocracy over the masses. The *gennaioi*, *eugeneis*, *gnōrimoi*, *epieikeis*, *epiphaneis*, *charientes*, *sōphrones*, and *chrēstoi*, opposed themselves to the *plēthos*, *ochlos*, *dēmos*, and to the *ponēroi*, *mochthēroi*, and *phauloi*.[19]

This division appears to dominate the anti-democratic rhetoric of pseudo-Xenophon's *Constitution of the Athenians*, where the author employs just such a polarity to characterise his own social group against the Athenian masses.[20] However, tracing the rhetoric surrounding the *ponēros* in Old Comedy, Rosenbloom concludes that Aristophanes deployed *ponēros* against *chrēstos* to distinguish the new wealthy citizens who aspired to leadership of the *polis* from the traditional aristocratic elite.[21] The *dēmos* became *ponēros* when led by the *ponēroi*, just as it would be *chrēstos* if it allowed the *chrēstoi* to guide it.[22] Yet, Aristophanes' definition of the *dēmos* as *chrēstos* does not merely imply a reversal of pseudo-Xenophon's position.[23] Instead, both men communicated their anxieties over democracy through an evolving moral vocabulary, which could be manipulated to advance their ideas.

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[19] Donlan. 1999: 127-128; cf. Donlan, 1977: 97-98.

[20] See Hughes, Thorpe and Thorpe, 1992: 4. On the contested authorship and possible purpose of this treatise, see Moore, 1983: 19-22.

[21] Rosenbloom, 2002. Moore, 1983: 22, also notes that in the *Constitution of the Athenians*, words like *ponēros* and *chrēstos* have less absolute meanings that Hughes *et al* imply.

[22] Rosenbloom, 2002: 285. Olson, 1995, speculates that a similar concern with the *dēmos*' subjection to demagogues of the new wealth elite underlies Aristophanes' *Wasps*.

[23] As Rosenbloom, 2002: 288, states.

However, at the same time as traditional value-concepts were being given a new significance, they were taken up by the democratic city in order to denote the communal qualities of the Athenian *dēmos*. On the fifth-century battlefield, the man who was *kalos* and *agathos*, now characterised as the *anēr agathos* and *kalos kagathos*, became an integral component of hoplite ideology.[24] For example, at Pylos, Thucydides' Spartans evaluate their battle presence through the term *kalos kagathos*, deploying it alongside a wider rhetoric on the cowardice of archers designed to diminish their enemy's battle-glory.[25] The qualities of the *anēr agathos* and *kalos kagathos*, newly configured as *andragathia* and *kalokagathia*, now relate to the ideal hoplite soldier who fights in tandem with his fellow citizens in defence of the *polis*. Whatever the reality of this ideal, *polis* ideology excluded the aristocratic cavalry from its communal vision.[26] To be a *kalos* and *agathos* man it was necessary to adopt the martial persona of the hoplite, rather than the Homeric hero.

Furthermore, excellence (*aretē*), shame (*aischynē*) and nobility of birth (*eugeneia*) became means of praising the democracy in late fifth- and fourth-century funeral orations.[27] Lacking an independent moral vocabulary of its own,

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[24] See Cartledge, 2001: 162.

[25] Th. 4.40.2. On the rhetoric associated with the archer, see Mackie, 1996: 49-54.

[26] See Cartledge, 1998: 63-64, who reminds us of the distance between the democratic hoplite ideal and the *dēmos*' military experiences as sailors (*nautai*), and highlights some of the consequences. In addition, in a paper presented at the Classical Association Conference 2003 on 'Herodotus and the myth of the "hoplite battle"', Daly showed that hoplite warfare was not even the predominant form of land battle in Herodotus' account of the Persian Wars. See also Low, 2002, on the place of cavalry ideology in the fifth- and fourth-century Athenian *polis*.

[27] See Loraux, 1986: 172-220.

the democratic city glorified its military and political achievements using the only means at its disposal.[28] Athens' citizens were invited to imagine their shared equality through a (modified) language of superiority which aligned the democratic citizen with epic heroes of the past and with the former ruling class whose political prerogatives they had usurped.[29] Ober observes a similar pattern in fourth-century forensic oratory. However, here the impetus came from the city's elite rather than the *dēmos* (or, more precisely, the elite leaders of the *dēmos* who sought to represent the city for it). One strategy available to a defender or prosecutor keen to gain the jury's favour was to present himself as *ho metrios*, an ordinary 'middling' citizen.[30] To this end, the elite speaker addressed his audience as if they were his social equals. However, rather than downgrade his own standing, the speaker elevated the audience. As a result, social markers of 'aristocratic' status became 'nationalised'.[31] *Sōphrosynē* and *charis* came to denote the moderation and grace expected of Athenian citizens, all of whom

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[28] Loraux. 1986: 218.

[29] Like *kalokagathia* and *andragathia*, *aischynē* and *eugeneia* are not attested until the fifth century. Therefore, the *dēmos* defines itself through a *modified* language of aristocratic superiority. On the abstraction of virtues in the fifth and fourth centuries, see Bassi, 2003, which will be discussed shortly on page 271.

[30] On the 'middling citizen', see Morris, 1996: 21-22, 28-31, 40.

[31] This process, recognised by Ober, 1989: 260, echoes the usurption of aristocratic terminology and value-concepts by Pausanias (and by implication his audience), examined in chapter 3. Again 'aristocratic' denotes the way that Athens' fifth- and fourth-century elite embraced value-concepts previously associated with birth elites to construct their own identities. These aristocratic markers, whether indicators of 'elite' status by birth (so 'true' aristocracy) or by wealth or lifestyle, were then claimed by for the *polis*' rhetoric and self-identity.

could be appealed to as well-born, *eugeneis*.[32] Moreover, Lysias, Aeschines and Dinarchus could now speak of *hoi polloi* as *kaloi kagathoi* and *kalokagathia* as belonging to the whole *dēmos*.[33]

At a communal level, the Athenian citizenry was now the city's political aristocracy, and accordingly, it defined itself collectively through traditional aristocratic terminology. This process of appropriation raises important questions surrounding the meaning of terms like *kalos*, *agathos*, and *andreia*, and their amalgams *kalokagathia* and *andragathia*. If funeral orators and lawcourt speakers could now talk of members of the *dēmos* as *kaloi kagathoi*, could this term, or its components *kalos* and *agathos*, have meaning for the Athenian aristocrat outside of its new democratic application?[34] Bassi attributes the emergence of value-concepts like *kalokagathia*, *andragathia* to signify the abstract qualities of the man who is *kalos* and *agathos* to 'a destabilisation of dominant ethical categories over time'. Philosophers like Plato spent so much time defining terms like *andreia* because their meanings were no longer certain.[35] Democratisation of traditionally aristocratic values implies a crisis in aristocratic self-identity. Ideological barriers between rich and poor within the city were

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[32] Ober, 1989: 259-261.

[33] Ober, 1989: 261: Lysias 30.14, Aeschines 1.134; Dinarchus 3.18.

[34] A similar question mark hangs over *andragathia*, a term used by Herodotus (1.136.1, 1.65.2, 1.99.2, 5.39.1, 6.128, 7.166) to describe rulers or to convey traditional connotations of worth in battle. However, it is later applied to recipients of Athenian honours for their services to the *dēmos*. Whitehead, 1993: 47-50, discusses the epigraphic evidence for this, and proposes that *andragathia* was not adopted to give its recipients aristocratic status, but because it intimated value through action.

[35] Bassi, 2003: 53. Cf. Hobbs, 2002: 123.

broken down, and identities were elided. Within certain bounds, Pseudo-Xenophon, Aristophanes and the democratic city could deploy the moral vocabulary of fifth-century Athens in whatever manner they liked.

Xenophon's philosophical attempts to understand *kalokagathia* and define the *kalos kagathos* therefore build on developments within the democratic *polis*. Xenophon's *Symposium* looks to the behaviour of *symposion*-going *kaloi kagathoi* in an effort to uncover and display the essence of *kalokagathia*. Such a task was perhaps crucial for a self-styled member of Athens' aristocratic (as opposed to civic) elite who found the traditional language of his separation and superiority used to emphasise his communality with the democratic *polis*.[36]

In short, modern ambiguity and vagueness over the terms *kalos kagathos* and *kalokagathia* reflect the historical situation. As Donlan remarks *kalokagathia* was 'a contested term, claimed by non-nobles as well' as aristocrats.[37] Moreover, Huss shows that within Xenophon's various works the term *kalos kagathos* has a number of connotations. When referring to people, it might imply class or social stratum, membership of a political and/or military group, a moral mannly quality, or general nobility. *Kalos kagathos* might even be something one does or aspire to.[38]

Therefore, Xenophon is interested in defining *kalokagathia* precisely because there is no consensus regarding its meaning. His bafflement comes

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[36] This may have been especially the case for the wealthy and well-educated Xenophon who had been exiled from the Athens for political reasons, but who still interacted with its intellectual culture. The reasons for Xenophon's exile are discussed by Cartledge, 1987: 60; and his intellectual relationship with the city is explored by Higgins, 1977: 128-143.

[37] Donlan, 1973: 373.

[38] Huss, 1999a: 62-64.

through in the *Oeconomicus* where Socrates professes to have looked everywhere to find someone he considers *kalos kagathos*. In the passage quoted at the beginning of this chapter, the philosopher recalls how he first sought out men characterised who were *kalos*, but found *agathos* lacking. He therefore resolved to find a man whom others called *kalos kagathos*.[39] When he finally encountered someone who met this criterion, Socrates asked him how he spent his time in the hope of learning how Ischomachus came to deserve the accolade.[40]

Of course, Socrates' ignorance on the matter is contrived. If he did not know what made a man *kalos kagathos* before talking to Ischomachus, he certainly had some ideas by the time he related his meeting to Critoboulus. Through the reported conversation between Socrates and Ischomachus, the philosopher outlines what his student must do to earn the title of *kalos kagathos*, which he longs to be worth.[41] Similarly, in the *Symposium*, Xenophon uses the gathering of *hoi kaloi kagathoi andres* in Callias' *andrōn* to offer his reader a definition of *kalokagathia*. However, while Xenophon presents the *symposion* as a place where *kalokagathia* can be learned by mixing with *kaloi kagathoi*, he critiques the efficacy of this education and recommends a better method of learning *kalokagathia*.

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[39] Xen. *Oec.* 6.14-7.

[40] Xen. *Oec.* 7.2.

[41] Xen. *Oec.* 6.12. Although chapter 5 proposes that the situation is a little more complicated than this observation allows: cf. page 252.

Lessons in *Kalokagathia* from *Hoi Kaloi Kagathoi Andres*?

καὶ ὁ Λύκων εἶπεν· Οὐκοῦν νέοις μὲν ἂν εἴη ταῦτα·

ἡμᾶς δὲ τοὺς μηκέτι γυμναζομένους τίνος ὄζειν δεήσει;

Καλοκἀγαθίας νὴ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης.

Καὶ πόθεν ἄν τις τοῦτο τὸ χρῖμα λάβοι;

Οὐ μὰ Δί', ἔφη, οὐ παρὰ τῶν μυροπωλῶν.

'Αλλὰ πόθεν δή;

'Ο μὲν Θέογνις ἔφη·

'Εσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπ' ἐσθλὰ διδάξεαι· ἢν δὲ

κακοῖσι συμμίσγῃς, ἀπολεῖς καὶ τὸν ἐόντα νόον.

καὶ ὁ Λύκων εἶπεν· 'Ακούεις ταῦτα, ὦ υἱέ;

And Lycon said, 'And so that would be for young men;

for those of us who no longer exercise, what is it proper to smell of?'

'*Kalokagathia*, by Zeus', said Socrates.

'And where might one get hold of this kind of oil?'

'By Zeus, not from the perfume-seller'.

'But where then?'

'Theognis said, "You will learn good from the good; but if you mix

with bad men, you will destroy your mind"'.

And Lycon said, 'Do you hear that, son?' (Xen. *Smp.* 2.4.8-5.2)

Socrates' recommendations for learning *kalokagathia* frame the entire *symposion*. When Socrates tells Lycon he will learn 'good from the good' he singles out the current gathering as a place for learning *kalokagathia* from *kaloi kagathoi*. But moreover, the philosopher gives the symposiasts a demonstration

of this recommended learning process in action. By quoting Theognis, Socrates subsumes the poet's authority as the educator of Cyrnus and generations of other young men in the *symposion*, into his own teaching persona.[42] However, Socrates does not just repeat Theognis' wisdom but develops it in a new way. The poet's instructions to the young Cyrnus are redirected towards an older man and reformulated for the *symposion* as a gathering of *kaloi kagathoi*. The philosopher appears to tell Lykon that learning good from the good requires one to incorporate lessons learnt from other *kaloi kagathoi* into the lessons he in turn gives. *Kalokagathia* arises from the mutual lessons which are implicit in the conversations of *kaloi kagathoi*.

This model of learning arises twice more within the drama of the *Symposium*. Firstly, when the philosopher initiates a round of speaking, Callias declares proudly that he has the ability to make men better (*beltious*; literally more *agathoi*).[43] Antisthenes immediately challenges him by asking whether he accomplishes this by teaching a craft or *kalokagathia*.[44] He thus assumes that a man might improve another through teaching him *kalokagathia*. But further, Antisthenes goes on to give his host a lesson in *kalokagathia*, proclaiming it to be the most indisputable form of justice (*dikaiosynē*). Although bravery (*andreia*) and wisdom (*sophia*) can be damaging to friends and the *polis*, justice (hence, *kalokagathia*) has no part in injustice (*adikia*).[45]

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[42] The lines quoted are Thgn. 35-6 W.

[43] Xen. *Smp*. 3.4.1-2.

[44] Xen. *Smp*. 3.4.3-4.

[45] Xen. *Smp*. 3.6-9.

With this definition, Antisthenes undertakes the kind of inquiry found in Plato's *Protagoras* and *Laches*. The interlocutors of these dialogues face the issue of how *dikaiosynē*, *sōphrosynē*, and *andreia* relate to *aretē*, whether they are all equal parts of *aretē*, or are different names for the one virtue.[46] Antisthenes teaches Callias about *kalokagathia* as a virtue, ordering its various components into a hierarchy based on their relationship to injustice, and the consequences that might arise from acting out certain virtues. On Antisthenes' analysis, *andreia* and *sophia*, bravery and wisdom, also have a part in *kalokagathia*, but he warns that they might not always have positive consequences. The most indisputable form of *kalokagathia* does not bring harm to one's friends or one's *polis*, but on occasions this is just what *kalokagathia* might do.

Thus, somewhat ironically in light of his initial claim to benefit men by teaching them *kalokagathia*, Callias learns about the virtues which it embodies, and the dangers it can pose, from Antisthenes. Thus, the two symposiasts act out the learning process embodied in Theognis/Socrates' poem. Moreover, by discussing justice and injustice, wisdom and bravery, and linking them to the *polis*, Antisthenes fulfils a similar role to Socrates in the *Memorabilia*. As the passage quoted at the beginning of this chapter reveals, Xenophon presents the discussion of such matters as topics which a man must know if he is to be *kalos kagathos*; ignorance of them could lead to the charge of slavishness.[47] By coming together in the *symposion* and participating in its entertainments, the

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[46] See Hobbs, 2000: 123; Schmitt, 1992.

[47] Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.16.

kaloi kagathoi achieve a greater understanding of *kalokagathia* and become more *kalos kagathos*.

These benefits are recognised by Hermogenes who proclaims how much he admires Socrates because he flatters Callias whilst simultaneously teaching him what sort of man he should be.[48] During his speech on Eros, the philosopher compliments Callias for choosing a beloved who reflects his own qualities. His boyfriend Autolycus is fond of neither luxury (*habrosynē*) nor softness (*malakia*), and instead displays (*epideiknunai*) power and strength (*rhōmē* and *krateia*), *andreia* and *sōphrosynē*.[49] By Hermogenes' account, Socrates not only commends Callias for embodying these traits himself, but teaches him to be vigorous, strong, brave, self-controlled and not to revel in luxury or become enfeebled by soft living. Moreover, Socrates' commendation of Callias' conduct advocates 'ouranian' relationships between *erastai* and *erōmenoi*. Callias should focus on friendship and doing good deeds (*kala erga*) rather than Autolycus' physical beauty.[50] According to the comic and oratorical tradition, these are lessons of which the famous debaucher is in much need.[51] Being instructed in these things, Callias learns about *kalokagathia* and the kind of man he should be. And moreover, Hermogenes' observation teaches Callias that he should learn these things from Socrates' instruction.

Thus, when Socrates states that good men teach the good he sets out an educational framework which makes learning *kalokagathia* an essential

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[48] Xen. *Smp.* 8.12.1-3.

[49] Xen. *Smp.* 8.8.2-5.

[50] Xen. *Smp.* 8.10.1-11.1.

[51] See below, page 283.

component of being *kalos kagathos*. In other words, learning *kalokagathia* lies at the heart of *kalokagathia* (as an abstraction of the qualities of the *kalos kagathos*). However, this view is not one Socrates' fellow symposiasts necessarily share. Xenophon records the response to Socrates' definition of *kalokagathia*:

> καὶ ὁ μέν τις αὐτῶν εἶπε· Ποῦ οὖν εὑρήσει τούτου διδάσκαλον; ὁ δέ τις ὡς οὐδὲ διδακτὸν τοῦτο εἴη, ἕτερος δέ τις ὡς εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο καὶ τοῦτο μαθητόν. ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἔφη· Τοῦτο μὲν ἐπειδὴ ἀμφίλογόν ἐστιν, εἰς αὖθις ἀποθώμεθα· νυνὶ δὲ τὰ προκείμενα ἀποτελῶμεν.
>
> And some of them said: and where might he find a teacher of this? And some said that it could not even be taught, while some others said that it was just as learnable a thing as any other. So Socrates said, 'As this is disputable, we should put it aside for another time. But now let's finish the programme'. (Xen. *Smp.* 2.6.1-4)

The symposiasts have not yet learnt Socrates' lesson. Socrates remains unfazed by their disbelief and pretends to draw the subject to a close. However, as chapter 4 has discussed, Socrates immediately uses the dancing troupe, to whom he directs the symposiasts' attention, to provoke his companions towards thinking about and discussing features related to *kalokagathia*; for example, education, the *gymnasion*, women, *andreia*, and exercise. He hopes that their responses, and their subsequent conversations in the *symposion*, will act as a proof to his original statement.

Xenophon's Kaloi Kagathoi

Socrates' assertion that the *symposion* provides a location for *kaloi kagathoi* to improve one another merely by being together is put to the test as the evening progresses. However, even before the conversation begins, the status of Xenophon's guests as *kaloi kagathoi* is put at issue. On the one hand, Xenophon goes to great pains to establish the social claims of his guests to that title. In his opening statement he defines his subjects as *kaloi kagathoi*. A quick *résumé* of their portfolios reveals that these men are members of an elite circle of wealthy Athenian aristocrats. Callias (and his brother Hermogenes) belonged to the family of the Ceryces, one of the two priestly families responsible for the Eleusinian Mysteries.[52] He was brother-in-law to Alcibiades and was involved in political life at Athens, acting as *stratēgos* and envoy at different stages in his career.[53] Similar attributes are shared by other members of the group. Niceratus was the son of the famous general Nicias, whose great wealth allowed him to perform the liturgy of trierarch, and who was himself a *stratēgos*. Charmides was the son of Glaucon, who was cousin of the oligarch Critias, and found himself drafted in by the Thirty Tyrants to rule in the Piraeus. Although Xenophon's *symposion* contains a mixture of men with oligarchic and democratic sympathies, they are all well-connected enough to be invited to the house of Callias and to participate in the aristocratic lifestyle. Thus, like

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[52] See Pangle, 1996: 25, who suggests on the basis of the *Memorabilia* that Hermogenes is an impoverished bastard of Hipponicus. Note, however, that as an impoverished bastard he still manages to participate in an elite lifestyle.

[53] Huss, 1999a, 70-78, provides a detailed account of the historical personae of Xenophon's characters.

Aristophanes in the *Wasps*, Xenophon gathers his guests from amongst Athens' notables.[54]

Moreover, their aristocratic status is reinforced through revelations which illuminate aspects of their lifestyles. Xenophon introduces his guests, and sets the scene for his *symposion*, with the statement that it was horse-race day at the Panathenaea, and Callias, the son of Hipponicus, had brought his boyfriend, the pancratiastic victor Autolycus, to witness the spectacle.[55] Thus, from the beginning, Callias and Autolycus are associated with athletics, the *gymnasion* and the pederastic relations for which its aristocratic participants were famous. The *gymnasion* is emphasised again when the guests arrive at Callias' house newly washed and freshly oiled following their gymnastic activities.[56] And later Socrates appeals to the imagery of the *palaistra* as he discusses the appropriate activities for free men and the benefits accrued to them by exercising.[57] Moreover, there are frequent quips about, and references to, sophistic education, wealth and the role of the Athenian aristocrat in the democratic city. Xenophon's *kaloi kagathoi* are characterised in the first instance by their attendance at the *symposion* and *gymnasion*, their bought educations and their leadership of, and liturgical contributions to, the *polis*.

However, from the very beginning their place in the *symposion* is called into question. When Callias happens upon Socrates and his friends and invites them to his party, he tells them that his preparations would seem more glamorous

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[54] On the guests at the *symposia* described in *Wasps*, see Storey, 1985, and MacDowell, 1995: 172-173.

[55] Xen. *Smp.* 1.2.1-4.

[56] Xen. *Smp.* 1.7.4-8.1.

[57] Xen. *Smp.* 2.4; 2.17-18.

if they were adorned by men of pure souls (*ekkekatharmenoi tas psuchas*) like the philosopher and his disciples, rather than generals, cavalry leaders, and political hopefuls.[58] He thus appears to question whether generals, cavalrymen and politicians bring glamour to drinking parties. Or, more precisely, he questions the kinds of men that should be invited to *his symposion*. Contrary to expectations, he implies that it is not famous military and political leaders who should be invited but men like Socrates, men of 'pure souls'. To some extent Callias' sentiments fit in with Athenian rhetoric of the time. The ridicule of political hopefuls is familiar to us from pseudo-Xenophon's *Constitution of the Athenians*, and Aristophanes' *Knights*, and Low has proposed that at a civic level Athens despised its cavalrymen as cowards.[59] Yet the men who accompany Socrates to Callias' house are, or will be, *stratēgoi* and *hippeis*, democratic leaders and political revolutionaries – in other words just the kind of men Callias hopes to dilute.

To complicate matters further, Socrates' responds to Callias' comment as if it were a joke, accusing his future host of mocking him as a do-it-yourself philosopher.[60] Bowen and Huss both propose that the perceived joke revolves around Callias' description of Socrates as a man of pure soul. The former alleges that Callias challenges Socrates by aligning his purified soul with the Pythagoreans and others who cleansed it before undergoing initiation at Eleusis; however, why Callias makes this analogy now (and why it is funny or insulting)

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[58] Xen. *Smp.* 1.4.1-6.

[59] Low, 2002: 106-110. Although Low (110-117) also argues that Athens' cavalrymen fought back, using the imagery of the horseman to emphasise their place in the community of the *polis*.

[60] Xen. *Smp.* 1.5.1-4.

is unclear.[61] Alternatively, Huss suggests Callias is making fun of Socrates and Antisthenes for their inordinate interest in souls.[62] This second explanation is more convincing given Socrates' later praise of desire for the soul as opposed to that of the body, but other possible jokes exist. Perhaps Callias' observation that men of pure souls would be more glamorous party-goers than generals, cavalry men and politicians is insulting in itself. Or maybe it is amusing because some of Socrates' companions *are* generals, cavalry men and politicians, and not men of pure souls. Or perhaps, the idea of the pure-souled Socrates in a *symposion* with all these men is funny; hence, Socrates' initial refusal of the invitation 'as was fitting'. As chapter 5 has shown, Socrates is always on the edge of the *symposion*, directing the symposiasts towards conversation amongst themselves when they might rather be staring at the beautiful dancers. But if this interpretation is correct, where does that leave the *kaloi kagathoi* who accompany Socrates? As the *symposion* progresses, they also require Socrates' direction (Hermogenes) and embrace the erotic atmosphere of the *symposion* (Charmides).[63] Yet here they are described as men of pure souls.

The ambiguity of Callias' invitation to Socrates, and the inconclusive nature of his joke, puts the moral standing of his guests at issue. Can Athens' elite, men who might be defined as *kaloi kagathoi* through their lifestyle, also be of pure soul? Indeed, should they be if they are to participate in the *symposion*? If the answer is no, then what makes them worthy of recollection? What kinds of

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[61] Bowen. 1998: 89.

[62] Huss, 1999a: 81.

[63] On Hermogenes' unsuitable *paroinia*, cf. chapter 5, pages 222-226.

lessons do these *kaloi kagathoi* hold for one another in the *symposion*, and for the reader of the *Symposium*?

This problematisation of the *kaloi kagathoi* in Xenophon's *Symposium* is deepened by details of the symposiasts' 'historical' lives. Callias' love of luxury, young boys, and all-round debauchery was immortalised in Eupolis' *Autolycus* and *The Flatterers*, and Andocides' forensic speech *On the Mysteries*.[64] Huss alleges that Xenophon's *Symposium* presents a positive picture of Callias to combat these negative portraits.[65] After all, Callias is *axiotheatos* when he looks at the beautiful young Autolycus. However, I prefer to see the positive aspects of Callias' presentation standing in deliberate contrast with his historical persona. Callias' conviction that he makes men just and teaches them *kalokagathia* by giving them his money is met with disbelief by Antisthenes. Can this man really teach others anything about justice?[66] Similarly, Charmides' story of how civic-minded he has become since he lost all his money is at odds with his rapacious actions whilst a member of the Piraeus Ten in 404/3. Moreover, the speeches of Niceratus and Critoboulus both undermine their arguments from within. Xenophon's *kaloi kagathoi* are not perfect specimens of virtue, but men whose personalities and contributions challenge the very notion of the *symposion* as a place where 'you will learn good from the good'.

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[64] And. *On the Mysteries* 113-135. esp. 131.

[65] Huss, 1999a: 72.

[66] Xen. *Smp.* 4.1-4.

Educating Niceratus

'Ο πατὴρ ὁ ἐπιμελούμενος ὅπως ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς γενοίμην ἠνάγκασέ με πάντα τὰ 'Ομήρου ἔπη μαθεῖν· καὶ νῦν δυναίμην ἂν 'Ιλιάδα ὅλην καὶ 'Οδύσσειαν ἀπὸ στόματος εἰπεῖν.

'My father who cared that I should become a good man (*anēr agathos*) compelled me to learn the whole of Homer; so now I am able to recite the whole of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* by heart.' (Xen. *Smp.* 3.5.5-8)

'Ακούοιτ' ἄν, ἔφη, καὶ ἐμοῦ ἃ ἔσεσθε βελτίονες, ἂν ἐμοὶ συνῆτε. ἴστε γὰρ δήπου ὅτι "Ομηρος ὁ σοφώτατος πεποίηκε σχεδὸν περὶ πάντων τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. ὅστις ἂν οὖν ὑμῶν βούληται ἢ οἰκονομικὸς ἢ δημηγορικὸς ἢ στρατηγικὸς γενέσθαι ἢ ὅμοιος 'Αχιλλεῖ ἢ Αἴαντι ἢ Νέστορι ἢ 'Οδυσσεῖ, ἐμὲ θεραπευέτω. ἐγὼ γὰρ ταῦτα πάντα ἐπίσταμαι.

He said, 'You shall hear from me how you might become better through association with me. For surely you know that Homer, the wisest man (*ho sophōtatos*), has represented in poetry nearly every aspect of human experience. So, should any one of you wish to be become practised in estate management or qualified in public speaking or fit for command, or to become like Achilles or Aias or Nestor or Odysseus, cultivate me. For I understand all these things'. (Xen. *Smp.* 4.6.3-9)

With these statements, Niceratus caps and challenges Callias' confidence in his ability to make men better with an assertion of his own competence in this sphere. He contends that learning Homeric epic has made him an *anēr agathos*, a 'good man'. Now that he can recite the words of Homer, the 'wisest man', he can teach this wisdom to others so that they might learn about all aspects of human experience from him. Hence, they will become better too.

The method of teaching proposed by Niceratus seems to exemplify the kind of learning and teaching utilised by Socrates in his earlier quotation of Theognis. Like Niceratus, Socrates uses the wisdom of an earlier poet as the basis for instructing his fellow symposiasts. And by following Theognis/Socrates' advice to learn good from the good, they will become *kaloi kagathoi*. However, in the banter which accompanies Niceratus' contribution, the validity of this educational model comes under fire, and its difference from Socrates' proposed mode of learning becomes clear.

Antisthenes leads the attack by implying that in knowing Homer, Niceratus is no different from, or better than, a rhapsode:

> Ἐκεῖνο δ', ἔφη ὁ Ἀντισθένης, λέληθέ σε, ὅτι καὶ οἱ ῥαψῳδοὶ πάντες ἐπίστανται ταῦτα τὰ ἔπη;
>
> Καὶ πῶς ἄν, ἔφη, λελήθοι ἀκροώμενόν γε αὐτῶν ὀλίγου ἀν' ἑκάστην ἡμέραν;
>
> Οἶσθά τι οὖν ἔθνος, ἔφη, ἠλιθιώτερον ῥαψῳδῶν;
>
> Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη ὁ Νικήρατος, οὔκουν ἔμοιγε δοκῶ.
>
> Δῆλον γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὅτι τὰς ὑπονοίας οὐκ ἐπίστανται. σὺ δὲ Στησιμβρότῳ τε καὶ Ἀναξιμάνδρῳ καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς πολὺ δέδωκας ἀργύριον, ὥστε οὐδέν σε τῶν πολλοῦ ἀξίων

λέληθε.

> Antisthenes said, 'Has it escaped your notice, that all the rhapsodes know these poems too?
>
> 'How could I forget', he said, 'when I listen to them almost every day?'
>
> 'And do you know any body of men more foolish than rhapsodes?', Antisthenes said.
>
> 'No, by Zeus', Niceratus said, 'not in my view'.
>
> 'Clearly', said Socrates, 'they do not understand the hidden meanings (*huponoiai*). But you have given lots of money to Stesimbrotus and Anaximander and many others, so nothing of great worth has escaped you.' (Xen. *Smp.* 3.6.7-7.1)

Antisthenes' logic strikes straight at the heart of the matter; he implies that learning Homer has not made Niceratus an *anēr agathos*, but a foolish rhapsode.[67] However, as Huss demonstrates, the implication of Socrates' following comment is contested.[68] On the one hand, Socrates may be defending Niceratus, proposing that he really has learnt *huponoiai* from his teachers.[69]

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[67] In light of this it would be interesting to know more about Antisthenes' own writings on Homer and his approach to them. However, as Giannantoni, 1985: 333ff, demonstrates, unravelling Antisthenes' method from his representations is a difficult process. Whether Xenophon's Antisthenes offer his own opinions reflecting his approach to Homer or presents a viewpoint limited to the current textual situation is unclear.

[68] Huss, 1999a: 189-190.

[69] See Huss, 1999a: 190 and Ford, 2002: 73.

Thus, as Bowen notes, Socrates' follow-up is designed to stop Antisthenes in his tracks and maintain the harmony of the *symposion*, saying 'the philosopher intervenes before Antisthenes can draw the inference that Niceratus is stupid'.[70] But Socrates' response anticipates the force of Niceratus' later argument that he can use his knowledge of Homer to make men better; thus it preemptively supports Antisthenes' coming attack. In this light, Socrates' observation is completely ironic. While Antisthenes questions Niceratus' status as a good man, Socrates undermines the value of the knowledge he will later purport to have acquired. One of Niceratus' teachers, Stesimbrotus, may even have been rhapsode.[71] If this was the case then Niceratus asserts that he has learned how to be an *anēr agathos* from the very men whom he has just agreed are fools. This two-pronged attack by Socrates and his Antisthenes hits out at two pillars of the Greek educational establishment: Homeric epic and Sophists like Stesimbrotus, who take money in exchange for false wisdom.

When Niceratus develops his claim to improve others through his Homeric knowledge of household management, politics and military strategy, Antisthenes steps up the assault:

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[70] Bowen, 1998: 102.

[71] On the identification of Stesimbrotus as a rhapsode, see Huss, 1999a: 190-191, although he himself comes down against this interpretation. Richardson, 1974: 74, suggests the Anaximandrus mentioned here is an anachronistic retrojection of the man whom the Suda records living in the time of Artaxerxes (404-358 BC). Huss (191) notes that nothing remains of his works on Homer, but they were used by Apollodorus in his commentary on the Homeric catalogue of ships.

Ἦ καὶ βασιλεύειν, ἔφη ὁ Ἀντισθένης, ἐπίστασαι, ὅτι οἶσθα ἐπαινέσαντα αὐτὸν τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα ὡς βασιλεύς τε εἴη ἀγαθὸς κρατερός τ' αἰχμητής;

Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἔφη, ἔγωγε ὅτι ἁρματηλατοῦντα δεῖ ἐγγὺς μὲν τῆς στήλης κάμψαι,

αὐτὸν δὲ κλινθῆναι ἐυξέστου ἐπὶ δίφρου
ἦκ' ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ τοῖιν, ἀτὰρ τὸν δεξιὸν ἵππον
κένσαι ὁμοκλήσαντ' εἶξαί τέ οἱ ἡνία χερσί.

'And you understand kingship too?', asked Antisthenes, 'You know that he praises Agamemnon himself as both 'good king and strong spearman'.

'Yes, by Zeus', he said. 'I know that it is necessary for the charioteer to turn near to the post, "and to lean across his well-planed chariot, coming slightly to the left, cheering on and goading the right-hand horse, the reins yielding in his hands"'. (Xen. *Smp.* 4.6.10-12).

The resemblance between this snippet of conversation and the Platonic dialogue between Socrates and the rhapsode Ion is striking.[72] In the *Ion*, Socrates urges his interlocutor to demonstrate the wisdom he has found in Homer in order to disclose how useless this knowledge really is. The philosopher forces Ion, who styles himself as the best rhapsode in Greece, to admit that the knowledge which Homer inspires in him on matters like chariot-racing, fishing and medicine is

[72] In chronological terms, traditional thinking places the *Ion* near the beginning of Plato's corpus, in which case it would precede Xenophon's *Symposium* by a considerable margin. Cf. Kraut, 1992b: 5ff.

inferior to the knowledge which chariot racers, fishermen and physicians could give on account of their experience.[73] In fourth-century Greece the wisdom of Homer is quite redundant. In a similar vein, Antisthenes proffers a nugget of Homeric wisdom which tricks Niceratus into brandishing his alleged erudition. When Niceratus offers the same piece of redundant advice on chariot-racing as Plato's *Ion* gives, Antisthenes' argument about the foolishness of rhapsodes is complete.[74] The advice Homer offers on chariot-racing is useless to the fourth-century *kalos kagathos*, who would never need to ride a chariot, just as the model of kingship provided by Agamemnon would be of no benefit to him within the democratic *polis*. Homer does not teach him about estate management, politics or strategy, but useless trivia. Knowing Homer does not make Niceratus an *anēr agathos*. In consequence, conversing with Niceratus cannot make men better either.

Similar ideas are found in the *Memorabilia* where Socrates asks Euthydemus if he owns a copy of Homer because he aspires to be a rhapsode. His companion replies no, for rhapsodes are very foolish (*panu ēlithious*). Socrates then asks if it is because he aspires to the *aretē* of men involved in politics and household management, who rule and benefit mankind.[75] Euthydemus confirms this is what he desires: he hopes to learn the very lessons from Homeric epic which Niceratus finds there. Socrates points out the errors of this ambition by leading him into a discussion on *aretē* and justice which demonstrates the uselessness of all his previous attempts to approach

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[73] Pl. *Ion* 537a-538d.

[74] Pl. *Ion* 537b.

[75] Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.10-11.

kalokagathia.[76]

Niceratus follows up his observations on chariot-racing with another piece of Homeric wisdom, namely that onion provides a good seasoning for drink.[77] Again Plato also deploys this quote in the *Ion*, but its tone and content are particularly well suited to Xenophon's light-hearted *symposion*.[78] Niceratus submits this piece of Homeric insight in an effort to increase the symposiasts' enjoyment of the party. This time Charmides and Socrates both jump in to demonstrate the limitations of Niceratus' advice. Charmides jokes that if Niceratus went home smelling of onions, his wife would not suspect him of kissing others.[79] At first the philosopher seems to defend Niceratus from this ridicule, agreeing that onion can serve as *opson*. However, he quickly moves on to cap Charmides' joke with the observation that if the symposiasts ate onion, nobody would say they went to Callias' house to enjoy themselves.[80] These jokes highlight the flaw in Niceratus' recommendation for enhancing the sympotic experience. Although Socrates is usually keen to expel sex from the *symposion*, here he admits that eating onions would dampen the atmosphere, because kissing would no longer be pleasurable. Socrates again confirms that 'Homeric wisdom' is antiquated and irrelevant to contemporary Athenian society. Moreover, he usurps Homer's position of authority, replacing the poet's (and Niceratus') wisdom with his own advice on what is suitable, and not suitable, for the *symposion*.

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[76] Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.23.

[77] Xen. *Smp.* 4.7.

[78] Pl. *Ion* 538c.

[79] Xen. *Smp.* 4.8.1-3.

[80] Xen. *Smp.* 4.8.4-8.

The failings of Niceratus' education also constitute an indictment against sophistic education. Socrates' initial probing regarding the value of *huponoiai* such as Niceratus has been taught to uncover is developed in the subsequent conversation. This failure builds on the negative picture of Sophistic education inferred by Callias' performance. When Callias invites Socrates to dinner, the philosopher complains that his future host is always scornful of 'do-it-yourself philosophers' like Socrates because he has paid Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus and many others to lend him their wisdom.[81] In response, Callias promises that if Socrates comes into his *andrōn* he will provide an *epideixis* of the *sophia* he has previously kept hidden (*apokruptesthai*), as testimony to his worth.[82] Callias too has acquired secret wisdom from the sophists which he promises to display. However, Callias' eventual *epideixis* attests the limits of this education. When Callias professes to make men more excellent through justice, Antisthenes turns the table on his host, placing him in the position of student rather than teacher. Later, when Callias asserts that he improves men by giving them money, Antisthenes questions him so harshly that his victim accuses his examiner of being a *sophistēs*.[83] Socrates avoids the outright denunciation of sophistry which can be found in Xenophon's *On Hunting*, and informs Plato's *The Sophist*, *Protagoras* and *Gorgias*.[84] However, with a little help from Antisthenes, the contributions of Callias and Niceratus to the *periodos tōn logōn* highlight the inadequacies of their sophistic educations.

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[81] Xen. *Smp.* 1.5.1-4.

[82] Xen. *Smp.* 1.6.

[83] Xen. *Smp.* 4.4.4-5.

[84] Xen. *Cyn.* 13. Cf. De Romilly, 1992: 27. Xenophon's attitude towards the sophists in *On Hunting* is discussed in chapter 5, pages 258-259.

Niceratus' participation in the *periodos tōn logōn* gives him the opportunity to act like Theognis' good man who teaches others good. Indeed, with his ambition to make other men *agathos* through his understanding of Homer, he tries consciously to fit into this model. However, the responses of Antisthenes and Socrates to Niceratus' contributions question the validity of his instruction; hence, his original claims are discredited. Socrates and Antisthenes' double-act combines light-hearted and serious criticism to undermine Niceratus' argument fatally, thus permitting a critique of the education offered by *hoi kaloi kagathoi andres* whilst the educational process is underway. The result is to elevate Socrates, not Niceratus, to the position of *ho sophōtatos* in place of Homer.

In this respect, the Niceratus episode supports Gray's opinion that Xenophon's Socratic writings adapt the Greek tradition of wisdom literature to present Socrates as *the* wise man of his generation.[85] Socrates not only fulfils this role by deploying Socratic methods but questions the validity of earlier claimants to the title as well. However, the wisdom of past authorities, and indeed of fifth-century sophists, is not dismissed out of hand. Over the course of the *symposion*, Socrates quotes Theognis and uses the words of Gorgias to outline good drinking practices; and in his speech on *erōs*, the philosopher makes use of Homeric epic twice.[86]

However, Socrates employs the words of past poets and contemporary sophists in quite different ways from Niceratus. Niceratus memorises Homeric verse so that he might learn about all aspects of human experience. Socrates, on

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[85] Gray, 1992, and 1998. See also chapter 5, page 228-229.

[86] Xen. *Smp.* 2.26.4-7.1 (Gorgias); 8.30.3-5, 31.1-7 (Homer).

the other hand, uses the wisdom of other men as a spring board to discuss his own ideas. Gorgias' advice to drink little cups and often is harnessed by Socrates to promote a playful atmosphere in the *Symposium*.[87] Further, Xenophon and Socrates build Gorgias' observation into the shape of the *symposion*; the small, but oft-filled, cup provides an analogy for the short bursts of entertainment which shape the *symposion*. Similarly, Socrates quotes the lines from Theognis to provoke a conversation on the learning of *kalokagathia*.[88] Using the philosopher's guiding hand, Xenophon puts this piece of wisdom to the test. Through the claims and counter-claims of the symposiasts, his reader is invited to consider the validity of Theognis and Socrates' advice. Finally, when Socrates quotes Homer, he corrects the epic poet, and reveals what he *really* meant to say; and he refers to the Homeric relationship between Achilles and Patroclus to facilitate his own discussion of pederastic relations.[89] Homer's characters, and the mythological lovers of other songs, do not provide a model for *erōs*; nor are Pausanias' opinions on the value of an army of lovers affirmed.[90] Significantly, Socrates begins his comments on Homer, Pausanias

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[87] Xen. *Smp.* 2.26.4-27.1.

[88] Xen. *Smp.* 2.4-6.

[89] Xen. *Smp.* 8.30.4-8; 8.31.1-7.

[90] Xen. *Smp.* 8.31-34. Socrates' discussion of Pausanias' opinions has elicited much excitement from scholars concerned with the relationship between Plato's and Xenophon's *Symposia*. Xenophon's reporting of an opinion attributed to Pausanias (but spoken by Phaedrus in Plato's *Symposium*) is perceived as evidence that Xenophon has copied Plato. See Dover, 1965; Thesleff, 1978. However, whether, as Huss, 1999a: 415-417, asserts, Xenophon is drawing imperfectly from Plato's text or the known opinions of the historical Pausanias does not matter here. Socrates treats 'Pausanias' as an authority on the topic of male sexual relations, whose opinions are open to his challenge.

and the poets by calling to Niceratus as if to say 'look, Niceratus, this is how it's done'.[91] Competing authorities from the past and present are to be used, thought with and explored; they should not be taken as straightforward lessons in human affairs.

The Niceratus episode once again raises the question of how *kalokagathia* might be learned. Like their literary counterparts in other texts, Socrates and Antisthenes indicate to their audience that sophistic education does not divulge important hidden messages.[92] Learning Homeric epic is not useful, and does not transform those who know it into *andres agathoi*. It cannot enable men to make other men more excellent unless it is deployed in the correct (Socratic) way.

Hence, Niceratus' implicit promise to make his audience better remains unfulfilled. However, the symposiasts still learn from the performance. Socrates' deployment of verses and opinions attributed to other so-called authorities invites the watching symposiasts to think about how they might *legitimately* interact with these sources of wisdom to their personal benefit. And it encourages the reader to think about the style and content of his education, rather than dictate to him how it should be.

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[91] Xen. *Smp.* 8.31.1-2.

[92] According to Diogenes Laertius (6.16) Antisthenes wrote *Of the Sophists: a Work on Physiognomy*. This may have made him a suitable companion for Socrates in the attack on Niceratus. However, Antisthenes' argument is not known.

The Beauty of Critoboulus

τί γὰρ σύ, ἔφη, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, ἐπὶ τίνι μέγιστον φρονεῖς;

Ἐπὶ κάλλει, ἔφη.

Ἦ οὖν καὶ σύ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἕξεις λέγειν ὅτι τῷ σῷ κάλλει ἱκανὸς εἶ βελτίους ἡμᾶς ποιεῖν;

Εἰ δὲ μή, δῆλόν γε ὅτι φαῦλος φανοῦμαι.

'And you, Critoboulus', he said, 'what are you most proud of?'

'Beauty (*kallos*)', he said.

'And so you too', said Socrates, 'will be able to say that you are capable of improving us by your beauty?'

'If not, it is clear that I will appear *phaulos*'. (Xen. *Smp.* 3.7.1-6)

Xenophon's critique of education continues with Critoboulus' account of the value of *kallos* (beauty). Like Niceratus, Critoboulus presents himself as an authority on the subject. Moreover, he not only tells his companions how he improves other men but uses his body to support his argument. The result is an investigation into the role of physical beauty in *kalokagathia* which highlights the risk it poses to the viewing *kalos kagathos* as much as it seeks to define it. Like his forthcoming beauty competition with Socrates, Critoboulus' statements about beauty and its effects discuss, but also problematise, an integral component of *kalokagathia*.

The subject of Critoboulus' pride is ostensibly his physical beauty, which he cherishes for the influence it has on other men. However, his introductory joke exposes the problem of trying to dissociate the physical aspects of *kallos* from the moral. His witty juxtaposition of *kallos* and *phaulos* discloses the

extent to which the physical qualities of beauty are moralised and socialised within the abstract compound *kalokagathia*. Critoboulus is proud of his beauty, and its supposed ability to make his fellow symposiasts more *agathos*; however, if cannot demonstrate his point he will appear *phaulos*. Like *kalos*, the adjective *phaulos* has several connotations. Huss notes that elsewhere in the *Symposium*, *phaulos* is placed in opposition to *agathos*, but outside the text it is used to describe the opposite of *chrēstos*, 'useful', *spoudaios*, 'serious' or 'excellent', and *sophos*, 'wise'.[93] And, as discussed in chapter 3, in sociological terms it implies low status and vulgarity. In addition, *phaulos* might connote physical ugliness. Bowen and Huss both opt for the sense of 'useless' in their translations. This fits Socrates' later attempt to define its opposite, *kalos*, as 'useful'; yet, it does not really convey its full meaning. After all, in the beauty competition Critoboulus exemplifies *to kalon* as physical beauty, and, alongside the judges, fails to be convinced by Socrates' redefinition.[94] Further, by leaving the meaning of *phaulos* open, the connotations of Critoboulus' dilemma become more clear. If he cannot prove that his beauty benefits others, Critoboulus admits that he will be far from useful, excellent, or wise; in other words, completely lacking the qualities which raise him above the *phauloi*. Huss moves towards understanding this irony with the explanation, 'wenn er sich hier nicht als ἀγαθός beweist, ist er auch kein καλὸς κἀγαθός'.[95] But the point Critoboulus makes is that he will no longer be *kalos*, nor *kalos kagathos*. His physical beauty will be called into question because of his inability to defend his proposal and

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[93] Huss, 1999a: 192.

[94] The beauty competition is examined in chapter 4, pages 183ff.

[95] Huss, 1999a: 192.

improve others by his beauty. Thus, Critoboulus recognises that by contending to improve men through his physical beauty, he puts his moral and social status to the test.

Critoboulus begins his argument by proving that he is beautiful on the grounds that his fellow symposiasts recognise him as such.[96] He then describes the positive effects which Cleinias' beauty has on him: he will gladly sacrifice his money and freedom, and risk his life, for his beloved.[97] Like Niceratus, Critoboulus caps Callias' claim to make men better. He asserts that by being beautiful, he is more just than his host; therefore, he leads men towards even greater virtue.[98] By describing the qualities which the beautiful man inspires in those who desire him, Critoboulus composes a list of behaviours which define the man whose *aretē* is complete. These include freedom in one's spending, a love of *ponos* (stylised aristocratic toil) and of beauty, even in the face of danger, self-control and a sense of shame.[99] However, his pride lies in his ability to strengthen these virtues, to make men *more* virtuous than they already are. His audience, who Critoboulus believes would go through fire for him, become more *agathos* on account of his beauty.[100] In this analysis, *aretē* becomes elided with *to agathon* and both are dependent upon *kallos* for their existence.

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[96] Xen. *Smp.* 4.10.

[97] Xen. *Smp.* 4.11-12; 14.

[98] Xen. *Smp.* 4.15.1-3

[99] For *ponos* as stylised aristocratic toil (athletics, hunting, estate management) which exists in opposition to the *erga* (productive works) of the common people, see Johnstone, 1994. And on the aristocratic/democratic virtue of *philokalia*, see above, chapter 3, page 136.

[100] Xen. *Smp.* 4.16.2-4.

Critoboulus' words instructs his fellow symposiasts in the virtues associated with the perfect *kalos kagathos*, while his physical beauty works to promote those qualities within them. However, Critoboulus is not the only beauty in the *andrōn*. Physical beauty, combined with *sōphrosynē* and a sense of shame, are Autolycus' defining features. Moreover, Critoboulus addresses Callias and the *symposion* at large as 'we men of beauty', (*hēmas tous kalous*).[101] This emphasis reminds the reader that Critoboulus is not the only symposiast to exert an influence on his companions. Not unlike Theognis, he asserts that beautiful symposiasts become more virtuous simply by mixing together.

Like the symposiasts whom he addresses, Critoboulus is both *kalos* and a lover of *kallos*. Thus, he procures for himself the qualities of *aretē* which he inspires in others, and which are strengthened within him. However, Critoboulus' speech undermines this position. The impression which Critoboulus gives of himself is not that of a self-controlled *kalos kagathos*, but an intemperate lecher who loses all sense of propriety and decorum on catching sight of the object of his desire. His promise to improve others through his good looks actually highlights the damage *kallos* can also do to the *kalos kagathos*.

Critoboulus' desire for the beautiful Cleinias is marked primarily by his loss of self-control. He would happily spend all day looking at his beloved at the expense of everything else in his life.[102] He becomes angry with night-time because he cannot see his beloved and is grateful to the sun because it reveals

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[101] Xen. *Smp*. 4.15.3.

[102] Xen. *Smp*. 4.12.1-4.

Cleinias to his gaze.[103] And, although he claims that his *aretē* increases, he also says,

> ἥδιον δ' ἂν δουλεύοιμι ἢ ἐλεύθερος εἴην, εἴ μου Κλεινίας ἄρχειν ἐθέλοι.
>
> It would be sweeter if I were a slave than free, if Cleinias wished to rule me. (Xen. *Smp.* 4.14.3-4)

In short, Critoboulus admits to acting, and demonstrates willingness to act, in a way which is at odds with his status as a free man. In the discussion on perfume, Socrates tells his audience that it is important for free men to distinguish themselves from slaves not only by their scent, but also the means by which they attain it.[104] However, Critoboulus would happily surrender his free status in return for Cleinias' affection. In Plato's *Symposium*, Pausanias asserts that Athens indulges free men who submit themselves to slavish behaviour when it is done under the influence of *erōs*.[105] But Critoboulus' physical reactions to Cleinias place him in opposition to the model of the free, self-controlled lover personified in Callias' response to Autolycus' beauty, and later attributed to Hermogenes.

As discussed in chapter 4, the symposiast inspired by *sōphrōn erōs* holds his eyes affectionately, moderates his voice and holds himself more freely.[106]

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[103] Xen. *Smp.* 4.12.4-13.1.

[104] Xen. *Smp.* 2.3.3-4.7.

[105] Pl. *Smp.* 183a.

[106] Xen. *Smp.* 1.10.4-7; 8.3.4-6.

However, Critoboulus does not look at Cleinias affectionately but stares incessantly. Indeed, Socrates' says Critoboulus resembles one of those *hoi tas Gorgonas theōmenoi*, 'who see Gorgons'. Instead of conducting his gestures in a moderate way, making himself more like a free man, he remains completely still. In comparison, the fast-flowing pace and enthusiastic tone of Critoboulus' description of his desire for Cleinias is far from 'soothing'. His conversation with Socrates reveals that Critoboulus' passion is more akin to the kind derided earlier by Xenophon. The immoderate lover appears more gorgonesque (*gorgoteros*), sounds fearful (*phoberōteros*) and gestures violently (*sphodroteros*).[107] Critoboulus cannot stop thinking about Cleinias, so when he talks about him he become enthusiastic and excitable.[108] Thus, he is not the model of someone *aidēmonesteros te kai enkratesteros*, but is thoroughly subject to his passions.[109]

Critoboulus' speech and his subsequent conversation problematise the role of beauty in *kalokagathia*. It is an intrinsic part of the formula; yet, like *andreia* and *sophia*, it can be damaging to the *kalos kagathos*. Beauty, or more precisely the act of admiring it, carries the potential for loss of *sōphrosynē* and self-control (*enkrateia*) in the admirer, which might be witnessed through his physical reactions. Whoever looks at the *kalos kagathos*, enthused by immoderate Eros, will not see a free man inspired to greater *aretē*. Enslaved by his passions, the actions of this man make him a spectacle of all that is not free.

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[107] Xen. *Smp.* 1.10.2-4. Cf. chapter 4, pages 190-193.

[108] Xen. *Smp.* 4.21.2-3, and 3ff.

[109] Xen. *Smp.* 4.15.6.

Critoboulus' portrait of his erotic desire for beautiful Cleinias feeds into a wider discourse on the dangers of *erōs* which permeates Xenophon's *symposion*. Socrates blames Critoboulus' derisible state on the physical consummation of his passion. Kissing arouses sweet hopes which any man capable of moderation must avoid.[110] This observation sheds light on the philosopher's attempts to restrain *erōs* in the *symposion* and prefigures the sentiments articulated in his coming speech. There, Socrates recommends spiritual love over sexual gratification. The lover cannot make his beloved *agathos* whilst his behaviour is *ponēros*; nor can he teach him modesty and temperance if he himself is immodest and intemperate.[111] In the *Memorabilia*, similar opinions are expressed when Critoboulus is again chided for having succumbed to the passion of kisses from good-looking boys. Socrates informs his interlocutor, Xenophon, that the normally sober (*sōphronikos*) and cautious (*pronoētikos*) Critoboulus has become rash (*thrasus*), foolish (*anoētos*) and fool-hardy (*rhipsokindunos*).[112] Once a man has kissed a beauty he looses his freedom and becomes like a slave, caring nothing for the affairs of *kaloi kagathoi*.[113] Similarly, Agesilaus receives Xenophon's praise for avoiding the kisses of Megabates. Xeneophon asks if Agesilaus' reticence is not indeed *to sōphronēma kai lian gennikon*, 'an instance of exceedingly noble temperance'. Agesilaus' ability to control Aphrodite earns him the accolade of being 'worth remembering' (*axion mnēsthēnai*).[114]

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[110] Xen. *Smp.* 4.25.1-26.2.

[111] Xen. *Smp.* 8.27.3-7.

[112] Xen. *Mem.* 1.3.8-9.

[113] Xen. *Mem.* 1.3.11.

[114] Xen. *Ages.* 5.4.

Critoboulus' discussion of beauty plays an important part in Hindley's argument that throughout his works, Xenophon sets up his own acceptance of male-male sexual relations as different from, if not quite in opposition to, Socrates' stricter approach.[115] Hindley takes seriously Critoboulus' claim to inspire virtue in others and maintains that combined with his representation in the *Memorabilia* and *Oeconomicus*, Xenophon 'advocates a temperate course in which the self-disciplined man can nonetheless enjoy a positive ἔρως, and in which physical consummation is tempered with respect for the beloved, body and soul'.[116] I would be more cautious in attributing the views of Xenophon's characters (even when they purport to be 'Xenophon' himself) to the author and the real-life Socrates than Hindley, or recognising developments in his thoughts. When located within the nexus of erotic discourse which permeates the *Symposium*, no such claims for 'Xenophon's opinions' can be made. The character of Critoboulus, through his speech and reported actions, exposes the dangers inherent in beauty and its concomitant sexual desire for the *kalos kagathos*. Although Socrates' attempts to eject *erōs* from the *symposion* are critiqued by Xenophon's inclusion of *erōs* within it, 'sober desire' is equated with the symposiasts' physical responses. No attempt is made to promote a 'way of moderation', which Hindley implies Xenophon promotes over Socrates' views.[117]

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[115] Hindley, 1999. Hindley's theory builds on his earlier work on Xenophon's *Hellenica*, which asserts that Xenophon thought that sexual relations between men could be honourable and provoke men to valour: cf. Hindley, 1994: 365.

[116] Hindley, 1999: 87-88; 89.

[117] Hindley, 1999: 97.

Physical beauty, *to kallos*, emerges from the *Symposium*'s discussion as a stimulus towards, and indeed an intrinsic part of, *kalokagathia*. It both serves to define the *kalos kagathos* and influences his *aretē*. However, by inducing *erōs*, *kallos* may be detrimental as well as beneficial to its viewers. While it can provoke men to live more freely, perform better in dangerous situations and heighten their sense of shame and self-control, it can also make them act slavishly and shamefully. Critoboulus embodies this duality. He proposes to make men more *agathos* and inspire them towards *aretē* by his beauty; yet, his reaction to Cleinias' beauty makes him less *agathos*. Critoboulus' speech acts out this dilemma for his audience. Like the *gelōtopoios*, his performance in the *symposion* and his reaction to Cleinias warn the symposiasts, and Xenophon's readers, of the risks involved in being *kalos kagathos*. There is only a thin line between *kalokagathia*, *aretē*, *sōphrosynē*, *enkrateia* and *eleutheria* and negative counterparts. When he first proclaimed his pride in his own beauty, Critoboulus said that if he could not demonstrate how his beauty makes men more excellent, he would be *phaulos*. Ironically, by reporting his reactions to the beautiful Cleinias, he discloses that he is indeed *phaulos*. The lesson Critoboulus ultimately provides for his fellow symposiasts is quite different from that which he initially imagines, but it is a lesson in *kalokagathia* nonetheless.

Poor Charmides

Charmides' speech in favour of poverty over wealth also offers its audience lessons which differ considerably from its speaker's intentions. However, his instruction differs in form from that of Niceratus and Critoboulus because it can only be fully appreciated by the reading audience outside the *symposion*.

Charmides argues that he is proud of his poverty, because it allows him to lead a better life than wealth. His opening comments expose the criteria by which he makes this judgement:

> Οὐκοῦν τόδε μέν, ἔφη, ὁμολογεῖται, κρεῖττον εἶναι θαρρεῖν ἢ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ ἐλεύθερον εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ δουλεύειν καὶ θεραπεύεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ θεραπεύειν καὶ πιστεύεσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς πατρίδος μᾶλλον ἢ ἀπιστεῖσθαι.
>
> 'Very well', he said, 'this is agreed: it is better to be courageous than fearful, to be free rather than a slave, to receive attentions rather than give them, and to be trusted by one's fatherland rather than distrusted.' (Xen. *Smp.* 4.29.3-30.1)

By citing common agreement, Charmides appeals to the support of his fellow symposiasts, and lends his thesis the authority of society at large. With four oppositions, he presents a model of good and bad behaviour which corresponds to the specific details of his subsequent argument.[118] On the good side are bravery, freedom, being attended to, and having the trust of one's fatherland; on the bad are fearfulness, servility, attending on others and being distrusted by the city. As a rich man, Charmides' actions showed him to belong to the latter group: he was afraid of burglars and attackers, looked after sycophants, spent money on the city and could not escape it.[119] Now that he has no property, he is

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[118] Huss, 1999a: 258, usefully schematises the relationship between the opening observations and the content of his speech in a table of opposition.

[119] Xen. *Smp.* 4.30.

trusted by the city, nobody threatens him, the state pays him money and he can leave the city *hōs eleutheros*, 'like a free man'.[120]

Further, Charmides rounds up the benefits of a poor life with the comment,

> καὶ εἰμὶ νῦν μὲν τυράννῳ ἐοικώς, τότε δὲ σαφῶς δοῦλος ἦν.
>
> 'I am now like a tyrant, but then I was clearly a slave'. (Xen. *Smp.* 4.32.1-2)

He denies free status to Athens' wealthy elite, outlining the ways by which the city treated him as a slave: as a rich man he paid money to the state and in return received abuse for the company he kept. However, as a free man, he is also a tyrant. In his history of the so-called Peloponnesian war, Thucydides painted a picture of the Athenian democracy under Pericles as a principate.[121] By contrast, Charmides describes his contemporary *polis* as a city of tyrants. Charmides lauds himself as a courageous, free and trusted citizen whilst also voicing the kind of anti-democratic rhetoric which might be expected of oligarchic sympathisers.

Thus, a strong sense of irony underwrites Charmides' supposed enjoyment of the life of a free man. To gain his freedom, Charmides has been forced to give up the markers of his elite, aristocratic status. He owns no property, is not courted by sycophants, and no longer performs the liturgies

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[120] Xen. *Smp.* 4.31.5.

[121] Th. 2.65.

through which Athens' aristocrats could act as beneficiaries to the democratic *polis* and compete with one another for *timē*.[122] He glories in his role as a tyrant-citizen. Yet, here he sits in the *symposion*, at the heart of elite society. Like a good *kalos kagathos* he improves his fellow symposiasts, educating them with his discussion of bravery, freedom, slavery, and *polis* life – in other words, *kalokagathia*.

This irony extends beyond the walls of the *andrōn* and embraces the reader's knowledge about the historical Charmides. The citizen who now flaunts the city's trust died at the hands of Athens' returning democrats whilst serving on the oligarchic Board of Ten.[123] Whilst involved in this government, Charmides became infamous for confiscating land from his political opponents and, indeed, other citizens too.[124] Thus, the 'good democrat' stance which Charmides assumes in his speech is quite incompatible with his real-life aristocratic and oligarchic activities. For the audience of the *Symposium* who knows his history, and has perhaps read or listened to Xenophon's *Memorabilia* too, the contrast between the real-life figure and the man whom Charmides presents himself as is remarkable.

Knowledge of Charmides' historical persona thus imbues his speech with a deeper sense of irony, affecting the understanding of both Charmides' immediate audience and the reader of the *Symposium*. Charmides' internal audience can appreciate the irony of their aristocratic friend claiming to embrace

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[122] See Wilson. 2000.

[123] Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.19.

[124] Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.21; Lys. 12.6-20.

poverty and gain benefit from a democratic life.[125] Charmides talks up the drawbacks associated with aristocratic life, whilst being the epitome of that lifestyle. In content and position, Charmides' speech stands in close proximity to Antisthenes' praise of wealth. On the surface, both men appear to argue something quite inimical to their 'known' personae.[126] However, in the end Antisthenes actually praises poverty as wealth, and Charmides' commendation of poverty and democracy is insincere. However, the full impact of Charmides' irony can only be appreciated by the reader of the *Symposium*, who also knows about his role in the city following Athens' defeat by Sparta. Charmides does not intend his allegation that being a poor citizen gives a man courage and makes him trusted and free to be taken seriously. Charmides' account of *polis* life is therefore not an endorsement of the democratic city. It outlines ways in which aristocrats and oligarchs might think about their place within the city. When he alleges that the poor are courageous rather than afraid, free rather than slave, cared for rather than caring for others, he does not intend to praise poor citizens but to outline the negative consequences of democracy. Within the democratic city, the aristocrats cannot be free and brave. Charmides' speech enhances and politicises the symposiasts' understanding of *kalokagathia*.

Yet, the future oligarch also offers his audience a more subversive lesson in *kalokagathia*, whose terminology he strikingly never deploys. His account discloses how a political radical, a counter-insurgent, might hide in the *dēmos*.

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[125] On this topos Huss, 1999a: 257.

[126] Antisthenes' reported stance against pleasure (D.L. 6.3) and luxury (D.L. 6.8) make his supposed pride in wealth (Xen. *Smp.* 3.8) surprising, as Hermogenes' questions imply. However, his speech on 'the wealth of one's soul' (4.34-44) quickly sets about redefining wealth and luxury in a more expected way.

In his speeches on pandering and *erōs*, Socrates discusses how the symposiasts might best use their relationships to benefit themselves in the city. Charmides too advances a way in which the *kalos kagathos* might take part in its politics. By adopting a demotic persona, the *kalos kagathos* might appear to be a good citizen and bide his time until an opportunity to reveal his true self appears.

Charmides' representation of aristocratic life within the democratic city reflects Hiero's depiction of his experiences as a tyrant in Syracuse. Charmides complains that as a rich man he was fearful that men would break into his house and hurt him. He was distrusted by the city, and obliged to give it money.[127] In *Hiero*, the tyrant laments that no-one trusts him and he lives in fear of his life. Further, Simonides tells him that he should contribute to athletic and dramatic festivals from his private funds.[128] These similarities signal an analogy between Charmides' *kalos kagathos* and the tyrant. Xenophon uses Charmides' contribution to alert his reader to the transiency of boundaries between being slave and free, slave and tyrant, and tyrant and free.

Lessons from the *Symposion* and or the *Symposium?*

As a meeting-place for *kaloi kagathoi* Xenophon's *symposion* provides the perfect location to explore Socrates' promise that 'you will learn good from the good'. By mixing together and talking to one another, the symposiasts should (as Socrates hopes) benefit one another. However, this process is made problematic by Xenophon's characterisation of his *kaloi kagathoi* and by their own performances. Callias, Niceratus and Critoboulus declare that they make

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[127] Xen. *Smp.* 4.30.1-2

[128] Xen. *Hier.* 4.1-5; 2.8-12.

men better. Rather than prove this, however, their *epideixeis* open them up to attack. Together, Antisthenes and Socrates scrutinise their arguments, highlighting the symposiasts' pretensions. Further, Critoboulus' speech undermines its author's position from within. These contributions do provide lessons for the symposiasts, but, as we have seen, they are not the lessons which their speakers originally intended. Thus, the idea of the *symposion* as a place for learning 'good from the good' is called into question. Can symposiasts who cannot even teach one another correctly learn *kalokagathia* without the guidance of Socrates?

Charmides' playfully ironic speech strengthens the sense that the *kaloi kagathoi* are not privy to the full lesson of the *symposion*. Although they can identify Charmides' irony for themselves, the *Symposium*'s external reader or listener is better placed to appreciate and benefit from his instruction. Knowledge about the symposiasts' public reputations, social lives and political careers sheds light on their performances. For example, Callias' insistence that he teaches *kalokagathia* to men by giving them money conflicts with the picture of the lecherous philanderer known from the plays of Eupolis and Andocides' speeches (and perhaps other now inaccessible sources). Furthermore, familiarity with Xenophon's other works and the Socratic dialogues of Plato allows the reader to appreciate the flaws in Niceratus' sophistic/Homeric model of education more clearly than the listening symposiast. Indeed, the quotations which Niceratus chooses to deploy as evidence for his argument conspicuously direct the reader towards Plato's *Ion*. Finally, if somewhat obviously, the reader of the *Symposium* can more readily bring the various performances of the evening into conjunction with one another than the participants in the *symposion*.

Xenophon's authorial comment draws the reader's attention to Callias as a model of sober *erōs*. Thus, when Critoboulus gives an account of his own reaction to the beautiful Cleinias, the *Symposium*'s audience is better placed to realise the incongruity of his argument than his fellow symposiasts.

Callias' *symposion* provides a forum for the discussion of *kalokagathia*. It singles out *andreia*, *kallos* and *to kalon*, *dikaiosynē*, *sōphrosynē*, and *sophia* as virtues subsumed within the *kalos kagathos*. Moreover, education, exercise, wealth, the *gymnasion*, the *symposion* and the *polis* are sites for its expression, assertion and exploration. In this sense, Xenophon's investigation into *kalokagathia* reflects the problem of redefining it for a fourth-century elite which must operate within the democratic *polis*. Although its component virtues are brought into view, *kalokagathia* really gains its meaning through the actions of the *kalos kagathos*. By providing a forum for discussing these actions, the educational *symposion* becomes implicated in the very process of creating *kalokagathia*. By mixing together, the *kaloi kagathoi* come towards a better understanding of *kalokagathia*. Like Socrates in the *Memorabilia*, whose discussion of similar themes and topics leads men to be *kalos kagathos*, the symposiasts lead one another to be *kalos kagathos*.

However, at the same time as Xenophon sets up the *symposion* as a place for learning *kalokagathia*, he challenges its efficiency. His *Symposium*, a literary reconstruction, provides a much better opportunity for exploring *kalokagathia*. It is more efficacious to learn good from good by reading about *kaloi kagathoi* in a written *epideixis* than by actually mixing with them in the *symposion*. Towards the end of the *symposion*, Socrates can still say that Hermogenes melts for desire

of *kalokagathia* 'whatever *kalokagathia* is' (*ho ti pot' estin hē kalokagathia*).[129] By reading the *Symposium*, we reach a much clearer (though in no sense definitive) understanding than the symposiasts.

Xenophon thus makes a claim for *paideia* conducted through the medium of writing against the traditional *symposion*. While Callias' drinking is spontaneous and vibrant, and not (as Dupont would have it) a fossilised event, Socrates' mediating presence alone cannot realise its educational potential. The performances of the symposiasts and the hired entertainers combine to provide a lesson in how to do a *symposion*, but the resultant *symposion* is not up to the task. The *symposion* only provides a useful lesson when it is viewed through the textual filter of the *Symposium*.

In the late fifth- and fourth-century, Athens became a site of increased 'textualisation'. Not only were manuscripts increasingly available and reported as being read by groups and individuals, but the words reproduced on them became 'texts', or 'fixed and isolated verbal constructs demanding a special form of appreciation'.[130] Manuscripts from the fourth century made use of technical devices which facilitate their reading, and writers began deploying techniques like acrostics which can only be appreciated when read.[131] Moreover, Thucydides and Plato incorporated strategies for enabling their audiences to

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[129] Xen. *Smp.* 8.3.3-4.

[130] For references to individual and communal reading in Aristophanes, Plato, and Xenophon, see Knox, 1985: 9-12. This definition of 'textualisation' is offered by Ford, 2003: 19.

[131] On the availability of manuscripts, see Knox, 1985: 9-10, and on the 'readerly writer' Chaeremon's acrostics, see Ford, 2003: 18.

navigate within their written works which also enhanced their own arguments.[132] The speeches in Thucydides' history were artistically constructed to deprive them of authority outside of the moment in which they were spoken within the text. This permitted an 'open-ended critical reading' which aided Thucydides' audience in his search for clarity and truth.[133] Plato also exploited this open-endedness to investigate the place of writing in the Socratic method.[134]

Yunis uses these observations to envisage three reading audiences for classical texts: firstly, readers and listeners who simply enjoyed the text at face value; secondly, readers like teachers, scholars, and priests who appreciated their 'open-endedness'; and thirdly, a narrow group of 'critical readers' who recognised the need to decipher the distinction between word and meaning in order to uncover the latter.[135] This final reader sounds surprisingly modern, reflecting a notion that texts demand to be read in particular, 'critical' ways simply because they are texts. However, the disjunction between word and meaning has only dominated the reading of a select group of scholars for the past fifty or so years. Further, Ford's study on early literary criticism uncovers an ancient engagement with structure and form and with the written text as a mimetic art form.[136] For Isocrates, the value of written texts lies not in their ability to convey the 'truth' but to 'transcend mere depiction and construct a

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[132] Yunis. 2003b. On Plato's manipulation of the textual nature of his *Symposium*, see Halperin, 1992, discussed in chapter 5, page 252.

[133] In other words, by giving the speeches authority only within the text, Thucydides invited his reader to assess their validity for themselves. See Yunis, 2003b: 199-204.

[134] See Yunis, 2003b: 204-207; Halperin, 1992.

[135] Yunis, 2003b: 211-212.

[136] Ford, 2002: 229-249.

representation that reaches the inner character and motives of his subject'.[137] It is just this level of reading which Xenophon aims at with his written composition of *gnōmai* which portray the deeds of men whose actions are *axiomnēmoneuta*.

Moreover, although an increased awareness of the possibilities inherent in writing influenced the construction of written texts, it is not necessary to imagine them being *read* for an 'open-ended analysis' to take place. Indeed, the verb *akouein* served to indicate both 'reader' and 'listener'.[138] The episodic nature of the *symposion*, which guides the *Symposium*'s audience towards thinking about *kalokagathia* in a specific way, is equally as accessible to the listener as the reader. After all, punctuation and paragraphing were still in their infancy, and searching for something in a papyrus scroll (as Socrates and Critoboulus do) might not have been an easy task.[139] The *Symposium* need not be read by a solitary, silent reader in order for it to be re-read.[140]

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[137] Ford. 2002: 240.

[138] In Aristotle's *Poetics* (1453b3-7), *ho akouōn* is the reader or listener who experiences tragedy through the written text, as opposed to the viewer who watches the play performed. Cf. Ford, 2003: 20. Note, however, that Xenophon (*Symposium* 7.3.2-5) uses the less ambiguous *anagignōskein* to conjure up the spectacle of someone reading and writing whilst spinning around on a wheel.

[139] Turner, 1987: 5-19, charts the development of different types of 'punctuation' inserted by scribes to aid a manuscript's reader. The *paragraphē*, a horizontal stroke placed between lines to mark the end of a segment, is mentioned by Isocrates (*Antidosis* 59), Hypereides (*Against Demosthenes* fr. c1) and Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 1409a20), but only found in fifth- and fourth-century inventories and catalogues. The dicolon (:), another separating device, was used in fourth-century manuscripts of comic plays and Platonic dialogues to indicate a change of speaker. Some other forms of punctuation are found in manuscripts of Alcaeus, Bacchylides and Demosthenes.

Thus, the *Symposium* appeals equally to listening and reading audiences who are alert to the possible intricacies of Xenophon's literary representations and not only to the reader determined to analyse the text to uncover hidden meanings. Furthermore, the images which Xenophon constructs are deployed towards overtly philosophical ends: namely, the investigation into *kalokagathia*, and how it might be learned. Xenophon calls for a style of 'reading' whereby the reader or listener improves his understanding through the written *Symposium*; at the same time, he promotes the educational value of his text. Thus, Xenophon challenges contemporary educational practices. Robb's study of literacy and *paideia* implies that writing continued to be used primarily as an aid to memorising and performing instructive verse down into the middle of the fourth century.[141] Even the new education advocated by Plato in the *Republic* continues to focus on these skills.[142] Yet in the *Symposium*, this form of training is

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but as Turner notes (10-11), it is unclear whether these go back to the original 'author'. or are a consequence of the copyist importing later habits into old texts.

[140] However, recent articles by Gavrilov, 1997, and Burnyeat, 1997, suggest that silent reading in the ancient period was more widespread than the earlier focus on orality allowed. See Gavrilov's Appendix (70-71) for a list of fifth- and fourth-century passages which seem to imply silent reading. In Thucydides' 'programmatic statement' (1.22), Yunis, 2003b: 199, identifies three structural and interrelated oppositions between i) written and oral performance, ii) truth and fiction, and iii) what is useful and pleasing. However, he does not make clear that the historian hopes his work will not only be heard once but will be a possession for all time; he does not demand that his text be physically read. The emphasis (as Yunis recognises) is not on the difference between reading and listening to an oral performance, but between conveying messages in oral and written form.

[141] Robb, 1994: 188.

[142] Robb, 1994: 192-197. Pl. *Rep.* 376e ff.

critiqued through Niceratus' contribution to the round of speaking, an underlying scepticism regarding sophists, and Socrates' new method for learning from past authorities. Unlike Niceratus, Socrates memorises poems in order to extract wisdom from them. Like the performances of the symposiasts, the songs of the *symposion* become reference points for his further investigations. At the same time as the 'wonders' of the *symposion* encourage the symposiasts to inquire into *kalokagathia*, Xenophon's written record performs the same task for its audience.

In conclusion, Xenophon's *Symposium* purports to display the playful and serious deeds of the *kaloi kagathoi* which are 'worth remembering'. The various performances by the symposiasts, the dancing troupe, the *gelōtopoios* and Socrates combine to promote an event characterised by viewing and performing, a mixture of playfulness and seriousness. Together Socrates and Xenophon construct the *symposion* as a place for learning how to do a *symposion*, where learning, experiencing and negotiating *kalokagathia* are central to the sympotic experience. However, the lesson which the *Symposium* provides turns in upon itself. The participants in this *symposion* do not accept Socrates' ideas for a good *symposion*. And they do not learn *kalokagathia* from one another. Only the *Symposium*'s reader can learn the lessons of the *symposion*. By visiting the *symposion*, and its constituent parts again and again, he can engage in a process which teaches him about *kalokagathia*, and leads him towards being *kalos kagathos*. Xenophon not only asserts his primacy over Socrates, but the primacy of the written *Symposium* over the real-life *symposion*.

Conclusion

This thesis began by positioning itself against current methodological approaches to the institution of the *symposion*. Modern scholars have performed the worthwhile task of establishing the Greek drinking party as a viable object of historical investigation. Yet, my investigations have shown that their pictures of the *symposion* are sometimes distorted by their approaches to the relevant sources. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the *symposion* gained shape as a sociologically significant institution, where elite members of the *polis* gathered to drink and sing; in the process they affirmed friendships and explored individual and communal identities. However, this *symposion* originally derived from the application of anthropological theories about homosociality and commensality, theories which are themselves now undergoing reassessment. Homeric epic, lyric poetry, and Athenian figured vases were all treated equally, despite having different relationships to the *symposion*. For example, epic poetry described Homeric feasting (whatever its relationship to 'reality' may have been), whilst lyric poetry and Athenian vases were both used in archaic and classical *symposia*, and sometimes recreated the *symposion* for their listening and viewing audiences. Despite these differences, these sources became *direct evidence for* the *symposion*. And as the varied readings of lyric poetry show, this evidence could be selected and read to say whatever scholars desired.

My thesis has hopefully provided an antidote to some of the more uncritical approaches. It has focused exclusively on representations of the *symposion*, instead of combining them with the poetry, vases or images employed within the *andrōn*. I maintain that these representations do not simply

depict reality, but re-present the *symposion* according to their author's ambitions for it. While the 'meaning' of the *symposion* is shaped to some degree by the ambitions of the author, it also depends on the interaction between text and reader.[1] The represented *symposion* gains its 'reality' in this moment of interaction, when the author's ambitions are mediated through the processes of reading and viewing.

I chose to conduct my investigations via the *symposia* represented in Plato's and Xenophon's *Symposia* for two reasons. Firstly, their *symposia* were constructed in the early-to-mid fourth century, a period which scholarship on the *symposion* often ignores. On these scholars' account, the classical institution was either so similar to its archaic predecessor that it needs no investigation, or so different that the institution of the *symposion* as we know it no longer existed. Yet, Fisher's exploration of homosocial practices in the classical city, and the continued presence of the *symposion* on the comic stage, imply that the *symposion* retained a presence in the Athenian *polis*, whether at a practical or ideological level. Secondly, Plato and Xenophon both wrote Socratic dialogues

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[1] In *The Order of Things*, Foucault, 1970: 3-16, dissects this process, taking his reader through his reading/viewing of Velázquez' *Las Meninas*, a painting of a painter painting an unseen portrait of Philip II and Mariana of Spain. Through this account, he establishes the intricate relationship between the image, its viewer and its creator, highlighting the interactive games which all three parties must play in order to give the painting meaning. This interaction is achieved through the discontinuity and distancing of the different parties: 'around the scene are arranged all the signs and successive forms of representation; but the double relation of the representation to its model and to its sovereign, to its author as well as to the person to whom it is being offered, this relation is necessarily interrupted' (16).

in order to promote their philosophical ideas.[2] Their *symposia* make no pretension to reality, but fit into their authors' aspirations for each *Symposium*. By studying these *symposia* we might uncover Plato and Xenophon's philosophical objectives, and in doing so discover what it was that made the *symposion* a suitable location for their explorations.

In this conclusion, I will bring together my analyses of the *symposia* represented in Plato's and Xenophon's *Symposia* to propose a new understanding of these texts, and to investigate their imagined role for the *symposion* in the creation of identity. My theoretical approach requires me to stop short of declaring the historical *symposion* to be a location for constructing identities, but the philosophical ambitions of Plato and Xenophon for the *symposion* both rely on this property. Or rather, their representations of the *symposion* give the institution of the *symposion* this meaning.

Representing the *Symposion*: Authorial ambitions for the *Symposium*

Some structural similarities underlie our two *symposia*: for example, their occurrence in the house of an Athenian notable and in the aftermath of civic festivals and competitions; the unexpected presence of Socrates; the setting of drinking patterns for the evening; and their focus on *erōs*. Yet, they are essentially quite different events; even their shared features are shaped and deployed in different ways. Plato's *symposion* is a place for talking and performing, for communality and competition, and the discussion of *erōs*. While Xenophon's *symposion* is a *synousia* which draws the *agōn* into its proceedings, it is defined in different ways: by the variety of entertainments on offer, the

[2] I use 'idea' in the modern sense, rather than the Platonic *Idea*, or Form.

fluctuation of symposiasts from viewers to performers, the discussion of *erōs*, and an underlying concern with *kalokagathia*. Plato's *Symposium* offers a model of the *symposion* as *mimēsis*, while Xenophon's *Symposium* comprises an exploration of it.

In chapter 2, we discovered that Plato's *symposion* was a performance, and a site for performance too. The *Symposium* sets up the sympotic action as if it were a *theōria*, a spectacle for the observation and contemplation of a *theatēs*, or spectator. And participants in the spectacle perform not only for this extra-textual audience, but for one another as well. Both performances revolve around *mimēsis*: the symposiasts imitate the kind of men who are well-educated and *kaloi kagathoi*, and the extra-textual audience engages with their performance as a theatrical *mimēsis*. With every reading or recitation, Plato's reader becomes allied to the symposiast, whose words he utters from his mouth. Yet, the reader/reciter was at the same time an audience to the *symposion*, watching the events from outside. He thus participated in the *mimēsis* of *kaloi kagathoi*, whilst interacting with the *symposion* as a *mimēsis* of these *mimēseis*.

By drawing the reader into this relationship with his *symposion*, Plato advances his ambitions for the *symposion* and the *Symposium*. In the *Republic*, where Socrates discusses the relationships between spectacle, spectator and performer, the processes of viewing and performing are equated with doing philosophy. As Monoson notes: 'when it comes to representing the ongoing activity of intellectual toil, including laboring to describe the ideal city, Plato consistently turns to images that liken robust intellectual work to audience performance'.[3] Thus, *mimēsis*, viewing and performing do not exist in

[3] Monoson. 2000: 220.

opposition to philosophy but are integral aspects of it. The *symposion*, with its discussions on *erōs*, demonstrates how to go about discussing it.[4] But the reader also sees men striving for virtue throughout their sympotic performances, and experiences their quest for virtue (or more precisely, the quest to become *kaloi kagathoi*) within the *symposion*.

Thus, the textuality of Plato's *Symposium* does not usurp the processes of viewing and performing, but facilitates them. The 'new' theatrical dialogue incorporates the dynamics of its tragic and comic predecessors in its form. By contrast, Xenophon uses the *symposion* to make claims for the *Symposium* as a written text. Chapters 4 and 5 revealed how Xenophon deployed the *topoi* of sympotic representation to create an event which critiques itself as its progresses. The guests at Callias' house are preoccupied with an impulse to do what is fitting, and Socrates in particular has fixed ideas about what exactly 'fitting to the *symposion*' means. In the guise of symposiarch, he leads the symposiasts towards a *symposion* where giving benefit and cheer to one another is facilitated through playful conversations on serious matters. The *symposion* which results is an amalgam of this sympotic ideal and a Xenophontic critique of Socrates' attempts to create it. Whilst Socrates minimises the participation of the hired performers and uninvited laughter-maker, they play an important role in Xenophon's *symposion*. And Xenophon finds a place for beauty and *erōs* in the *symposion*, while Socrates tries to de-eroticise the event.

Xenophon thus establishes an ideal *symposion* where the performances of Callias, his guests, the *gelōtopoios* and the Syracusan's dance troupe participate

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[4] Nussbaum. 1986: 127, and Blondell, 2000: 145 consider this a key purpose of Platonic dialogues in general, as discussed in chapter 2.

in an on-going conversation on *kalokagathia*. Yet, as chapters 5 and 6 discovered, this *symposion* is not a straightforward ideal. While Xenophon establishes the *symposion* as a place for teaching and learning *kalokagathia*, and becoming *kalos kagathos*, the learning process, both in the *symposion* and outside the *Symposium*, is hampered by the characters who attend it. The symposiasts attempt to live out the method of instruction proposed by Socrates whereby 'you will learn good from the good'. But their claims to make men better are proven false by the performances they give. Callias needs further instruction in *kalokagathia* from Antisthenes, Niceratus' methods for educating others are proven to be inadequate, and Critoboulus' discussion of beauty reveals him to be *phaulos*. The men who mix with these symposiasts risk experiencing the other side of Theognis/Socrates' maxim, that 'if you mix with bad men, you will destroy your mind'.

The only way to learn from this *symposion* is to read about it. One might enter Xenophon's *symposion* in a similar way to the Platonic event. But aligning oneself with Callias' guests would not engage you in the process of becoming *kalos kagathos*. Plato encourages the viewing of virtuous deeds to stimulate virtue in the audience. But on this understanding of audience-performance interaction, the viewer could only learn bad things from Xenophon's *mimēsis* of the *symposion*. Xenophon intends his *symposion* to be analysed and assessed dispassionately from a distance, a distance which is enforced by the nature of the *Symposium* as a text to be read.

The *Symposium* repeatedly draws attention to its textuality. To appreciate the intricacy of Xenophon's argument one must visit it again and again, comparing disparate episodes with one another, and bringing outside knowledge

of the characters to bear. Moreover, Xenophon emphasises his own authority. Where Plato notoriously resists aligning himself with any of the opinions on offer in his dialogues, Xenophon will show us the men *he* was with when *he* discovered that the playful and serious deeds of *kaloi kagathoi* were *axiomnēmoneuta*.[5] He decides what events are 'worth remembering' and why. Further, Xenophon at once distances himself from Socrates to establish his own version of the *symposion* and uses the philosopher to mediate the dangerous components of the *symposion*. And in doing so, he promotes a particular way of learning. While the *Symposium* sets up an ideal *symposion* for its readers' consideration, it further suggests that the *symposion* can only live up to this ideal if it is experienced through the written text.

Identity and Performance in the *Symposion*

Although the Greeks had no word for 'identity', the construction of identity (as we would understand it) lies at the centre of our two *symposia*.[6] In Plato's *symposion*, communal and competitive elements co-exist to promote an environment in which the symposiast can display and affirm his own identity, and test the identities of others. In Xenophon's ideal *symposion*, the symposiasts

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[5] In this respect, Xenophon presents himself more as a Herodotus and a Thucydides. than a Plato, as both of these writers place their authorial personae at the heart of their work: cf. Marincola, 1997: 3-12. In this respect, Xenophon also resembles the sixth- to fifth-century poet Xenophanes who used his poetic representation of the *symposion* to advance his authority on the subject of sympotic conversation and aristocratic lifestyles. Cf. Ford, 2002: 46-58, discussed in chapter 4, note 47.

[6] The *Chambers 21st Century Dictionary* defines 'identity' as 'the state or quality of being a specified person or thing; who or what a person or thing is'.

become more *kaloi kagathoi*, mixing with one another, and learning *kalokagathia*. Moreover, the 'outside' entertainments of Philippus and Socrates offer an anti-model of *kalokagathia*, against which the symposiasts might position themselves. Together, these *symposia*, or rather the stories told about them, the literary images they produced, and the values placed in them by their authors imbue the *symposion* with meaning as a location for the construction of individual and group identities.

Our authors' concern with their symposiasts as *kaloi kagathoi* foreshadows current academic interest in the construction of identities. Indeed, their approaches are not dissimilar (although of course not identical) to the theoretical discourses which shape our conversations on identity construction today. For example, the symposiasts construct their identities within the *symposion* primarily through performances (a combination of *epideixeis*, *theōriai* and *agōnes*), and their reactions to the performances of others. This last action itself constitutes a performance and is an integral component of the *theōria*. Moreover, as we discovered in chapters 2, 4 and 6, the words and actions of all the symposiasts are performative. The symposiasts (and the *gelōtopoios*) do not indulge in Goffmanesque rounds of role playing, but invest their identities in their *epideixeis*. By entering into this proof, or self-display, they recreate what it means to be *kalos kagathos*, or not.

Pausanias' encomium of Eros, discussed in chapter 3, provides an interesting insight into this process. The speaker draws on the communal experiences, values, and language of the sympotic group as 'aristocrats', and as elite members of the democratic city, in order to align himself with the group. This assertion of individual identity through the collective fits modern

preoccupations with the place of the 'constitutive outside' or the 'Other' in identity formation. For psycho-analysts, Derridean deconstructionists, and performance theorists alike, 'identities can function as points of identification and attachment only *because* of their capacity to exclude, to leave out, to render "outside"'.[7] In the *symposion*, these Others might be women, low status laughter-makers, members of the *dēmos*, or non-Athenians. This interpretation asserts that identification is impossible outside of the Other, and indeed, Pausanias defines himself (and his audience) against the practices of the *dēmos*. However, when called upon to define himself against another Other (the non-Athenian *poleis*), he incorporates himself into the citizen body. On Pausanias' reading, the 'identity' of the *kalos kagathos* is not 'a constructed form of closure', but an amalgam and negotiation of different identities which are gendered, sociological, and political (created both within the *polis*, and in relation to other *poleis*).[8] The *kalos kagathos* is constructed through differentiation *and* association, and also association with that which it might on occasion differentiate itself from. In this sense, Pausanias' performance reflects

[7] See Hall, 1996: 4-5. In particular, 'the Other' and 'othering' have been recognised at work in the creation of modern identities of 'race' and 'gender. For example, Brah, 1992, investigates the construction of 'ethnic' and 'gendered' identities within modern Britain. On her reading, identity is always created through a series of oppositions, whether these oppositions are imposed externally (by a colonial or masculine power), or from within to combat these forces. Cf. Hall, 1987; Gilroy, 1994; Bhabha, 1994; and Said's comments on the reception of *Orientalism* in the Afterword to the 1995 reprint of Said, 1978. J. Hall, 1997: 33, adopts this understanding for his discussion of Greek ethnic identities.

[8] On the use of difference to create a 'constructed form of closure', see Hall, 1996: 5.

the method of identity construction described by Hall as a combination of identification or suture: 'not an essence but a *positioning*'.[9]

This understanding of identity is relevant to our *Symposia* in two ways. Firstly, the *kalos kagathos* who is performing in the *symposion* acts as a signifier in relation to whom his audience might position themselves. The symposiasts of Plato's *symposion* establish what makes a man *kalos kagathos* through their recognition of performers (and themselves) as *kaloi kagathoi*. Secondly, Xenophon's *kalokagathia* is not just an abstract virtue but is something which creates identities and which is itself 'always in "process"'.[10] However, by contrast, although Callias' guests are *kaloi kagathoi*, and promise to teach *kalokagathia* and improve each other, they never live up to their own rhetoric. If

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[9] Hall, 1987: 72. On 'suture', see Heath, 1981, who discusses its origins in Lacanian psychoanalytic theories of the unconscious (76-86). However, as his study reveals, it has most profitably been applied to cinematic theory to describe the discourses created by the apparatuses of cinema, for example the showing and viewing of films (14-15). On the cinema screen, a character acts as a 'signifier' of its spectator's lack. The spectator becomes a subject (or the viewer's identity is invested) in the realisation of this lack (52-54). Hence, 'the subject makes the meanings the film makes for it' (88). 'Lack' in this sense signifies the absence of the ego in whatever one sees, promoting everything to be viewed from a point of difference. The specificities of this lack are what emerge from the interaction between subject and signified, and what give the subject its definition. As a process of identity formation suturation differs from Althusser's interpellation (see above, chapter 3, page 141) because meaning is created in the process of recognition, and not imposed on it externally by an all-powerful ideology. Hence, Hirst, 1976: 404, criticises the application of Althusser's interpellation to identity construction because it denies that 'recognition, the crucial moment on the constitution (activation of the subject), presupposes a point of cognition prior to the recognition. Something must recognise that which it is supposed to be'.

[10] Hall, 1996: 2.

their ideas were allowed to become touchstones for defining *kalokagathia*, then *kalokagathia* would become thoroughly debased. On one level the symposiasts are to all intents and purposes *kaloi kagathoi*; but at the same time they are not. Hence, Xenophon proposes a method of becoming *kalos kagathos* which doesn't just involve imitation, but critique. The symposiasts are *axiomnēmoneutoi* for this reason, not because they provide one-dimensional models for emulation.

Modern theories of identity help us to identify strategies and techniques of identity construction in Plato and Xenophon's *symposia*. However, they do not (and should not) map directly on to the processes in which the symposiasts are engaged. The performances of the guests at the houses of Agathon and Callias have their own cultural specificity, and are, moreover, tied into their author's ambitions for the *symposion*.

At the beginning of this study, I set out to investigate the classical *symposion* through its representations in the philosophical *Symposia* of Plato and Xenophon. However, as the resulting thesis has revealed, the task of extracting the real-life institution from its literary representations is complicated. Both authors shaped their different *symposia* to fit their ambitions not only for the *symposion*, but for the text of the *Symposium* too. However, they both placed the process of becoming *kalos kagathos* at the heart of their *symposia*, and the *symposia* at the heart of so-called Athenian 'Performance Culture'. Their conception of the *symposion* as a place for identity construction may have built on earlier literary traditions and contemporary ideas about it, or derive from the performative sympotic atmosphere which Stehle argues lyric poetry generated. But more significantly, through its representation in the *Symposia* of Plato and Xenophon, the fourth-century *symposion* gains meaning as – and hence becomes

– a place for learning, teaching, viewing, performing, and exploring *kalokagathia*.

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